Com. v. Jacobs, T. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TIMOTHY LEE JACOBS JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 916 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 7, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-15-CR-0001942-2018
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2020
Timothy Lee Jacobs, Jr. (Jacobs) appeals from the February 7, 2020
judgment of sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Chester
County (trial court) following his convictions for third-degree murder and
related offenses. On appeal, Jacobs challenges two evidentiary rulings and
the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm.
I.
We glean the following facts from the trial court’s opinion:
The facts at trial established that, on April 10, 2018, [Jacobs] and
his half-brother, Tyrell Jacobs, pursued and killed Eric Brown by a
fatal gunshot wound to the chest after a dispute during a
basketball game. The Commonwealth presented evidence, inter
alia, in the form of video footage taken inside the Star Social Club,
where the killing occurred. On the video, as [Jacobs] walked up
to the entrance of the bar, one could see the outline or “printing”
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A23044-20
of a firearm tucked into the waistband of his pants. Once inside,
[Jacobs] and Tyrell Jacobs repeatedly attempted to start a fight
with the victim. The video footage shows that he attempted to
entice Mr. Brown to leave the bar to go outside. Mr. Brown
refused, instead trying to diffuse the situation. The footage also
reveals that [Jacobs] brandished his weapon in the crowded bar,
aimed the weapon at the victim, and chased the victim around the
bar. The attackers eventually cornered Mr. Brown in a rear
storage room as he attempted to escape through the back door.
It was locked. There was no way out. The video shows Tyrell
Jacobs at the door to the storage room, blocking it, and firing one
shot at Eric Brown’s chest, taking his life. The videotape of the
entire event, from the chase, pursuit, corner, and murder was
shown to the jury. [Jacobs] and Tyrell Jacobs fled the scene to
avoid apprehension.
Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 6/8/20, at unnumbered 2-3.
Jacobs was arrested in West Philadelphia a week later on April 17, 2018.
When taken into custody, Jacobs had on him a loaded Sig Sauer 9mm
handgun. Ballistics testing revealed that the weapon fired neither the
cartridge casing found at the murder scene nor the projectile recovered from
the victim. Before trial, Jacobs filed a motion in limine to preclude the Sig
Sauer 9mm, arguing that its admission would result in unfair prejudice,
confuse the issues and mislead the jury. The Commonwealth countered that
the Sig Sauer 9mm was relevant to proving that Jacobs possessed a handgun
in the Star Social Club, asserting that it was the handgun seen in the security
video. The trial court agreed and denied the motion.
At trial, the Commonwealth introduced video surveillance footage
showing several angles inside of the Star Social Club. The footage captured
the initial altercation and chase in the bar portion of the club, as well as the
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shooting near the rear entrance. In addition, the Commonwealth introduced
video surveillance footage from surrounding areas depicting the Jacobs
brothers’ arrival at the bar and flight after the shooting.
During its case in chief, the Commonwealth also presented Nyeirah
Jones, who testified that the Jacobs brothers stayed at her home one night
while they were fugitives. Despite not expressing any lack of recollection, she
was shown her police statement over Jacobs’ objection. After reading her
statement, she testified her memory was refreshed and that one of the
brothers said “main man had it coming” in reference to the murder.
After the reception of the evidence, the jury found Jacobs guilty of third-
degree murder, aggravated assault, simple assault, firearms not to be carried
without a license, possession of an instrument of crime, possession of a
concealed weapon, recklessly endangering another person (four counts) and
conspiracy to commit aggravated assault.1 On February 7, 2020, Jacobs was
sentenced to serve an aggregate term of 31 to 62 years’ imprisonment.2
Jacobs filed a timely motion to modify his sentence, which the trial court
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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 2702(a)(1), 2701(a), 6106(a)(1), 907(a), 907(b),
2705 and 903(a). Tyrell Jacobs, who was tried jointly, was found guilty of
first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
2 The trial court imposed 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment for third-degree
murder with consecutive terms of 3 to 6 years for the firearms offense, 1 to 2
years each for two of the reckless endangerment counts and 6 to 12 years for
conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. All other counts were either run
concurrently or merged.
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denied. Jacobs timely appealed, and he and the trial court have complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, Jacobs challenges: (1) admission of the Sig Sauer
9mm; (2) the Commonwealth refreshing the recollection of Nyeirah Jones;
and (3) the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We address each issue in
turn.
II.
In his first claim, Jacobs challenges the denial of his pretrial motion in
limine to preclude admission of the Sig Sauer 9mm that the police recovered
when he was arrested a week after the murder.3
Generally, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by law. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.” Pa.R.E.
402. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401. However, the trial court
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3 Our standard of review of a trial court’s evidentiary ruling is well-established:
The admission of evidence is solely within the discretion of the
trial court, and a trial court’s evidentiary rulings will be reversed
on appeal only upon an abuse of that discretion. An abuse of
discretion will not be found based on a mere error of judgment,
but rather occurs where the court has reached a conclusion that
overrides or misapplies the law, or where the judgment exercised
is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill-will.
Commonwealth v. Woodard, 129 A.3d 480, 494 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citations omitted).
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“may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a
danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403.
The trial court admitted the recovered handgun under the “similar
weapon exception,” which our Supreme Court has explained as follows:
A weapon not “specifically linked” to the crime is generally
inadmissible; however, the fact “the accused had a weapon or
implement suitable to the commission of the crime charged ... is
always a proper ingredient of the case for the prosecution.”
[Commonwealth v.] Robinson, [721 A.2d 344,] 351 [(Pa.
1998)] (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). “Any uncertainty that the weapon is the actual
weapon used in the crime goes to the weight of such evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Williams, 537 Pa. 1, 640 A.2d 1251, 1260
(1994) (citing Commonwealth v. Coccioletti, 493 Pa. 103, 425
A.2d 387, 390 (1981)). “The only burden on the prosecution is to
lay a foundation that would justify an inference by the finder of
fact of the likelihood that the weapon was used in the commission
of the crime.” [Commonwealth v.] Lee, [662 A.2d 645,] 652
[(Pa. 1995)] (citing Commonwealth v. Thomas, 522 Pa. 256,
561 A.2d 699, 707 (1989) (“If a proper foundation is laid, the
weapon is admissible where the circumstances raise an inference
of the likelihood that it was used.”)).
Commonwealth v. Christine, 125 A.3d 394, 400 (Pa. 2015).
In Christine, the Commonwealth tried to introduce evidence that the
defendant possessed a shank even though it was not used in the crime. In
holding that the “similar weapon exception” does not apply to cases where the
weapon at issue was not used in the crime, our Christine Court explained:
The cases cited deal with weapons that might have been used.
Possession of a handgun may be relevant even if the particular
gun possessed cannot be proven to be the one used in the crime.
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That it was possessed may allow the inference it could have been
used. Here, however, the exception is not in play, as the shank
was admittedly not used in the pertinent assault. The theory of
the exception is that the weapon possessed could have been the
weapon used—that simply is not the case here, and admission
under the similar-weapon exception was error. To the extent that
cases affirm use of this exception strictly on the basis of similarity,
without an inference they were the weapons used, we reject them.
Id. at 400-01 (footnote omitted).
There was no dispute at trial that Jacobs had a firearm inside the Star
Social Club, as the security video shows him brandishing a handgun while he
and his brother chase the victim. Besides the security video, however, the
Commonwealth presented no other evidence tending to prove that the
handgun seen in the security video was the Sig Sauer 9mm Jacobs possessed
when he was arrested on April 17, 2018. Jacobs focuses on this lack of
evidence in arguing that the Commonwealth failed to lay a foundation that
would allow the jury to infer that the Sig Sauer 9mm was “similar in color,
shape, or type” to the handgun that he possessed in the Star Social Club. See
Jacobs’s Brief at 21. Moreover, Jacobs observes there was no evidence linking
the two firearms, as none of the Commonwealth’s witnesses described the
“caliber, make, model, color, shape, or length of the firearm in the video
footage of April 10, 2018.” Id. at 27.
Jacobs is correct: there was no evidence connecting the two firearms
beyond them both being handguns and being possessed by Jacobs, albeit one
week apart. The issue then is whether more was needed to allow the inference
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that they were the same handgun, as that would be the only permissible
grounds for admission.4 We find there was not.
In limiting the application of the “similar weapon exception,” Christine
expressly recognized that possession of a handgun, even if not proven to have
been used in the crime, “may allow the inference it could have been used.”
Christine, 125 A.3d at 400. In this case, Jacobs was charged with possessing
firearms without a license, possession of an instrument of crime and
possession of a concealed weapon on April 10, 2018, the date of the Star
Social Club incident. Jacobs’ possession of the Sig Sauer 9mm on April 17,
2018, allowed the inference that it could have also been the handgun that he
possessed during that incident. That being the case, there was enough for
the “similar weapon exception” to apply, as the “[t]he theory of the exception
is that the weapon possessed could have been the weapon used[.]” Id. at
401 (emphasis added).
Jacobs emphasizes that Christine states that “[t]o the extent that cases
affirm use of [the similar weapon] exception strictly on the basis of similarity,
without an inference they were the weapons used, we reject them.” Jacobs’
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4 We reject the Commonwealth’s suggestion that the firearm was admissible
as other crimes evidence under Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). See Commonwealth’s
Brief at 21. The trial court suggests the same in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
See TCO at 8. The Commonwealth argues that the firearm was admissible as
other crimes evidence under Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2), but it never gave notice of its
intent to have the firearm admitted as other crimes evidence as required by
Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3).
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Brief at 32 (quoting Christine, 125 A.3d at 401). Read in isolation, this
statement supports his contention that possession alone is insufficient for
application of the exception. However, when read in context of the Court’s
discussion, the statement merely disavows those decisions applying the
exception to similar weapons that were not used in the crime. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Williams, 58 A.3d 796, 801 (Pa. Super. 2012) (admitting
photograph of defendant with firearm was admissible to show that he
possessed a weapon similar to the one used to commit his crimes, even though
ballistics testing precluded it from being the murder weapon). Indeed,
Christine recognizes the exception may still apply when there is an inference
the weapon was used, which, as discussed above, arises when a firearm is
possessed and cannot be excluded as being used in the crime. Accordingly,
based on Christine, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion in limine and allowing the Sig Sauer 9mm to be admitted.
Even if the handgun should have been excluded, any such error was
harmless. Where there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt,
admission of evidence of the defendant’s possession of a weapon not directly
connected to the relevant crimes is harmless. See Commonwealth v.
Hernandez, 230 480, 489-90 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations omitted). After
reviewing the surveillance videos admitted at trial, we find there was
overwhelming evidence of Jacobs’ guilt that he possessed a weapon and was
an accomplice to the murder.
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The videos show Jacobs in the passenger side of a white sedan that
passes the Star Social Club and parks around the corner, backing up into the
spot so it can get out faster. Jacobs and the driver remain in the car for
several minutes. In the meantime, Tyrell Jacobs is seen waiting in a SUV for
the victim. After the victim walks past and into the bar, Tyrell Jacobs gets out
and walks down an alley behind the bar. Around the same time, Jacobs gets
out of the white sedan and begins to walk toward the Star Social Club while
talking on his cell phone. Jacobs, however, soon turns around and walks to
the alley to join his brother, who is also on his cell phone. The brothers then
walk to the Star Social Club while the driver of the white sedan waits.
Inside the bar, the brothers confront the victim and try to start a fight,
with Tyrell Jacobs punching him and Jacobs motioning for him to step outside.
Despite this, the victim does not fight back. The brothers leave the bar but
soon return. This time, when Tyrell Jacobs punches the victim, he hits back
and tries to run away. The brothers chase him around the bar, with Jacobs
pulling out his handgun and pointing it at the victim as he tries to get away.
With the front entrance cut off, the victim runs to the backroom. Tyrell Jacobs
pursues the victim and shoots him once in the chest. As the murder is being
committed, Jacobs is seen putting the handgun back into his pants before
rushing out of the front entrance and running to the waiting white sedan.
Once Jacobs gets in, the sedan takes off.
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The surveillance videos constitute overwhelming evidence that Jacobs
was an accomplice to the murder, showing his every move before, during and
after the murder. At trial, Jacobs attempted to portray this as a bar fight gone
wrong. However, the videos show that the brothers were waiting for the
victim to arrive and then directly confronted him inside the bar. Moreover,
the videos show Jacobs pointing his gun at the victim as he runs around the
bar. Then, after his brother shoots the victim, Jacobs runs back to the waiting
sedan and immediately flees.
Compared to this, the admission of the Sig Sauer 9mm played a minor
role in the trial. Neither defense counsel nor the Commonwealth mentioned
the handgun during their closing arguments. Moreover, that Jacobs possessed
a firearm inside the Star Social Club can be clearly seen in the Star Social Club
security video, not to mention that his defense counsel conceded in her
opening statement that Jacobs had a handgun and pointed it at the victim
inside the Star Social Club. See N.T., 10/14/19, at 123. As a result, any
error concerning the admission of the Sig Sauer 9mm was harmless.
III.
Next, Jacobs argues that the trial court erred in allowing the
Commonwealth to refresh the recollection of Nyeirah Jones through her police
statement without first establishing that she could not recollect what the
brothers said when they were in her home.
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Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 612 provides that a witness’s memory
may be refreshed with a writing or other item. Pa.R.E. 612(a). As Jacobs
notes in his brief, in Commonwealth v. Proctor, 385 A.2d 383, 385 (Pa.
Super. 1978), this Court held that a proper foundation must first be
established before a party may avail himself or herself of the rule permitting
a witness to refresh his or her recollection. Specifically, we held,
[t]o permit the use of a writing in order to refresh the memory of
a witness, the proponent must show: (1) that the witness’[s]
present memory is inadequate; (2) that the writing could refresh
the witness’[s] present memory; and (3) that reference to the
writing actually does refresh the witness’[s] present memory.
Id. (citation omitted).
Nyeirah Jones testified pursuant to a material witness warrant. Afraid
she would be hesitant to testify, the Commonwealth preemptively showed her
a police statement that she gave to the police not long after the brothers
stayed overnight at her home.
Q: Now, did you have the opportunity at all in any of this to speak
with the Jacobs’ brothers about what you were aware of, what had
happened at the Star Social?
A: Yes.
Q: What did they say about that?
A: I’m asking too much.
Q: You’re asking too much. I’d like to show you something, Miss
Jones, if that’s okay?
A: That’s fine.
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Q: Do you remember speaking with the Upper Darby Police
Department and writing out a written statement with them?
A: Yes.
N.T., 10/15/19, at 197-98.
Jacobs objected and argued that the witness did not testify that she was
unable to recall what was said in her home. Id. at 198. The trial court decided
that the Commonwealth could show her the statement.
THE COURT: You can show the statement to her. I will allow her
to read it. Then you ask the follow-up question, does that refresh
your recollection about what anything else you may have said,
that’s fine. It may refresh it, it may not, and we’ll cross the bridge
when we get there.
Id. at 199. After being shown her statement, Nyeirah Jones stated that it
refreshed her memory and that one of the brothers said, “Main man had it
coming.” Id.
We need not undertake a lengthy analysis of this claim, as it is clear the
Commonwealth did not establish that the witness’s memory was exhausted.
The Commonwealth concedes as much in its brief, but argues that its failure
to show that Nyeirah Jones’ memory was inadequate is excused because she
testified under a material witness warrant; she gave an initial “vague and
general answer” and then testified her memory was refreshed after being
shown her statement. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 31. We are unpersuaded
by these arguments, none of which are supported with case law for the motion
that the first requirement for refreshing recollection can be excused. The
witness never stated that her memory was inadequate or that she could not
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recall what the brothers said. Likewise, her initial answer that the brothers
said she was “asking too much” was not vague or general. Until she expressed
that she could not remember what was said or was unwilling to do so, it was
error for her to be shown her police statement, even if she said afterwards
that it refreshed her memory.
This does not end our inquiry, as we must determine whether this error
was harmless. A judgment can be sustained despite the erroneous admission
of evidence if the error could not have contributed to the verdict.
Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 130 A.3d 697, 716 (Pa. 2015). Harmless
error exists where:
(1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was
de minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely
cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially
similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly
admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so
overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so
insignificant by comparison that the error could not have
contributed to the verdict. The Commonwealth has the burden of
proving harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 461 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Jacobs asserts this was not harmless error because the evidence “was
directly on point with regard to malice, the pivotal issue in any murder case.”
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Jacobs’ Brief at 47.5 He contends that the statement that the victim “had it
coming” was enough for the jury to find malice. Id. at 48. While neither de
minimis nor cumulative, we concluded that the witness’s testimony was
insignificant by comparison to the properly admitted and uncontradicted
evidence of guilt, namely, the surveillance videos.
Besides the statement not being directly attributed to Jacobs, all of his
actions in relation to murder were captured on video. In particular, Jacobs
arrives in a car that backs up into its parking spot, suggesting he anticipated
that the car would need to get away quick. See N.T., 10/16/19, at 64. Jacobs
then waits in the sedan for several minutes until his brother walks down the
alley, at which point he gets out of the car and is on his cell phone. Because
of the way Jacobs immediately turns around to meet his brother, who was
also on his cell phone, it is evident that the two were talking to each other
before going to confront the victim. Id. at 78-79, 104. The videos
demonstrate that Jacobs was in communication with his brother before the
murder and knew that they would need to get away quick, especially since the
driver of the white sedan remained parked waiting for Jacobs.
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5 To sustain a conviction of third-degree murder, the Commonwealth must
prove that the defendant killed another person with malice. Commonwealth
v. Knox, 219 A.3d 186, 195 (Pa. Super. 2019). Malice is defined as
“exhibiting an extreme indifference to human life.” Id. A fact-finder may find
malice not only in an intentional killing, “but also in an unintentional homicide
where the perpetrator consciously disregarded an unjustified and extremely
high risk that his actions might cause death or serious bodily injury.” Id.- 14 -
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Jacobs’ malice argument becomes even weaker in light of the
surveillance video from inside the bar. Tellingly, rather than order a drink,
the brothers went directly to the victim and confronted him. When the victim
tried to run away after being punched, Jacobs pulled out his handgun and
chased him, cutting off the victim’s attempt to exit. That Jacobs pulls out his
handgun and stops the victim’s escape contradicts his argument that he did
not exhibit any malice. Then, after corralling the victim into the backroom,
Jacobs waits near the door while his brother chases him down and shoots him
when he is unable to escape. Jacobs then runs out of the bar and goes directly
to the waiting white sedan. Signicantly, the video shows that the driver starts
the sedan even before Jacobs reaches the car and then drives away within
seconds of Jacobs getting in. This video evidence, when taken together,
shows that Jacobs was an accomplice to his brother in killing the victim.
According, Jacobs’ second issue merits no relief.
IV.
Finally, Jacobs alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing the statutory maximum for third-degree murder and consecutive
sentences for firearms not to be carried without a license, conspiracy to
commit aggravated assault and two counts of recklessly endangering another
person. Specifically, Jacobs contends that the trial court failed to state its
reasons for its sentence as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), which provides,
in relevant part, that “the court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose
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in open court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons
for the sentence imposed.” Id.
Jacobs’ claim implicates the discretionary aspects of the trial court’s
sentence. “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle
an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987,
991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Before reaching the merits of such
claims, we must determine:
(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved
his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of
sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a
substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the
sentencing code.
Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
omitted).
Jacobs has filed a timely notice of appeal and included a separate Rule
2119(f) statement in his brief. Moreover, he properly preserved his claim by
timely filing a post-sentence motion to modify or reduce his sentence. Lastly,
his contention that the trial court failed to state adequate reasons on the
record for his sentence qualifies as a substantial question for our review. See
Commonwealth v. Flowers, 149 A.3d 867, 871 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation
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omitted). Jacobs’ claims, therefore, raise a substantial question, and we will
consider the substantive merits of his sentencing issues.6
Before hearing from Jacobs and the Commonwealth, the trial court
stated the following:
[B]efore we begin the various presentations, and this is not to cut
off a presentation but, rather, to give you some indication of that
I have done in preparation, as to [Jacobs] I’ve had the opportunity
to review the Chester County Adult Probation and Parole
Presentence Investigation Report, which was completed as of
January 30, 2020. That report contained with it a number of
attachments, all of which I have read, specifically focusing on
various reports and material that was prepared for earlier
hearings. And, for the record, let me say I have reviewed the
report from the Network for Behavioral Change dated November
of 2005; the first of several reports from Bruce Mapes, Ph.D.,
dated April of 2006; reports from the Community Mental Health
Services and Human Services dated May of 2006; an evaluation
from the Chester County Youth Service dated October of 2006;
second report from Bruce Mapes dated September of 2006; a
report from Summit Quest Academy dated March 12th of 2007; a
third report from Bruce Mapes dated October of 2008; a second
Psychiatric Evaluation from Chester County Youth Services dated
March 19 of 2009; a fourth report from Dr. Mapes dated May of
2009; and a final report dated June of 2009.
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6 Our standard of review is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
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I have also received a Commonwealth’s Memorandum In Aid Of
Sentencing and a Defendant’s Memorandum In Aid Of Sentencing.
I thank both attorneys for taking the time to put their thoughts
down in writing to give me an opportunity to think about it going
forward.
N.T., 2/7/20, at 5-6.
Then, after hearing from both Jacobs and the Commonwealth, the trial
court stated the following before imposing sentence.
I have taken a lot of time to read and consider all of the material
that was presented on your behalf. I certainly listened to the
family of Eric Brown, and have thought long and hard about the
events of April 10th, 2018. I have to say that I am saddened by
the reading of the Presentence Investigation because somewhere
in there, somewhere inside there is a very intelligent, motivated
young man. The Presentence Investigation Report contained a list
of grades that you had, A’s and B’s in relatively difficult subjects.
The fact that you graduated, given the homelife that you had, is
admirable. I am deeply saddened for you that circumstances
didn’t channel that brain and drive into a positive world, positive
direction.
Having reviewed all of the material, considered all of the
necessary guidelines and the Sentencing Commission, it’s now my
obligation to impose sentence, and I do so, as follows …
Id. at 32-33.
After reviewing the sentencing transcript, we find no abuse of discretion
in the trial court’s sentence. Where, as here, the trial court has the benefit of
a presentence investigation, “it is presumed that the court is aware of all
appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the court
has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.”
Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(citation omitted). Relevant to Jacobs’ contention, “[t]he sentencing judge
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can satisfy the requirement that reasons for imposing sentence be placed on
the record by indicating that he or she has been informed by the pre-
sentencing report; thus properly considering and weighing all relevant
factors.” Id. (citation omitted). The trial court laid out, on the record, all of
the materials that it had reviewed in consideration of its sentence. This is
adequate for satisfying Section 9721(b), as a sentencing court is not required
to undertake a lengthy discourse of its reasons for imposing its sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Rush, 162 A.3d 530, 544 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
omitted). As a result, based on our review of the record, we find that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/2/20
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