L.A.W. v. W.R.W ( 2016 )

J-A08002-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
L.A.W., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
W.R.W.,
Appellant No. 1477 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered April 16, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Domestic Relations at No(s): 2014-12491-PF
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2016
W.R.W. (“Father”) appeals from the final protection from abuse
(“PFA”) order entered on April 16, 2015, wherein the court prohibited
Father’s contact with L.A.W. (“Mother”) and their son, B.W., except to
comply with the prevailing child custody order. We affirm.
The certified record supports the following facts. Mother and Father
divorced prior to the commencement of these proceedings. B.W. was born
of the marriage during July 2008. Prior to April 2014, Father exercised
periods of partial physical custody. However, following Father’s admission
that he was suffering from mental health problems, the parties agreed that
Mother would supervise his visits with B.W. Shortly thereafter, Mother
received a text photograph from Father’s girlfriend that indicated that Father
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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had suicidal ideations. Specifically, Father transmitted a text with a
photograph of a self-inflicted knife wound in his leg. The accompanying
message read, “I don’t know if you recognize the pain you don’t care to deal
with. Tell my son the truth. I have finally found release. I only wanted us.”
N.T. 4/16/15, at 11; Plaintiff’s Exhibit-1. Mother contacted Father, stated
her concern about B.W.’s safety, and convinced Father to cancel the
supervised visitation that had been scheduled for that evening. N.T.,
4/16/15, at 11. The supervised visitations continued on an as-requested
basis throughout that summer.
During August 2014, Father was involved in an automobile accident
while driving under the influence of alcohol. While convalescing, Father
admitted to Mother that the accident was, in fact, a failed attempt to commit
suicide. Mother persuaded him to commit himself to mental health
treatment for seventy–two to ninety–six hours. Two months later, Father
was involved in a second automobile accident. While he did not characterize
that collision as another suicide attempt, Mother was suspicious of the
incident in light of Father’s previous attempt and ideations.
Meanwhile, during October 2014, Father demanded to exercise
physical custody independent of Mother’s supervision. He argued that his
mental health had improved and that supervision was unnecessary. He
threatened to file a petition for contempt against Mother if she did not
comply with his demands. In anticipation of Father’s impending legal
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maneuver, Mother filed a motion to modify the existing custody order. The
hearing on that motion was scheduled for January 2015.
During the period preceding the modification hearing, Father engaged
in increasingly erratic behavior and he harassed Mother by telephone, text
messages, and emails. Specifically, on December 11, 2014, Father called
Mother at 8:11 p.m. and 8:27 p.m. The next morning between 8:40 and
10:33 a.m., Father called Mother five times from his mobile phone, leaving
three brief voicemail messages, and once from his work phone. He followed
that onslaught with eleven text messages to Mother between 10:36 a.m.
and 10:50 a.m. the same morning. The messages related to their
relationship and Father’s attempts to contact B.W. Mother issued two
responses to Father’s inquiries. She informed him, “Stop contacting me”
and “I will have him call you when he’s home.” Plaintiff’s Exhibit-2. In
addition to the foregoing attempts to communicate with Mother on the
morning of December 12, 2014, Father sent Mother three emails trying to
establish contact.
As a result of Father’s repeated texts, emails, and voicemail messages,
Mother contacted the West Whiteland Township Police Department. Officer
Robert B. Malarick contacted Father and formally advised him to cease
communication with Mother and informed Father that further attempts to
contact her could result in his being charged with harassment. During the
PFA hearing, Mother testified without objection that the police relayed
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Father’s statement that he would stop attempting to contact Mother by
telephone and that “he was just going to show up at [her] house.” N.T.,
4/16/15, at 22. While Father did not follow through with his stated intention
to menace Mother in person, he called her twice on the following day.
On December 19, 2014, Mother was contacted by her attorney, who
relayed a message from Father’s counsel indicating that she was
withdrawing her representation of Father due to his threatening behavior
and advising caution in what she characterized as an unsafe situation.
Mother’s counsel interpreted the warning as including threats against him
and Mother. Upon receipt of the telephone call, Mother retrieved B.W. and
his younger half-sister, who is not a party to the final PFA, order from school
and took refuge in a local hotel. Mother explained, “we packed up some
belongings and we went to a hotel for the evening because of the state of
which -- I was concerned for our wellbeing as I did not know what threats
were being made against me.” Id. at 25. The following day, she called the
police department to alert it of Father’s threats against her custody lawyer.
She informed police that she was afraid of Father and requested extra police
patrols around her home. The police increased their presence in Mother’s
neighborhood, told her to call if she observed Father nearby, and provided
her information about services designed to combat domestic violence.
On December 23, 2014, West Whiteland Township Police Detective
Scott Pezick told Mother that the department had received multiple reports
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about Father over the preceding days and that it wanted to discuss the
situation with her. Detective Pezick had spoken to Father and advised him
to use their respective counsel as intermediaries regarding custody issues,
but Father responded that he was going to retrieve B.W. from school on his
own. Mother informed Detective Pezick that she “had an extensive history of
violence and abuse with [Father] and that he was admittedly mentally ill and
that his repeated contact with [her] had [placed her in] a very bad position.”
Id. at 23. In sum, “[she] was afraid of what [Father] was going to do next.”
Id.
Detective Pezick ordered an increased police presence at B.W.’s school
until Mother was physically able to recover her son. Mother observed a
marked police car at the school when she arrived, and having called the
school to advise it of the situation, she was able to obtain B.W. without
incident. After collecting B.W. and exiting the building, Mother noticed that
two additional marked police cars had arrived. As Father was not observed
at the school that day, the intimation he made to Detective Pezick was
apparently empty. Nevertheless, the police advised Mother to use extreme
caution when dealing with Father and to call 911 immediately if he
attempted to contact her.
Based on the foregoing events, Mother obtained a temporary PFA
order against Father effective December 23, 2014. The temporary order,
which applied to Mother, B.W., and his younger half-sister, was scheduled to
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terminate on January 5, 2015, but it was subsequently continued to
February 5, 2015 and then to April 16, 2015. The first continuance was due
to a lack of service, and the second continuance was made to accommodate
the criminal investigation into Father’s alleged violation of the Wiretapping
and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5701-5782, as
discussed infra. When the local Sheriff’s Office called Father in an attempt
to serve notice of the temporary PFA and inform him of the conditions of the
PFA, Father advised the deputy that he did not intend to comply with the
order “and that no one was going to keep him away from his kid.” Id. at
30.
While the hearing on the final PFA order was pending, Father sent
Mother’s attorney an email that revealed that Father had surreptitiously
recorded an October 2014 telephone conversation with Mother. Father
ostensibly proffered the twenty-one minute recording to the attorney in
order to establish Mother’s alleged duplicity. However, in actuality, by
recording Mother secretly and then disseminating that recording to a third
party, Father exposed himself to criminal liability for violating sections
5703(1) and (2) of Pennsylvania’s Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance
Control Act (“Wiretap Act”). Upon being notified of Father’s actions, Mother
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contacted Detective Pezick, who, following an investigation, charged Father
with, inter alia, two counts of violating the Wiretap Act.1
The evidentiary hearing was held on April 16, 2015. At the outset of
the hearing, Mother suggested that the court continue the hearing pending
the criminal matter based upon potential Fifth Amendment concerns if Father
elected to testify. Acting pro se, Father opposed the continuance and
declined to testify during the PFA hearing. Mother testified in favor of the
petition and introduced five exhibits. Father presented three witnesses.
While Father marked five exhibits for identification, none of the exhibits was
admitted into evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court
entered a final PFA order against Father that precluded him from contacting
Mother and B.W. for three years.2 The PFA order specifically stated that (1)
it would yield to the then-existing custody arrangement; (2) it was imposed
without prejudice to Father’s right to petition to modify custody; and (3) a
modified custody order would supersede the final PFA order. This timely
appeal followed.
____________________________________________
1
On December 10, 2015, Father pleaded guilty to one count of violating §
5703(1) of the Wiretap Act and the trial court imposed thirty days to twelve
months imprisonment consecutive to the thirty-day to six months sentence
that had been imposed after Father pleaded guilty to DUI following the failed
suicide attempt during August 2014.
2
As the trial court found that Mother had not satisfied her burden of proving
an allegation of abuse regarding B.W.’s half-sister, the order did not include
that child.
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Father raises four questions for our review, which we restate for clarity
as follows:
1. Whether the trial court was biased against Father.
2. Whether the preponderance of evidence standard outlined
in § 6107(a) of the PFA is too slight of an evidentiary burden in
light of the rights and liberties that are at stake for the
defendant.
3. Whether the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel
to represent Father during the PFA proceedings.
4. Whether Mother adduced insufficient evidence to establish
a course of conduct that is tantamount to abuse under §
6102(a)(4).
Father’s brief at 4-5.
In Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917, 921 (Pa.Super. 2013), we
reiterated, “The purpose of the PFA act is to protect victims of domestic
violence from the perpetrators of that type of abuse and to prevent domestic
violence from occurring.” The petitioner has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence the allegations of abuse. See 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 6107(a). This Court “review[s] the propriety of a PFA order for an abuse
of discretion or an error of law.” Ferko-Fox, at 920. Our Supreme Court
has defined abuse of discretion as follows:
The term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom
and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within the
framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of
giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be
exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice,
personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions. Discretion is
abused when the course pursued represents not merely an error
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of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable
or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that
the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000), (quoting
Coker v. S.M. Flickinger Co., 625 A.2d 1181, 1184-855 (Pa. 1993)).
As Father’s first and third issues are related, we address those claims
jointly. The crux of this argument is that the trial court was biased against
him in that an attorney did not represent him and because he refused to
consent to a continuance pending the criminal action regarding his violation
of the Wiretap Act. While he presents several examples of the trial court’s
alleged bias during the PFA hearing, his argument is predicated on the
foundational position that, while there is no statutory right to PFA counsel,
he was entitled to the assistance of counsel in this case as a matter of due
process. He continues that, having been denied court-appointed counsel
and being unable to afford private representation, the trial court was biased
against him for attempting to defend himself pro se. Father’s claims are
wrong as a matter of law and baseless as a matter of fact.
Pursuant to § 6107(a) of the PFA Act, a defendant has the right to be
represented by counsel during the PFA hearing to determine whether a final
PFA order is warranted. However, as Father appears to concede, there is no
statutory right to the appointment of PFA counsel. In Weir v. Weir, 631
A.2d 650 (Pa.Super. 1993), this Court discussed this precise issue and
reasoned that, since the PFA is a quasi-civil statute, the requirement that a
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defendant be advised of his right to representation did not equate to the
right to the appointment of counsel. We stated,
Unlike cases arising under the Juvenile Act or cases
concerning involuntary commitment, there is no legislatively
created right to court-appointed counsel in [PFA] proceedings.
Rather, the [PFA] only requires that the court advise a defendant
of the right to be represented at the hearing by counsel. See 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 6107(a). The right to be represented by counsel
cannot be equated with the right to receive court-appointed
counsel. The right to be represented by counsel in civil
proceedings is one accorded to all individuals. However, all civil
litigants do not have the right to court-appointed counsel. The
[PFA] thus cannot be construed as requiring the appointment of
counsel for indigent parties.
Id. at 657.
Furthermore, while the Weir Court passed on the related issue of
“whether a PFAA action is the type of proceeding which involves the
deprivation of a constitutional right so as to require the appointment of
counsel,” id., at 657-658, in Varner v. Holley, 854 A.2d 520, 523
(Pa.Super. 2004), this Court subsequently interpreted the Weir Court’s
discussion as holding “that a PFA action is not the type of proceeding which
involves the deprivation of a constitutional right so as to require the
appointment of counsel.” Hence, as illustrated in Varner, the principle that
no right to counsel exists under the PFA Act is well ensconced. Thus, where,
as here, Father was advised of his right to representation during the hearing
and neglected to request the appointment of counsel, assert his indigence,
or contact a lawyer referral service as suggested by the formal notice of
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hearing, his predicate argument that the PFA process is unjust fails as a
matter of law.
Moreover, Father’s specific allegations of bias also fail. As we
previously reiterated in In re In the Interest of S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 808
(Pa.Super. 2005), a mere adverse ruling, without more, does not
demonstrate bias. Father first asserts that the trial court admonished him
for complaining that Mother did not provide adequate notice of her request
for a continuance. Next, he contends that, while the trial court reminded
Mother’s counsel to move for the admission of her exhibits, it deliberately
declined to remind Father about that necessity. Additionally, Father argues
that the trial court threatened him with contempt for leveling too many
objections. Finally, Father asserts that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings
disfavored him disproportionally. In support of this position, he highlights
four instances where the trial court declined to rule in his favor in disposing
of the parties’ countervailing objections to the testimony. As highlighted,
infra, the certified record belies all of Father’s allegations of bias.
Despite Father’s protestations to the contrary, the trial court did not
admonish him for challenging the timeliness of Mother’s request for a
continuance pending the completion of the criminal matter. While the trial
court questioned Father’s cryptic reference to “Section 209” as a basis to
oppose the continuance, in reality the court not only supported Father’s
opposition to the motion but it also advised Father, “if you don’t want a
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continuance then there will be a hearing.” N.T., 4/16/15, at 5.3 There is
nothing in the certified record to support Father’s claim that the trial court
intimidated him based on his desire to proceed with the PFA hearing on April
16, 2015. Hence, this claim fails.
Similarly, the certified record will not sustain Father’s contentions that
the trial court threatened him with contempt for leveling too many
objections during the hearing or that it ruled against him disproportionally.
The allegation implicates an exchange with the trial court wherein Father
reiterated an objection to a question and added commentary after the court
had overruled his initial objection. The brief exchange occurred as follows:
Q. I am going to take you back to some of the events leading up
to the case. Can you please tell the court about [Father’s]
behavior last spring?
[Father]: Objection, relevance.
The Court: Overruled.
The Witness: In April of 2000[. . . ]
[Father]: Objection, relevance.
The Court: Overruled.
[Father]: This pertain[s] nothing to [Mother].
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3
Father’s brief indicates that he attempted to invoke “PA Rules [sic] of Civil
Procedure” 209. See Father’s brief at 7. However, his ostensible
clarification is unhelpful because Pa.R.C.P. 209 was rescinded effective
January 1996.
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The Court: Overruled. You keep up with this [and] there is not
going to be much of a hearing because you’re going to be
downstairs. You may answer the question. April of 2014?
N.T., 6/16/15, at 8-9.
Apparently conceding that the foregoing interaction fails to evince trial
court bias on its own, Father complains that, while the trial court threatened
him with contempt if he persisted with his objections, the court neglected to
admonish Mother’s counsel for similar conduct. Again, however, the record
does not support Father’s allegation of disparate treatment. While the court
did not threaten Mother’s counsel with contempt for her missteps during the
hearing, it reprimanded her for a variety of reasons. For instance, the court
displayed impatience for counsel’s disorganized exhibits, chided her
repeatedly for raising objections prematurely, criticized the grounds of her
objections, and complained about her enunciation and presentation. Id. at
21, 45, 57, 66, 79. In addition, the trial court chastised Mother’s counsel for
what it deemed to be a superfluous statement that she rested her case-in-
chief with reservation to recall her client if necessary. The court corrected,
“You’re resting your case in chief, is that what you are saying? . . . And you
might have rebuttal testimony? . . . All right. If there is appropriate proper
rebuttal testimony at that time you’ll be permitted. . . . It is without
reservation.” Id. at 65-65. The record belies Father’s claims of bias.
Likewise, Father’s assertion of disparity in the manner that the court
disposed of the parties’ evidentiary objections is not persuasive. Generally,
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“[o]ur standard of review for a trial court's evidentiary rulings is narrow.
Commonwealth v. Mickel, 2016 Pa. Super. 132 *3. Therefore, “[t]he
admissibility of evidence is solely within the discretion of the trial court . . .
[.]” Id.
Instantly, the certified record confirms that the trial court ruled on the
parties’ objections impartially. In disposing of Father’s objections, the court
sustained six of ten objections he leveled against Mother’s direct testimony,
sustained two objections to Mother’s exhibits, and overruled several of
Mother’s objections to the testimony that Father adduced at trial. Father
highlights four specific examples in which the trial court purportedly ruled
against him. While his precise argument is unclear, Father asserts baldly
that the trial court “used the objections by [the parties] to shape the
proceedings and was able to suppress significant evidence that should have
been considered by a fair and impartial judge.” See Father’s brief at 7.
Father provides one-paragraph summaries for each of the evidentiary
determinations; however, he fails to argue, much less explain, how the four
rulings establish the trial court’s bias. Indeed, rather than assail the trial
court’s impartiality, at best, Father’s obscure references to the noted
testimony are facial challenges to the merits of the court’s evidentiary
rulings, issues that were not included or fairly suggested in his statement of
questions presented. Hence, those challenges are waived. Pa.R.A.P.
2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement
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of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”); see e.g.,
Southcentral Employment Corp. v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. of
Pennsylvania, 926 A.2d 977, 983 n.5 (Pa.Super 2007) (issue waived
because it was not explicitly raised in appellant's statement of questions
involved). As the trial court dispensed its criticisms evenly and ruled fairly
on the parties’ various objections, we reject Father’s assertion of bias.
Father’s final assertion of bias is premised upon the fact that the trial
court declined to prompt him to move for the formal admission of the exhibit
that he marked and presented during his defense. Significantly, at the close
of Mother’s case-in-chief, the trial court inquired of her counsel, “Any
exhibits you wanted to put into evidence?” N.T., 4/16/15, at 59. Father
complains that the court did not extend a similar courtesy to him.
The record reveals that, when Mother’s counsel attempted to level an
anticipatory objection to one of Father’s exhibits, the trial court interceded,
“I don’t want to get highly technical here, but has anybody offered the
exhibits into evidence?” Id. at 78. Following a brief exchange during which
the trial court twice asked counsel when Father had moved for the exhibit’s
admission, counsel eventually understood the implication and withdrew the
purported objection. As Father did not comprehend the significance of the
exchange, he failed to formally request that the trial court admit the exhibits
into evidence.
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Unlike Father’s other assertions of bias, this contention has a factual
predicate. That is, in this isolated instance, the trial court treated Mother
and Father differently. Nevertheless, no relief is due.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the trial court was not obligated
to assist Father in navigating the procedural pitfalls of self-representation.
In Commonwealth v. Freeland, 106 A.3d 768, 776 (Pa.Super. 2014), we
stressed, “a pro se litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth in
the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court.” Furthermore, in Commonwealth v.
Gray, 608 A.2d 534, 550 (Pa.Super. 1992) (quotation omitted), we
reiterated, “Any layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal
proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that his lack
of expertise and legal training will prove his undoing.” Thus, the trial court
was not constrained to assist Father based on his status as a layman.
Moreover, in light of the certified record as a whole, this remote
example of the court declining to extend a professional courtesy to Father
that it previously had extended to Mother’s counsel, does not establish trial
court bias. Significantly, although the trial court was not obliged to assist
Father, it was sensitive to the fact that Father was proceeding pro se.
Indeed, the court’s decision to avert its assistance in this instance was
inconsistent with its actions throughout the hearing. Specifically, the trial
court previously guided Father in leveling evidentiary objections, questioning
Mother on cross-examination, and marking and identifying defense exhibits.
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Ideally, the court would have also informed Father of the formal requirement
to move the exhibit into evidence. Although it did not, mindful of the court’s
impartial rulings and the assistance it provided Father throughout the
proceeding, we cannot find that the trial court’s isolated act demonstrated a
bias against Father. Thus, we also reject this claim.
We address Father’s remaining claims jointly. He argues that the
evidentiary burden required to attain a final PFA order is too slight and that
notwithstanding this reduced threshold, Mother’s evidence was insufficient to
sustain the final PFA order. Father concedes, as he must, that the PFA Act
demands that a petitioner adduce only a preponderance of evidence in order
to satisfy his or her evidentiary burden. In this regard, he asserts that the
relaxed burden is unjust and violative of his due process rights. He also
challenges the statutory definition of “abuse” pursuant to § 6102(a)(2) and
maintains that the low evidentiary threshold permitted Mother to prove her
case against him despite what he characterized as scant evidence of threats
or harassment.4 Unfortunately for Father, beyond his bare assertion of
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4
The PFA defines abuse as follows:
“Abuse.” The occurrence of one or more of the following acts
between family or household members, sexual or intimate
partners or persons who share biological parenthood:
(1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly causing bodily injury, serious bodily injury, rape,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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injustice and his assessment of the evidence that Mother adduced during the
hearing, he does not develop his claims with any legal argument or citation
to relevant legal authority. At most, Father alleges a lack of evidence of
imminent serious bodily injury and attempts to justify his pernicious
behavior throughout this case, including the violations of the Wiretap Act, as
a reasonable response to the impediments that he believed Mother and her
counsel erected to prevent him from exercising physical custody of B.W.
Thus, any assertion that the PFA Act is constitutionally infirm is waived. See
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault,
statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault,
indecent assault or incest with or without a deadly weapon.
(2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious
bodily injury.
(3) The infliction of false imprisonment pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 2903 (relating to false imprisonment).
(4) Physically or sexually abusing minor children, including
such terms as defined in Chapter 63 (relating to child
protective services).
(5) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly
committing acts toward another person, including following
the person, without proper authority, under circumstances
which place the person in reasonable fear of bodily injury. The
definition of this paragraph applies only to proceedings
commenced under this title and is inapplicable to any criminal
prosecutions commenced under Title 18 (relating to crimes
and offenses).
23 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1-5).
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In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting In re A.C.,
991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa.Super. 2010)) (“where an appellate brief fails to
provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails
to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that
claim is waived.”).
Moreover, Father’s assertion that Mother did not establish abuse
defined as a reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury pursuant to §
6102(a)(2) fails. Notwithstanding Father’s protestations, Mother was not
limited to that definition of abuse. In reality, Mother proved by a
preponderance of the evidence abuse defined under § 6102(a)(5) as “a
course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts toward another person . . .
under circumstances which place the person in reasonable fear of bodily
injury.” Specifically, she established that over a two-day period during
December 2014, Father harassed her relentlessly via telephone, text
message, and email. He rebuffed police directions to leave Mother alone and
threatened to “just . . . show up at [her] house.” N.T., 4/16/15, at 15.
Thereafter, he threatened Mother and her counsel, which led Mother to take
refuge overnight in a local hotel. Undaunted, three days later, Father
informed police of his intent to defy their directives, again, and physically
remove B.W. from school. While Father failed to follow through with this
threat, the ruse placed Mother in fear “of what [Father] was going to do
next.” Id. at 23.
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Indeed, even when faced with notice of the PFA proceedings, Father
advised the Sheriff’s deputy that he did not intend to comply with the
temporary PFA order if it interfered with his custodial rights. Id. at 30.
These events are even more alarming when superimposed over Father’s
history of erratic behavior. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not
commit an abuse of discretion in finding that Mother proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that Father engaged in a course of conduct
under circumstances that placed her in fear of bodily injury.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/16/2016
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