Croce, L. v. Croce, M. ( 2019 )

J-S40038-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
LORIN A. CROCE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MARCIA CROCE :
:
Appellant : No. 206 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered January 15, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Civil Division at No(s):
11499 CD 2015
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2019
Marcia Croce (Wife) appeals from the order entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Indiana County (trial court) denying her petition to set aside
her divorce settlement agreement with Lorin A. Croce (Husband). We affirm.
In 2015, Husband filed a complaint in divorce against Wife. Both parties
were represented by counsel for several years until October 2018 when Wife’s
counsel withdrew and she began to represent herself. Soon after, Husband
filed a motion for appointment of a master for divorce and distribution of
property, which was granted. The master held a settlement conference that
concluded with Husband and Wife signing an agreement disposing of all claims
which was filed in the trial court.
About three weeks later, Wife filed a complaint in the trial court that it
treated as a petition to set aside the parties’ agreement. Among other things,
Wife alleged that she involuntarily signed the agreement at the conference
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S40038-19
due to duress. The trial court held a hearing on Wife’s petition and heard
testimony from both her and the master. After the hearing, the trial court
entered an order denying the petition. Wife filed a timely pro se notice of
appeal and the trial court ordered her to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
within 21 days. In its order, the trial court notified Wife that any issue not
properly included in the statement shall be deemed waived. However, Wife
never filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
We first address whether Wife has properly preserved any issues for
review. This Court has previously emphasized the requirement to submit a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement:
Pa.R.A.P 1925(b) provides that a judge entering an order giving
rise to a notice of appeal ‘may enter an order directing the
appellant to file of record in the trial court and serve on the judge
a concise statement of the errors complained of on appeal
(‘Statement’).’ Rule 1925 also states that ‘[i]ssues not included
in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the
provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.’ Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(4)(vii). In Commonwealth v. Lord, [ ] 719 A.2d 306 (
[Pa.] 1998), our Supreme Court held that ‘from this date forward,
in order to preserve their claims for appellate review, [a]ppellants
must comply whenever the trial court orders them to file a
Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Rule
1925. Any issues not raised in a [Rule] 1925(b) statement will be
deemed waived.’ Lord, 719 A.2d at 309; see also
Commonwealth v. Castillo, [ ] 888 A.2d 775, 780 ( [Pa.] 2005)
(stating any issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b)statement are
deemed waived). This Court has held that ‘[o]ur Supreme Court
intended the holding in Lord to operate as a bright-line rule, such
that failure to comply with the minimal requirements of Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) will result in automatic waiver of the issues raised.’
Greater Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc.,
88 A.3d 222, 224 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Schofield, [ ] 888 A.2d
771, 774 ( [Pa.] 2005)).
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U.S. Bank, N.A. for Certificateholders of LXS 2007-7N Trust Fund v.
Hua, 193 A.3d 994, 996-97 (Pa. Super. 2018).
Before finding waiver, we must first determine if Wife was properly
served with notice of her obligation under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) to file a
statement of errors complained of on appeal. See Presque Isle, 88 A.3d at
226. “[S]trict application of the bright-line rule in Lord necessitates strict
interpretation regarding notice of Rule 1925(b) orders.” Id. “[F]ailure by the
prothonotary to give written notice of the entry of a court order and to note
on the docket that notice was given will prevent waiver for timeliness pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).” Id.
Here, the Indiana County Prothonotary’s docket shows that the trial
court’s order directing Wife to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement was entered
on February 11, 2019, along with the Prothonotary noting that copies were
mailed to Wife and Husband’s counsel on that same day. Wife concedes as
much in her reply brief, instead blaming her failure to file a statement on her
lack of having counsel. See Wife’s Reply Brief, at 7-9. “[A]lthough this Court
is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status
generally confers no special benefits upon an appellant.” Commonwealth v.
Lyon, 833 A.2d 245, 251-52 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
“Accordingly, a pro se litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth
in the Pennsylvania Rules of Court.” Id. As a result, by failing to file a
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Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, as required by the trial court’s order, Wife’s
claims on appeal are waived.
Even if her claims were preserved, we would find that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Wife’s petition.1 As she did at the hearing,
Wife claims that her assent to the settlement agreement was the product of
duress. Our Supreme Court has defined duress as follows:
[T]hat degree of restraint or danger, either actually inflicted or
threatened and impending, which is sufficient in severity or
apprehension to overcome the mind of a person of ordinary
firmness.... The quality of firmness is assumed to exist in every
person competent to contract, unless it appears that by reason of
old age or other sufficient cause he is weak or infirm.... Where
persons deal with each other on equal terms and at arm’s length,
there is a presumption that the person alleging duress possesses
ordinary firmness.... Moreover, in the absence of threats of actual
bodily harm there can be no duress where the contracting party
is free to consult with counsel....
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1 The following standard of review would apply to Wife’s claims:
The determination of marital property rights through prenuptial,
post[-]nuptial and settlement agreements has long been
permitted, and even encouraged. Both prenuptial and post-
nuptial agreements are contracts and are governed by contract
law. Moreover, a court’s order upholding the agreement in divorce
proceedings is subject to an abuse of discretion or error of law
standard of review. An abuse of discretion is not lightly found, as
it requires clear and convincing evidence that the trial court
misapplied the law or failed to follow proper legal procedures. We
will not usurp the trial court’s factfinding function.
Paroly v. Paroly, 876 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal quotation
marks, brackets, and citations omitted).
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Degenhardt v. Dillon Co., 669 A.2d 946, 950 (Pa. 1996) (quotation
omitted).
At the hearing, Wife testified that she was particularly stressed the
morning of the conference and became more so as the conference progressed.
Eventually, Wife conceded, she signed the agreement, testifying that she
would have been willing to sign anything to get out of the conference.
Moreover, much of Wife’s testimony concerning duress was contrasted by the
master, who testified that there was no undue coercion or duress applied
toward Wife in order to get her to agree to the divorce settlement. Based on
this, the trial court determined that Wife had not met her burden of proving
that she should not be bound to the agreement due to duress, and Wife does
not point us to any facts that would compel us to disturb the trial court’s
factual determination.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/16/2019
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