Com. v. Singletary, D. ( 2023 )

J-S43019-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
DAVID SINGLETARY :
:
Appellant : No. 589 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 10, 2020,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007831-2018.
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MARCH 31, 2023
Following his non-jury conviction of possessing a firearm by a prohibited
person,1 David Singletary appeals, nunc pro tunc, from the judgment of
sentence imposing three to six years of incarceration. For the reasons below,
we affirm.
Singletary and his uncle, Demetrius Singletary (“Uncle”), shared a
townhouse in Philadelphia. In mid-September 2018, the trial court issued a
protection-from-abuse order (“PFA”) against Singletary in favor of Uncle. A
week later, on September 20, Uncle called 911 to report that Singletary had
a gun in the home and was violating the PFA.
When officers arrived, two of them positioned themselves behind the
townhouse. Two other officers knocked on the front door, where Uncle
greeted them. He informed the police that Singletary had just fled through a
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
J-S43019-22
backdoor in the basement. Uncle invited the two officers to accompany him
through the house and into the basement. The officers who remained outside
detained Singletary.
“The basement was a common area that contained a shelf at the bottom
of the steps, a mantlepiece for an old fireplace, a washer, dryer, couches, a
bed sectioned off with some sheets, and some storage.” Trial Court Opinion,
4/22/22, at 2. The “officers saw a loaded Glock with an additional magazine
partially stuffed into [the] couch cushion, as well as scales and hundreds of
empty and unused containers. Officers held the scene until they obtained a
search warrant to seize the items.” Id.
Police charged Singletary with unlawful possession of the gun and other
offenses, irrelevant to this appeal.
Singletary moved to suppress the evidence, because police “entered his
private space without permission and/or a warrant.” Motion to Suppress
Physical Evidence at 2. They “entered his private area without knocking or
announcing their entry and, due to said unlawful entry, are alleged to have
observed a firearm and illegal narcotics.” Id. Thus, Singletary claimed the
police performed a warrantless search of the basement and in violation of the
knock-and-announce rule.
After the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth argued the police did
not need a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement to enter the
basement with Uncle, because they were not there to conduct an evidentiary
search. See N.T., 1/24/23, at 45.
-2-
J-S43019-22
The suppression court denied Singletary’s motion from the bench. See
id. at 50. In compliance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I), the suppression court
placed its factual findings and conclusions of law on the record. Included
therein, the court said:
The [officers’] entry into the basement was not for
purposes of securing any drug-related evidence, but it was
to locate the alleged violator of the [PFA], as well as the
person who allegedly, at that point, the officers had
reasonable suspicion to believe had a gun.
The officers were operating within their authority
under the law.
Id. at 49.
In other words, the suppression court rejected Singletary’s theory that
the officers conducted a warrantless search. The court ruled the police were
simply there in response to Uncle’s report of a PFA violation. Thus, the court
never reached the issue of whether Uncle had actual or apparent authority to
consent to a search of the basement.
The matter immediately proceeded to a bench trial. The court convicted
and sentenced Singletary as described above. This appeal followed.
Singletary raises two appellate issues:
1. Whether the court was in error in denying the motion
to suppress.
2. Whether the verdict was contrary to law and
insufficient to find [Singletary] guilty of VUFA § 6105,
possession of a firearm prohibited.
-3-
J-S43019-22
Singletary’s Brief at 8. We address Singletary’s second issue first, because a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, if successful, results in discharge.
Singletary argues that the Commonwealth offered insufficient evidence
to convict him of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited from doing
so. In his view, the evidence did not “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
[he] resided in the basement where the firearm was found and that he had
intent to exercise dominion and control over the firearm.” Id. at 18.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we face “a question of
law.” Commonwealth v. Chambers, 188 A.3d 400, 409 (Pa. 2018).
Accordingly, our standard of review is “de novo.” Id. We view the “evidence
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, and
we draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the Commonwealth’s favor.”
Id. “Through this lens, we must ascertain whether the Commonwealth proved
all of the elements of the crime at issue beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.Critically, “the Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of
wholly circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 956 A.3d
386, 392 (Pa. 2013). When sitting as the fact finder, the trial court is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence. See id.Explaining Singletary’s conviction on the possession-by-a-prohibited-
person charge, the learned Judge Barbara A. McDermott, writing for the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, opined as follows:
To sustain a conviction for possession of a firearm [by
a] prohibited [person], the Commonwealth must prove that
a defendant possessed a firearm and was previously
-4-
J-S43019-22
convicted of an offense enumerated in 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
6105(b). Commonwealth v. Williams, 911 A.2d 548,
550-551 (Pa. Super. 2006). Possession may be proved
entirely through circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth
v. Buford, 101 A.3d 1182, 1189-1190 (Pa. Super. 2014).
“Physical possession or control means the knowing exercise
of power over a weapon . . . which may be proven through
evidence of a direct, physical association between the
defendant and the weapon . . . or evidence of constructive
control.” Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86, 100
(Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hanson,
83 A.3d 1023, 1036-37 (Pa. 2013)). Constructive control
entails the ability to exercise a conscious dominion over the
firearm or controlled substance and the intent to do so.
Commonwealth v. Wright, 255 A.3d 542, 553 (Pa. Super.
2021), appeal denied, (internal citations omitted).
Constructive possession may be established by the totality
of the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 67
A.3d 817, 820 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Commonwealth
v. Brown, 48 A.3d 426, 430 (Pa. Super. 2012)).
The evidence established that [Singletary] was in
constructive possession of the firearm, because the firearm
was found near his ID in the basement, where he was
staying, and he was apprehended close to the firearm.
Police found [Singletary’s] firearm sticking out of a couch
cushion near his ID on the mantlepiece. [Singletary’s] ID
and the bed curtained-off from the rest of the basement
showed that he stayed in the basement. The basement has
a door allowing access to the back of the house where
[Singletary] was apprehended. In Commonwealth v.
Davis, 743 A.2d 946, 953-954 (Pa. Super. 1999), the
defendant was in constructive possession of contraband,
because his prescription bottle was nearby, even though the
contraband was in a common area. Similar to Davis,
[Singletary] was in constructive possession of the firearm,
[because it] was found near his ID in the basement where
he stayed. See Davis, 743 A.2d at 953-954 . . . Therefore,
[Singletary’s] conviction for VUFA § 6105 was sufficiently
supported by the evidence presented at trial.
-5-
J-S43019-22
Trial Court Opinion, 4/22/22, at 5-6. We agree with the above, well-reasoned
opinion and adopt it as our own. Singletary’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue
is meritless.
Turning to his other claim of error, Singletary contends the suppression
court incorrectly refused to suppress the gun. He claims Uncle “did not have
authority to allow the police to search . . . the basement, and there were no
exigent circumstances to have prevented the officers from getting a search
warrant.” Singletary’s Brief at 13.
Our scope and standard of review for orders denying suppression are
well-settled. “Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression
court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much
of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649,
654 (Pa. 2010). We review legal conclusions de novo. See id.The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides
that, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
. . . .” Pursuant to that Amendment, warrantless searches “are presumptively
unreasonable, subject only to specifically established exceptions.”
Commonwealth v. Wilmer, 194 A.3d 564, 567-568 (Pa. 2018) (quotations
and citations omitted).
“One exception to the warrant requirement is a consent search.”
Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 257 A.3d 1, 9 (Pa. Super. 2020), reargument
-6-
J-S43019-22
denied (Feb. 11, 2021), appeal denied, 259 A.3d 883 (Pa. 2021). A third
party may consent to a warrantless search, even when the defendant is not
present, if the third party has actual and apparent authority to consent. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Basking, 970 A.2d 1181 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)).
Because a consent search is an exception to the warrant requirement,
Uncle’s authority to consent would be an issue, if the police had conducted a
warrantless search of the basement. The suppression court ruled they had
not. See N.T., 4/22/22, at 45-50. Instead, the suppression court concluded
the police were in the basement to apprehend Singletary for violated the PFA.
Singletary did not challenge that ruling on appeal. He therefore waived
the issue of whether the suppression court erred in concluding there was no
search prior to the officers getting a warrant. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (“No
question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions
involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The
argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be
argued; and shall have at the head of each part — in distinctive type or in
type distinctively displayed — the particular point treated therein, followed by
such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”).
Accordingly, we need not decide whether Uncle had actual or apparent
authority to consent to a warrantless search. Even if he lacked that authority,
the suppression court’s decision (i.e., that police did not perform a warrantless
-7-
J-S43019-22
search) would remain undisturbed. Hence, the same is true for its ultimate
conclusion that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
Singletary’s failure to appeal the suppression court’s basis for denying
his motion renders the question of consent moot. Therefore, we do not
consider it further in this direct appeal.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Nichols joins the memorandum.
Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/31/2023
-8-