In the Interest of: S.T.C., a Minor ( 2017 )

J-S61017-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.T.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.L.C., MOTHER :
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: No. 1332 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree Entered March 23, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000877-2016,
CP-51-DP-0002123-2014
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.T.H.-C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.L.C., MOTHER :
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: No. 1335 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree Dated March 23, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000878-2016,
CP-51-DP-0000314-2015
J-S61017-17
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.A.S.H.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.L.C., MOTHER :
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: No. 1338 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree Entered March 23, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000879-2016,
CP-51-DP-0000313-2015
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.T.H.-C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.L.C., MOTHER :
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:
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: No. 1340 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree Entered March 23, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000880-2016,
CP-51-DP-0002122-2014
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.S.A.H.-C., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.L.C., MOTHER :
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: No. 1342 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree Entered March 23, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000881-2016,
CP-51-DP-0002120-2014
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BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., RANSOM, J., and PLATT*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED OCTOBER 19, 2017
Appellant, S.L.C. (“Mother”), files this appeal from the decrees entered
March 23, 2017, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, by the
Honorable Allan L. Tereshko, accepting Mother’s Voluntary Relinquishment of
Parental Rights to her five minor children, S.T.C. (“Child 1”), born in May of
2014; S.T.H.-C. (“Child 2”), born in April of 2006; S.A.S.H.-C. (“Child 3”),
born in August of 2009; Sa.T.H.-C. (“Child 4”), born in November of 2011;
and S.S.A.H.-C. (“Child 5”), born in May of 2008 (collectively, the “Children”),
terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children, and changing the
Children’s goal to adoption.1, 2 After review, we affirm the trial court’s
decrees.3
In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court set forth the
factual and procedural history of this matter, which the record evidence
supports. As such, we adopt it herein and for the purpose of further appellate
review. Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 6/7/17, at 3-13.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 J.F. is the father of Child 1. W.H. is the father of Child 2, Child 3, Child 4
and Child 5. Both J.F. and W.H.’s parental rights were involuntarily terminated
by decree the same day. Neither J.F. nor W.H. has filed notices of appeal with
regard to any child.
2Mother has two other children in DHS custody that are not subject to this
appeal.
3 This Court consolidated these appeals by Order dated May 23, 2017.
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By way of background, the family became known to DHS on July 15,
2014, when DHS received a General Services Report, which alleged that the
Maternal Grandmother of the Children had physically abused Child 1. Id. at
3. On August 8, 2014, in-home services were implemented through the
Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) Catholic Social Services. Id. Child 1,
Child 4, and Child 5 were adjudicated dependent on September 15, 2014. Id.
at 5. Child 2 and Child 3 were adjudicated dependent on February 26, 2015.
Id. at 11. Permanency review hearings were held on April 13, 2015, July 6,
2015, and November 9, 2015. Id. at 10-12. The first termination hearing
was held on October 13, 2016, before the Honorable Allan L. Tereshko. Id.
at 14. On this date, prior to the hearing, and after consultation with her
attorney, Mother signed a Petition for Voluntary Relinquishment of Parental
Rights and a Petition to Confirm Consent. Id. at 1-2. The trial court took this
under consideration, and held the matter in abeyance to await the expiration
of the period of time in which Mother could withdraw her voluntary
relinquishment. Id. at 21. DHS filed the Petition for Voluntary Relinquishment
of Parental Rights and a Petition to Confirm Consent on December 21, 2016,
and a hearing on the petition was held on March 23, 2017. Id. at 2. At both
hearings, the trial court heard testimony from Tracy McNair, the CUA social
worker. Mother was present for both hearings, but did not testify on her own
behalf.
On March 23, 2017, the trial court entered decrees granting Voluntary
Termination of Parental Rights for the Children as to Mother, and changed the
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Children’s permanency goals to adoption. Mother timely filed notices of appeal
and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion
on June 7, 2017.
On appeal, Mother, through counsel, raises the following issue for our
review:
Did the [trial] [c]ourt err as a matter of law and abuse its
discretion in refusing to allow [M]other to revoke her Voluntary
Relinquishment of Parental Rights which were executed more than
thirty (30) days prior to the Termination of Parental Rights hearing
but to which she testified were signed under duress and threat by
the CUA case manager, that a Dependent Petition would be filed
for a minor child in her care and uninvolved with [DHS][?]
Mother’s Brief, at 3.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Further, as set forth by our Supreme Court:
A party seeking to disturb a termination decree must show that
the consent given to terminate parental rights was not intelligent,
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voluntary and deliberate. See Susko Adoption Case, 363 Pa. 78,
83, 69 A.2d 132, 135 (1949) (“consent prescribed by the Adoption
Act is a parental consent that is intelligent, voluntary and
deliberate.”); accord Chambers Appeal, [452 Pa. 149, 153, 305
A.2d 360, 362 (1973) ] ...; In re Fritz, 460 Pa. 265, 333 A.2d
466 (1975).
In re M.L.O., 490 Pa. at 240, 416 A.2d at 89–90.
Mother argues the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its
discretion by refusing to allow Mother to revoke her voluntary relinquishment
of parental rights, which she maintains were signed under duress and threat
by the CUA case manager. Mother’s Brief, at 5. Mother further argues the
CUA case manager threatened that, unless Mother signed a voluntary
relinquishment, a dependency petition would be filed for a minor child in
Mother’s care who was not involved with DHS. Id.
At the October 13, 2016 hearing, Tanesha Clement, Assistant City
Solicitor representing DHS, stated on the record that Mother signed a
voluntary relinquishment of parental rights petition moments before the
hearing. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 10/13/16, at 7. Ms. Clement requested
that Mr. McNair testify for the purpose of establishing grounds for involuntary
termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children, and asked the trial
court to hold its decision in abeyance until the voluntary relinquishment for
the Children matured. Id.
At the March 23, 2017 hearing, the trial court again heard testimony
from Mr. McNair. Mr. McNair testified he was present when Mother signed the
Petitions for Voluntary Relinquishment of Parental Rights and the Consent of
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Birth Mother. N.T., 3/27/17, at 27. Mr. McNair further testified that Mother
did not appear to be under the influence, Mother appeared to understand both
what she was reading and what Mr. McNair communicated to her, and that
Mother spoke with her attorney before signing the voluntary relinquishment
petition. Id. at 28. Mr. McNair stated that he did not promise Mother anything
in return for signing the petitions and that he neither threatened nor pressured
Mother. Id. at 29. Mr. McNair opined that Mother signed the petitions of her
own free will and volition. Id. Mr. McNair stated that Mother contacted him
via telephone and told him that she wished to revoke her consent, whereupon
he advised Mother to put her wishes in writing and contact her attorney. Id.
at 30-31.
At issue in this case is the application of Section 2711 of the Adoption
Act. This Court has explained,
“[T]he interpretation and application of a statute is a question of
law that compels plenary review to determine whether the court
committed an error of law.” Wilson v. Transport Ins. Co., 889
A.2d 563, 570 (Pa. Super. 2005). “As with all questions of law,
the appellate standard of review is de novo and the appellate
scope of review is plenary.” In re Wilson, 879 A.2d 199, 214
(Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc).
In re Adoption of J.A.S., 939 A.2d 403, 405 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 954 A.2d 577 (Pa. 2008).
Section 2711 provides, in relevant part:
§ 2711. Consents necessary to adoption.
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(a) General rule. -- Except as otherwise provided in this
part, consent to an adoption shall be required of the
following:
...
(3) The parents or surviving parent of an adoptee who
has not reached the age of 18 years.
...
(c) Validity of consent. -- No consent shall be valid if it
was executed prior to or within 72 hours after the birth of
the child. A putative father may execute a consent at any
time after receiving notice of the expected or actual birth of
the child. Any consent given outside this Commonwealth
shall be valid for purposes of this section if it was given in
accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction where it was
executed. A consent to an adoption may only be
revoked as set forth in this subsection. The revocation
of a consent shall be in writing and shall be served
upon the agency or adult to whom the child was
relinquished. The following apply:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (3):
...
(ii) For a consent to an adoption executed by a birth
mother, the consent is irrevocable more than 30
days after the execution of the consent.
(2) An individual may not waive the revocation period
under paragraph (1).
(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the following apply:
(i) An individual who executed a consent to an
adoption may challenge the validity of the
consent only by filing a petition alleging fraud
or duress within the earlier of the following time
frames:
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(A) Sixty days after the birth of the child or
the execution of the consent, whichever
occurs later.
...
(ii) A consent to an adoption may be invalidated
only if the alleged fraud or duress under
subparagraph (i) is proven by:
...
(B) clear and convincing evidence in all other
cases.
...
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711 (internal emphasis added).
In In re Adoption of J.A.S., supra, this Court stated:
Significantly, [ ] Section [2711] describes the timeline for
revocation of a consent to adoption, as well as a challenge
to its validity (and only on the grounds of fraud or duress).
This Section further makes clear that a revocation and/or a
challenge to the validity of a consent to adoption must be in
conformity with the Act.
...
Hence the statute renders a consent to adoption irrevocable
more than thirty (30) days after execution. See 23
Pa.C.S.A. §2711(c)(1)(ii). 2 Additionally, the statute
precludes a challenge to the validity of the consent to
adoption after sixty (60) days following the birth of the child
or the execution of the consent, whichever occurs later, and
only upon the grounds of fraud or duress. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2711(c)(3)(i)(A).
_______________________________________________
2 Nothing in the statutes presupposes the “validity” of the
consent.
In re Adoption of J.A.S., 939 A.2d at 407-408.
In its opinion, the trial court found that Mother’s consent was intelligent,
voluntary, and deliberate. TCO, at 22. Further, neither Mother nor her
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attorney made any attempt to revoke that consent in writing as required. Id.The trial court concluded:
The uncontradicted evidence is that Mother was competent
when explained the voluntary relinquishments. She was
explained the impact of the relinquishments. The evidence
is uncontested that the witness who observed believed her
to be fully informed of the impact of the relinquishments
both in terms of terminating her parental rights and in terms
of how such a document might affect the consideration of
placement of other children going forward, in that, if her
rights were involuntary terminated, it could be considered
by operation of law as a factor effecting the placement of
[the C]hildren, another child going forward could be
considered as an aggravating circumstance which is a
matter not within any discretion of the Court but a matter
entered by operation of law.
The test is not whether she made a phone call to someone.
The test is, did she file a written retraction of that
statement. She was represented by current counsel at the
time. Neither counsel nor Mother filed such a retraction.
The statute is quite clear that the only way a retraction can
be executed is by a written submission which is filed with
the Court within the 30[-]day period allowed by law.
Mother's execution of the voluntary relinquishment of [the
C]hildren is deemed to be final and irrevocable, absent such
a filing. Therefore, as a matter of law, [M]other's rights to
[the C]hildren for whom she executed such document are
terminated.
TCO, at 23-24 (internal citations omitted).
The trial court determined Mr. McNair testified credibly that, at the time
she signed the voluntary relinquishment petitions, Mother was not under the
influence of any drugs or alcohol, understood the documents, and what he
communicated to her regarding voluntary relinquishment of her parental
rights. Id. at 21. The trial court further determined Mr. McNair credibly
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testified he received a phone call from Mother where she expressed her wish
to revoke her consent, and that he advised her during that same call to submit
a written request, and to contact her attorney. Id. at 22. We defer to a trial
court’s determination of credibility, absent an abuse of discretion, and discern
no such abuse in its finding Mr. McNair’s testimony credible. In re M.G., 855
A.2d 68, 73-74. Moreover, the competent evidence in the record supports the
trial court’s determinations that Mother’s consent was intelligent, voluntary,
and deliberate, and that neither Mother, nor her attorney made any attempts
to revoke Mother’s consent in writing, as required by statute. Accordingly, we
can discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s conclusion.
See id. Therefore, we affirm the decrees accepting Mother’s Voluntary
Relinquishment of Parental Children to Children, terminating Mother’s Parental
Rights to Children, and changing the Children’s Goal to Adoption.
Decrees affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/19/2017
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