In The Interest of: T.L.H., a Minor ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: T.L.H., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: F.D., FATHER
No. 3997 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree Entered November 28, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Domestic Relations at No(s):
CP-51-AP-0000496-2017
CP-51-DP-0000592-2015
FID: 51-FN-000492-2015
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 07, 2018
F.D. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered on November 28, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which involuntarily
terminated his parental rights to his minor child, T.L.H. (“Child”) (born in
March of 2013).1 Additionally, Father’s counsel has filed a petition to withdraw
and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). Upon review, we
grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the termination decree.
The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this
matter as follows:
[Mother] is the biological [m]other of [Child].
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1 T.A.H. (“Mother”) voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to Child by
separate decree entered by the trial court on the same date.
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[Father] is the biological [f]ather of [Child] and is listed as
the [f]ather on [] Child’s birth certificate.
[Mother] has another [c]hild currently under [the
Department of Human Services (DHS)] supervision: Z.H., [born
in February of 2014]….[2], [3]
On March 2, 2015, … [DHS] received a General Protective
Services (GPS) Report alleging that Mother left [] Children, [T.H.]
and Z.H.[,] in the care of their maternal grandmother, M.H.
[(“Maternal Grandmother”)], who was unable to care for them;
that Mother frequently left [] Children with either [M]aternal
[G]randmother … or other family and friends; and that Mother did
not want to take responsibility for parenting [] Children. The
Report also alleged that Mother recently left [] Children with a
family friend, who contacted the police, and that the police
requested that Mother retrieve them before they were taken to
DHS. The Report further alleged that there was no information
available regarding [] Children’s [f]athers, [F.D.] and N.I. This
Report was determined to be valid.
On March 2, 2015, DHS went to the home of [M]aternal
[G]randmother … who stated that Mother had retrieved [] Children
from the home and that the family’s whereabouts were unknown
to her. [Maternal Grandmother] provided DHS with the cellular
telephone number of Mother.
On March 2, 2015, DHS telephone [sic] Mother and notified
her of the GPS Report[.] Mother stated that she was with []
Children but not at home and that she would be able to meet with
DHS at [Maternal Grandmother’s] home on March 3, 2015.
On March 3, 2015, DHS went to [Maternal Grandmother’s]
home, but no one was present. DHS left a notification letter
requesting that Mother contact DHS regarding the safety of []
Children.
On March 3, 2015, DHS again telephoned Mother, who
stated that she had left [] Children in the care of one of their
paternal grandmothers, who she did not identify. Mother also
stated that she would be able to meet with DHS later on that day
____________________________________________
2 The record identifies N.I., a/k/a N.E., as the biological father of Z.H.
3 T.L.H. and Z.H. are referred to collectively herein as “Children”.
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at [Maternal Grandmother’s] home; subsequently, Mother failed
to do so.
By March 4, 2015, DHS was unable to contact Mother and
[Maternal Grandmother] via telephone because they did not
answer or return calls.
On March 7, 2015, [] Children’s maternal aunt, C.G.,
contacted DHS and stated that [] Children were in her care after
Mother left them on the porch without her knowledge or consent.
C.G. also stated that when she contacted Mother, Mother stated
that C.G. could care for [] Children. DHS instructed C.G. to take
[] Children to DHS on March 9, 2015.
On March 9, 2015, C.G. transported [] Children to DHS.
DHS obtained an [O]rder of Protective Custody (OPC) for []
Children. The Community Umbrella Agency (CUA)[,] Turning
Points for Children (TPFC)[,] placed [] Children in [f]oster [c]are.
As of March 9, 2015, Father … was incarcerated at
Montgomery County Correctional Facility for violation of
probation.
A Shelter Care Hearing was held on March 11, 2015[,] for
[Child] before the Honorable Jonathan Q. Irvine. The [OPC] was
lifted and legal custody transferred to DHS, and placement of Child
to [f]oster [c]are. Visitation is set forth as Mother to have
supervised visits with Child at the Agency. Child is safe as of
3/10/2015.
An [a]djudicatory [h]earing was held for [] Child on March
19, 2015, before … [Judge] Irvine. Legal [c]ustody of [] Child
remains with DHS, and physical custody of [] Child shall continue
in [f]oster [c]are through CUA [TPFC]. Child is [a]djudicated
[d]ependent. Mother’s visitation continued as supervised as
arranged by Agency. Child is doing well, and DHS/CUA [is] to
apply for Child’s birth certificate, if necessary, and make [an]
effort to place Child with sibling. Mother [was] referred to [a
Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU)] for assessment, [and a] full drug
and alcohol screen dual diagnosis. Father is … currently
incarcerated in Montgomery County Facility #31632285.
On March 30, 2015, CUA held a Single Case Plan (SCP)
[m]eeting. The parental objective for Father … was to participate
in CUA services. Mother participated in the SCP [m]eeting. Father
did not participate in the SCP [m]eeting.
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A [p]ermanency [r]eview [h]earing was held on June 17,
2015, before the Juvenile Court [h]earing [o]fficer, Alexis Ciccone.
The [c]ourt ordered the legal custody of [] Child to remain with
DHS, and placement to continue in [f]oster [c]are. Child is
referred for forthwith medical evaluation. Mother is referred to
CEU for assessment, full drug and alcohol screen, dual diagnosis….
On November 9, 2015, CUA held a[n] [SCP] [m]eeting. The
parental objectives for Father … were to secure stable housing and
to maintain employment. Parents failed to participate in the SCP
[m]eeting.
A continuation of the case was granted on December 9,
2015, because Child Advocate was not available, and CUA [TPFC]
failed to appear at the [h]earing. Child [was] to remain as
committed.
On February 22, 2016, CUA held a[n] [SCP] [m]eeting. The
parental objectives for Father … were to contact CUA and to
participate in CUA services. Mother participated in the SCP
[m]eeting. Father failed to participate in the SCP [m]eeting….
On August 23, 2016, CUA held a[n] [SCP] [m]eeting. The
parental objectives for Father … were to contact CUA and to
participate in CUA services. All [p]arents failed to participate in
the SCP [m]eeting.
A continuation of the case was granted by the [c]ourt on
August 25, 2016, because the Honorable Vincent W. Furlong
recused himself from hearing the case because he previously
represented [] Child.
A continuation of the case was granted by the [c]ourt on
October 4, 2016, because Mother’s counsel was not available for
the hearing.
On November 16, 2016, CUA held a[n] [SCP] [m]eeting.
The parental objectives for Father … were to contact CUA and to
participate in CUA services. Mother participated in the SCP
[m]eeting, however, both [f]athers did not participate in the SCP
[m]eeting.
A continuation of the case was granted by the [c]ourt on
November 22, 2016, because Father’s counsel requested the
matter be heard by a [j]udge. Child is safe as of 11/21/2016.
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A Permanency Review hearing was held on January 12,
2017, before … [Judge] Irvine. The [c]ourt ordered the legal
custody of [] Child to remain with DHS, and placement to continue
in [f]oster [c]are through Children’s Services. Child may be
moved to a pre-adoptive home prior to the next [c]ourt date by
agreement of CUA and Child Advocate. Mother is re-referred to
CEU for assessment, dual diagnosis and 3 randoms before next
[c]ourt date. Supervised visitations with Mother and Father shall
occur at the Agency. CUA is to complete a home assessment in
Mother’s home. Child is safe as of 1/05/2017.
On April 9, 2017, Father was arrested and charged with
manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture
or deliver a controlled substance in violation of the Controlled
Substance Act (CSA), intentional possession of a controlled
substance by a person not registered under the CSA and
conspiracy.
A Permanency Review Hearing was held on May 17, 2017,
before the Honorable Allan L. Tereshko. The [c]ourt ordered the
legal custody of [] Child to remain with DHS, and placement to
continue in [f]oster [c]are through [TPFC]. Child is doing well.
[DH]S did [a Parent Locator Search (PLS)] on Father currently
incarcerated at [Community Education Center (CEC)] Hoffman,
PP#970750. Case continued due to Mother now contesting [the]
hearing. Child to remain as committed, and is safe as of
5/09/2017.
A Permanency Review Hearing was held on September 20,
2017, before … [Judge] Tereshko. The [c]ourt ordered the legal
custody of [] Child to remain with DHS, and placement to continue
in [f]oster [c]are through [TPFC]. All parties to sign voluntary
relinquishment petitions within 20 days.
Terminations Hearings – 9/20/2017 and 11/28/2017
On September 20, 2017, this [c]ourt held the first hearing
as to the Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights and Goal
Change Petitions filed on May 1, 2017, against Mother and Father.
The parents did not attend the hearing[;] however, both were
represented by their respective attorneys.
Megan Fitzpatrick, counsel for DHS, requested all attorneys
to stipulate to the Statements of Facts, and if the witness were
called to testify, she would testify consistent with the Statement
of Facts as it relates to Mother and both fathers and the single
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case objectives, and the current status of goal for adoption at this
time. All attorneys present stipulated on the record.
Alisha Stewart, Case Manager, CUA [TPFC], was the first
witness to testify. She noted [] Children are placed in a pre-
adoptive [f]oster [h]ome through the Agency, and she last saw
[Child] and his sibling, Z.H., in the home on 9/19/2017. Ms.
Stewart testified reunification with Mother has been ruled out
because Mother has not been consistent with her SCP objectives,
and desires to sign Voluntary Relinquishment documents
regarding her parental rights.
Ms. Stewart testified as to Father[,] … who was currently
incarcerated at a Montgomery County Correctional Facility, [that]
she spoke to him on the telephone and he desired to signed [sic]
Voluntary Relinquishment documents for [] Child. She testified
Father has not had consistent contact with [] Child, and [] Child
would not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were
terminated.
Jessica Estevez, Case Manager Supervisor, CUA [TPFC], was
the next witness to testify. She noted she is the current
Supervisor on this case and that [] Children came into care in
March 201 [sic], because Mother had left them with a family
member. She noted that Mother was not consistent with visiting
her Children. Mother did not comply with the SCP objectives. As
to Father, Ms. Estevez testified that neither of the [f]athers were
involved with [] Children’s care.
This [c]ourt then closed the evidentiary record as to both
Children and agreed to hold the matter under advisement until []
Mother and Father sign Voluntary Relinquishments and gave it a
60 day review date.
On November 28, 2017, this [c]ourt held the second hearing
as to the Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights and Goal
Change Petitions filed on May 1, 2017, against Mother and Father.
Both Mother and Father attended the hearing, and both were
represented by their respective attorneys.
Caitlin Dustin, counsel for DHS noted that Mother had signed
the Voluntary Relinquishment documents on September 29, 2017,
and did not file a written revocation to DHS to revoke those
documents. This [c]ourt found that Mother’s execution of the
documents were done of her own free will and no promises were
made. Mother did not file written retractions, and by operation of
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law, Mother’s parental rights as to both of her Children were
terminated at this hearing.
[] Father … testified he did not want to voluntarily terminate
his parental rights to [] Child…. Therefore, this [c]ourt proceeded
on the involuntary termination on the record as it was developed
at the last hearing on September 20, 2017. The [c]ourt found []
Child was not in Father’s care at the time of placement in DHS
custody, and concluded Sections 2511(a)(1) and (2) were
satisfied. The [c]ourt also found that it would be in the best
interest of [] Child for Father’s parental rights to be terminated,
and the goal be changed to adoption for [] Child.
Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 2/1/18, 2-12 (citations to record omitted).
The trial court issued a decree dated November 28, 2017, terminating
Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and
(b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938. On December 7, 2017,
Father filed a timely notice of appeal. In lieu of filing a Rule 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal, Father’s counsel filed a
statement of intent to file an Anders brief.
On March 8, 2018, counsel filed with this Court a petition to withdraw
and Anders brief. Before reaching the merits of Father’s appeal, we must
first address counsel’s request to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Rojas,
874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“‘When faced with a purported Anders
brief, this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without
first passing on the request to withdraw.’”) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Smith, 700 A.2d 1301, 1303 (Pa. Super. 1997)). “In In re V.E., … 611 A.2d
1267 ([Pa. Super.] 1992), this Court extended the Anders principles to
appeals involving the termination of parental rights.” In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1,
3 (Pa. Super. 2014). To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:
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1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy
of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the
[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel
or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy
of the court’s attention.
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
banc) (citing Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super.
2009)). With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform
the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdraw, this Court has
held that counsel must attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter
sent to their client advising him or her of their rights. Commonwealth v.
Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Additionally, an Anders brief must comply with the following
requirements:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record;
(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes
arguably supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous;
and
(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
In the instant matter, counsel has filed a petition to withdraw, certifying
that she has reviewed the case and determined that Father’s appeal is wholly
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frivolous. Counsel also has filed a brief that includes a summary of the history
and facts of the case, the issues raised by Father, and counsel’s assessment
of why those issues are meritless, with citations to relevant legal authority.
Counsel has attached to her brief a copy of her letter to Father, advising him
that he may obtain new counsel or raise additional issues pro se. Accordingly,
counsel has substantially complied with the requirements of Anders and
Santiago. See Commonwealth v. Reif, 117 A.3d 777, 781 (Pa. Super.
2015) (observing that substantial compliance with the Anders requirements
is sufficient). We, therefore, may proceed to review the issues outlined in the
Anders brief. In addition, we must “conduct an independent review of the
record to discern if there are any additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked
by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super.
2015) (footnote omitted).
Counsel’s Anders brief lists the following in the section entitled
Statement of the Questions Involved:
A. Whether the trial court erred in involuntarily terminating []
Father’s parental rights pursuant to [sections] 2511(a)(1),
2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5), [and] 2511(a)(8)[,] where it was not
supported by clear and convincing evidence when [] Father
completed a substantial portion of his FSP/SCP goals?[4]
B. Whether the trial court erred in involuntarily terminating []
Father’s parental rights where there was a bond between []
Father and Child and the termination of parental rights would
____________________________________________
4 Counsel is incorrect in stating that Father’s parental rights were terminated
pursuant to sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) of the Adoption Act. As
discussed in greater detail, infra, Father’s parental rights were terminated
pursuant to sections 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b).
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have a negative effect on the developmental, physical and
emotional needs of [Child]?
Anders brief at 5.
We consider these issues mindful of our well-settled standard of review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
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In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant
to sections 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). We need only agree with the trial court
as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), as well as section 2511(b), in
order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc). Here, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under sections
2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
…
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent.
…
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §
2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
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repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations
omitted).
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental
duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child
needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs,
physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive
interest in the development of the child. Thus, this [C]ourt has
held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires
affirmative performance.
In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Moreover, this Court has previously stated:
A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the
parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in
resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-
child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for
a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental
responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her
physical and emotional needs.
Id. Where a parent does not “exercise reasonable firmness in declining to
yield to obstacles, his [parental] rights may be forfeited.” In re A.S., 11 A.3d
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473, 481 (Pa. Super. 2010). With respect to the application of section
2511(a)(2) to an incarcerated parent, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held:
[I]ncarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be
determinative of the question of whether a parent is incapable of
providing “essential parental care, control or subsistence” and the
length of the remaining confinement can be considered as highly
relevant to whether “the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
parent,” sufficient to provide grounds for termination pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).
S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 830 (Pa. 2012).
Instantly, the trial court found the evidence to be “clear, direct, weighty,
and convincing that Father cannot, nor will [he] be able to[,] remedy the
conditions which brought Child into [the] [c]ourt’s supervision. Nor is the
[c]ourt persuaded that Father will be able to fulfill his parental responsibilities
in the future.” TCO at 16. The court emphasized Father’s incarceration and
lack of contact with Child. Id. at 14-16.
After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by terminating Father’s parental
rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2). Child was never in the care of Father.
In fact, Father was unable to care for Child, as he was incarcerated for a large
portion of this case, and in the short period of time that he was out of custody,
he failed to reach out to DHS or attempt to have any contact with Child.
Moreover, at the termination hearing, DHS presented the testimony of Ms.
Stewart, indicating that she spoke to Father on the telephone and that he
expressed his desire to sign voluntary relinquishment documents for Child.
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Id. at 16. Ms. Estevez further testified that Father was not involved with
Child’s care. Id.
At the time the court entered its termination decree, on November 28,
2017, Child had been in foster care for nearly three years. During that time,
there is no evidence that Father attempted to make any contact with Child.
Thus, the record supports the finding of the trial court that Father has been
incapable of providing Child with the essential parental care, control, and
subsistence necessary for his mental and physical well-being, and that Father
is unable to remedy the causes of his parental incapacity. Father is not
entitled to relief.
We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(b). We have
discussed our analysis under section 2511(b) as follows:
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884
A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles
such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the
inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we
instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and
status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect
on the child of permanently severing that bond. However, in cases
where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and child,
it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. Accordingly, the
extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the
circumstances of the particular case.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations
omitted).
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Here, the trial court found that terminating Father’s parental rights
would best serve Child’s needs and welfare. See TCO at 16-18. The court
reasoned that there is no bond between Father and Child, and that Child will
not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights are terminated. Id. at
17. In support of its decision, the trial court stated that it “heard competent,
credible evidence from both Ms. Stewart and Ms. Estevez … regarding Father’s
absence in [] Child’s life. Both Agency workers provided credible, persuasive
testimony and opined [] Child would not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s
parental rights were terminated.” Id. After careful review, we again deem
the court’s position to be well-supported by the record, and we discern no
abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Accordingly, our independent review of Father’s claims demonstrates
that they do not entitle him to relief. Moreover, our review of the record does
not reveal any non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel. See Flowers, 113
A.3d at 1250. Therefore, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw, and affirm
the trial court’s decree.
Petition to withdraw granted. Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/7/18
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