In Re: Adoption of A.J.A.M., A Minor ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.J.A.M., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: A.M.C., FATHER
No. 309 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2015-A0078
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IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.J.M., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: A.M.C., FATHER
No. 310 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2015-A0079
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IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.J.A.M., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: A.M.C., FATHER
No. 311 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2015
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In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2015-A0080
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IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.J.A.M., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: A.S., MOTHER
No. 302 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 15, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2015-A0078
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IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.J.M., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: A.S., MOTHER
No. 303 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 15, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2015-A0079
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IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.J.A.M., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: A.S., MOTHER
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No. 304 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 15, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2015-A0080
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IN RE: ADOPTION OF: K.H.S., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: A.S., MOTHER
No. 305 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 15, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2015-A0081
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 29, 2016
In these consolidated appeals, A.M.C. (Father) and A.C. (Mother)
appeal from the December 15, 2015 decrees involuntarily terminating their
parental rights to their daughters, A.J.A.M.1, born in September of 2011,
and A.J.M., born in December of 2010, and their son, A.J.A.M.2, born in April
of 2010. In addition, Mother appeals from the December 15, 2015 decree
involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her son, K.H.S., born in
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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March of 2008, who is not the natural child of Father.1 Upon careful review,
we affirm.2
These appeals arise from the petitions for the involuntary termination
of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights filed by A.F.S. (Maternal
Grandmother) and A.G.S., Sr. (Maternal Grandfather) (collectively, Maternal
Grandparents) on April 17, 2015, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), and (8). On the same date, Maternal Grandparents filed petitions
for adoption of A.J.A.M.1, A.J.M., A.J.A.M.2, and K.H.S. (collectively, the
Children).
We summarize the factual and procedural history as follows. The
Children have lived since birth with Maternal Grandparents. N.T., 12/10/15,
at 35-37, 45. In December of 2010, Chester County Children and Youth
Services (CCCYS) became involved with the family due to A.J.M., the third
oldest child involved in this appeal, being born prematurely with illegal drugs
in her system. Id. at 25, 39, 42-43. A.J.M. was discharged from the
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1
On December 15, 2015, the orphans’ court issued a decree granting the
petition to confirm the consent of H.A.A., the putative father of K.H.S, filed
by Maternal Grandparents. He did not appeal.
2
We note that the Guardian ad litem filed briefs in these appeals in support
of the decrees involuntarily terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental
rights.
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hospital into Maternal Grandparents’ care, and CCCYS established a safety
plan that prohibited Mother from being alone with A.J.M.3 Id. at 30.
At that time, Mother and Father resided with Maternal Grandparents in
Phoenixville, in Chester County. Id. at 18, 26. Maternal Grandmother
implied in her testimony that, shortly after CCCYS became involved in
December of 2010, Father moved out of her home. Id. at 44.
Thereafter, in April of 2011, Mother left Maternal Grandparents’ home
with her sons, K.H.S. and A.J.A.M.2, and went to a hotel in Pottstown, in
Montgomery County. Id. at 35-37, 39, 41-42. After approximately two
weeks, Mother returned K.H.S. and A.J.A.M.2 to Maternal Grandparents. Id.
at 37, 39-40. Mother never resided with Maternal Grandparents again. 4 Id.
at 41-42.
In September of 2011, A.J.A.M.1., like her sister, was born
prematurely with illegal drugs in her system. At that time, the family safety
plans were transferred from CCCYS to Montgomery County Children and
Youth Services (MCCYS).5 N.T., 12/10/15, at 42-43. A.J.A.M.1 was
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3
In June of 2011, CCCYS expanded the safety plan to include K.H.S. and
A.J.A.M.2. N.T., 12/10/15, at 41.
4
By the time of the subject proceedings, Mother and Father resided together
in a two-bedroom apartment in Pottstown. N.T., 12/15/15, at 9.
5
The record suggests by then Maternal Grandparents resided in Pottstown,
where they continued to reside at the time of the subject proceedings. N.T.,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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discharged from the hospital into Maternal Grandparents’ care, and MCCYS
established a safety plan for that child. Id. at 43-44.
On April 23, 2012, Maternal Grandmother filed an emergency
complaint for custody with respect to the Children in the Montgomery
County Court of Common Pleas. By order dated May 30, 2012, the court
granted Maternal Grandmother sole physical and sole legal custody of
A.J.A.M.2, A.J.M., and A.J.A.M.1. By separate order the same date, the
court granted Maternal Grandmother sole physical and sole legal custody of
K.H.S.
Two years later, on April 17, 2015, Maternal Grandparents filed the
above-described termination petitions. The hearing was held on December
10, 2015, during which Maternal Grandmother and Maternal Grandfather
testified on their own behalf. Mother testified on her own behalf, and she
presented the testimony of N.F.-O., Father’s sister, and Charlene Williams,
Mother’s friend. The hearing was continued and concluded on December 15,
2015, during which Father testified on his own behalf.
At the conclusion of the testimonial evidence, the orphans’ court
placed its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record in open court.
See N.T., 12/15/15, at 109-135. By decrees dated December 15, 2015, the
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
12/10/15, at 18. Maternal Grandmother testified that, after Mother moved
out, she and Maternal Grandfather moved with the Children to a larger home
in Pottstown. Id. at 19-20.
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orphans’ court terminated Father’s and Mother’s parental rights pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).
On January 13, 2016, Father timely filed notices of appeal and concise
statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule
of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which this Court consolidated
sua sponte.6 In addition, on January 11, 2016, Mother timely filed notices of
appeal and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal, which
were also consolidated.
Father presents two questions for our review:
I. Did the [orphans’] court commit an error in terminating the
parental rights of Father to each of the Children, pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1), where the testimony at trial
demonstrated that Father had essentially been prevented from
having an opportunity to provide parental duties at all relevant
times?
II. Did the [orphans’] court commit an error by involuntarily
terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children where the
facts did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that
such termination was in the best interests of the Children as
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6
We note that the orphans’ court entered separate decrees terminating
Father’s parental rights to A.J.A.M.1, A.J.M., and A.J.A.M.2. Father
improperly filed only one notice of appeal and one concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal from the decrees. See Pa.R.A.P. 341, Note
(“Where, however, one or more orders resolves [sic] issues arising on more
than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of
appeal must be filed.”). However, because Father’s arguments on appeal
are identical as to each child, we discern no prejudice arising from his
procedural misstep. Therefore, we decline to quash Father’s appeal.
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contemplated by 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(b) but, to the contrary,
confirmed that a loving and positive bond exists between Father
and each of the Children[?]
Father’s brief at 2.
Mother presents one question for our review:
[Did] the [orphans’] court err[] when it terminated Mother’s
parental rights where the evidence presented was insufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence to demonstrate that
the needs and welfare of the Children would be promoted by
terminating parental rights[?]
Mother’s brief at 2.
We consider Father’s and Mother’s issues mindful of our well-settled
standard of review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
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Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The
burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights
are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
We conclude that the orphans’ court in this case properly terminated
Father’s and Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and
(b), which provide as follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing
of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose
of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has
refused or failed to perform parental duties.
...
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
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child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall
not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).7
We have explained,
To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the moving
party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct,
sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the
termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish
parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform
parental duties. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 510
(Pa. Super. 2006). In addition,
Section 2511 does not require that the parent
demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to
perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights
may be terminated pursuant to [s]ection 2511(a)(1)
if the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose
of relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to
perform parental duties.
In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 550 Pa. 595, 708 A.2d 88,
91 (Pa. 1998).
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform
parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing
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7
Notably, Mother concedes in her brief that the testimonial evidence
established that she failed to perform her parental duties during the six-
month period prior to the filing of the termination petitions. Therefore, in
this disposition, we review the decrees under Section 2511(a)(1) with
respect to Father’s parental rights only.
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parental rights, the court must engage in three lines
of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her
conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between
parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect
of termination of parental rights on the child
pursuant to Section 2511(b).
Id. at 92 (citation omitted).
In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Parental duty is defined as follows:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental
duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A
child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These
needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely
passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court
has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which
requires affirmative performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association with
the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty
requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place
of importance in the child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good
faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order
to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her
ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all
available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and
must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed
in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental
rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
others provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional
needs.
In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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Moreover,
It is incumbent upon a parent when separated from his child to
maintain communication and association with the child. This
requires an affirmative demonstration of parental devotion,
imposing upon the parent the duty to exert himself, to take and
maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.
In re G.P.−R., 851 A.2d 967, 976 (Pa. Super. 2004).
With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite
analysis as follows:
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884
A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated,
“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are
involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.”
In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern
the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost
attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that
bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a
bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no
bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super.
2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis
necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.
Id. at 63.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Instantly, the orphans’ court concluded that, for a period in excess of
six months preceding the filing of the termination petitions, Father and
Mother failed to perform their parental duties to the Children pursuant to
Section 2511(a)(1). Further, the court concluded that terminating Father’s
and Mother’s parental rights “will not sever any strong and existing bond
between the [C]hildren and their biological parents. . . .” N.T., 12/15/15, at
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134. The court concluded that terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental
rights will serve the Children’s needs and welfare pursuant to Section
2511(b).
Father argues on appeal that the court erred in terminating his
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) because Maternal
Grandparents prevented him “from having the kind of relationship he would
like to have with the Children.” Father’s brief at 11. Specifically, Father
asserts that Maternal Grandparents do not allow the Children to sleep over
at his apartment, and that his “ability to visit with the Children has
historically ‘been up and down’ and only ‘[w]hen the time [is] good for
them.’” Id.
The orphans’ court stated on the record in open court that it found
Maternal Grandmother “to be a credible witness in virtually every regard.”
N.T., 12/15/15, at 127. As such, the court found no “obstacle has been put
in the path of [Mother] or [Father] in terms of their children. It may not
have been as convenient as they would have liked it to be, but that doesn’t
make it an obstacle. You had the opportunity to exercise parental duty if
you had chosen to do it.” Id. at 127-128. The testimonial evidence
supports the court’s findings.
Maternal Grandmother testified on direct examination as follows:
Q. Have you made any offers to [Mother] or [Father] about
coming to the house and being involved with the children?
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A. The doors are open all the time. They know they can come
and go as they want. Their problem is that they always want to
come and take the kids, and I don’t trust them. Sometimes I let
them go; sometimes I question their motives.
They have an open invitation for Sunday dinner, and every
time they come to the house, I let them see the kids. And
[Father] has actually taken the kids to more things than
[Mother] has.
N.T., 12/10/15, at 46-47. On re-direct examination, Maternal Grandmother
testified that the Children are not a priority in Mother’s and Father’s lives.
Id. at 130. She testified:
Q. Do [Mother and Father] see the children based upon the
children’s schedule or what you would seem to think would be
their schedule?
A. Their schedule.
Id.
She continued on cross-examination by the Guardian ad litem:
Q. [A]s far as [Father] is concerned, he seeks out contact with
the children from time to time; correct?
A. Yes, he does.
Q. Approximately how frequent[ly] would you say he seeks out
this contact?
A. This year probably four or five times.
Q. And is there any regularity in that contact?
A. No. I just get a text from him, or I’ll get a call from [Mother]
saying he wants to see the kids, or he stops by the house and
asks if he can take them.
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N.T., 12/10/15, at 119. Maternal Grandmother testified on direct
examination that Father “comes around holidays, like Memorial Day or July
4th. He asks to take the kids to the Pottstown Parade, and I usually let
them go with him.”8 Id. at 52.
Father explained the reason for his infrequent visits this year in his
cross-examination by Maternal Grandparents’ counsel.
Q. [Y]ou heard testimony from [Maternal Grandparents] that
basically you’ve seen the kids, we’ll say, a handful of times in
the past year or two.
A. I heard them say that, yeah.
Q. Was that inaccurate?
A. Handful is like five. I seen [sic] them more than five times.
But also I was going three of these classes a week, plus one-on-
one a week, plus I had a parole officer in Montgomery County
that I had to go to twice a week, plus I had a parole officer in
Berks County I had to go to twice a week.[9] My days were, kind
of, heavy.
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8
Maternal Grandmother testified that the Pottstown Parade occurs on the
July 4th holiday. N.T., 12/10/15, at 52-53.
9
On inquiry by the orphans’ court, Father testified that he had been
released from prison in February of 2010, and he “was on the run” until
being re-incarcerated in January of 2013. N.T., 12/15/15, at 70, 72. Father
testified that he remained in prison until March 4, 2014, and that he served
this time between the Berks County and Montgomery County prisons. N.T.,
12/15/15, at 67, 70. He testified that he presently has one year remaining
on a probation sentence in Montgomery County for a crime involving the
possession of drugs. Id. at 68.
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And, again, when I go over there, I don’t like to have
somebody over me as well. . . . Like, I understand if they’re
there, they have to listen to them, and we have to go by things
they said, but there should be a little space for us. That’s what I
believe.
...
Q. For you it was more difficult to see the kids under [Maternal
Grandparents’] supervision, and you would have preferred that
they just let you have the kids?
A. Yeah. I would prefer they let me have my kids, yeah.
...
Q. So you described all the various appointments that you would
have during the week. Did those include on the weekends?
A. No.
Q. You were eight blocks away.[10] Did you ever in the evenings
just walk over to the house to see the kids?
A. Yes. Like, I walk by still all the time. If they’re not outside
and stuff -- when they’re outside, I talk to them all the time. I
just don’t go in and deal with them.
N.T., 12/15/15, at 28-30.
Father testified on cross-examination by the Guardian ad litem that he
never tried to work out a visitation schedule with Maternal Grandparents.
N.T., 12/15/15, at 51. Further, Father acknowledged that Maternal
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10
Upon his release from prison in March of 2014, Father lived eight blocks
away from Maternal Grandparents. N.T., 12/15/15, 30, 53-54. In
September of 2015, Father moved to his current apartment. Id. at 60.
Mother lives with Father and testified that their apartment is “[a] block or
two” away from Maternal Grandparents’ home. N.T., 12/10/15, at 236-237.
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Grandparents never told him not to contact them. Id. at 52-53. With
respect to whether he ever telephoned the Children, Father testified:
Q. Did you ever call the children and speak with them on the
phone?
A. Not lately.
Q. How often would you say that you have called them and
spoken with them on the phone?
A. Pretty much when I would be with [Mother] if we were cool,
and she would call because, again, I don’t really get along with
[Maternal Grandparents].
Id. at 56. Father testified that he last saw the Children on November 26,
2015, when he sent a text message to Maternal Grandmother and requested
that the Children visit him at his home. Id. at 57-58.
Based on the foregoing testimonial evidence, we discern no abuse of
discretion by the orphans’ court in finding that Maternal Grandparents did
not place obstacles in the path of Father’s performance of his parental
duties. The testimonial evidence supports the court’s finding that Father
chose not to exercise his parental duties soon after CCCYS became involved
with this family in December of 2010, through Maternal Grandmother’s
physical and legal custody award in May of 2012, and continuing to the time
of the filing of the termination petitions. During all this time, Father
displayed a “merely passive interest in the development” of the Children.
See In re B.,N.M., supra. Therefore, we reject Father’s issue with respect
to Section 2511(a)(1).
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We next consider whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion in
terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(b). Father argues the testimonial evidence does not support
termination because it demonstrates that a bond exists between him and the
Children. Mother argues the evidence was insufficient to support
termination because Maternal Grandparents did not present evidence
regarding whether a bond exists between her and the Children.
We have emphasized, in part:
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court
can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child,
and should also consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation marks and
citations omitted)). In addition, in considering the affection a child may
have for his or her natural parents, this Court has explained as follows:
[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent
simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is
not only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s
feelings were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis,
the analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics
as it is the rare child who, after being subject to neglect
and abuse, is able to sift through the emotional wreckage
and completely disavow a parent. . . . Nor are we of the
opinion that the biological connection between [the parent]
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and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when
considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a
parent, to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The
psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in
terms of the development of the child and its mental and
emotional health than the coincidence of biological or
natural parenthood.
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
The testimony of Maternal Grandmother demonstrates that
terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights will serve the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the Children.
Maternal Grandmother testified that the Children see her “[a]s their mom[,]”
and Maternal Grandfather“[a]s their dad.” N.T., 12/10/15, at 124. She
testified that the oldest child, K.H.S., then age seven, is doing well both at
home and in school. Id. at 59. She testified that A.J.M., nearly age five,
who needed many health services after birth, no longer needs the services
and is doing well. Id. at 64-68. She testified that Early Intervention
Services monitored the youngest child, A.J.A.M.1, then age four, for the first
year of her life, but that she never needed any services and is likewise doing
well. Id. at 68.
However, the second oldest child, A.J.A.M.2, then age five and in
kindergarten, has learning disabilities and anger issues, and he is diagnosed
with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. N.T., 12/10/15, at 61. Maternal
Grandmother testified that he has an Individualized Education Program
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involving speech and language. Id. She explained further that he receives
wraparound services at school, and that he is under treatment with a
psychologist. Id. Importantly, she testified that neither Mother nor Father
has asked about A.J.A.M.2’s services or whether they can participate in his
services. Id. at 115. In addition, Maternal Grandmother testified that
A.J.A.M.2 has made significant improvement since the beginning of the
school year. Id. at 63-64.
With respect to the Children’s bond with Father, Maternal Grandmother
testified that that they do not view him as a father figure, but more as a
playmate. N.T., 12/10/15, at 119-120. She testified that his daughters,
A.J.M. and A.J.A.M.1, call him by his first name. Id. at 112. She testified
that his son, A.J.A.M.2, has a stronger bond with Father than do his
daughters. Id.
With respect to the Children’s bond with Mother, Maternal
Grandmother testified that the oldest child, K.H.S, loves her, and that he
demonstrates this by sitting with her when she visits and being sad and
withdrawn when she leaves. Id. at 69, 118. She testified that A.J.A.M.2
has resentment towards Mother, and that he demonstrates this by kicking,
hitting, and fighting with Mother while she visits. Id. Significantly, Maternal
Grandmother testified that she observed Mother discipline her sons, K.H.S.
and A.J.A.M.2, by punching them in the chest on ten separate occasions.
Id. at 131, 136. With respect to Mother’s daughters, A.J.M. and A.J.A.M.1,
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Maternal Grandmother testified that they “don’t even know” Mother, and
that they call Mother by her first name. N.T., 12/10/15, at 69, 99.
Finally, Mother testified that she has been in and out of prison since
2012 for crimes related to drugs. N.T., 12/10/15, at 260, 282. She testified
that she was most recently incarcerated on December 18, 2014, and that
she was released on April 10, 2015. Id. at 214-215. Mother testified that,
in May of 2015, she began living in a halfway house, and, on September 9,
2015, she left the halfway house without permission. Id. at 222, 229-230.
She testified that she turned herself in on November 8, 2015, and, as a
result, she was re-incarcerated. Id. at 231. Mother remained incarcerated
at the time of the subject proceedings, and she was awaiting her sentencing
hearing. Id. at 243.
Based on the foregoing testimonial evidence, we reject Father’s and
Mother’s arguments with respect to Section 2511(b). Indeed, the
testimonial evidence demonstrates that the Children do not have a parent-
child bond with Father. Likewise, the evidence demonstrates that the
youngest three children do not have a parent-child bond with Mother. To
the extent that the evidence reveals that K.H.S. may have a parent-child
bond with Mother, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that it is not a
beneficial bond. We conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that involuntarily terminating Father’s and Mother’s
parental rights will serve the physical, emotional, and developmental needs
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and welfare of the Children. Accordingly, we affirm the decrees pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/29/2016
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