Interest of: C.C. Appeal of: Commonwealth ( 2014 )

J-A28001-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.C. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA : No. 290 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Order Entered December 19, 2012
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-JV-0001882-2012;
CP-51-JV-0001883-2012
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 03, 2014
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the order
entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which discharged
Appellee, C.C., from the probation imposed following his adjudication of
delinquency. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
On August 14, 2012, C.C. admitted to one count of IDSI against his
younger, male cousin (when C.C. was fifteen years old). The court
adjudicated C.C. delinquent and placed him on probation under the
supervision of the Philadelphia Juvenile Probation Department. Additionally,
the court ordered C.C. to undergo treatment at the Joseph J. Peters Institute
(“JJPI”); to have no unsupervised contact with minor children; to attend
school with no unexcused absences, lateness, cutting, or suspensions; to
stay away from the complainant; to undergo random drug screens; and to
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remain on GPS monitoring.
The court held a review hearing on October 18, 2012. At the review
hearing, C.C.’s probation officer informed the court that C.C. was doing very
well, earning high grades in school, and complying with probation. The
probation officer also indicated C.C. had a positive progress report from
JJPI.1 Based on C.C.’s progress, the probation officer asked the court to
remove GPS monitoring and to schedule a subsequent review hearing in
sixty days to determine whether to discharge C.C. from probation. The
probation officer explained the request for the sixty-day review hearing was
due to the implications of the Sexual Offender Notification and Registration
Act (“SORNA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10 et seq. (effective December
20, 2012).2 Counsel for C.C. joined the probation officer’s recommendation,
and the Commonwealth did not object to the removal of GPS monitoring or
the timeframe for the next review hearing. Consequently, the court
removed GPS monitoring and scheduled a review hearing for December 13,
1
The September 2012 JJPI progress report specified, inter alia, that C.C.
had completed four individual therapy sessions, took responsibility for his
actions and admitted the sexually inappropriate behavior, and was very
motivated and engaged in treatment. The report recommended C.C. to
continue sexual offense-specific treatment and to have no contact with the
complainant. The report classified C.C.’s risk of re-offending as “low to
medium.” The report estimated the length of C.C.’s needed treatment was
12-13 months.
2
Under SORNA, juveniles adjudicated delinquent on or after December 20,
2012, or juveniles adjudicated delinquent prior to that date but who are still
under delinquent supervision as of December 20, 2012, are subject to, inter
alia, lifetime sex offenders’ registration.
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2012.
At the December 13, 2012 review hearing, C.C.’s probation officer
informed the court that C.C. was complying with treatment, doing very well,
and “went above and beyond” in terms of satisfying his supervision
requirements. C.C.’s probation officer admitted C.C. still needed treatment
from JJPI. Based on C.C.’s progress, and to avoid the SORNA requirements,
C.C.’s counsel urged the court to discharge C.C. from probation and have
the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) file a dependency petition,
under which the court could order C.C. to continue treatment at JJPI. The
Commonwealth objected to C.C.’s release from probation. The court said it
wanted to hear from the complainant’s mother (C.C.’s aunt) before it made
a decision, so the court directed the Commonwealth to ascertain her wishes.
On December 19, 2012, the complainant’s mother appeared before the
court.3 The complainant’s mother explained her primary concern was for
C.C. to continue treatment. She expressed her belief in “second chances”
and did not want to subject C.C. to lifetime registration under SORNA, so
long as C.C. continued treatment. The court also admitted into evidence a
report from JJPI dated December 10, 2012. The report stated that C.C.
3
One day prior, the parties had appeared before the court, at which time
the Commonwealth represented that the complainant’s mother opposed
C.C.’s release. C.C.’s counsel advised the court that the Commonwealth had
failed to inform the complainant’s mother of the severity of SORNA’s
requirements and had told her instead that whether the court discharged
C.C. was “no big deal” and would not “affect [C.C.’s] life[.]” As a result, the
court rescheduled the hearing for the following day so it could hear directly
from the complainant’s mother.
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began treatment on August 31, 2012, and had completed twelve (12)
individual and six (6) group therapy sessions. The report specified, inter
alia, C.C. exhibited strong participation in therapy; had no unexcused
absences; has been eager to engage fully with treatment and has been very
open and honest in therapy; C.C. admitted his offense; C.C. has expressed a
desire to better understand his actions; and C.C. showed appropriate
empathy for the complainant. The report explained C.C.’s probation officer
recommended discharging C.C. from probation, and JJPI endorsed that
recommendation, with the understanding that C.C. would continue treatment
at JJPI until completed. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court
discharged C.C. from probation and ordered DHS to file a dependency
petition, under which C.C. is required to attend and complete sex offender
treatment at JJPI, attend school, have no unsupervised contact with minor
children, stay away from the complainant and his family, and submit to
random urine screens. The court made clear it would take appropriate
action if C.C. failed to comply with the court’s directives.
Two days later, the Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration
on December 21, 2012, which the court denied that day. The
Commonwealth timely filed a notice of appeal on January 18, 2013, and a
voluntary concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
The Commonwealth raises one issue for our review:
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WHERE [C.C.] PLEADED GUILTY TO [IDSI] AGAINST A
CHILD VICTIM AS A FELONY OF THE FIRST DEGREE, DID
THE [TRIAL] COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DISCHARGING HIM FROM PROBATION LESS THAN FIVE
MONTHS FOLLOWING HIS ADJUDICATION?
(Commonwealth’s Brief at 4).
The Commonwealth argues the court adjudicated C.C. delinquent
based on C.C.’s admission to IDSI against his younger, male cousin and
C.C.’s need for treatment and supervision. The Commonwealth asserts the
court directed C.C. to undergo treatment at JJPI, which projected the length
of treatment as 12-13 months. The Commonwealth maintains that at the
December 19, 2012 hearing, the Commonwealth, JJPI, C.C.’s probation
officer, C.C.’s counsel, the complainant’s mother, and the court agreed C.C.
still needed treatment, supervision, and rehabilitation. On this basis, the
Commonwealth contends C.C. is still a delinquent child pursuant to the
Juvenile Act when the court discharged C.C. from probation. The
Commonwealth claims the court’s determination that treating C.C. as a
dependent child rather than a delinquent child was erroneous, where C.C.
does not meet the definition of a dependent child. The Commonwealth
submits the court’s treatment of C.C. greatly reduced the court’s ability to
supervise C.C., as an adjudication of delinquency allows the court to place
the delinquent child under the supervision of a probation officer, whereas an
adjudication of dependency does not.
The Commonwealth avers the court’s decision to terminate C.C.’s
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probation also frustrated the purposes of the Juvenile Act to protect the
community, impose accountability for offenses committed, and develop
competencies to enable children to become responsible and productive
members of the community. The Commonwealth suggests the court ignored
these functions of the Juvenile Act and considered only C.C.’s best interests.
The Commonwealth emphasizes that the court discharged C.C.’s probation
solely to avoid the SORNA implications, a result the court cannot compel
simply because the court disagrees with the legislative determination that
SORNA mandates lifetime registration for juvenile sex offenders adjudicated
delinquent of certain sex offenses. The Commonwealth highlights that C.C.
knew about the implications of SORNA when he admitted to IDSI. The
Commonwealth concludes the court abused its discretion by discharging
C.C.’s probation, and this Court must reinstate C.C.’s delinquency probation.
We disagree.
Our review of a juvenile court’s disposition implicates the following
principles:
Our standard of review of dispositional orders in juvenile
proceedings is well settled. “The Juvenile Act grants broad
discretion to the court when determining an appropriate
disposition. We will not disturb a disposition absent a
manifest abuse of discretion.” In re R.D.R., 876 A.2d
1009, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2005) (internal citation omitted).
Moreover, “[a] petition alleging that a child is delinquent
must be disposed of in accordance with the Juvenile Act.
Dispositions which are not set forth in the Act are beyond
the power of the juvenile court.” In re J.J., 848 A.2d
1014, 1016-17 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
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Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362, 366-67 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en
banc). Further, the purpose of the Juvenile Act is as follows:
Consistent with the protection of the public interest,
to provide for children committing delinquent acts
programs of supervision, care and rehabilitation
which provide balanced attention to the protection of
the community, the imposition of accountability for
offenses committed and the development of
competencies to enable children to become
responsible and productive members of the
community.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(2). This section evidences the
Legislature’s clear intent to protect the community while
rehabilitating and reforming juvenile delinquents.
In re L.A., 853 A.2d 388, 394 (Pa.Super. 2004) (some internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). “The rehabilitative purpose of the Juvenile Act is
attained though accountability and the development of personal qualities
that will enable the juvenile offender to become a responsible and productive
member of the community.” In re R.D.R., supra (quoting In re B.T.C.,
868 A.2d 1203, 1205 (Pa.Super. 2005)).
The Juvenile Act defines a delinquent child as “[a] child ten years of
age or older whom the court has found to have committed a delinquent act
and is in need of treatment.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. IDSI constitutes a
delinquent act. See id. Section 6352(a) of the Juvenile Act sets forth the
available dispositions for a delinquent child as follows:
§ 6352. Disposition of delinquent child
(a) General rule.—If the child is found to be a
delinquent child the court may make any of the following
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orders of disposition determined to be consistent with the
protection of the public interest and best suited to the
child’s treatment, supervision, rehabilitation and welfare,
which disposition shall, as appropriate to the individual
circumstances of the child’s case, provide balanced
attention to the protection of the community, the
imposition of accountability for offenses committed and the
development of competencies to enable the child to
become a responsible and productive member of the
community:
(1) Any order authorized by section 6351
(relating to disposition of dependent child).
(2) Placing the child on probation under supervision
of the probation officer of the court or the court of
another state as provided in section 6363 (relating to
ordering foreign supervision), under conditions and
limitations the court prescribes.
* * *
In selecting from the alternatives set forth in this section,
the court shall follow the general principle that the
disposition imposed should provide the means through
which the provisions of this chapter are executed and
enforced consistent with section 6301(b) (relating to
purposes) and when confinement is necessary, the court
shall impose the minimum amount of confinement that is
consistent with the protection of the public and the
rehabilitation needs of the child.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6352(a)(1), (a)(2) (emphasis added).
The Juvenile Act defines a dependent child as a child who, inter alia,
“is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as
required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental,
or emotional health, or morals.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. Section 6351(a) of
the Juvenile Act sets forth the available dispositions for a dependent child, in
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pertinent part, as follows:
§ 6351. Disposition of dependent child
(a) General rule.—If the child is found to be a
dependent child the court may make any of the following
orders of disposition best suited to the safety, protection
and physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child:
(1) Permit the child to remain with his parents,
guardian, or other custodian, subject to conditions
and limitations as the court prescribes, including
supervision as directed by the court for the
protection of the child.
* * *
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(a)(1).
The General Assembly enacted SORNA on December 20, 2011, and
amended it on July 5, 2012. SORNA became effective December 20, 2012.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10 et seq. SORNA defines “juvenile offender” as
an individual who was 14 years of age or older at the time the individual
committed an offense which, if committed by an adult, would be classified
as, inter alia, an offense under 18 Pa.C.S.A § 3123 (relating to IDSI) and
either: (i) is adjudicated delinquent for such offense on or after December
20, 2012; or (ii) has been adjudicated delinquent for such offense and on
December 20, 2012, is subject to the jurisdiction of the court on the basis of
that adjudication of delinquency. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12. Juvenile
offenders are required to register for life under SORNA. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9799.15(a)(4) (stating: “A juvenile offender who was adjudicated in this
Commonwealth…shall register for life of the individual”). SORNA also
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requires juvenile offenders to verify their registration quarterly. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.25(a)(5). SORNA imposes harsh penalties for juvenile
offenders who fail to register or fail to verify their registration. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.21(a). A juvenile offender must wait twenty-five (25)
years to petition the court for termination of the registration requirement.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.17(a).
Instantly, the court explained its rationale for discharging C.C.’s
probation before the effective date of SORNA as follows:
When fashioning a disposition for [C.C.], this [c]ourt
properly considered [C.C.’s] prior treatment, supervision,
rehabilitation, and welfare while attempting to impose the
necessary treatment required consistent with the public’s
protection and [C.C.’s] own rehabilitative needs. An abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
The Commonwealth failed to establish that the [c]ourt
ignored or misapplied the law, exercised [its] judgment for
reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or arrived
at a manifestly unreasonable decision in [C.C.’s]
disposition and commitment.
In this juvenile proceeding, this [c]ourt stands in parens
patriae in relation to the juvenile, and the focus of the
proceeding is dedicated to the best interests of the
juvenile. With respect to this [c]ourt’s authority to impose
a disposition of a delinquent child, the Juvenile Act grants
broad discretion to the [c]ourt. A reviewing court should
not disturb a [trial] court’s disposition absent manifest
abuse of discretion.
* * *
“The Juvenile Act requires the trial judge to consider the
protection of the public interest, and to fashion a sentence
which is best suited to the child’s treatment, supervision,
rehabilitation, and welfare, under the individual
circumstances of each child’s case.” [In re R.W., 855
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A.2d 107, 111 (Pa.Super. 2004)]. When fashioning a
proper disposition for [C.C.], this [c]ourt considered
[C.C.’s] history of successful treatment, supervision,
rehabilitation, the [complainant’s] mother’s own stated
wishes for [C.C.], and the stigma and harsh realities of
[C.C.] being given the life-long label of a “Juvenile
Offender” under SORNA. This [c]ourt believes that it was
in the best interest of [C.C.’s] own rehabilitative treatment
needs to treat him as a Dependent Child rather than a
Delinquent Child.
(Juvenile Court Opinion, filed June 27, 2013, at 9-12) (some internal
citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The record makes clear the court
considered all relevant factors when rendering its disposition, in light of the
Juvenile Act’s dual purpose to protect the community while rehabilitating and
reforming juvenile delinquents. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(2); In re L.A.,
supra.
Further, after adjudicating C.C. delinquent, the court had authority to
enter any of the dispositions set forth in Section 6352(a). See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6352(a). The court decided to place C.C. on probation per Section
6352(a)(2). See id. During C.C.’s review hearings, the court learned about
C.C.’s significant progress in treatment. Specifically, at the October 18,
2012 review hearing, C.C.’s probation officer informed the court that C.C.
was doing very well, earning high grades in school, and complying with
probation. The probation officer indicated C.C. had a positive progress
report from JJPI. At that time, the probation officer asked the court to
remove C.C.’s GPS monitoring, and the court granted that unopposed
request.
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Subsequently, at the December 13, 2012 review hearing, C.C.’s
probation officer informed the court C.C. was complying with treatment,
doing very well, and “went above and beyond” in terms of satisfying his
supervision requirements. Based on C.C.’s progress and to avoid the SORNA
requirements, C.C.’s counsel urged the court to release C.C. from juvenile
probation and have DHS file a dependency petition, under which the court
could order C.C. to continue treatment at JJPI. The Commonwealth objected
to this request, so the court deferred its ruling.
The court heard from the complainant’s mother at a hearing on
December 19, 2012. The complainant’s mother explained her primary
concern was for C.C. to continue treatment. She expressed her belief in
“second chances” and did not want to subject C.C. to lifetime registration
under SORNA, so long as C.C. still received treatment. The court also
admitted into evidence a report from JJPI dated December 10, 2012, which
reflected C.C.’s substantial progress. Notably, the report indicated that JJPI
endorsed the recommendation of C.C.’s probation officer, to discharge C.C.
from probation with the understanding that C.C. would continue treatment
at JJPI. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court terminated probation and
ordered DHS to file a dependency petition, under which C.C. is required,
inter alia, to attend and complete sex offender treatment at JJPI. The court
made clear it would take appropriate action if C.C. failed to comply with the
court’s directives.
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The court’s decision to terminate C.C.’s probation and require C.C. to
continue treatment under a dependency order falls within the court’s
available options per Section 6352(a). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6352(a)(1). The
court permitted C.C. to remain with his parents, subject to the conditions
and limitations prescribed by the court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(a)(1). In
its decision, the court recognized the strict consequences C.C. faced if he
remained on juvenile probation through SORNA’s effective date. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.15(a)(4); 9799.17(a); 9799.21(a); 9799.25(a)(5). Thus,
the court released C.C. from juvenile probation, consistent with the
protection of the public interest and best suited to C.C.’s need for treatment,
supervision, and rehabilitation. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6352(a). We see no
manifest abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to terminate C.C.’s
juvenile probation and compel institution of dependency proceedings as a
viable alternative under the circumstances of this case. See B.D.G., supra.Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judge Wecht joins this memorandum.
Judge Jenkins files a dissenting statement.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/3/2014
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