Com. v. Owens, M. ( 2023 )

J-S37040-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MICHAEL BRADY OWENS :
:
Appellant : No. 19 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 18, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-45-CR-0001095-2018
BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and OLSON, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED APRIL 12, 2023
Appellant, Michael Brady Owens, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on November 18, 2021. We affirm.
The trial court ably summarized the underlying facts of this case:
on March 16, 2016, McMichael's Hunting Club members
discovered burnt human remains on State Game Lands 38,
later identified as Demetria Hughes [(hereinafter “the
Victim”)]. An autopsy on the Victim determined that the
cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head. On March
21, 2016, Pennsylvania State Troopers conducted an
interview with [Appellant’s co-defendant,] Randy
Criste-Troutman [(hereinafter “Co-Defendant
Criste-Troutman”),] at the Lackawanna County Prison. He
related the Victim was an associate of his in dealing heroin
and owed him in excess of $1,000.00 for illegal drugs.
[Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman related that he used a ruse
to lure the [Victim] into the woods in order to kill him.
Specifically, [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman told the Victim
they would commit a home invasion robbery and the Victim
agreed to participate. [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman
further related that [Appellant] helped lure the [Victim] with
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the robbery ruse. [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman related
that Appellant shot and killed the Victim in the woods.
On April 26, 2016, Appellant gave sworn testimony to the
Monroe County Investigating Grand Jury. During his
testimony, Appellant admitted to knowing the Victim, and
knew the Victim and [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman to be
associates. Moreover, Appellant knew [Co-Defendant]
Criste-Troutman was involved in the sale of illegal drugs,
specifically heroin. Appellant related that [Co-Defendant]
Criste-Troutman contacted him and asked to help drop off a
friend. Appellant stated that he picked up [Co-Defendant]
Criste-Troutman and was advised that the Victim was that
friend. Appellant related that he drove [Co-Defendant]
Criste-Troutman and the Victim to a wooded area, that
[Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman and the Victim exited the
vehicle, and that after a period of time [Co-Defendant]
Criste-Troutman returned alone. Appellant advised that he
returned to the same spot with [Co-Defendant]
Criste-Troutman between one and three days later.
Appellant further advised [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman
brought a gas can filled with gasoline on the return trip.
Finally, cell phone tracking evidence supports finding that:
(1) Appellant accompanied [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman
and the Victim to the scene of the murder on the date the
murder occurred; (2) Appellant and [Co-Defendant]
Criste-Troutman returned to the scene of the crime that
night; and (3) Appellant and [Co-Defendant]
Criste-Troutman returned to the scene of the crime three
days later. Moreover, Appellant and [Co-Defendant]
Criste-Troutman were in frequent contact via text message
communications during this time period.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/7/22, at 36-37 (citations omitted).
A jury found Appellant guilty of a number of crimes, including
first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, tampering with or fabricating
physical evidence, and abuse of a corpse.1 On November 18, 2021, the trial
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 903(a)(1), 4910(1), and 5510, respectively.
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court sentenced Appellant to serve an aggregate term of life in prison without
the possibility of parole, with a consecutive term of 256 to 552 months in
prison, for his convictions.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. He numbers four claims on
appeal:
1. Whether, pre-trial, the court erred when it ruled
[Appellant] was precluded from receiving the mental health
report evaluating [Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman,] and
containing exculpatory statements for Appellant?
2. Whether, pre-trial, the court erred when it failed to grant
[Appellant’s] motion to dismiss pursuant to [Pennsylvania
Rule of Criminal Procedure] 600?
3. Whether, at trial, the court erred where it precluded
[Appellant] from cross-examining [Co-Defendant
Criste-Troutman] on statements he had made during his
mental health evaluation?
4. Whether, at trial, the court erred when it overruled
objections to [Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence] 404(b) [] that
[Appellant] had previously “beat a body,” which statements
were offered through Detectives Thomas McAndrew and
Wendy Serfass, and where this evidence’s probative value did
not substantially outweigh its potential for unfair prejudice,
where it was not relevant for any permissible purpose, and
where the Commonwealth had provided no notice and failed
to meet a court-imposed deadline for notice of 404(b)
evidence prior to trial?
Appellant’s Brief at 6-7.
We have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the relevant law, the certified
record, the notes of testimony, and the opinion of the able trial court judge,
the Honorable Margherita Patti-Worthington. We conclude that Appellant is
not entitled to relief in this case, for the reasons expressed in President Judge
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Patti-Worthington’s August 16, 2021 and February 7, 2022 opinions.
Therefore, we affirm on the basis of President Judge Patti-Worthington’s
thorough opinions and adopt them as our own. In any future filing with this
or any other court addressing this ruling, the filing party shall attach a copy
of President Judge Patti-Worthington’s August 16, 2021 and February 7, 2022
opinions.
Although we adopt the trial court’s opinions as our own, we specifically
address Appellant’s first and third claims on appeal which challenge the trial
court’s rulings precluding Appellant from receiving the mental health
evaluation reports of Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman, and further precluding
Appellant from cross-examining Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman on statements
he made during the mental health evaluations. In its opinion, the trial court
thoroughly and ably explained why Appellant’s claims fail. See Trial Court
Opinion, 2/7/22, at 3-20. We further note that our opinions in
Commonwealth v. Nuzzo, 284 A.3d 1243 (Pa. Super. 2022) and
Commonwealth v. Segarra, 228 A.3d 943 (Pa. Super. 2020) foreclose
Appellant’s ability to obtain relief on these claims.
In the case at bar, the trial court ordered Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman
to undergo incompetency evaluations, pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7402 of the
Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”). Section 7402 of the MHPA declares:
§ 7402. Incompetence to proceed on criminal charges and
lack of criminal responsibility as defense
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(a) Definition of Incompetency.--Whenever a person who has
been charged with a crime is found to be substantially unable to
understand the nature or object of the proceedings against him or
to participate and assist in his defense, he shall be deemed
incompetent to be tried, convicted or sentenced so long as such
incapacity continues.
...
(c) Application for Incompetency Examination.--Application
to the court for an order directing an incompetency examination
may be presented by an attorney for the Commonwealth, a person
charged with a crime, his counsel, or the warden or other official
in charge of the institution or place in which he is detained. A
person charged with crime shall be represented either by counsel
of his selection or by court-appointed counsel.
(d) Hearing; When Required.--The court, either on application
or on its own motion, may order an incompetency examination at
any stage in the proceedings and may do so without a hearing
unless the examination is objected to by the person charged with
a crime or by his counsel. In such event, an examination shall be
ordered only after determination upon a hearing that there is a
prima facie question of incompetency. Upon completion of the
examination, a determination of incompetency shall be made by
the court where incompetency is established by a preponderance
of the evidence.
(e) Conduct of Examination; Report.--When ordered by the
court, an incompetency examination shall take place under the
following conditions:
(1) It shall be conducted as an outpatient examination unless
an inpatient examination is, or has been, authorized under
another provision of this act.
(2) It shall be conducted by at least one psychiatrist or
licensed psychologist and may relate both to competency to
proceed and to criminal responsibility for the crime charged.
(3) The person shall be entitled to have counsel present with
him and shall not be required to answer any questions or to
perform tests unless he has moved for or agreed to the
examination. Nothing said or done by such person during the
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examination may be used as evidence against him in any
criminal proceedings on any issue other than that of his mental
condition.
(4) A report shall be submitted to the court and to counsel and
shall contain a description of the examination, which shall
include:
(i) diagnosis of the person's mental condition;
(ii) an opinion as to his capacity to understand the nature
and object of the criminal proceedings against him and to
assist in his defense;
(iii) when so requested, an opinion as to his mental
condition in relation to the standards for criminal
responsibility as then provided by law if it appears that the
facts concerning his mental condition may also be relevant
to the question of legal responsibility; and
(iv) when so requested, an opinion as to whether he had
the capacity to have a particular state of mind, where such
state of mind is a required element of the criminal charge.
...
50 P.S. § 7402.
In Nuzzo, this Court held that a competency petition and its attached
materials – as filed under 50 P.S. § 7402 – are “documents concerning
persons in treatment,” and are thus encompassed within the MHPA’s general
“confidentiality of records” provision, “when the petition contains factual
averments and materials offered in support of the prima facie showing of
incompetency and which refer, reflect, or relate, inter alia, to mental health
treatment and diagnosis records, including, but not limited to, names of
physicians and treatment facilities, hospitalizations, medical opinions or
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diagnosis (including medical records, letters, and charts), and current or
recommended courses of treatment.” Nuzzo, 284 A.3d at 1256 (emphasis
omitted). The MHPA’s “confidentiality of records” provision, contained at 50
P.S. § 7111, declares:
(a) All documents concerning persons in treatment shall be kept
confidential and, without the person's written consent, may not be
released or their contents disclosed to anyone except:
(1) those engaged in providing treatment for the person;
(2) the county administrator, pursuant to section 110;
(3) a court in the course of legal proceedings authorized by
this act;
(4) pursuant to Federal rules, statutes and regulations
governing disclosure of patient information where treatment is
undertaken in a Federal agency; and
(5) a covered entity or a covered entity's business associate
that makes the use, disclosure or request for disclosure in
accordance with 45 CFR Pt. 164 Subpt. E2 (relating to privacy
of individually identifiable health information).
In no event, however, shall privileged communications, whether
written or oral, be disclosed to anyone without such written
consent. . . .
50 P.S. § 7111.
As this Court explained in Segarra:
In construing [s]ection 7111, our [Supreme] Court determined
that, by its clear and unambiguous terms, disclosure was allowed
only in certain limited enumerated instances, and only to parties
designated by the statute. . . . Apart from these express
exceptions, our Court held that disclosure is permitted to third
parties only where the patient has given his or her written
consent:
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The unambiguous terms contained in the provision regarding
the confidentiality of medical records leaves little room for
doubt as to the intent of the Legislature regarding this section.
. . . “[A]ll documents concerning persons in treatment shall be
kept confidential and, without the person's written consent,
may not be released or their contents disclosed to anyone.” 50
P.S. § 7111(a). The provision applies to all documents
regarding one's treatment, not just medical records.
Furthermore, the verbiage that the documents “shall be kept
confidential” is plainly not discretionary but mandatory in this
context — it is a requirement. The release of the documents is
contingent upon the person's written consent and the
documents may not be released “to anyone” without such
consent. The terms of the provision are eminently clear and
unmistakable and the core meaning of this confidentiality
section of the [MHPA] is without doubt — there shall be no
disclosure of the treatment documents to anyone.
Zane v. Friends Hosp., 836 A.2d 25, 31-32 (Pa. 2003).
Segarra, 228 A.3d at 951-952 (some quotation marks omitted), quoting In
re Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 220 A.3d 558, 566-567
(Pa. 2019).
Section 7111(a)(3) exempts from the general confidentiality mandate
“a court in the course of legal proceedings authorized by this act.” 50 P.S.
§ 7111(a)(3). However, as this Court has held, “a criminal prosecution is not
a legal proceeding authorized by the act” and, thus, does not fall under the
general confidentiality exception. Segarra, 228 A.3d at 953 (quotation
marks, citations, and corrections omitted). As we explained:
A strict construction of Section 7111 reveals that all documents
concerning persons in treatment are to be kept confidential and
may not be released or disclosed to anyone, absent the patient's
written consent, with certain exceptions. The third exception to
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the privilege of confidentiality conferred by the MHPA on a
patient's records allows a court to review the records in the
course of legal proceedings authorized by the MHPA. 50 P.S.
§ 7111(3).
The unambiguous language of section 7111(3) leads us to
conclude that a patient's inpatient mental health treatment
records may be used by a court only when the legal proceedings
being conducted are within the framework of the MHPA, that
is, involuntary and voluntary mental health commitment
proceedings. See 50 P.S. § 7103 (MHPA establishes the rights and
procedures for all involuntary treatment of mentally ill persons,
whether inpatient or outpatient, and for all voluntary inpatient
treatment of mentally ill persons). We can find no language within
the act itself which includes criminal proceedings within the
framework of the act, nor can we find any caselaw in the
Commonwealth which supports such a proposition.
Absent any authority to the contrary, we conclude that a criminal
prosecution is not a legal proceeding authorized by the act.
Segarra, 228 A.3d at 952-953 (quotation marks and corrections omitted)
(emphasis in original), quoting Commonwealth v. Moyer, 595 A.2d 1177,
1179 (Pa. Super. 1991).
On appeal, Appellant claims that he should have been able to receive
the mental health evaluation reports of Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman. He
also claims that he should have been able to cross-examine Co-Defendant
Criste-Troutman on statements he made during his mental health evaluations,
some of which were placed into evidence during Co-Defendant
Criste-Troutman’s incompetency hearings. See Appellant’s Brief at 17-30.
However, the mental health evaluation reports and incompetency hearings
were all ordered by the trial court and conducted in accordance with 50 P.S.
§ 7402. As explained above, in Nuzzo, this Court held that a competency
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petition and its attached materials – as filed under 50 P.S. § 7402 – are
“documents concerning persons in treatment,” and are thus encompassed
within the MHPA’s general “confidentiality of records” provision, “when the
petition contains factual averments and materials offered in support of the
prima facie showing of incompetency and which refer, reflect, or relate, inter
alia, to mental health treatment and diagnosis records, including, but not
limited to, names of physicians and treatment facilities, hospitalizations,
medical opinions or diagnosis (including medical records, letters, and charts),
and current or recommended courses of treatment.” Nuzzo, 284 A.3d at
1256 (emphasis omitted). By definition, Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman’s
mental health evaluation reports and incompetency hearings “refer, reflect, or
relate [to Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman’s] mental health . . . diagnosis
records.” See id.; see also 50 P.S. § 7402(e)(4) (“[a mental health
evaluation] report shall be submitted to the court and to counsel and shall
contain a description of the examination, which shall include . . . [a] diagnosis
of the person’s mental condition”) (emphasis added). Thus, as in Nuzzo,
Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman’s mental health evaluation reports and
incompetency hearing transcripts are “documents concerning persons in
treatment,” and are thus encompassed within the MHPA’s general
“confidentiality of records” provision.
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Further, pursuant to Segarra and the plain language of Section 7111,
Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman’s records must “be kept confidential and,
without the person's written consent, may not be released or their contents
disclosed to anyone.” 50 P.S. § 7111. Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman has not
given his written consent. Therefore, in accordance with Segarra, Appellant
is not entitled to receive Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman’s mental health
evaluation reports or cross-examine him on the statements he made during
these mental health evaluations. See Segarra, 228 A.3d at 953 (holding: “a
criminal prosecution is not a legal proceeding authorized by the act” and, thus,
does not fall under Section 7111(a)(3)’s exception to the general
confidentiality requirement). Appellant’s claim to the contrary thus fails.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/12/2023
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Circulated 03/16/2023 11:56 AM