Com. v. Webb, J. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S05039-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    JASON WEBB                                 :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 899 WDA 2022
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 13, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-02-CR-0002048-2015
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                           FILED: APRIL 17, 2023
    Jason Webb appeals from the order dismissing his Post Conviction Relief
    Act (“PCRA”) petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Webb argues his trial
    counsel was ineffective for failing to raise issues related to the discretionary
    aspects of his sentence. We affirm.
    Webb shot Tezjuan Taylor outside of the Beer Barrel bar in McKeesport,
    causing his death. The Commonwealth charged Webb with criminal homicide
    and persons not to possess firearms.1 The charges were severed for trial. A
    jury convicted Webb of third-degree murder, and, on a separate docket –
    which is the subject of the instant appeal – the court found Webb guilty of
    persons not to possess firearms.
    ____________________________________________
    1   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
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    The court sentenced Webb for these two convictions at the same time it
    sentenced him on a third, unrelated docket, at which Webb had pleaded guilty
    to several other offenses, including possession of firearm with altered
    manufacturer’s number. In that case, the police had stopped Webb and
    recovered a handgun and drugs from Webb’s person. See N.T., 9/14/15, at
    9-11.
    At the sentencing hearing, the court referenced a presentencing
    investigation report (“PSI”). Id. at 13. The court summarized details from
    Webb’s life, including his upbringing, his father’s death, and his previous
    criminal record. Id. at 16-17. The court discussed Webb’s lack of male role
    models and subsequent engagement in gang culture. Id. 17-20. It talked
    about the impact of drugs and gangs on the community and recounted that
    the murder Webb committed was the result of a feud between two groups
    wanting to sell drugs in the same area. Id. at 20-23. The court also discussed
    the seriousness of murder as opposed to other crimes. Id. at 26-27. In his
    allocution, Webb apologized, explained that he had shot Taylor out of panic
    that his own life was in danger, and emphasized that he had turned himself in
    after the shooting. Id. at 32-33.2
    For third-degree murder, the court sentenced Webb to 15 to 30 years’
    incarceration and a consecutive 10 years of probation. On the instant docket,
    for his conviction for persons not to possess firearms, the court sentenced
    ____________________________________________
    2In addition, Webb’s mother testified and asked for leniency. Webb’s counsel
    presented letters written on Webb’s behalf.
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    Webb to a concurrent term of two and one-half to five years’ incarceration.
    For possession of firearm with altered manufacturer’s number, the court
    sentenced Webb to a consecutive term of five to 10 years’ incarceration.3
    Webb’s aggregate sentence was 20 to 40 years’ incarceration followed by 10
    years of probation.
    Following the sentence, the court stated,
    I believe that what gets me most about your story is the
    narcissism of your story. When people come in and they can tell
    me a story and they can show me, you know, real remorse, I
    believe that to be genuine remorse is a credit for forgiveness.
    You’re still seeing yourself as a victim. You’re still almost in a
    primitive [phase] of the resolution. You still haven’t moved past
    the point of the dispute resolution. You still think that people are
    going to get you and, you know, maybe that’s partially true, but
    there is a distinction between fear and paranoia. Fear has a reality
    base. Maybe this fear, maybe it is paranoia. Maybe it is just a
    manifestation of brainwashing which you and the generation that
    you have grown up in has been a product of.
    I believe that you believe that the drugs you were selling w[ere]
    the product. I believe that you and guys that look like you who kill
    guys that look just like you are the product.
    I believe you’re [preying] on the community. And it is unfortunate,
    because I don’t think that that was the way your grandma or your
    mom or people intended it. But you’re just sort of abandoned. And
    I believe that the gangster rap, the gangster videos, the whole
    indoctrination that you grew up with without a dad made you
    predisposed to be where you are right now.
    Id. at 34-36.
    ____________________________________________
    3The court did not impose any penalty on the other offenses to which Webb
    had pleaded guilty, which included receiving stolen property, firearms not to
    be carried without a license, possession of drug paraphernalia, and three
    counts of possession of a controlled substance.
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    Webb did not file any post-sentence motion at the instant docket. He
    filed a direct appeal in each case but discontinued the appeals effective August
    18, 2017.
    Webb filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on September 19, 2017,
    referencing all three dockets. The PCRA court appointed counsel and directed
    counsel to file a separate petition at each docket. At the instant docket,
    counsel filed an amended PCRA petition alleging that trial counsel was
    ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence motion challenging Webb’s
    aggregate sentence on the grounds that it was manifestly excessive, not
    consistent with general sentencing principles, and not based on reasons stated
    on the record.
    The PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without
    a hearing. The court noted that Webb’s sentence at the instant docket was
    concurrent with his sentence for his murder conviction. The court also stated
    that it had reviewed the PSI prior to sentencing. The court found it had stated
    adequate reasons for the sentence at the hearing, including “Webb’s lack of
    remorse, his obstinance, his failures at community[-]based rehabilitation and
    his menacing behavior in the localized venue [where] these crimes took
    place.” Order, 5/3/22, at 2.4
    ____________________________________________
    4 Although the docket entry for this order is labeled, “Order dismissing PCRA,”
    the order states that the court’s intention was to dismiss the petition without
    a hearing, and it gave Webb approximately one month, until June 1, 2022, to
    respond. See Order, 5/3/22, at 1-2; Docket No. 38; see also Pa.R.Crim.P.
    907.
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    The court dismissed the petition,5 and Webb filed a notice of appeal. He
    raises the following issues:
    I.     Is the petitioner eligible for relief under the Post Conviction
    Relief Act?
    II.    Did the lower court abuse its discretion in finding no merit
    to the claim raised in the PCRA petition, and denying the
    petition without a hearing, where trial counsel was
    ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence motion
    challenging the discretionary aspects of Mr. Webb's
    sentence insofar as (1) the sentence imposed at [all three
    dockets], was manifestly excessive in the aggregate, (2) the
    court failed to state any reasons for imposing a sentence
    above the aggravated range of the guidelines at [the instant
    docket], and (3) the court failed to follow the general
    principle that the sentence imposed should call for
    confinement that is consistent with the protection of the
    public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact
    on the life of the victim and on the community, and the
    rehabilitative needs of the defendant?
    Webb’s Br. at 8.6
    Webb argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a post-
    sentence motion raising that his aggregate sentence was manifestly
    ____________________________________________
    5 The court issued a final order on July 13, 2022, dismissing the petition. See
    Order, 7/13/22, at 1. The corresponding docket entry is labeled “Court will
    formalize its tenta[tive] conc[clusions] and dismiss PCRA.” Docket No. 39.
    6 Webb also appealed from denial of PCRA relief on his sentence for possession
    of firearm with altered manufacturer’s number, raising the same two issues.
    We address that appeal in a separate memorandum opinion. See
    Commonwealth v. Webb, No. 900 WDA 2022. Webb additionally appealed
    at the docket for his murder conviction, and we affirmed the denial of PCRA
    relief. See Commonwealth v. Webb, 
    236 A.3d 1170
    , 1183 (Pa.Super.
    2020). In that appeal, Webb did not raise the issue of trial counsel
    ineffectiveness based on counsel’s failure to pursue discretionary sentencing
    claims.
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    excessive. He asserts that the court imposed the maximum sentence for each
    offense. He argues that his sentence on the instant docket was above the
    aggravated range, and the court did not state sufficient reasoning to support
    an extra-guidelines sentence. Webb contends the facts of this case are not
    outside of the “normal” or “typical” facts comprising the crime of persons not
    to possess firearms. Id. at 28-29.
    Webb also argues the court failed to adequately consider the proper
    sentencing factors – those being the protection of the public, the gravity of
    the offense, and Webb’s rehabilitative needs.7 He argues that the court did
    not make any reference to his need for rehabilitation. According to Webb, the
    court focused only on “(1) [Webb]’s narcissism; (2) lack of remorse; (3)
    [Webb]’s paranoia; (4) the impact of drugs on the community; and (5)
    [Webb’s] lack of a father (who was murdered) during his childhood caused
    him to be abandoned.” Id. at 24. Webb argues that his narcissism and
    paranoia are irrelevant for sentencing, “as they are personality characteristics
    which may not be malleable in a sentencing context.” Id. at 29. He asserts
    that a lack of remorse should not be grounds to aggravate his sentence, as he
    believes he is innocent.8 Webb argues that the court should have considered
    his father’s death as a mitigating factor, as well as the fact that he turned
    himself in to the police.
    ____________________________________________
    7   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).
    8   At trial, Webb argued he acted in self-defense.
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    Webb contends that his trial counsel could have no reasonable basis for
    failing to raise these issues, and that Webb suffered prejudice because he was
    unable to obtain appellate review of his sentence.
    We review an order denying PCRA relief to determine whether the PCRA
    court’s conclusions are supported by the record evidence and free of legal
    error. Commonwealth v. Midgley, 
    2023 PA Super 18
     at *5 (Feb. 7, 2023).
    We will not disturb the court’s decision “unless there is no support for the
    findings in the certified record.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Commonwealth v. Larkin, 
    235 A.3d 350
    , 355 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc)).
    A PCRA petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the presumption that
    trial counsel was effective. Id. at *6. To carry this burden, a petitioner must
    both plead and prove that “(1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2)
    . . . counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction;
    and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable
    probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.”
    Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Patterson, 
    143 A.3d 394
    , 397-98
    (Pa.Super. 2016)).
    A challenge to the discretionary aspects of the sentence will only warrant
    appellate consideration when it presents a substantial question that the
    sentence violated a provision of the Sentencing Code or the norms underlying
    the sentencing process. Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 
    117 A.3d 763
    , 768
    (Pa.Super. 2015). We may find a substantial question when the aggregate
    sentence is facially excessive considering the criminal conduct at issue. See
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    Commonwealth v. Sarvey, 
    199 A.3d 436
    , 455-56 (Pa.Super. 2018). We
    may also find a substantial question in allegations that the court failed to
    consider the factors stated in the Sentencing Code or to state the reasons for
    its sentence, or that it relied on impermissible factors. See Commonwealth
    v. Coulverson, 
    34 A.3d 135
    , 143 (Pa.Super. 2011); Commonwealth v.
    Shugars, 
    895 A.2d 1270
    , 1274 (Pa.Super. 2006); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
    9721(b) (stating court must “follow the general principle that the sentence
    imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with . . . the protection
    of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life
    of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the
    defendant”).
    However, we will only vacate a sentence falling outside of the guidelines
    if it is unreasonable. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(3). An “unreasonable” decision is
    “one that is irrational or not guided by sound judgment.” Sarvey, 
    199 A.3d at 456
     (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A court has broad
    discretion in fashioning a sentence, including in deciding whether to run
    sentences consecutively or concurrently. We will not disturb a sentence absent
    a manifest abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Moury, 
    992 A.2d 162
    ,
    169-70, 171 (Pa.Super. 2010).
    Moreover, a court need not undertake a lengthy discourse to satisfy the
    requirement that it state its reasons for imposing sentence. Commonwealth
    v. Rush, 
    162 A.3d 530
    , 544 (Pa.Super. 2017). Rather, “the record as a whole
    must reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of the facts of the crime and
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    character of the offender.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). We presume a court that
    has the benefit of a PSI has been adequately apprised of all relevant
    sentencing criteria. Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    942 A.2d 903
    , 908 (Pa.Super.
    2008).
    Webb has failed to prove that his discretionary sentencing issue has
    merit. Even assuming Webb’s allegations raise a substantial question, Webb
    has not proven that the court’s aggregate sentence was excessive or
    unreasonable given the facts of the case, let alone the concurrent sentence
    he received at the instant docket for persons not to possess firearms. Webb
    has also failed to prove that the court failed to consider all relevant factors,
    especially given the court’s utilization of a PSI. The court stated its reasoning
    when it imposed sentence, and we find its recitation to be more than
    adequate. We are further unconvinced by Webb’s arguments that a
    defendant’s character traits such as paranoia and narcissism, or a defendant’s
    lack of remorse, are not relevant to a defendant’s capacity for rehabilitation
    and are not proper considerations for a sentencing court.
    As Webb has failed to prove his sentencing claim has merit, he has failed
    to prove his trial counsel was ineffective for declining to file a post-sentence
    motion. We therefore find the PCRA court did not err in denying relief.
    Order affirmed.
    -9-
    J-S05039-23
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/17/2023
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