Reifsnyder, B. v. Reifsnyder, M. ( 2020 )

J-A25020-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
BRIAN E. REIFSNYDER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
MONICAL R.D. REIFSNYDER, N/K/A : No. 563 MDA 2020
MONICA R. DUNLAP :
Appeal from the Order Entered March 25, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County Civil Division at No(s):
FC-2016-146
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED DECEMBER 09, 2020
Appellant, Brian E. Reifsnyder (“Husband”), appeals from the decree
entered March 25, 2020 that dissolved the matrimonial bond between
Husband and Monica R.D. Reifsnyder, n/k/a Monica R. Dunlap (“Wife”). On
appeal, Husband challenges various features of the equitable distribution
award issued by the trial court, including the trial court’s consideration of the
tax consequences of its alimony award, the allocation scheme for the marital
estate, and the allocation of payment responsibility for counsel fees and
expenditures relating to the special hearing master (“master”). We vacate
the court’s decree and remand for further proceedings.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
Husband and Wife married on June 27, 1998. Their first child, A.R., was born
in May 2005, and their second child, E.R., was born in October 2010. On June
J-A25020-20
28, 2016, Husband filed a complaint in divorce. Wife filed an answer on July
22, 2016, and a counterclaim for equitable distribution, alimony, alimony
pendente lite (“APL”) and spousal support.
On July 19, 2017, the parties participated in a de novo support hearing.
On November 30, 2017, the trial court entered an order directing Husband to
pay Wife $928.24 per month in spousal support.1 Trial Court Order, 11/30/17,
at 1. In this same order, the trial court delineated its findings regarding the
parties’ respective earning capacities. The trial court concluded that Wife’s
“earning capacity shall be based upon earning $12.75 per hour for a 27 [and
one-half] hour work week,” i.e., $18,232.50 gross annually. Id. The trial
court then concluded that Husband’s “earning capacity shall be based upon
the median adjusted gross income for years 2015 and 2016, with said median
income being $58,431.50.” Id.
The case was then referred to a master who held a hearing on March
28, 2018. During the hearing, the master indicated that she would give “great
deference” to the trial court’s November 30, 2017 ruling regarding the parties’
earning capacities. N.T. Hearing, 3/28/18, at 142. The master, however,
permitted both parties to present testimony about their respective incomes
for the year 2017. Id. On October 5, 2018, the master issued her report and
____________________________________________
1 Husband’s obligation to pay $928.24 per month to Wife in spousal support
was offset by Wife’s obligation to pay Husband $707.60 per month in child
support. The trial court’s November 30, 2017 order, therefore, directed
Husband to pay $220.64 per month for spousal support, with an additional
$50.00 per month toward arrears. Trial Court Order, 11/30/17, at 1-2.
-2-
J-A25020-20
recommended that the trial court award Wife 55% of the marital estate and
Husband 45% of the marital estate. In addition, the master recommended
that Husband pay Wife $928.24 per month in alimony for a period of ten years.
Lastly, the master concluded that neither party was entitled to attorney’s fees
but that Husband, as the party in a better financial position, should pay the
remainder of the master’s fees and costs.
Both parties filed exceptions with the trial court. Thereafter, on May 29,
2019, the trial court entered an order disposing of both parties’ exceptions.
In its order, the trial court agreed “with the findings in the [m]aster’s [r]eport,
other than that [of] division.” Trial Court Order, 5/29/19, at 1. On July 3,
2019, the trial court entered an equitable distribution order which stated, in
relevant part, as follows:
[The order] awarded [Husband 40%] of the martial property and
[Wife 60%] of the value of the martial property. The [c]ourt
further ordered that each party would be responsible for their
individual counsel fees and costs. With respect to the [m]aster’s
fees and costs, [Husband] paid the initial $750[.00] and the
additional fees of $200[.00] were ordered to be paid equally by
both parties within [30] days. [Lastly, the trial court awarded
a]limony . . . to [Wife] in the amount of $928.24 per month for a
period of ten [] years.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/20, at *1 (un-paginated). Husband then appealed
the trial court’s July 3, 2019 order but, because Husband filed his appeal prior
to entry of the divorce decree, this Court quashed his appeal on February 24,
2020. Reifsnyder v. Reifsnyder, 2020 WL 883515, *1 (Pa. Super. Feb. 24,
-3-
J-A25020-20
2020). The divorce decree was subsequently entered on March 24, 2020.
This timely appeal followed.2
Husband raises the following issues on appeal:3
I. [Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ordered Husband
to pay Wife $928.24 per month in alimony for a period of ten years
without considering all of the relevant factors, including the Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”) of 2017?]
II. [Did the trial court err in entering an equitable distribution award
of 60/40% in favor of Wife, without explanation, and when both
Husband and Wife are in comparable economic and financial
straits?]
III. [Did the trial court err in failing to award Husband attorney’s
fees?]
IV. [Did the trial court err in ordering Husband to pay the majority of
the master’s fees and costs?]
See generally Husband’s Brief at 6-8.
In his first issue, Husband challenges the trial court’s alimony award to
Wife. We conduct our review of this issue according to the following standard:
The role of an appellate court in reviewing alimony orders is
limited; we review only to determine whether there has been an
error of law or abuse of discretion by the trial court. Absent an
abuse of discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support
____________________________________________
2 Husband filed his notice of appeal on April 1, 2020. On April 7, 2020, the
trial court entered an order directing Husband to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(1). Husband
timely complied. The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) on April 29, 2020.
3We have consolidated and reordered Husband’s issues on appeal for clarity
and ease of discussion. See Husband’s Brief at 6-8.
-4-
J-A25020-20
order, this Court will not interfere with the broad discretion
afforded the trial court.
The purpose of alimony is not to reward one party and to punish
the other, but rather to ensure that the reasonable needs of the
person who is unable to support himself or herself through
appropriate employment, are met. In determining the nature,
amount, duration and manner of payment of alimony, the court
must consider all relevant factors, including those statutorily
prescribed for at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701.[4] Alimony is based upon
____________________________________________
4Section 3701(b)(1)-(17) of the Divorce Code lists the relevant factors a court
must consider in determining “whether alimony is necessary and in
determining the nature, amount, duration and manner of payment of
alimony.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a). Section 3701(b)’s factors are as follows:
(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the parties.
(2) The ages and the physical, mental and emotional conditions of
the parties.
(3) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not
limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.
(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties.
(5) The duration of the marriage.
(6) The contribution by one party to the education, training or
increased earning power of the other party.
(7) The extent to which the earning power, expenses or financial
obligations of a party will be affected by reason of serving as the
custodian of a minor child.
(8) The standard of living of the parties established during the
marriage.
(9) The relative education of the parties and the time necessary
to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party
seeking alimony to find appropriate employment.
(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.
(11) The property brought to the marriage by either party.
-5-
J-A25020-20
reasonable needs in accordance with the lifestyle and standard of
living established by the parties during the marriage, as well as
the payor's ability to pay.
Dalrymple v. Kilishek, 920 A.2d 1275, 1278–1279 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(citations omitted) (footnote added). However, “the factors in Section
3701(b) do not create an exhaustive list.” Schultz v. Schultz, 2018 WL
1724877, at *9 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “In fact, the trial court
should also consider the assets the petitioning spouse received in equitable
distribution.” Id. (citation omitted).
____________________________________________
(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.
(13) The relative needs of the parties.
(14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during the
marriage. The marital misconduct of either of the parties from the
date of final separation shall not be considered by the court in its
determinations relative to alimony, except that the court shall
consider the abuse of one party by the other party. As used in
this paragraph, “abuse” shall have the meaning given to it under
section 6102 (relating to definitions).
(15) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications of the alimony
award.
(16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient property,
including, but not limited to, property distributed under Chapter
35 (relating to property rights), to provide for the party's
reasonable needs.
(17) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable of
self-support through appropriate employment.
23 Pa.C.S.A § 3701(b)(1)-(17).
-6-
J-A25020-20
Husband raises various challenges to the trial court’s decision to award
alimony to Wife. Although many of his contentions are generalized and
undeveloped, Husband argues, among other things, that the trial court abused
its discretion in failing to consider the tax ramifications of the TCJA in fixing
the amount of alimony to be paid to Wife. Husband’s Brief at 42-45. We are
constrained to agree.5
Section 3701 mandates that a court must consider the “Federal, State
and local tax ramifications of the alimony award” when determining “the
nature, amount, duration and manner of payment of alimony.” 23 Pa.C.S.A
§ 3701(a) and (b)(15). The TCJA became effective January 1, 2019. The act,
inter alia, “eliminate[d] tax deductions for alimony payments for divorce
decrees executed after December 31, 2018 or ‘executed on or before such
date and modified after such date if the modification expressly provides that
the amendments made by this section apply to such modification.’” Maloney
v. Maloney, 2019 WL 5491354, at *6 (Pa. Super. Oct. 25, 2019) (unpublished
memorandum) (citation omitted).
In this case, the master issued her report and recommendation on
October 5, 2018, prior to the TCJA’s effective date. In her report, with regard
to Section 3701(b)(15) and the tax ramifications of the alimony award, the
master simply stated that she “did not find this factor to be applicable.”
____________________________________________
5 Because we agree that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
consider the ramifications of the TCJA, we need not address Husband’s
remaining challenges to the trial court’s alimony award.
-7-
J-A25020-20
Master’s Report, 10/5/18, at 18. Thereafter, the trial court adopted the
master’s report and, as such, the master’s determination that Section
3701(b)(15) did not apply for purposes of considering the tax ramifications of
the alimony award. Indeed, the trial court, on May 29, 2019, issued an order
indicating that it reviewed the “[e]xhibits, and [a]rgument on [] Wife’s
[e]xeptions and [c]ross[-e]xceptions filed by [] Husband”6 and did “not
disagree with the findings in the [m]aster’s [r]eport, other than that [of]
division.” Trial Court Order, 5/29/19, at 1. In addition, in its Rule 1925(a)
opinion, the trial court stated that “[a]ll decisions made by the [master] and
[c]ourt have been justified by the [master’s] report.” Trial Court Opinion,
4/29/20, at 7.
The trial court, however, did not issue its order regarding equitable
distribution until July 3, 2019 and the divorce decree was not entered until
March 24, 2020. As such, the order determining alimony was executed after
the TCJA became effective. Notably, the trial court, in its 1925(a) opinion,
acknowledged this fact. It stated:
____________________________________________
6 In his cross-exceptions filed November 8, 2018, Husband stated:
No consideration was given to the fact that if the divorce is not
finalized by the end of the year, [Husband] will not be able to
deduct the alimony payments from his income, thereby creating
an additional tax burden for him.
Husband’s Cross-Exceptions, 11/8/18, at *1 (un-paginated).
-8-
J-A25020-20
The [o]rder determining [a]limony was entered to the record on
July 3, 2019. Because the [o]rder was executed or modified after
December 31, 2018, the [TCJA] applies, making the alimony
payments not deductible when [Husband] files his taxes.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/20, at *7 (un-paginated). Thus, the trial court, in
its 1925(a) opinion, recognized that the TCJA impacted the tax consequences
of Husband’s alimony obligations but adopted the master’s report, which
revealed that the master did not consider the tax ramifications of the alimony
award because the TCJA was not applicable. See Master’s Report, 10/5/18,
at 18. We conclude that the failure to expressly consider Section 3701(b)(15)
and the tax ramifications of the TCJA constitutes legal error. Accordingly, we
are constrained to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.7
In his second issue, Husband challenges the percentage allocation of the
marital estate awarded by the trial court on July 3, 2019. Our review of such
claims is guided by the following well-established principles.
A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of
equitable distribution. Our standard of review when assessing the
propriety of an order effectuating the equitable distribution of
marital property is whether the trial court abused its discretion by
a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal
procedure. We do not lightly find an abuse of discretion, which
requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence. This Court
will not find an abuse of discretion unless the law has been
____________________________________________
7 We do not conclude that the trial court erred in awarding Wife alimony, in
determining the amount of alimony, or its duration. We simply conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion by adopting the master’s report which said
that Section 3701(b)(15) was inapplicable, only to later recognize that the
TCJA applied to the alimony award entered in the present case. Under these
circumstances, we can only conclude that the trial court failed to expressly
consider the ramifications of Section 3701(b)(15) in its alimony award.
-9-
J-A25020-20
overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised was
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record.
In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award,
courts must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We
measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of
effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving a
just determination of their property rights.
Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court to weigh the
evidence and decide credibility and this Court will not reverse
those determinations so long as they are supported by the
evidence. We are also aware that a master's report and
recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given the fullest
consideration, particularly on the question of credibility of
witnesses, because the master has the opportunity to observe and
assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties.
Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 455–456 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
Husband first argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it
deviated from the master’s recommended distribution scheme “without
explanation as required by 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 3506.” Husband’s Brief at 19.
Specifically, Husband claims that the trial court erred in changing the
“equitable distribution scheme [from 55/45% to 60/40%]” without providing
an adequate “reason for [the] chang[e].” Id. at 21. We disagree.
Section 3506 of the Divorce Code mandates that the trial court provide
a statement of reasons for its distribution of marital property. It states:
In an order made under this chapter for the distribution of
property, the court shall set forth the percentage of distribution
for each marital asset or group of assets and the reasons for the
distribution ordered.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3506.
- 10 -
J-A25020-20
Herein, the master, in her October 5, 2018 report, discussed each of the
11 factors listed in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502. See Master’s Report, 10/5/18, at
11-14; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)-(11). In its 1925(a) opinion, the
trial court expressly stated that the “[m]aster and the [c]ourt both utilized all
of the factors when determining the amount for [e]quitable [d]istribution.”
Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/20, at *7 (un-paginated). Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court satisfied the requirements of Section 3506.
Next, Husband challenges the trial court’s equitable distribution order.
He first argues that the trial court erred in determining the distribution scheme
of the marital estate. Husband, however, does not propose an alternative
distribution, and instead, simply argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding Wife 60% of the marital estate. Husband’s Brief at
22-35. In addition, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in directing him to either sell the marital residence or, if Husband chose not
to sell the martial residence, directing him to pay Wife $79,098.00. Id. at
72-76.
This Court has previously explained that Pa.R.A.P. 2119 compels a
finding of waiver “where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a
claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any
other meaningful fashion capable of review[.]” Tosi v. Kizis, 85 A.3d 585,
589 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). In the argument section of his
brief devoted to this issue, Husband, aside from one citation to case law, fails
to support his claims with pertinent precedent or explain whether or how the
- 11 -
J-A25020-20
trial court’s decision violated controlling authority. Instead, Husband engages
in a rambling argument in which he essentially claims that the trial court’s
decision was not favorable to him. See Husband’s Brief at 22-35 and 72-76.
“[W]e decline to become the appellant's counsel. When . . . briefs are wholly
inadequate to present specific issues for review, [this] Court will not consider
the merits thereof.” Branch Banking & Trust v. Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939,
942–943 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal alteration and citation omitted).
Accordingly, we conclude that Husband's contention that the trial court abused
its discretion in its equitable distribution order fails.8
In his third issue, Husband claims that the trial court erred in failing to
award him attorney’s fees. Husband, however, failed to present any
testimony or evidence regarding attorney’s fees during the hearing before the
master on March 28, 2018.9 Notably, Husband acknowledges this failure on
appeal. See Husband’s Brief at 71. Thus, we conclude that Husband’s claim
____________________________________________
8 Even if we considered the merits of Husband’s claims, we would conclude
that he is not entitled to relief. A review of the master’s October 5, 2018
report and recommendation demonstrates that she considered all of the
factors listed in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)-(11). See Master’s Report, 8/5/18,
at 11-14. As the trial court adopted the master’s report and recommendation,
except for the part relating to the distribution scheme of the martial estate,
we discern no abuse of discretion.
9 During the March 28, 2018 hearing, Husband’s counsel attempted to
introduce into evidence an exhibit regarding attorney’s fees. Wife’s counsel
objected and stated that “there was no testimony” about the document and,
as such, it was inadmissible. N.T. Hearing, 3/28/18, at 306. Husband’s
counsel replied: “You [are] right, there [was] no testimony about it.” Id. at
307. Thus, Husband failed to provide any testimony or evidence regarding
attorney’s fees during the hearing before the master.
- 12 -
J-A25020-20
is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”)
Lastly, Husband argues that the trial court erred in directing him to pay
the majority of the master’s fees and costs. Again, however, Husband
engages in a rambling argument and fails to “provide any discussion of [his]
claim with citation to relevant authority” or “develop the issue in any other
meaningful fashion capable of review.” Tosi, 85 A.3d at 589 n.6. Accordingly,
this issue is also waived.
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Husband’s issues
regarding the distribution scheme of the marital estate, attorney’s fees, and
the master’s fees and costs are waived on appeal and, otherwise, meritless.
But, because the trial court committed legal error in not considering the tax
consequences of the TCJA when it awarded alimony to Wife, we vacate the
equitable distribution order dated July 3, 2019. We remand for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision.
Order vacated. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this
decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/09/2020
- 13 -