Com. v. Acevedo, J. ( 2015 )


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  • J.S36045/14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, :               IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :                  PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee    :
    :
    v.                     :
    :
    :
    JASON ACEVEDO,                :
    :
    Appellant   :               No. 1769 EDA 2013
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 29, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division No(s).: CP-51-CR-0002302-2013
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., JENKINS, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:                         FILED JANUARY 07, 2015
    Appellant, Jason Acevedo, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, following his bench
    convictions for possession of a controlled substance1 and possession with
    intent to deliver a controlled substance2 (“PWID”).              He challenges the
    sufficiency of the evidence for his PWID conviction. We affirm.
    We   state   the   facts   as   set   forth   by   the   trial   court:   “The
    Commonwealth’s only witness was one of the arresting police officers who
    described being on routine patrol with two other officers at about 7:00 . . .
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
    2
    35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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    p.m. on October 12, 2012, when they encountered [Appellant].”           Trial Ct.
    Op., 9/16/13, at 1. At trial, the officer testified to the following:
    . . . On that date and time, we were travelling,
    myself, Officer Boyes and Officer Vandermay were
    travelling eastbound on the 500 block of Cambria
    when I observed [Appellant] near a vacant lot. I
    observed him bend down and retrieve a small item
    and walk approximately five feet to two individuals
    that were standing there . . . . [Appellant] made a
    shaking motion from what appeared to be a small
    box into his hand. At that time he walked towards
    two individuals. He looked up and saw us coming
    down the street and, with his right hand, threw the
    items to the ground, what appeared to be a small
    box to the ground. . . .
    I stopped the two individuals for investigation,
    and Officer Vandermay, in my presence, recovered a
    small box containing eight clear ziplock packets with
    a white chunky substance with a picture of a Playboy
    symbol on one side and two small ziplock packets of
    a white chunky substance laying on the sidewalk. At
    the time Officer Vandermay recovered them items.
    [The two individuals] were released due to
    investigation, and Officer Boyes approximately a
    block away stopped [Appellant] and recovered . . .
    cocaine, crack cocaine. . . .
    No drugs were found on [Appellant’s] person from who[m]
    they recovered $13.00. On cross examination the officer
    described the lighting as very well, that it was one of the
    other officers who placed the recovered items on the
    property receipt, and demonstrated on a map where
    everyone was when he observed [Appellant] through the
    rear passenger window of his vehicle from about 20 feet
    away. . . . The [Commonwealth] then submitted the lab
    report by stipulation, which showed that the packets
    recovered contained 20 milligrams of cocaine base and 117
    milligrams of cocaine, and rested. The only evidence
    adduced by [Appellant] was to have the same officer
    confirm that at the preliminary hearing he testified that
    “When I observed [Appellant] in a well lit area go to a
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    vacant lot and retrieve what appeared to be a small
    box[.]”
    Id. at 1-3 (citations omitted). Appellant was convicted of the above crimes
    on May 29, 2013, and the court sentenced him to one-and-a-half to three
    years’ imprisonment.      Appellant appealed and timely filed a court-ordered
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
    Appellant raises the following issue in his brief:
    Was not the evidence insufficient to support [Appellant’s]
    conviction for possession of a controlled substance with the
    intent to deliver, insofar as there was no delivery of any
    controlled substance nor evidence of an intent to deliver?
    Appellant’s Brief at 3.   Appellant concedes that while walking towards two
    other people, he dropped something and ran when the police arrived.         He
    maintains that because the two men had no money and only stood there,
    there is no evidence they were or conducted themselves as potential buyers.
    Appellant argues the amount of money found on him, $13, and the amount
    of cocaine found, ten packets weighing in total 137 milligrams, is insufficient
    evidence to support his conviction for PWID.         We hold Appellant is not
    entitled to relief.
    The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence is
    de novo, as it is a question of law. Commonwealth v. Sanford, 
    863 A.2d, 428
    , 431 (Pa. 2004).
    The critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the
    evidence to support a criminal conviction . . . does not
    require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the
    evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable
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    doubt. Instead, it must determine simply whether the
    evidence believed by the fact-finder was sufficient to
    support the verdict.
    Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 
    934 A.2d 1233
    , 1235-36 (Pa. 2007)
    (citations and quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing the sufficiency of
    the evidence, an appellate court must determine whether the evidence and
    all reasonable inferences deducible from that, viewed in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are sufficient to establish
    all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1237.
    PWID is defined as follows:
    Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture,
    delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or
    deliver, a controlled substance by a person not registered
    under this act, or a practitioner not registered or licenses
    by the appropriate State board, or knowingly creating,
    delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a
    counterfeit controlled substance.
    35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). “In order to uphold a conviction for possession of
    narcotics with the intent to deliver, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a controlled substance and
    did so with the intent to deliver it.” Commonwealth v. Aguado, 
    760 A.2d 1181
    , 1185 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc).
    In determining the sufficiency of evidence for PWID, the court looks at
    the following factors: the quantity of the drugs, “the manner in which the
    controlled substance was packaged, the behavior of the defendant, the
    presence of drug paraphernalia, and large [ ] sums of cash found in
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    possession of the defendant.      The final factor to be considered is expert
    testimony.”    Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1237-38 (citations omitted).      Another
    factor is lack of drug paraphernalia for personal consumption. Id. at 1238.
    In Commonwealth v. Bagley, 
    442 A.2d 287
     (Pa. Super. 1982), a
    trial court issued a search warrant to search for drugs and drug
    paraphernalia in the defendant’s car.        
    Id. at 288
    .   Police followed the
    defendant’s vehicle, and observed the vehicle decrease speed, a small white
    package the size of a cigarette box being thrown out the window, and the
    vehicle quickly accelerate.      
    Id.
       The police retrieved the package and
    stopped the defendant.     
    Id.
         The package contained eleven baggies of
    heroin, weighing in total 15.3 grams. 
    Id.
     The purity of the drugs ranged
    from four percent to eighteen percent.       
    Id.
       A jury found the defendant
    guilty of, inter alia, PWID, but the trial court granted the defendant’s motion
    to arrest judgment of PWID. 
    Id. at 288-89
    . The Commonwealth appealed.
    
    Id. at 289
    .
    This Court noted the purity of the drugs did not create an inference
    that the heroin was possessed with the intent to deliver. 
    Id. at 292
     (holding
    “[t]he higher the purity of the heroin seized, the reasoning goes, the more
    likely that the possessor is a trafficker, since heroin users rarely receive
    uncut heroin.”). The Court further reasoned that the Commonwealth failed
    to show that the defendant’s activity prior to his arrest supported the
    inference that he possessed heroin with the intent to deliver.     
    Id. at 291
    .
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    Thus, the Bagley Court affirmed the order granting an arrest of judgment
    on the PWID conviction because the Commonwealth failed to produce
    evidence that the quantity of the drugs was for possession with intent to
    deliver and not personal use.    
    Id. at 291
    ; see also Commonwealth v.
    Pagan, 
    461 A.2d 321
    , 322-23 (Pa. Super. 1983) (possession of “small
    amount” of marijuana, 19.9 grams, and lack of additional paraphernalia to
    indicate preparation of sale or delivery was insufficient to support conviction
    of PWID).
    In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
    645 A.2d 1366
     (Pa. Super. 1994),
    police observed the defendant, who was holding a brown paper bag,
    speaking with another man. 
    Id. at 1367
    . The “defendant moved his right
    hand from his mouth to his side,” and upon seeing the police, put his hand
    back to his mouth and walked away. 
    Id.
     When the officers followed, the
    defendant ran and threw away the bag. 
    Id.
     When the police apprehended
    him, he had seventeen individual bags of fentanyl in his mouth, weighing a
    total of 1.17 grams and $10. 
    Id.
     The police also found seven syringes in
    the brown bag.     
    Id.
       The court convicted him of, inter alia, PWID, but
    subsequently, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for arrest of
    judgment because there was reasonable doubt as to whether the drugs were
    for delivery or personal use. 
    Id.
     On appeal, this Court affirmed because the
    small amount of drugs found, the paraphernalia that suggested personal
    use, the small amount of money, and the fact that the defendant did not
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    transfer anything to the other man reflected personal use rather than an
    intent to deliver. 
    Id. at 1369-70
    .
    In Commonwealth v. Smagala, 
    557 A.2d 347
     (Pa. Super. 1989), a
    police officer searched a garage the defendant had rented. Id. at 348. The
    search produced .8 grams of cocaine, a razor blade, a rolled up $20 bill,
    bicarbonate soda, test tubes, a glass pipe with residue, wire mesh screens,
    hundreds of burnt matches, used tissues, four “tally sheets” with names and
    numerical amounts written on them, two bundles of used glassine baggies,
    $834, and a loaded handgun in the defendant’s car. Id. at 352. At trial, the
    court convicted the defendant of PWID. Id.
    On appeal, this Court reversed the conviction based on expert
    testimony:
    Expert testimony at trial indicated that test tubes and
    bicarbonate of soda are used to convert cocaine in the
    powder form into cocaine in the rock form, crack. The
    cocaine rock is then smoked in a glass pipe inside of which
    is a wire mesh screen. Instantly, the garage work bench
    was covered with hundreds of burnt matches and the
    [defendant] possessed all the necessary tools to [17]
    create and smoke crack. Those facts are consistent with
    personal use of cocaine. Also, a rolled up twenty dollar bill
    and a razor blade were found on the person.             The
    Commonwealth’s expert testified that the razor blade was
    used to divide the cocaine into lines and then the rolled
    currency was used to inhale those lines of cocaine through
    the users nostrils. Also, numerous used tissues were
    found on top of the work bench where the glass pipe was
    located. Again, those facts are consistent with personal
    use.    The totality of the evidence leads us to the
    unavoidable conclusion that the [defendant] intended
    either to smoke the cocaine or inhale it.
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    Id. at 352.
    In In re Evans, 
    717 A.2d 542
     (Pa. Super. 1998), police officers
    observed the defendant and two other men standing on the street in a high
    crime area.     
    Id. at 543
    .   When the defendant noticed the officers, he
    appeared startled, reached towards his waistband, and turned quickly. 
    Id.
    After the officers exited their vehicle, the defendant threw an object to the
    ground.   
    Id.
       The police recovered the object and found nine individually
    wrapped pieces of crack cocaine, weighing a total of 1.03 grams.         
    Id. at 543-44
    .   The trial court convicted defendant of PWID.     
    Id. at 544
    .     This
    Court affirmed, finding it reasonable to infer intent to deliver when the
    defendant is in a high crime area, possesses nine individually wrapped
    packets of crack cocaine, and did not possess paraphernalia for personal
    use. 
    Id. at 546
    .
    Instantly, the facts of this case are more consistent with In re Evans
    than Bagley, Pagan, Jackson, and Smagala. Here, the police observed
    Appellant in an empty lot, walk towards two individuals, pick up a box,
    shake out two baggies from the box, walk closer toward the individuals, and
    upon noticing the police, flee and discard the drugs. Like the defendant in
    Evans, and unlike the defendants in Jackson and Smagala, Appellant did
    not possess drug paraphernalia consistent with personal use.      See In re
    Evans, 
    717 A.2d at 546
    ; Jackson, 
    645 A.2d at 1369-70
    ; Smagala, 557
    A.2d at 352. Similar to the defendant in Evans, who, after observing police,
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    discarded nine individually wrapped packets of crack cocaine, Appellant,
    after he observed the police, discarded ten individually wrapped baggies of
    cocaine. See In re Evans, 
    717 A.2d at 546
    .
    Unlike the defendant in Bagley and Jackson, Appellant’s behavior
    suggested an intent to deliver.     See Jackson, 
    645 A.2d at 1369-70
    ;
    Bagley, 
    442 A.2d at 291
    . In Bagley, the defendant was in his vehicle and
    exhibited no conduct that he was travelling to potential buyers.    Bagley,
    
    442 A.2d at 290
    . Here, Appellant picked up a box containing drugs in an
    empty lot, and walked towards two men. In Jackson, “[t]he police officers
    could not see anything in [the defendant’s] . . . , nor did they see anything
    pass between [him] and the man to whom he was speaking.” Jackson, 
    645 A.2d at 1370
    . Instantly, police observed Appellant in an empty lot, pick up a
    box, walk towards two individuals, and shake two objects into his hand.
    Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Appellant’s actions,
    coupled with the packaging of the drugs and the lack of personal use
    paraphernalia, supported a conviction of PWID. In sum, we hold the record
    sufficiently establishes all the elements of PWID and affirm the judgment of
    sentence. See Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1237.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/7/2015
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