Com. v. Minch, J. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JOHN MINCH
Appellant No. 1626 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 13, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008111-2009
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 12, 2016
John Minch appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on
February 13, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.
After careful review, we affirm.
On November 15, 2013, Minch was convicted of murdering his ex-wife,
Melissa Groot. At the time of her murder, on May 6, 1999, Melissa was
living with her second husband, David Groot, and their baby, Gavin, in
Bethel Park, Pennsylvania. Minch’s daughter with Melissa, Caitlan, was in
the custody of Melissa’s parents, Mary and Frank Michael.
On the morning of Melissa’s murder, Melissa called her father, Frank
Michael, to tell him that she received a hang-up phone call. Melissa had
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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plans to have lunch with Frank and Caitlan later that day. Frank tried to
reassure Melissa that someone may have dialed a wrong number and that
she should lock her doors.
Detective Terry Hediger testified that the Groot residence received a
call at 8:32 a.m. from a pay phone on South Park Road, a couple of blocks
away from the Groot home. Detective Hediger also testified that Officer
Frank Marks and his partner located surveillance footage from a security
camera positioned outside a bank on South Park Road, right next door to the
gas station where the call was made to the Groot residence. The footage
recovered from the bank’s security camera revealed a vehicle that matched
the physical description of the 1970 Chevrolet Blazer that Minch was seen
driving on the morning of Melissa’s murder. During Officer Marks’ interview
with Minch, Minch was unable to provide a witness to verify his whereabouts
on the morning of May 6, 1999.
David Groot, Melissa’s husband, left for work at around 8:20 a.m. on
the morning of May 6. David was working temporarily as an IT professional
at Centimark in Southpointe, Canonsburg. Mr. John Anthony Bowman,
David’s supervisor at the temporary agency, hand-delivered David his check
sometime between 8:30 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. Mr. Todd Porterfield, David’s
supervisor at Centimark, testified that he saw David sometime after 9:00
a.m.
Frank picked Caitlan up from preschool at around 11:30 a.m. or 11:45
a.m. and drove to Melissa’s house. Frank rang Melissa’s doorbell a couple of
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times but there was no answer. Frank took Caitlan out to lunch and went
home. David also tried to call Melissa around 9:30 a.m. to get a phone
number he left at the house. When Melissa did not answer the phone, David
tried calling Melissa several more times throughout the day.
David left work at around 4:00 p.m. and upon arriving home, he
discovered Melissa lying in the bathtub with her nightgown on, pale, not
moving, with blue lips, and a pool of blood on the bathmat. Dr. Karl
Williams testified that an autopsy revealed that Melissa’s carotid artery was
completely severed, with two major incised sharp edge wounds across her
windpipe and cutting across the larynx. The autopsy also revealed a long,
deep wound to Melissa’s abdomen and liver, completely severing her aorta.
Either the wound to the neck or the wound to the abdomen would have
caused Melissa’s death. There were also numerous defensive wounds
located primarily on Melissa’s left hand. The manner of death was ruled a
homicide.
Detective Hediger testified that he interviewed Minch on May 18, 1999,
at the homicide office in the City of Pittsburgh. Minch stated to Detective
Hediger that he did not know where Melissa and his daughter Caitlan were
living, and that he had never been to Melissa’s house. Minch provided
Detective Hediger with paperwork indicating that Melissa requested her
home address be removed from court documents.
The Commonwealth also presented forensic evidence linking Minch to
the murder of Melissa Groot. Pamela Woods microscopically examined hairs
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recovered from Melissa’s hands and nightgown in June 2007. One of the
hairs recovered from the victim’s hand had a root that Woods believed was
suitable for nuclear DNA testing. Woods sent the fourteen unknown
questioned hairs, including the hair from the victim’s hand, for additional
testing to Dr. Terri Melton at Mitotyping Technologies. Dr. Melton, the
Commonwealth’s expert, testified that the laboratory performed “…DNA
extraction, PCR amplification and DNA sequencing on each of those 14
unknown questioned hairs.” N.T. Trial, 11/12/13, at 678.
There was not enough nuclear DNA, however, to extract from the hair
and form a profile. The mitochondrial DNA testing revealed that one hair in
the victim’s hand could have come from the victim, one hair in the victim’s
hand could have come from Minch, eight hairs from the nightgown could
have come from David Groot, and four hairs from the nightgown were
unsourced. Minch and his maternal relatives could not be excluded as
possible contributors of the hair found on Melissa’s hand. At trial, “[t]he
Commonwealth’s expert testified that, statistically, the mitochondrial DNA
profile that was determined to be Mr. Minch’s or that of his maternal
relatives would be expected in one-third of one percent of all North
Americans of any race.” N.T. Trial, 11/12/13, at 686.
The Commonwealth also presented evidence of the strained
relationship between Minch and Melissa Groot. Detective Hediger testified
that when he questioned Minch, he asked if Minch had ever been violent with
Melissa. Minch responded that he had never hit her. The Commonwealth
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presented the trial court with medical records, subsequently admitted into
evidence, that Melissa Groot sought medical treatment in 1996 for a swollen
nose because Minch hit her. Bryan Schrecengost, a case worker with
Children Youth Services (CYS), testified that CYS first became involved with
Minch after allegations were made that Minch abused Caitlan when she was
three or four years old. Schrecengost also testified that, “I remember
specifically one incident when [Minch] was very agitated and he told me that
he was going to kill [Melissa].” N.T. Trial, 11/8/13 at 523.
Richard Lauffer, Charles Volk, and Sean Ball, inmates incarcerated with
Minch while Minch was awaiting trial, testified that Minch admitted to killing
Melissa Groot. Richard Lauffer testified that he met Minch in prison and they
spoke extensively about their charges. According to Lauffer, Minch said that
“[He] killed her, and [he’s] going to get away with it.” N.T. Trial, 11/13/13,
at 935. Charles Volk testified that “[Minch] told me that he used a knife;
that it came from the kitchen counter. He told me she was – he left her in
the bathtub. He has confessed over and over and over again.” Id. at 947.
Sean Ball, also a fellow inmate, testified that Minch told him he killed Melissa
with a knife from the kitchen.
On March 31, 2009, Minch was charged with one count of first-degree
murder and one count of burglary. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(a); 18 Pa.C.S.A.
3502(a)(1). On November 15, 2013, a jury found Minch guilty of both first-
degree murder and burglary. On February 13, 2014, the court sentenced
Minch to life in prison for the murder conviction, and to a concurrent term of
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3 to 6 years’ incarceration for the burglary conviction. Minch filed post-
sentence motions, which were denied.
Minch filed a notice of appeal on October 3, 2014 and a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal on February 19, 2015. On
September 21, 2015, the Honorable Phillip A. Ignelzi filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925
opinion.
On appeal, Minch challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence
presented at trial:
1. Whether the Appellant’s First-Degree Murder
and Residential Burglary convictions [should] be
vacated with prejudice due to the Commonwealth’s
failure to present sufficient evidence of these crimes?
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied Appellant’s post-trial motion seeking
a new trial owing to his convictions for First-Degree
Murder and for Residential Burglary being against
the weight of the evidence?
Appellant’s Brief, at 3.
When reviewing whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt, we review the evidence received at trial in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1164 (Pa. 2012). The ultimate
question of evidentiary sufficiency centers around whether any “rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id.-6-
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To prove first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must prove that the
appellant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill, that a human being
was unlawfully killed, that the defendant committed the killing, and the
killing was deliberate and premeditated. Commonwealth v. Chamberlain,
30 A.3d 381, 394 (Pa. 2011); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). Circumstantial
evidence alone is sufficient to prove any or all of the elements of a criminal
homicide. Id. Furthermore, “the facts and circumstances need not be
absolutely incompatible with defendants’ innocence, but the question of any
doubt is for the jury unless the evidence [is] so weak and inconclusive that
as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined
circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 371 A.2d 468, 478 (Pa.
1977) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Libonati, 31 A.2d 95, 97
(Pa. 1943).
Minch contends that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence to sustain his convictions for both first-degree murder and
residential burglary, violating the due process clauses of Article I § 9 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Specifically, Minch argues that the Commonwealth
“failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the element of identity” with
respect to the first-degree murder conviction. Appellant’s Brief, at 19.
Additionally, Minch argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to
support his conviction for residential burglary because “the Commonwealth’s
proof was deficient in three ways—first, on the element of identity again;
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second on the element of contemporaneous criminal intent; and third, on
the element of unauthorized entry.”1 Id.
The Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain Minch’s
conviction for both first-degree murder and burglary. Firstly, the
mitochondrial DNA testing of one of the hairs found on Melissa’s hands could
not exclude Minch as the hair’s source. In addition to the forensic evidence,
the Commonwealth presented footage recovered from a bank surveillance
camera that places Minch’s 1970 Chevrolet Blazer near Melissa’s home and
near the payphone where a hang-up phone call was placed to the Groot
residence on the morning of the murder. The Commonwealth also presented
the testimony of three inmates incarcerated with Minch while he was
awaiting trial, and each inmate testified that Minch confessed to killing
Melissa. Additionally, the Commonwealth presented evidence of the
contentious relationship between Melissa and Minch, including Minch’s past
physical abuse of Melissa.
We are satisfied that based on the significant circumstantial evidence
presented at trial, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of both first-degree murder and burglary beyond a reasonable
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1
A person commits the offense of burglary if, with the intent to commit a
crime therein, the person: (1) enters a building or occupied structure, or
separately secured or occupied portion thereof that is adapted for overnight
accommodations in which at the time of the offense any person is present.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1).
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doubt. The Commonwealth presented substantial circumstantial evidence
concerning Minch’s identity and criminal intent. This Court has held on more
than one occasion that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to sustain
the Commonwealth’s burden of proof and that a positive identification of the
assailant is not required. See Commonwealth v. Whiteacre, 878 A.2d 96(Pa. Super. 2005); Commonwealth v. Robertson, 874 A.2d 1200 (Pa.
Super. 2005). Therefore, we find that the Commonwealth’s evidence was
sufficient to sustain Minch’s conviction for both first-degree murder and
burglary.
Minch also challenges the weight of the Commonwealth’s evidence.
Appellate courts in Pennsylvania review a weight of evidence claim for an
abuse of discretion.
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. Because the trial judge has had the
opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented,
an appellate court will give the gravest consideration
to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
judge when reviewing a trial court's determination
that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citing
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 754, 753 (Pa. 2000)).
The term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of
judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a
dispassionate conclusion within the framework of the
law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving
effect to the will of the judge… Discretion is abused
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where the course pursued represents not merely an
error of judgment, but where the judgment is
manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not
applied or where the record shows that the action is
a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055; Widmer, 744 A.2d at 322 (quoting Coker v. S.M.
Flickinger Co., 65 A.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Pa. 1993)).
The factfinder is free to believe all, part, or none of
the evidence and to determine the credibility of the
witnesses. The trial court will award a new trial only
when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence
as to shock one's sense of justice. In determining
whether this standard has been met, appellate
review is limited to whether the trial judge's
discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only
be granted where the facts and inferences of record
disclose a palpable abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 985 A.2d 886, 897 (Pa. 2009) (citing
Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 879 (Pa. 2008)).
Minch argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
his post-sentence motion seeking a new trial on the ground that his
convictions were against the weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief, at
52. We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when
denying Minch’s post-sentence motion. Although Minch maintains “certain
facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them
equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice,” he fails to identify which
facts support his argument. See Thompson, 493 A.2d at 673.
We agree with the Commonwealth’s assertion that Minch has failed to
explain how the court abused its discretion or demonstrate that the
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Commonwealth’s evidence was so fundamentally inconsistent, unreliable, or
tenuous that it shocks one’s sense of justice. Smith, supra. The trial court
properly concluded “it was within the province of the jury to accept or reject
the expert’s testimony as probative of Minch’s guilt, to assess the value of
the photographs and phone records presented, and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/21/15, at 49. Therefore,
because the verdict rendered based on the evidence presented did not shock
the trial court’s sense of justice, we find no abuse of discretion. Clay,
supra.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/12/2016
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