In Re: H.C., a Minor ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: H.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: H.H., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1243 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered August 31, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County Orphans' Court at
No(s): Adopt-019-2019
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: MARCH 18, 2022
Appellant, H.H., (“Mother”) appeals from the August 31, 2021 order
terminating her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511 of the Adoption Act,
23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938 to her dependent child, H.C., who was born in
December 2010. We remand this case in order that the trial court may
prepare a comprehensive opinion in accordance with this memorandum.
The record demonstrates the following procedural history.1 On August
21, 2019, Susquehanna County Services for Children and Youth (“SCSCY”)
filed a petition for involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to H.C.
(“termination petition”) pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2),
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The trial court’s August 31, 2021 amended order terminating Mother’s
parental rights does not provide a detailed procedural and factual history of
this case, as discussed more fully infra.
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(a)(5), and (b).2 On September 28, 2020, Mother executed a consent to
adoption in which she agreed to the voluntary termination of her parental
rights to, and adoption of, H.C. Petition to Confirm Consent, 11/5/20, at
Exhibit A (“Consent to Adoption”). SCSCY petitioned the trial court to confirm
Mother’s consent to voluntary termination of her parental rights and adoption
on November 5, 2020. On January 15, 2021, the trial court found that Mother
wished to revoke her consent to voluntary termination of parental rights and
adoption, and the trial court entered an order granting Mother’s motion to
revoke her consent and ordered that the matter proceed with an involuntary
termination hearing. Trial Court Order, 1/15/21.
The trial court conducted an involuntary termination hearing virtually
via advanced communication technology due to the COVID-19 global
pandemic on March 1, 2021, March 23, 2021, June 30, 2021, and August 13,
2021, and conducted a person-to-person in-camera review of the child on July
1, 2021, at which only the child and guardian ad litem were present by
stipulation of the parties. On August 23, 2021, the trial court entered an order
terminating Mother’s parental rights to H.C. Trial Court Order, 8/23/21. On
August 31, 2021, the trial court entered an amended order terminating
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2 A review of the certified record reveals that the parental rights of J.C., the
child’s biological father, (“Father”) were involuntarily terminated by trial court
order dated September 30, 2020, and entered October 5, 2020. Trial Court
Order, 10/5/20. Father did not appeal the order terminating his parental
rights and he is not a party to this appeal.
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Mother’s parental rights to H.C. that included a correction as to Father’s last
name.3 Trial Court Amended Order, 8/31/21. This appeal followed.
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3 On September 17, 2021, Mother appealed from the August 23, 2021 order
terminating her parental rights to H.C., and this Court docketed the appeal at
1242 MDA 2021. That same day, Mother also appealed from the August 31,
2021 amended order terminating her parental rights to H.C., and this Court
docketed that appeal at 1243 MDA 2021.
In an October 25, 2021 per curiam order, this Court directed Mother to show
cause why her appeal docketed at 1242 MDA 2021 should not be quashed for
lack of jurisdiction in light of the amended order entered on August 31, 2021.
Mother filed a response with this Court on November 4, 2021, stating that she
filed a notice of appeal from both trial court orders terminating her parental
rights in order to preserve her appellate rights. Mother requested that this
Court consolidate the two appeals. In a November 8, 2021 per curiam order,
this Court quashed Mother’s appeal docketed with this Court at 1242 MDA
2021 on the basis “it appears that the August 2[3], 2021 [order] is a legal
nullity” in light of the August 31, 2021 amended order.
Section 5505 of the Pennsylvania Judicial Code states that, “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties
may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry,
notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court, if no appeal from
such order has been taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 (emphasis
added). Therefore, the trial court in the case sub judice was permitted
pursuant to Section 5505 of the Judicial Code to modify its August 23, 2021
order terminating Mother’s parental rights to H.C. but only after providing
notice to the parties. See Commonwealth v. Renninger, ___ A.3d ___,
2022 WL 16581, at *13 (Pa. Super. 2022 Filed January 3, 2022) (en banc)
(slip opinion). Here, the certified record contains no such notice. However,
unlike the circumstances in Renninger, supra, where the appellant objected
to the trial court’s failure to provide notice and the modified order included a
substantive change to the original order, the parties in the case sub judice did
not raise an objection to the trial court’s failure to provide notice to the parties
prior to entering the August 31, 2021 amended order. Moreover, a review of
the August 31, 2021 amended order demonstrates that the only modification
was to correct a typographical error pertaining to Father’s last name. As such,
we find that Mother’s appeal properly lies from the August 31, 2021 order
terminating her parental rights to H.C. despite the trial court’s failure to
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Mother raises the following issues for our review:
[1.] Did the trial court err [or] abuse its discretion in terminating
the parental rights of [Mother], where [SCSCY] failed to
present sufficient evidence to satisfy the elements of 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) or [another] section not specifically
mentioned in the trial court's [August 31, 2021] amended
order?
[2.] Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in terminat[ing]
the parental rights of [Mother], where [SCSCY] failed to
present sufficient evidence to establish that termination was
in the best interest of H.C., [pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(b)]?
[3.] Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law [or]
manifestly abused its discretion by not sufficiently stating
with specificity [and] reference to the record its basis for
terminating [Mother’s] parental rights [pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b)]?
[4.] Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law [or]
manifestly abused its discretion in determining whether
[SCSCY] presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the
grounds for termination of [Mother’s] parental rights under
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) or [another] section not
specifically mentioned in the trial court's [August 31, 2021]
amended order?
[5.] Even if [this Court] determines [SCSCY] presented sufficient
evidence to satisfy the grounds for termination of [Mother’s]
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) of the
Adoption Act or [another] section not specifically mentioned
in the trial court's [August 31, 2021 amended] order,
[whether] the trial court nevertheless erred as a matter of
law [or] manifestly abused its discretion in determining
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provide notice pursuant to Section 5505. See Commonwealth v. Garzone,
993 A.2d 1245, 1254 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating that an appeal properly
lies from an order modified pursuant to Section 5505), aff’d, 34 A.3d 67 (Pa.
2012).
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termination of [Mother’s] parental rights [was] in the best
interests of [H.C., pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)]?
Mother’s Brief at 7-8 (extraneous capitalization omitted).4
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is well-settled.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or
abused its discretion.” Id. “A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Id. The
trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827.
We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
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4 The fourth and fifth issues raised by Mother on appeal are duplicative of the
first and second issues raised by Mother, respectively. Moreover, a review of
the argument section of counsel’s appellate brief demonstrates that there is
only one argument section that addresses all five issues. Pennsylvania Rule
of Appellate Procedure 2119(a) directs that the argument section of an
appellate brief “shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to
be argued; and shall have at the head of each part - in distinctive type or in
type distinctively displayed - the particular point treated therein, followed by
such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” See
Mother’s Brief at 19-24 (setting forth a single argument section entitled “The
trial court erred in finding that [SCSCY] presented clear and convincing
evidence that involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights was
appropriate under [Section] 2511(a) and would best meet the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of [H.C.] under [Section] 2511(b)
and erred by not specifically stating with specificity [and] reference to the
record its basis for termination of Mother's parental rights” (extraneous
capitalization omitted; spelling errors corrected)); see also Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a).
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multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa.
2010)].
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (original brackets omitted). “[T]he
trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and
is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in
the evidence.” In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation
omitted). “If competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will
affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re B.J.Z.,
207 A.3d 914, 921 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is guided by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis5 of the grounds for
termination followed by an assessment of the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the [trial]
court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent.
The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the [trial]
court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the [trial]
court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to
Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare
of the child under the standard of best interests of the
child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
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5 An analysis is a detailed and comprehensive statement by the trial court
that, in the context of an order terminating parental rights, sets forth the
applicable law, i.e., Section 2511, and explains the trial court’s rationale
underpinning a decision to terminate, or not terminate, an individual’s
parental rights by detailing, with citation and reference to the record, its
application of the law to the facts, as determined by the trial court.
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parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
B.J.Z., 207 A.3d at 921 (citation omitted; emphasis added). We have defined
clear and convincing evidence as that which is “so clear, direct, weighty, and
convincing as to enable the trier[-]of[-]fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re Z.P., 994
A.2d 1108, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). A child has a right to
a stable, safe, and healthy environment in which to grow, and the “child's life
simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the
ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 9
(Pa. Super. 2009).
Here, without analysis, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental
rights to H.C. pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). Trial Court Amended Order,
8/31/21, at ¶13 (stating, “[p]ursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), grounds
exist for involuntary termination of [] Mother’s [parental] rights”).
Sections 2511(a)(2) provides as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must
be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal has caused the child to be without essential parental
care, control or subsistence necessary for his[, or her,]
physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super.
2003) (citation omitted). “The grounds for termination due to
parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to
affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may
include acts of refusal[,] as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(citations omitted).
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015).
Unlike subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) does not emphasize a
parent's refusal or failure to perform parental duties, but instead
emphasizes the child's present and future need for essential
parental care, control[,] or subsistence necessary for his physical
or mental well-being. Therefore, the language in subsection
(a)(2) should not be read to compel courts to ignore a child's need
for a stable home and strong, continuous parental ties, which the
policy of restraint in state intervention is intended to protect. This
is particularly so where disruption of the family has already
occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.
Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117 (citation omitted). “[W]hen a parent has
demonstrated a continued inability to conduct his[, or her] life in a fashion
that would provide a safe environment for a child, whether that child is living
with the parent or not, and the behavior of the parent is irremediable as
supported by clear and competent evidence, the termination of parental rights
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is justified.” Id. at 1118 (citation omitted). “A parent's vow to cooperate,
after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability
of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” Id.(citation and original quotation marks omitted).
Section 2511, in “permitting the termination of parental rights[,]
outlines certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must
provide for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the
requirements within a reasonable time following intervention by the state may
properly be considered unfit and have his [or her] parental rights terminated.”
Id. (citation and original quotation marks omitted).
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good
faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order
to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his[, or
her,] ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize
all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and
must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in
the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental
rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one's parental responsibilities while
others provide the child with the child's physical and emotional
needs.
Id. at 1119 (citation and original brackets omitted).
Once the trial court determines that involuntary termination of parental
rights is warranted under Section 2511(a), the trial court is required to
engage in an analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b) to determine
whether termination is in the best interests of the child. Section
2511(b) states,
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§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(b). The analysis under Section 2511(b)
focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best
serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, [Section]
2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the
term “bond” is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law,
however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any,
between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of
our analysis. While a parent's emotional bond with his or her child
is a major aspect of the [Section] 2511(b) best-interest analysis,
it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also
consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security,
and stability the child might have with the foster parent.
Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should
consider the importance of continuity of relationships and
whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed
without detrimental effects on the child.
In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943-944 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
and original brackets omitted), appeal denied, 183 A.3d 979 (Pa. 2018). A
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trial court may rely on a caseworker or social worker to determine the status
of and nature of a parent-child bond. J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 944 (holding, a trial
court “is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding
evaluation be performed by an expert” (citation omitted)); see also In re
C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding, a trial court must
“discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention
to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond” (citation
omitted)).
In terminating Mother’s parental rights to H.C., the trial court set forth
the following 18 findings of fact in its August 31, 2021 amended order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The subject child is [H.C.], [who was born in] December []
2010.
2. The petitioner is [SCSCY] with an address of 75 Public
Avenue, Montrose, Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania,
18801.
3. [Mother was born in] July [] 1991 and [resides in]
Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania[.]
4. [Father was born in] May [] 1986, and [his] address is
unknown.
5. [] Father's parental rights [to H.C.] were terminated [by trial
court order dated] September 30, 2020[, and entered
October 5, 2020].
6. The minor child was found dependent [by the trial] court on
August 11, 2016.
7. The minor [child] has been in placement since [August
2016,] and has expressed that she would like to be adopted
by her pre-adoptive foster parents.
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8. The minor has had six [] previous placements.
9. [] Mother has not shown significant progress towards
alleviating the circumstances that necessitated placement.
10. [] Mother has not shown that she is able to maintain stable,
consistent housing.
11. [] Mother has not maintained any ongoing [or] significant
contact with the child since placement.
12. [] Mother has relocated to Missouri.
13. Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), grounds exist for
involuntary termination of [] Mother's rights in that the
repeated and continuous inability, neglect[,] and refusal of
[] Mother to perform her parental duties has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control[,] or
subsistence necessary for her physical and mental
well-being, and the conditions and causes of the neglect and
refusal cannot and will not be remedied by [] Mother.
14. The minor child has been removed from the care of [Mother]
by the [trial] court or under a voluntary agreement with
[SCSCY] for a period of at-least six [] months, the conditions
which led to the removal or placement of the child continue
to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those
conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services
or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not
likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child within a reasonably period of time[,]
and termination of the parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the minor child.
15. [] Mother has not [] perform[ed] any parental duties for the
minor child for a period in excess of six [] months.
16. [SCSCY] desires to terminate the parental rights of []
Mother so that the minor child can be adopted by suitable
persons, previously identified in the dependency matter.
17. [SCSCY] is willing and able to take continued custody of the
minor child until adoption can be finalized.
18. To the best of [SCSCY’s] knowledge, [Mother] is not entitled
to the benefits of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
1940, as amended 50 U.S.C.A. § 501, et seq.
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Trial Court Amended Order, 8/31/21, at 1-3 (extraneous capitalization
omitted). Without an analysis, including a summation of credible testimony
provided during the course of the termination hearing or reference to the
certified record or other evidence, the trial court summarily terminated
Mother’s parental rights to H.C. in a one sentence statement as follows:
Mother has, through her course of conduct continuing for a period
of over six [] months, failed to perform her parental duties and
has caused the subject child to be without essential parental care,
control[,] or subsistence necessary for the subject child's physical
and mental well-being.
Id. at 3.
“A parent's right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of his or her children is among the oldest of fundamental rights.” In
re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). “[A] decree terminating
parental rights is widely regarded as the civil law equivalent to the death
penalty, forever obliterating the fundamental legal relationships between
parent and child.” Id. at 362. A decision to terminate parental rights has
far-reaching and intentionally irreversible consequences for the parent and
the child and, as such, the significant gravity of such a decision should not
escape the jurists of this great Commonwealth. Because a child’s future hangs
in the balance during termination proceedings, trial courts should be
ever-mindful to give full attention to the matter, proceed as expeditiously as
possible, and provide a comprehensive, thorough analysis explaining its
decision to terminate, or not terminate, parental rights, by detailing the
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applicable law as it applies to the individual circumstances of the case with
reference to the certified record in support thereof. Anything short of such a
comprehensive and thorough analysis constitutes an injustice to the child.6
Simply put, in the case sub judice, the trial court’s August 31, 2021
amended order terminating Mother’s parental rights to H.C., while it included
findings of fact interspersed with statements of law, lacked an analysis, much
less a comprehensive and thorough analysis, of the facts of the case as they
apply to the law that explains in detail with reference to the certified record
the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to
Section 2511(a)(2) and (b).7 We are unable to conduct a meaningful appellate
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6As our Supreme Court in Daniels v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Tristate Transport), 828 A.2d 1043 (Pa. 2003) explained,
One of the virtues of the legal profession - and it is a virtue that
certainly applies to the judicial decision-making process - is that
it depends upon reasoned articulation. Views are oftentimes
shaped, molded, and changed in the very process of articulation.
In addition, a [trial court’s] expression of the basis for a decision
may reveal distinct legal error, as in the misapprehension of a
governing standard or a material fact.
Daniels, 828 A.2d at 1054 n.8.
7 It may be inferred from the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental
rights to H.C. that the trial court found termination of parental rights to be in
the best interest of the child, albeit without reference to Section 2511(b).
Section 2511(a)(5) states that “[t]he rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed” when
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review of the amended order terminating Mother’s parental rights to H.C.
because the trial court’s amended order lacked an analysis with reference to
the certified record. See Commonwealth v. Moto, 23 A.3d 989, 995-996
(Pa. 2011) (explaining that, while appellate courts presume, absent evidence
to the contrary, that a trial court applies the facts in its possession and
“carefully consider[s] the entire record,” what a “trial court must do is to
explain the rationale for its decision in legal and factual detail sufficient to
allow meaningful review” (emphasis in original)); see also Artzt v. Artzt,
556 A.2d 409, 410 (Pa. Super. 1989) (stating that, when a comprehensive
opinion, which includes a thorough analysis of the record, findings of fact, and
conclusions of law, is not filed, remand for filing of such an opinion is
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The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the
court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period
of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal
or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or
will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent
are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal
or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and
termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5) (emphasis added). Although the trial court does
not cite to Section 2511(a)(5) as a ground for terminating Mother’s parental
rights, the trial court does state that “[t]he minor child has been removed
from the care of [Mother] by the [trial] court . . . for a period of at-least
six months[.]” Trial Court Amended Order, 8/31/21, at ¶14 (emphasis
added). Due to the lack of comprehensive analysis, it is unclear whether the
trial court also found sufficient grounds for termination of Mother’s parental
rights to H.C. pursuant to Section 2511(a)(5).
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mandated), appeal denied, 597 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 1991); Crowther v. Waida,
414 A.2d 675, 676 (Pa. Super. 1979) (stating that, in order to conduct a
meaningful review on appeal, this Court requires a comprehensive opinion
reflecting the trial court’s thorough analysis of the record and specifying the
reasons for its ultimate decision); Pennsylvania Social Servs. Local 668 v.
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 392 A.2d 256, 260 (Pa. 1978) (stating,
“In order for review to be meaningful, the [trial court’s opinion] must contain
statements of the reasons and basis for the decision which are sufficient to
demonstrate to the appellate court that the adjudication was not an abuse of
discretion. What is sufficient will vary from case to case.”). Therefore, we
are constrained to remand this matter in order that the trial court may prepare
a comprehensive Rule 1925(a) opinion analyzing the applicable law and the
facts of the case sub judice. The trial court shall file its comprehensive opinion
within 30 days of this decision. Thereafter, Mother shall have 14 days in which
to file a response. Upon the filing of Mother’s response, if any, SCSCY and
the guardian ad litem for H.C. shall have 14 days in which to file a response.
The certified record shall be returned to this Court no later than 60 days from
the date of this decision.
Case remanded. Jurisdiction retained.
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