Com. v. Luksik, J. ( 2022 )


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  • J-S34037-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant               :
    :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    JAMES ERNEST LUKSIK                        :   No. 329 MDA 2021
    Appeal from the Order Entered February 11, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-22-CR-0005712-2019
    BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                             FILED APRIL 01, 2022
    The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered in the Dauphin
    County Court of Common Pleas dismissing some charges, pertaining to two
    victims, against James Ernest Luksik (Appellee).1           The Commonwealth
    challenges the trial court’s conclusion that it did not establish a prima facie
    case for one count each of indecent assault without consent, indecent assault
    (victim under 16 years), and harassment, and two counts each of institutional
    ____________________________________________
    1 The Commonwealth averred the trial court’s order is appealable because it
    “will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution” pursuant to
    Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) (“[T]he Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from
    an order that does not end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies
    in the notice of appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap
    the prosecution.”). Commonwealth’s Notice of Appeal, 3/17/21.
    J-S34037-21
    sexual assault (schools) and corruption of minors.2 After careful review, we
    affirm.
    Appellee was 67 years old at the time of the alleged underlying
    incidents.      See Criminal Docket, 5/3/21, at 2.      The underlying facts and
    procedural history of the case are as follows:
    On March 25, 2019, [Appellee] was a teacher at Bishop Carroll
    [H]igh [S]chool in Ebensberg, PA. On that date, [Appellee]
    chaperoned a group of ninth grade students during a tour of the
    [capitol] building in Harrisburg, PA. During this trip, it is alleged
    by the Commonwealth that [Appellee] touched the backside area
    of two of the [minor] students, K.L. and H.H.
    On August 12, 2019, [Appellee] was charged with [the same
    five3]criminal counts as to [each alleged victim]: 1) [Institutional
    Sexual Assault (Schools)]; [2]) Corruption of Minors; [3])
    Indecent Assault; [4]) Indecent Assault Person Less than 16 Years
    [of] Age; and [5]) a summary charge of Harassment.
    Following a November 8, 2019[,] Preliminary Hearing [ ], at
    which none of the alleged victims testified, all [of the above listed]
    charges . . . were bound over for trial as to both of the alleged
    victims.
    After [Appellee’s] preliminary hearing . . . , but before [his]
    trial [ ], the Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down a ruling
    . . . that hearsay evidence alone cannot be used to establish all
    elements of all crimes for the purpose of establishing a prima facie
    case [ ] at a preliminary hearing.             Commonwealth v.
    ____________________________________________
    2   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3126(a)(1), (a)(8), 2709(a)(1), 3124.2(a.2)(1),
    6301(a)(1)(ii), respectively.   We note the trial court referred to the
    institutional sexual assault (schools) offenses as “sexual contact with a
    student.”
    3 The Commonwealth also charged Appellee with two counts of unlawful
    contact with a minor, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1). However, the trial court
    dismissed both of these counts after the preliminary hearing.      The
    Commonwealth raises no challenge concerning these two counts.
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    McClelland, 
    233 A.3d 717
    ,734 (Pa. 2020). Given this ruling, and
    the fact that the Commonwealth’s prima facie case against
    [Appellee] had been solely based on hearsay, [Appellee] filed an
    Omnibus Pretrial Motion in the nature of a habeas corpus Petition,
    seeking to dismiss the charges against him.
    Trial Ct. Op., 4/20/21, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted and paragraph break
    inserted).
    On January 27, 2021, the trial court held a hearing, allowing the
    Commonwealth to supplement the record with K.L.’s and H.H.’s testimony.
    Both girls were 17 years old at the time of the hearing. K.L. testified that on
    March 25, 2019, she was in the 9th grade at Bishop Carroll High School where
    Appellee was her teacher. N.T., McClelland H’rg, 1/27/21, at 26-27. On that
    day, K.L. attended a field trip to the Harrisburg Capitol Building. Id. at 27.
    Initially, on direct examination, K.L. stated Appellee “accidentally brushed up”
    against her “low back, kind of like toward [her] butt[.]” Id. at 29. The contact
    lasted “not even [2] seconds[.]” Id. at 32. K.L. “didn’t think it was a big
    deal” and again stated it was an “accident.” Id. at 29.
    However, on cross examination, K.L. said at the time of the incident,
    she “thought it was [her] brother behind her,” but “once she told somebody,
    they were . . . trying to make it sound like it was [Appellee].”            N.T.,
    McClelland H’rg, at 33. K.L.’s “friends made [her] think it was [Appellee.]”
    Id. at 39.    Prior to this conversation with classmates, K.L. did not think
    Appellee had been the one to “brush” up against her. Id. at 33. Ultimately,
    K.L. testified she did not know who touched her. Id. at 34 (in response to
    Appellee’s counsel asking if it was “possible that it was actually” K.L.’s brother
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    who touched her, she responded, “I don’t know,” several times and “Yeah,
    maybe.”), 39 (responding she “wasn’t sure” if Appellee touched her), 41
    (stating “it might not have been [Appellee]. It could have been someone else.
    But how do I know[?]”).
    K.L. further testified that after the field trip, Brandy Eckly questioned
    her about the incident.4 N.T., McClelland H’rg, at 34. K.L. felt pressured by
    Eckly “when [she was] being asked about what happened[.]” Id. at 36. K.L.
    described,
    I kind [of] felt like pressured that I should say that more than like
    what I even thought was, like, kind of bad. I didn’t think it was
    bad at all, but I felt like the first time at school when [Eckly] talked
    to us that I should have, like, made it sound bad kind of[. sic]
    Id.
    K.L. also testified she participated in an interview at the Child Advocacy
    Center. N.T., McClelland H’rg, at 36. During this interview, K.L. stated that
    she did not “know exactly” where she was touched because “people just
    always go like that to [her. sic.]” Id. at 37. During the hearing, she explained,
    “[P]eople accidentally brush up against me. That’s what I meant for that.
    Like at home, at school, like when I did have a job[,]” and what she
    experienced that day “was just kind of what [she] experienced [with a]nybody
    else.” Id. at 38.
    ____________________________________________
    4It is not apparent from the testimony whether Eckly is a Bishop Carroll High
    School employee, nor when Eckly questioned K.L. regarding the incident.
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    J-S34037-21
    H.H. testified that on March 25, 2019, she was also in the 9th grade at
    Bishop Carroll High School where Appellee was her teacher. N.T., McClelland
    H’rg, at 5, 7. H.H. stated that at school, Appellee would make “weird jokes”
    about “hot blonds[,] tight sweaters[,] tight skirts[,] and short skirts . . . that
    all the girls [at her school] were creeped out by.” [sic]. Id. at 8. During the
    field trip to the Capitol Building, H.H. was “just walking through [the building]
    and [Appellee] was telling [the students] to move on and tapped [H.H.’s] butt”
    for “a second” while she walked by him. Id. at 11-12, 16. After the incident,
    H.H. told her friend what happened. H.H. stated that, generally, “everyone
    was just kind of bothered by” Appellee’s behavior that day.            Id. at 9.
    “Everywhere [H.H. and her friends] looked[, Appellee] was there.” Id. While
    H.H. “didn’t think that was weird” at first, after speaking to her friends, she
    thought “[e]veryone felt [uncomfortable] and awkward that day.” Id.
    On February 11, 2021, the trial court dismissed all five charges that
    pertained to K.L.: indecent assault without consent, indecent assault (victim
    under 16 years), harassment, institutional sexual assault (schools), and
    corruption of minors.    With respect to H.H., the trial court dismissed the
    charges of institutional sexual assault (schools) and corruption of minors,
    finding “the Commonwealth [ ] failed to set forth a prima facie case[.]” Order,
    2/11/21. However, the trial court held over for trial the remaining charges
    with respect to H.H.:     indecent assault without consent, indecent assault
    (victim under 16 years), and harassment.         The Commonwealth filed this
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    appeal and timely filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).5
    The Commonwealth raises the following issue on appeal:
    Whether the trial court erred in granting Appellee’s petition for
    writ of habeas corpus where the Commonwealth presented
    sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case to support all
    charges?[6]
    Commonwealth’s Brief at 5 (capitalization omitted).
    ____________________________________________
    5 Although the trial court dismissed five charges with respect to one victim,
    and three charges against a second victim, the Commonwealth’s Rule 1925(b)
    statement was broad and vague:
    This Honorable Court erred in granting Appellee’s Petition
    for Writ of Habeas Corpus where the Commonwealth presented
    sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case to support all
    charges.
    See Commonwealth’s Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal
    Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 4/5/21. The statement did not identify any of
    the dismissed counts, let alone any particular element of the offenses.
    We remind the Commonwealth that when raising claims on appeal, it
    must set forth the issues with “sufficient detail.” See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii)
    (“The Statement shall concisely identify each error that the appellant intends
    to assert with sufficient detail to identify the issue to be raised for the judge.”).
    See also Commonwealth v. Tyack, 
    128 A.3d 254
    , 260 (Pa. Super. 2015)
    (to preserve a claim that the evidence was insufficient, the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    statement must specify the element(s) upon which the evidence was
    insufficient, so that this Court can analyze that element; where a Rule 1925(b)
    statement does not specify the allegedly unproven elements, the sufficiency
    issue is waived for appeal).
    6 The trial court did not specify in its February 11, 2021, order that it was
    “granting” Appellee’s habeas corpus petition. Order, 2/11/21. Nevertheless,
    this order ultimately gave Appellee some of the requested relief by dismissing
    some of the charges. 
    Id.
    -6-
    J-S34037-21
    The Commonwealth argues the trial court erred in finding it did not
    establish a prima facie case regarding each of the dismissed charges: one
    count each of indecent assault without consent, indecent assault (victim under
    16 years), and harassment, and two counts each of institutional sexual assault
    (schools) and corruption of minors. The Commonwealth maintains K.L.’s and
    H.H.’s testimony showed that when they were 15 years old, Appellee, their
    teacher, “touched both of their butts.”          Commonwealth’s Brief at 18.   The
    Commonwealth insists it proved Appellee’s “intent to arouse or gratify his
    sexual desire . . . circumstantially through [testimony that he] has made
    sexually explicit and inappropriate jokes to minor students.[7]”         
    Id.
       We
    conclude no relief is due.
    Our standard of review of pre-trial habeas corpus petitions is limited:
    We review a decision to grant a pre-trial petition for a writ
    of habeas corpus by examining the evidence and reasonable
    inferences derived therefrom in a light most favorable to the
    Commonwealth. In Commonwealth v. Karetny, [ ] 
    880 A.2d 505
     (Pa. 2005), our Supreme Court found that this Court erred in
    applying an abuse of discretion standard in considering a pre-trial
    habeas matter to determine whether the Commonwealth had
    provided prima facie evidence. The Karetny Court opined, “the
    Commonwealth’s prima facie case for a charged crime is a
    question of law as to which an appellate court's review is plenary.”
    Id. at 513[.] The [ ] Court in Karetny continued, “[i]ndeed, the
    trial court is afforded no discretion in ascertaining whether, as a
    matter of law and in light of the facts presented to it, the
    ____________________________________________
    7 The Commonwealth also argues it presented circumstantial evidence that
    Appellee “inappropriately touched other minor students” and “indicated [ ]
    that he is attracted to them[.]” Commonwealth Brief’s at 18. However, our
    review of the McClelland hearing testimony leads to a different conclusion.
    -7-
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    Commonwealth has carried its pre-trial, prima facie burden to
    make out the elements of a charged crime.” [Id.] at 513. Hence,
    we are not bound by the legal determinations of the trial court. .
    ..
    A pre-trial habeas corpus motion is the proper means for
    testing whether the Commonwealth has sufficient evidence to
    establish a prima facie case. “To demonstrate that a prima facie
    case exists, the Commonwealth must produce evidence of every
    material element of the charged offense(s) as well as the
    defendant’s complicity therein.”    To “meet its burden, the
    Commonwealth may utilize the evidence presented at the
    preliminary hearing and also may submit additional proof.”
    Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 
    135 A.3d 1109
    , 1111-12 (Pa. Super. 2016)
    (en banc) (some citations omitted).
    The charges against Appellee are defined as follows:
    § 3126. Indecent assault.
    (a) Offense defined — A person is guilty of indecent
    assault if the person has indecent contact with the complainant,
    causes the complainant to have indecent contact with the person
    or intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with
    seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual
    desire in the person or the complainant and:
    (1) the person does so without the complainant’s
    consent;
    *     *   *
    (8) the complainant is less than 16 years of age and
    the person is four or more years older than the
    complainant and the complainant and the person are not
    married to each other.
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1), (8).
    § 2709. Harassment.
    (a) Offense defined — A person commits the crime of
    harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm
    another, the person:
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    J-S34037-21
    (1) strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects the
    other person to physical contact, or attempts or
    threatens to do the same[.]
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(1).
    § 3124.2. Institutional sexual assault.
    (a.2) Schools.
    (1) [A] person who is a volunteer or an employee of
    a school or any other person who has direct contact with a
    student at a school commits a felony of the third degree
    when he engages in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual
    intercourse or indecent contact with a student of the school.
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.2(a.2)(1).
    § 6301. Corruption of minors.
    (a) Offense defined
    *    *    *
    (ii) Whoever, being of the age of 18 years and
    upwards, by any course of conduct in violation of Chapter
    31 (relating to sexual offenses) corrupts or tends to
    corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18 years of
    age, or who aids, abets, entices or encourages any such
    minor in the commission of an offense under Chapter 31
    commits a felony of the third degree.
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii).
    We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that, regarding K.L., the
    Commonwealth did not establish a prima facie case “that a crime had been
    committed” or that Appellee was the perpetrator.      See Trial Ct. Op. at 4.
    Although K.L. initially stated on direct examination that Appellee touched her,
    she conceded, several times, that she did not know who touched her, and
    furthermore, she believed any contact to be an “accident.” N.T., McClelland
    H’rg, at 29, 34, 38-39, 41. After the incident, K.L. felt “pressured” by Eckly
    -9-
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    and was “persuaded” by fellow students to say Appellee touched her. Id. at
    33, 36, 39; see Trial Ct. Op. at 3. Even considering the testimony in the “light
    most favorable to the Commonwealth[,]” the evidence did not establish each
    element of the charged offenses, nor did it demonstrate Appellee’s “complicity
    therein.” See Dantzler, 135 A.3d at 1111-12.
    Regarding the charges pertaining to H.H., we agree with the trial court’s
    determination that the Commonwealth did not establish a prima facie case for
    institutional sexual assault (schools) or corruption of minors. The trial court
    reasoned:
    H.H. clearly testified that [Appellee] tapped her on the butt.
    As such, there was evidence to support some of the charges
    against [him] with respect to H.H. However, the evidence showed
    that this was a momentary tap on the butt that only lasted for a
    second. It cannot be said that such a momentary contact would
    tend to corrupt the morals of H.H. It also cannot be said that such
    a momentary contact constitutes a felony. . . .
    Trial Ct. Op. at 4 (footnotes omitted). This determination is supported by the
    evidence. The Commonwealth did not present “evidence of every material
    element of the [dismissed] offense(s) [or Appellee’s] complicity therein.” See
    Dantzler, 135 A.3d at 1112 (citation omitted). We agree with the trial court’s
    conclusion that “such a momentary contact” does not establish institutional
    sexual assault (schools) or corruption of minors. Trial Ct. Op. at 4.
    Lastly, we note that in Appellee’s brief, he raises arguments concerning
    the admissibility of hearsay and Pa.R.E. 404(b) evidence presented by the
    Commonwealth.     Appellee’s Brief at 10-22.    Appellee did not file a cross-
    appeal, and thus, we are without jurisdiction to address these claims. See
    - 10 -
    J-S34037-21
    Commonwealth v. Moser, 
    476 A.2d 980
    , 982 (Pa. Super. 1984) (this Court
    lacks jurisdiction to address additional claims from an appellee where they did
    not file a cross-appeal).
    We agree with the trial court’s determination that the Commonwealth
    failed to establish, as a matter of law, the elements to the dismissed charges.
    Accordingly, no relief is due.   We reiterate that with respect to H.H., the
    charges of indecent assault without consent, indecent assault (victim under
    16 years), and harassment may proceed.
    Order affirmed.
    Judge Dubow has joined the Memorandum.
    Judge McLaughlin files a Concurring/Dissenting Memorandum.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 04/01/2022
    - 11 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 329 MDA 2021

Judges: McCaffery, J.

Filed Date: 4/1/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/1/2022