Warner, L. v. Pietrini, B. ( 2017 )

J-S38001-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
LEVON T. WARNER, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
B. PIETRINI & SONS, JOHN DOE #1, :
JOHN DOE #2 & “SUPERVISOR :
MACK” :
:
Appellees : No. 618 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered January 7, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): No. 00980 January Term, 2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JULY 25, 2017
Appellant, Levon T. Warner, appeals pro se from the order entered in
the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which sustained preliminary
objections filed on behalf of Appellee, B. Pietrini & Sons, John Doe #1, John
Doe #2, and “Supervisor Mack” (collectively Appellee). For the following
reasons, we affirm.
On January 9, 2015, Appellant filed a complaint against Appellee
alleging that Appellant had been injured while working at Appellee’s
construction site, sometime in February 2008, when he experienced chest
pains while working at the job and was taken to the hospital, where doctors
diagnosed him with atrial fibrillation. Appellant also stated a cardiologist had
told Appellant at the time that he had suffered a work-related injury. On
___________________________
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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June 26, 2015, Appellant filed an affidavit of service that he had served the
complaint on Appellee by certified mail on February 26, 2015.
On October 16, 2015, Appellee filed preliminary objections to
Appellant’s complaint, contending: 1) improper service; 2) lack of good faith
efforts to serve Appellee; 3) complaint lacked specificity; 4) Workers’
Compensation Act was a complete bar to Appellant’s workplace-injury
claims; and 5) legal insufficiency of Appellant’s claim for punitive damages
and allegations of “reckless” and “wanton” conduct. Appellant filed no
response to Appellee’s preliminary objections. On January 7, 2016, the trial
court sustained Appellee’s preliminary objections and dismissed all of
Appellant’s claims against Appellee. Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of
appeal on January 27, 2016. No concise statement of errors complained of
on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) was ordered or filed.
The following represents Appellant’s issues as stated in his brief:
DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] AND VIOLATE APPELLANT’S
RIGHTS UNDER THE 5TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE
U.S. AS WELL AS THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION,
WHEN [APPELLEES] ADDED UNRELATED CRIMINAL
HISTORY THAT’S NOT RELATED TO APPELLANT’S CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS AND SHOWED BIASNESS AFTER
[APPELLEE’S] ATTORNEY[S] ENTERED THEIR
APPEARANCE?
DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] AND VIOLATE APPELLANT’S
RIGHT[S] UNDER THE 5TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE
U.S. AS WELL AS THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION,
WHEN [APPELLEE] MISREPRESENTED TO THE [TRIAL]
COURT APPELLANT’S WORK RELATED HEART INJURY AND
COMMITTED INTENTIONAL WRONGFUL ACTS, INCLUDING
[FRAUDULENT] CONCEALMENT ACTS BY THEIR
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SILENCE/ADMISSIONS THAT A CIVIL ACTION WAS BEING
FILED AGAINST B. PIETRINI & SONS ET AL., AFTER
[ACCEPTING] THE COMPLAINT, NOT RESPONDING TO IT,
NOT LOGGING A REPORT IN THE OSHA MANDATED
INJURY HISTORY [LOG], FURTHERMORE, [APPELLEE]
TOTALLY IGNORED THE “COURT ORDERS.” THE ONLY
TIME [APPELLEE] PARTICIPATED WAS THE FILING
“[ENTRY] OF APPEARANCE” MONTHS LATER AND
“PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS.” THE COURT DOCKET CAN
PROVE IT[.]
DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] AND VIOLATE APPELLANT’S
RIGHTS UNDER THE 5TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS TO THE
U.S. AS WELL AS THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION,
WHEN THE [TRIAL] COURT DISMISSED APPELLANT’S CIVIL
COMPLAINT WITHOUT ALLOWING A PRO SE LITIGANT,
THE OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT, MAKE
PROPER SERVICE, DENIED DISCOVERY AFTER APPELLANT
SHOWED A [GOOD] FAITH EFFORT BY ANSWERING ALL
COURT ORDERS TO THE BEST OF [HIS] ABILITY AND WAS
DUE [DILIGENT] THROUGHOUT THIS [ENTIRE] CIVIL
PROCEEDING?
DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] AND VIOLATE APPELLANT’S
RIGHTS UNDER THE 5TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE
U.S. AS WELL AS THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION
THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THROUGH
APPELLANT’S MEDICAL RECORDS FROM UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL PROVING THAT [APPELLEE]
RUSHED APPELLANT TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT AT
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL WITHOUT
CALLING 911 OR AN AMBULANCE TO THE JOB-SITE FOR
[HIS] HEALTH AND SAFETY, ON FEB. [19], 2008, WHEN
APPELLANT SUFFERED A WORK RELATED HEART ATTACK
INJURY. APPELLANT AND THE [SUPERVISOR]/MACK
[WERE] FROM THE SAME LOCAL 332 UNION THAT
VIOLATED THE BREACH OF CONTRACT BY CONCEALING
APPELLANT’S WORK RELATED HEART INJURY?
DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] AND VIOLATE APPELLANT’S
RIGHTS UNDER THE 5TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE
U.S. AS WELL AS THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION, IN
FINDING THAT THE WEIGHT OF THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE
WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CLAIMS THAT THERE’S
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NO WAY APPELLANT HAD A HEART ATTACK INJURY PRIOR
TO THE DAY OF THIS WORK RELATED HEART INJURY,
WHEN THE COURTS AND [APPELLEE] HAD A COPY OF
APPELLANT’S ENTIRE MEDICAL RECORDS AND BOXING
LICENSE?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4-5).
As a prefatory matter we note that, although this Court is willing to
construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally
confers no special benefit upon an appellant. First Union Mortg. Corp. v.
Frempong, 744 A.2d 327 (Pa.Super. 1999) (stating pro se status does not
entitle party to any particular advantage due to lack of legal training).
Accordingly, a pro se litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth
in the Pennsylvania Rules of Court. Jones v. Rudenstein, 585 A.2d 520(Pa.Super. 1991), appeal denied, 529 Pa. 634, 600 A.2d 954 (1991).
Appellate briefs must conform in all material respects to the briefing
requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rosselli v. Rosselli, 750 A.2d 355 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal denied, 564
Pa. 696, 764 A.2d 50 (2000) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2101). See also Pa.R.A.P.
2114-2119 (addressing specific requirements of each subsection of brief on
appeal).
The applicable rules of appellate procedure mandate that an
appellant’s brief shall consist of the following matters, separately and plainly
entitled and in the following order:
(1) Statement of jurisdiction.
(2) Order or other determination in question.
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(3) Statement of both the scope of review and the
standard of review.
(4) Statement of the questions involved.
(5) Statement of the case.
(6) Summary of argument.
(7) Statement of the reasons to allow an appeal to
challenge the discretionary aspects of a sentence,
if applicable.
(8) Argument for appellant.
(9) A short conclusion stating the precise relief
sought.
(10) The opinions and pleadings specified in
Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule.
(11) In the Superior Court, a copy of the statement of
errors complained of on appeal, filed with the trial
court pursuant to Rule 1925(b), or an averment
that no order requiring a statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) was entered.
Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a). Additionally, as to the argument section of an appellate
brief, Rule 2119(a) provides:
Rule 2119. Argument
(a) General rule.—The argument shall be divided
into as many parts as there are questions to be argued;
and shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive type
or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point
treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of
authorities as are deemed pertinent.
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Importantly, where an appellant fails to raise or properly
develop his issues on appeal, or where his brief is wholly inadequate to
present specific issues for review, a court will not consider the merits of the
claims raised on appeal. Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d 943 (Pa.Super. 2000)
(holding appellant waived claim where appellant failed to set forth adequate
argument concerning claims on appeal; appellant’s argument lacked
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meaningful substance and consisted of mere conclusory statements;
appellant failed to cogently explain or even tenuously assert why trial court
abused its discretion or made error of law). See also Lackner v. Glosser,
892 A.2d 21 (Pa.Super 2006) (explaining appellant’s arguments must
adhere to rules of appellate procedure, and arguments which are not
appropriately developed are waived on appeal; arguments not appropriately
developed include those where party has failed to cite relevant authority in
support of contention); Estate of Haiko v. McGinley, 799 A.2d 155(Pa.Super. 2002) (stating rules of appellate procedure make clear appellant
must support each question raised by discussion and analysis of pertinent
authority; absent reasoned discussion of law in appellate brief, this Court’s
ability to provide appellate review is hampered, necessitating waiver of issue
on appeal).
Instantly, Appellant is pro se on appeal and the defects in his brief are
substantial. Several required components of the brief are missing, including
the order or other determination in question, a cogent standard and scope of
review, an objective statement of the case without argument, a summary of
the argument, an averment that no order requiring a statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) was entered, or a
copy of the trial court opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)-(b); Pa.R.A.P.
2117(a)-(b). The most problematic aspect of Appellant’s brief, however, is
his failure to provide developed arguments in support of his issues;
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Appellant’s argument is rambling, repetitive, and often incoherent. See
Pa.R.A.P. 2119. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, we will address only
the arguments we can reasonably discern from this defective brief.
First, Appellant argues Appellee introduced evidence concerning
Appellant’s unrelated criminal history, creating prejudice against Appellant.
Appellant requests a motion in limine to preclude Appellee from introducing
exhibits or information related to Appellant’s current incarceration.
Appellant further contends the statute of limitations did not bar his claim for
workers’ compensation because Appellee committed acts of fraud and
concealment to lull Appellant into a “false sense of security” regarding the
filing of his claim. Appellant argues these acts tolled the running of the
statute of limitations because he was unaware of this deception at the time.
Moreover, Appellant maintains the trial court erred in dismissing Appellant’s
complaint due to lack of proper service. Appellant argues he was denied due
process by not being allowed to amend his complaint. Additionally,
Appellant contends that Appellees violated OSHA requirements by
transporting Appellant to the hospital in a pick-up truck and failing to file an
injury report. Finally, Appellant maintains there was sufficient evidence in
his medical records to prove his injury was work-related, and Appellees
refused to release discovery material in order to avoid liability. For these
reasons, Appellant concludes this Court should vacate the order sustaining
Appellee’s preliminary objections and remand the case to be reopened for
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trial. We disagree.
Appellate review in this case implicates the following general
principles:
In determining whether the trial court properly sustained
preliminary objections, the appellate court must examine
the averments in the complaint, together with the
documents and exhibits attached thereto, in order to
evaluate the sufficiency of the facts averred. The impetus
of our inquiry is to determine the legal sufficiency of the
complaint and whether the pleading would permit recovery
if ultimately proven. This Court will reverse the trial
court’s decision regarding preliminary objections only
where there has been an error of law or abuse of
discretion. When sustaining the trial court’s ruling will
result in the denial of claim or a dismissal of suit,
preliminary objections will be sustained only where the
case is free and clear of doubt.
Clemleddy Const., Inc. v. Yorston, 810 A.2d 693, 696 (Pa.Super. 2002),
appeal denied, 573 Pa. 682, 823 A.2d 143 (2003) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
With respect to the filing of preliminary objections, the Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure provide, in pertinent part:
Rule 1028. Preliminary Objections
(a) Preliminary objections may be filed by any party to
any pleading and are limited to the following grounds:
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action or the person of the defendant, improper
venue or improper form or service of a writ of
summons or a complaint;
* * *
(3) insufficient specificity in a pleading;
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(4) legal insufficiency of a pleading (demurrer)[.]
* * *
Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(1), (3)-(4). “Service of process is a mechanism by which
a court obtains jurisdiction [over] a defendant, and therefore, the rules
concerning service of process must be strictly followed.” Cintas Corp. v.
Lee’s Cleaning Services, Inc., 549 Pa. 84, 91, 700 A.2d 915, 917 (1997)
(citing Sharp v. Valley Forge Medical Center and Heart Hospital, Inc.,
422 Pa. 124, 221 A.2d 185 (1966)).
Thus, improper service is not merely a procedural defect
that can be ignored when a defendant subsequently learns
of the action against…. However, the absence of or a
defect in a return of service does not necessarily divest a
court of jurisdiction of a defendant who was properly
served. The fact of service is the important thing in
determining jurisdiction and...proof of service may be
defective or even lacking, but if the fact of service is
established jurisdiction cannot be questioned.
Cintas Corp., supra at 91, 700 A.2d at 918 (internal citations omitted). In
other words, successful service of process is the focus of an “improper
service” inquiry. Id.Regarding service of process in actions commenced in the First Judicial
District, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 400.1(a) provides:
Rule 400.1 Provisions for all Courts of the First
Judicial District
(a) In an action commenced in the First Judicial District,
original process may be served
(1) within the county by the sheriff or a competent
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adult, or
(2) in any other county by deputized service as
provided by Rule 400(d) or by a competent adult
forwarding the process to the sheriff of the county
where service may be made.
Pa.R.C.P. 400.1(a)(1)-(2). Rule 400(d) states:
Rule 400. Person to Make Service
* * *
(d) If service is to be made by the sheriff in a county
other than the county in which the action was commenced,
the sheriff of the county where service may be made shall
be deputized for that purpose by the sheriff of the county
where the action was commenced.
Pa.R.C.P. 400(d). Finally, Rule 424, governing service of process on
corporations, provides:
Rule 424. Corporations and Similar Entities
Service of original process upon a corporation or similar
entity shall be made by handing a copy to any of the
following persons provided the person served is not a
plaintiff in the action:
(1) an executive officer, partner or trustee of the
corporation or similar entity, or
(2) the manager, clerk or other person for the time
being in charge of any regular place of business or activity
of the corporation or similar entity, or
(3) an agent authorized by the corporation or similar
entity in writing to receive service of process for it.
Pa.R.C.P. 424. As a general rule, proper service of process on a corporation
in Pennsylvania cannot be satisfied by certified mail. See Vogt v. Liberty
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Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 900 A.2d 912 (Pa.Super. 2006) (holding court lacked
personal jurisdiction over corporation because service of original process was
erroneously effected by regular and certified mail).
Under Rule 1028(a)(3), the pertinent question is “whether the
complaint is sufficiently clear to enable the defendant to prepare his
defense,” or “whether the plaintiff’s complaint informs the defendant with
accuracy and completeness of the specific basis on which recovery is sought
so that [the defendant] may know without question upon what grounds to
make his defense.” Rambo v. Greene, 906 A.2d 1232, 1236 (Pa.Super.
2006).
“Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state; a complaint must not only give
the defendant notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests, but the complaint must also formulate the issues by
summarizing those facts essential to support the claim.” Lerner v. Lerner,
954 A.2d 1229, 1235 (Pa.Super. 2008). The pleadings standards set forth in
Pa.R.C.P. 1019 specifically
require the pleader to disclose the material facts sufficient
to enable the adverse party to prepare his case. A
complaint therefore must do more than give the defendant
fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests. It should formulate the issues by fully
summarizing the material facts. Material facts are ultimate
facts, i.e. those facts essential to support the claim.
Evidence from which such facts may be inferred not only
need not but should not be alleged.... Allegations will
withstand challenge under [Rule] 1019(a) if (1) they
contain averments of all of the facts the plaintiff will
eventually have to prove in order to recover, and (2) they
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are sufficiently specific so as to enable defendant to
prepare his defense.
Id. at 1235-36 (quoting Baker v. Rangos, 324 A.2d 498, 505-06
(Pa.Super. 1974)).
Under Rule 1028(a)(4), the relevant question is whether the contested
pleading is legally sufficient. Weiley v. Albert Einstein Medical Center,
51 A.3d 202, 208 (Pa.Super. 2012). A challenge in the nature of a
demurrer, gives rise to the following scope and standard of review:
Our review of a trial court’s sustaining of preliminary
objections in the nature of a demurrer is plenary. Such
preliminary objections should be sustained only if,
assuming the averments of the complaint to be true, the
plaintiff has failed to assert a legally cognizable cause of
action. We will reverse a trial court’s decision to sustain
preliminary objections only if the trial court has committed
an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
All material facts set forth in the complaint as well as all
inferences reasonably [deducible] therefrom are admitted
as true for [the purpose of this review]. The question
presented by the demurrer is whether, on the facts
averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is
possible. Where a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer
should be sustained, this doubt should be resolved in favor
of overruling it.
Regarding a demurrer, this Court has held:
A demurrer is an assertion that a complaint does not
set forth a cause of action or a claim on which relief
can be granted. A demurrer by a defendant admits
all relevant facts sufficiently pleaded in the complaint
and all inferences fairly deducible therefrom, but not
conclusions of law or unjustified inferences. In ruling
on a demurrer, the court may consider only such
matters as arise out of the complaint itself; it cannot
supply a fact missing in the complaint.
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Where the complaint fails to set forth a valid cause of
action, a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer
is properly sustained.
Lerner, supra at 1234-35 (internal citations omitted).
Regarding affirmative defenses, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 1030 provides:
Rule 1030. New Matter
(a) Except as provided by subdivision (b), all affirmative
defenses including but not limited to the defenses
of…immunity from suit…shall be pleaded in a responsive
pleading under the heading “New Matter”….
Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a). For example, statutory immunity from suit is not
properly raised in preliminary objections to a complaint; it is an affirmative
defense that should be raised in new matter in a responsive pleading.
Heifetz v. Philadelphia State Hospital, 482 Pa. 386, 393 A.2d 1160(1978); Taras v. Wausau Ins. Companies, 602 A.2d 882 (Pa.Super.
1992), appeal denied, 532 Pa. 657, 615 A.2d 1313 (1992) (stating statutory
immunity under Workers’ Compensation Act is affirmative defense that is
properly raised in new matter rather than by preliminary objections to
complaint). Nevertheless:
Where a party erroneously asserts substantive defenses in
preliminary objections rather than to raise these defenses
by answer or in new matter, the failure of the opposing
party to file preliminary objections to the defective
preliminary objections, raising the erroneous defenses,
waives the procedural defect and allows the trial court to
rule on the preliminary objections.
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Preiser v. Rosenzweig, 614 A.2d 303, 305 (Pa.Super. 1992), aff’d, 538
Pa. 139, 646 A.2d 1166 (1994). See also Fewell v. Besner, 664 A.2d
577, 582 (Pa.Super. 1995) (stating: “Where a party improperly raises
‘immunity from suit’ in preliminary objections and the opposing party does
not object to this defect, then the question of immunity from suit may be
decided by the court”).
Instantly, the trial court reasoned as follows:
The pro se [Appellant], who is currently incarcerated, filed
an appeal from an order entered by this Court that
sustained [Appellee’s] preliminary objections to the
Complaint filed on January 9, 2015. That Complaint was
almost completely illegible, and it contained several pages
upon which the written text was [smudged] to such an
extent that it was impossible to read the printed words on
those pages. The Complaint contained no separate
paragraphs or counts, and it did not espouse a clear theory
of liability against [Appellee]. To the extent that it was
possible to comprehend the Complaint, [Appellant] averred
that he was injured while working for [Appellee] on a
construction project. He averred that he suffered chest
pains while [racking] concrete on February 19, 2008 and
was taken to the hospital where he was diagnosed with
atrial fibrillation. [Appellant] averred that a cardiologist
named Dr. Dixon told him that he had suffered a work
related injury.
On June 26, 2015, [Appellant] filed an Affidavit of Service
stating:
I, Levon T. Warner, pro se do hereby state that I
served the defendant[s] B. Pietrini & Sons
Construction, my civil complaint upon certified mail
on Feb 26, 2015. According to the certified
receipt[s, t]he complaint was received and signed for
by Patricia Dunior on March 17, 2015. No. {7014
1200 0000 5099 2390}. Please see attached
exhibits as a matter of proof/record.
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Discussion
This [c]ourt [sustained] the uncontested preliminary
objections filed by [Appellee] because [Appellant] failed to
effectuate proper service of process against [Appellee].
This [c]ourt also [sustained] preliminary objections
because the claims brought by [Appellant] were barred by
the exclusivity provisions in the Workers’ Compensation
Act.
The address [c]ited by [Appellant] in the Affidavit of
Service filed on June 26, 2015 is located in Pennsylvania;
therefore, he failed to obtain personal jurisdiction over
[Appellee] when he mailed the Complaint to this
Pennsylvania address of 111 E. Church Road, King of
Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406. Since [Appellant] failed to
respond to the preliminary objections, the only evidence of
record that this [c]ourt could review when deciding this
matter was the Affidavit of Service.
With some limited exceptions, not applicable in this
matter, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure require
deputized service of process by sheriff to obtain
jurisdiction over defendants located within the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. …
* * *
In addition to the fatal flaws in [Appellant’s] method for
service of process, the claims brought by [Appellant] in
this matter were barred by the Pennsylvania Workers’
Compensation Act. [Appellant’s] Complaint clearly alleged
that he was working for [Appellee] at the time of the
alleged incident in February of 2008. In his Complaint,
[Appellant] himself described the alleged injury as a “work
related injury.”
It is well established under Pennsylvania law that the
Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy
to a claimant against his or her employer. 77 P.S. [§
481]; See also Alston v. St. Paul Insurance
Companies, 531 Pa. 261, 612 A.2d 421 (1992); Kuney
v. PMA Insurance Compan[y], 525 Pa. [171], 578 A.2d
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1285 (1990); Santiago v. Pennsylvania National
Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., 613 A.2d [1235], 1242
([Pa.Super.] 1992). The Act provides that the “liability of
an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place
of any and all other liability to such employees…in any
action at law or otherwise on account of any injury.” 77
[P.S.] § [481]. “[T]he exclusivity clause of the
Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 481,
reflects historical quid pro quo between an employer and
employee whereby the employee is relieved of the burden
of establishing fault for a work-related injury, and is
compensated expeditiously. The employer in turn is
relieved of the possibility of a larger damages verdict in a
common law action. The comprehensive system of
substantive, procedural and remedial laws comprising the
workers’ compensation system is the exclusive forum for
redress of injuries in any way related to the workplace.”
Snyder v. Pocono Medical Center, 547 Pa. 415, 419-20,
[690 A.2d 1152, 1155] (1977). Likewise, the Plaintiff
cannot hold a co-employee liable at common law for any
injury during employment, except for intentional wrong
acts. 77 [P.S.] § [72].
The workers’ compensation system was created to address
workplace injuries much like the one [Appellant] suffered
in February 2008. [Appellant] in his Complaint states that
he “was working on a job site” when he suffered his
alleged injury and was “rushed” to the hospital. He states
that he was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation and was told
by cardiologist, Dr. Dixon, that this was a work related
injury. Therefore, [Appellant’s] correct path for relief
would be through the channels of the workers’
compensation system because the Workers’ Compensation
Act provides the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries
such as the one alleged by [Appellant].
Conclusion
This [c]ourt did not have personal jurisdiction over
[Appellee] because [Appellant] failed to comply with the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure that govern service
of process. [Appellant’s] claims are equally barred by the
exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
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(Trial Court Opinion, filed October 4, 2016, at 1-4) (internal footnote
omitted). We accept the court’s analysis. The court makes clear it reviewed
Appellant’s complaint and did not sustain Appellee’s preliminary objections
simply because Appellant failed to respond. See, e.g., Dixon v.
Northwestern Mutual, 146 A.3d 780 (Pa.Super. 2016) (reiterating general
principle that party’s failure to respond to preliminary objections does not
sustain preliminary objections by default); Schuylkill Navy v. Langbord,
728 A.2d 964 (Pa.Super. 1999) (stating court cannot sustain preliminary
objections based solely on party’s failure to file proper response).
Moreover, the trial court appropriately addressed the Workers’
Compensation Act in its analysis, although statutory immunity is an
affirmative defense more properly raised in new matter and not through
preliminary objections. See Heifetz, supra; Taras, supra. Appellee raised
“immunity from suit” in preliminary objections, but Appellant did not object;
so the court was free to rule on the issue. See Fewell, supra; Preiser,
supra.
As a final word, review of Appellant’s complaint confirms the complaint
did not meet the general pleading requirements, as it was both factually and
legally insufficient. An entire page of the three and a half page document is
completely illegible. The remaining pages contain an incomplete summary
of the material facts and issues as well as many incoherent allegations
insufficient to withstand the preliminary objections. The state of Appellant’s
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complaint makes it virtually impossible to achieve an accurate understanding
of his claims. See Lerner, supra; Rambo, supra. Additionally, even if the
limited information that can be drawn from Appellant’s brief were true,
Appellant failed to set forth a legally cognizable claim for which relief can be
granted. See Lerner, supra; 77 P.S. § 481. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/25/2017
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