Com. v. Williams, C. ( 2022 )

J-S08028-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CHRISTOPHER ROBERT WILLIAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 1124 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 22, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-40-CR-0000710-2020
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: APRIL 12, 2022
Appellant Christopher Robert Williams appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed after he pled guilty to multiple counts of dissemination of
child pornography and possession of child pornography.1 Appellant’s counsel
(Counsel) has filed a petition to withdraw and an Anders/Santiago2 brief.
We grant Counsel’s request to withdraw and affirm.
The trial court summarized the procedural history as follows:
This matter arises from an information filed by the Luzerne County
District Attorney against [Appellant] on May 22, 2020. [Appellant]
was charged with 350 counts of dissemination of child
pornography and 350 counts of child pornography [and ten counts
of criminal use of communications facility, 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a)].
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6312(c) and 6312(d), respectively.
2Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. Santiago,
978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
J-S08028-22
On September 8, 2020, [Appellant] entered a guilty plea to the
700 [child pornography] counts contained in the information [and
the Commonwealth withdrew the ten counts of criminal use of
communication facility]. After an assessment was completed by
the Sexual Offender Assessment Board [(SOAB)], sentencing
occurred on July 22, 2021. [Appellant] received a sentence of 12
to 24 months on counts one through twelve to be served
consecutively. He also received 12 to 24 months on counts
thirteen through seven hundred to be served concurrent with
count twelve. The total aggregate sentence was 144 to 288
months [with credit for time served].
Trial Ct. Op., 10/13/21, at 1 (formatting altered).
We add that at sentencing, the trial court admitted into evidence the
report of SOAB member Paula Brust. N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 7/22/21, at 3.
Appellant and the Commonwealth stipulated that if Brust were to testify, she
would testify consistently with her report. Id. Based on the information
contained in the SOAB report, the trial court determined that Appellant was a
sexually violent predator (SVP). Id. at 6.
Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion. Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925.
In the Anders/Santiago brief, Counsel identifies the following issue:
Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to support the
designation of the Appellant as a sexually violent predator?
Anders/Santiago Brief at 2.
“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review
the merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining counsel’s
request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 951 A.2d 379, 382 (Pa.
-2-
J-S08028-22
Super. 2008) (citation omitted). Counsel must comply with the technical
requirements for petitioning to withdraw by (1) filing a petition for leave to
withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination of the record,
counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) providing a
copy of the brief to the appellant; and (3) advising the appellant that he has
the right to retain private counsel, proceed pro se, or raise additional
arguments that the appellant considers worthy of the court’s attention. See
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en
banc).
Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements
established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago, namely:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
“Once counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is then this
Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial court’s proceedings and
render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly
frivolous.” Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 291 (citation omitted). This includes “an
independent review of the record to discern if there are any additional, non-
frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113
-3-
J-S08028-22
A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and footnote omitted); accord
Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en
banc).
Here, Counsel has complied with the procedural requirements for
seeking withdrawal by filing a petition to withdraw, sending Appellant a letter
explaining his appellate rights, and supplying Appellant with a copy of the
Anders/Santiago brief.3 See Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 290. Moreover,
Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief complies with the requirements of
Santiago. Counsel includes a summary of the relevant factual and procedural
history, refers to the portions of the record that could arguably support
Appellant’s claim, and sets forth the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
See Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Accordingly, we conclude that Counsel has
met the technical requirements of Anders and Santiago, and we will proceed
to address the issues raised in Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief.
SVP Determination
In the Anders/Santiago brief, Counsel identifies Appellant’s challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence classifying Appellant as SVP.4
Anders/Santiago Brief at 8-11. Appellant contends that there was
insufficient evidence to establish “his likelihood of re-offending and any
____________________________________________
3 Appellant did not file a response to Counsel’s petition to withdraw.
4 We note that although Appellant did not file a post-trial motion, that does
not result in waiver of his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting an SVP designation. See Commonwealth v. Fuentes, 991 A.2d
935, 941 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc).
-4-
J-S08028-22
predation” and that Brust’s report “did not support a finding that Appellant
was either engaged in predatory behavior or likely to re-offend and he was
amenable to treatment.” Id. at 8, 11. Appellant contends that the large gap
in time between his prior offense and the instant offenses does not
demonstrate that he has a “recidivist character.” Id. at 11.
On this record, SOAB member Brust considered the fourteen factors
provided in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24 to support the SOAB report’s finding that
Appellant was a sexually violent predator. Further, Brust found that Appellant
possessed mental abnormalities including pedophilia disorder that presented
the risk of him reoffending and predation. The trial court found Brust’s SOAB
report credible. See Trial Ct. Op. at 2-3; see also N.T. Sentencing Hr’g at 6.
Further, Counsel explains that Appellant’s claim is frivolous because there is
no requirement that a particular number of the statutory factors must be
present for a trial court to find that an individual is a sexually violent predator.
Id. at 14. Counsel states that after conscientious review of the record, he
cannot locate anything demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion
in accepting the SOAB report as credible or that the evidence did not support
the trial court’s conclusion. Id. at 15.
This Court has previously held that:
The determination of a defendant’s SVP status may only be made
following an assessment by the [SOAB] . . . and hearing before
the trial court. In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a
reviewing court, must be able to conclude that the fact-finder
found clear and convincing evidence that the individual is a
sexually violent predator. As with any sufficiency of the evidence
claim, we view all evidence and [the] reasonable inferences
-5-
J-S08028-22
therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. We
will reverse the trial court’s determination of SVP status only if the
Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing evidence
that each element of the statute has been satisfied.
The standard of proof governing the determination of SVP status,
i.e., “clear and convincing evidence,” has been described as an
“intermediate” test, which is more exacting than a preponderance
of the evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The clear and convincing standard requires evidence that is so
clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact
to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of
the precise facts in issue.
Commonwealth v. Morgan, 16 A.3d 1165, 1168 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation
omitted). In reviewing an SVP determination, this Court may not re-weigh
the factors relied on by the fact-finder. Id. at 1173.
This Court has explained the SVP determination process as follows:
After a person has been convicted of an offense listed in 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9799.14, the trial court then orders an assessment to be done
by the SOAB to help determine if that person should be classified
as an SVP. An SVP is defined as a person who has been convicted
of a sexually violent offense . . . and who [has] a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely
to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses. In order to show
that the offender suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder, the evidence must show that the defendant suffers from
a congenital or acquired condition that affects the emotional or
volitional capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes that
person to the commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that
makes the person a menace to the health and safety of other
persons. Moreover, there must be a showing that the defendant’s
conduct was predatory. Furthermore, in reaching a
determination, we must examine the driving force behind the
commission of these acts, as well as looking at the offender’s
propensity to reoffend, an opinion about which the
Commonwealth’s expert is required to opine. However, the risk
-6-
J-S08028-22
of reoffending is but one factor to be considered when making an
assessment; it is not an independent element.
When performing an SVP assessment, a mental health
professional must consider the following 15 factors: whether the
instant offense involved multiple victims; whether the defendant
exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense; the nature
of the sexual contact with the victim(s); the defendant’s
relationship with the victim(s); the victim(s)’ age(s); whether the
instant offense included a display of unusual cruelty by the
defendant during the commission of the offense; the victim(s)’
mental capacity(ies); the defendant’s prior criminal record;
whether the defendant completed any prior sentence(s); whether
the defendant participated in available programs for sexual
offenders; the defendant’s age; the defendant’s use of illegal
drugs; whether the defendant suffers from a mental illness,
mental disability, or mental abnormality; behavioral
characteristics that contribute to the defendant’s conduct; and any
other factor reasonably related to the defendant’s risk of
reoffending. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(b).
Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189-90 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(some citations omitted and formatting altered).
Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s SVP designation as follows:
A [SVP] hearing was held immediately prior to sentencing on July
22, 2021. Before the SVP hearing began, counsel for [Appellant]
stipulated to the report of the [SOAB] member who conducted the
assessment of [Appellant]. The report of the SOAB member
determined that [Appellant] met the full criteria for pedophilic
disorder which is considered to be a congenital and/or acquired
condition and that this is a lifetime disorder. The report also
determined that despite knowing the consequences of his actions
for himself and his victims, [Appellant] engaged in illegal sexual
behavior again and has not been able to manage his offending.
He has a sexually, deviant pathway to offending and his pedophilic
disorder will predispose him towards committing sexual offenses
and his disorder will cause him to experience an internal drive
towards sexual offending. The board member found that
[Appellant] did suffer from a mental abnormality/personality
disorder as defined by Pennsylvania law.
-7-
J-S08028-22
With regard to predatory behavior, the report indicated that
[Appellant] has not been able to manage his predatory behavior
to date and has exhibited predatory behavior in his lifetime which
continued with the current offense. [Appellant’s] behavior does
meet the legal definition for predatory behavior.
Finally, the board member concluded that [Appellant] did meet
the criteria to be classified as a [SVP] under Pennsylvania law.
Upon review of the extensive report prepared by the [SOAB]
member, this court determined that the Commonwealth proved
[Appellant] to be a [SVP] by clear and convincing evidence. That
determination should be affirmed.
Trial Ct. Op. at 2-3 (citation omitted and formatting altered); see also SOAB
Report at 6-10.
Based on our review of the record, and viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, we agree with the trial court that the
SOAB report contains clear and convincing evidence that Appellant has mental
abnormalities and disorders that make him likely to engage in predatory
sexually violent offenses. See Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 189-90; Morgan,
16 A.3d at 1168. Therefore, we conclude Appellant’s challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his designation as a SVP is frivolous and
no relief is due.
Plea Issues
Although not included in the statement of questions,5 Counsel’s
Anders/Santiago brief also identifies three potential issues concerning
____________________________________________
5 We note that although Counsel did not include these issues in the statement
of questions, it does not preclude review, as we would have nonetheless
addressed these issues when conducting our independent review of the
record. See Flowers, 113 A.3d at 1250.
-8-
J-S08028-22
Appellant’s guilty plea. Anders/Santiago Brief at 13-14. Specifically,
Counsel discusses the trial court’s jurisdiction, the legality of Appellant’s
sentence, and the validity of Appellant’s plea. Id. We address each issue
separately.
First, with respect to jurisdiction, Counsel notes that because there is
no dispute that the incident occurred in Luzerne County, the trial court had
jurisdiction over Appellant’s case. Id. at 13.
A guilty plea “constitutes a waiver of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.” Commonwealth v. Little, 314 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa. 1974).
However, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Id. at 272-73. A
challenge to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law and,
therefore, our standard of review is de novo. Commonwealth v. Jones, 929
A.2d 205, 211 (Pa. 2007). There are two requirements for subject matter
jurisdiction as it relates to criminal defendants: 1) the competency of the court
to hear the case; and 2) the provision of specific and formal notice to the
defendant of the crimes charged. Id. at 210 (citation omitted). “[A]ll courts
of common pleas have statewide subject matter jurisdiction in cases arising
under the Crimes Code[.]” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division,
was competent to hear Appellant’s case, which involved violations of the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code occurring in Luzerne County. See
Commonwealth v. Kohler, 811 A.2d 1046, 1050 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding
that a county court of common pleas has jurisdiction over offenses that take
-9-
J-S08028-22
place within its borders). Further, the record reflects that Appellant received
specific and formal notice of the charges, including the allegation that they
occurred in Luzerne County, when the Commonwealth filed the criminal
complaint and criminal information. See Criminal Compl., 2/13/20; Criminal
Information, 5/22/20. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction over
Appellant’s case, and Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. See
Commonwealth v. Kohler, 811 A.2d at 1050.
Counsel also discusses the legality of Appellant’s sentence.
Anders/Santiago Brief at 13. Counsel concludes that Appellant’s sentence
is legal because none of the individual sentences exceed the seven-year
statutory maximum for a felony of the third degree. Id.“If no statutory authorization exists for a particular sentence, that
sentence is illegal and . . . . must be vacated. Likewise, a sentence that
exceeds the statutory maximum is illegal.” Commonwealth v. Infante, 63
A.3d 358, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted). Issues relating to the
legality of a sentence are questions of law, therefore, our standard of review
is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Id. (citations omitted).
Dissemination of child pornography and possession of child pornography
are both felonies of the third degree. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(d.1)(2)(i). Section
1103 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code provides, in relevant part, “[i]n the
case of a felony of the third degree, for a term which shall be fixed by the
court at not more than seven years.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(3).
- 10 -
J-S08028-22
Here, Appellant pled guilty to 350 counts each of dissemination of child
pornography and possession of child pornography. See N.T. Plea Hr’g,
9/8/20, at 2-6. The trial court sentenced Appellant to seven hundred terms
of one to two years’ imprisonment, twelve of which were imposed
consecutively; the remainder of the convictions were imposed concurrently.
See N.T. Sentencing at 11-12. Appellant’s individual sentences do not exceed
the statutory maximum for either offense. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(3).
Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. See Infante, 63
A.3d at 363.
Finally, Counsel discusses the validity of Appellant’s guilty plea.
Anders/Santiago Brief at 13-14. Counsel notes that Appellant did not object
to his plea during the plea hearing, did not seek to withdraw his plea at
sentencing, and did not file a post-sentence motion to withdraw his plea. Id.
at 13. Therefore, Counsel concludes that Appellant has not preserved any
claims concerning the validity of his plea. Id. at 13-14.
A guilty plea is valid if it is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
entered. Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 522 (Pa. Super. 2003).
To preserve a challenge to the validity of a plea, a defendant must either
object during the colloquy, or raise the issue at the plea hearing, sentencing
hearing, or in a post-sentence motion. Commonwealth v. Monjaras-
Amaya, 163 A.3d 466, 468-69 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Here, the record confirms that Appellant did not challenge his plea at
the plea hearing, at the sentencing hearing, or in a post-sentence motion.
- 11 -
J-S08028-22
Therefore, we agree with Counsel’s assessment that Appellant’s claim is
waived. See id. Accordingly, this issue is frivolous, and no relief is due. See
Commonwealth v. Tukhi, 149 A.3d 881, 888 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stating that
“[a]n issue that is waived is frivolous” (citation omitted)).
Based on our review of the record, we agree with Counsel’s assessment
that the issues discussed in the Anders/Santiago brief are frivolous.
Moreover, our independent review of the record does not reveal any
additional, non-frivolous issues preserved in this appeal. See Flowers, 113
A.3d at 1250. Accordingly, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm
the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/12/2022
- 12 -