Com. v. Beringer, M. ( 2023 )


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  • J-A05008-23
    ON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    MARGARET HACHLAF BERINGER, JR.              :
    :
    Appellant                :    No. 1591 EDA 2022
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 14, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-09-CR-0005408-2020
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                                    FILED APRIL 26, 2023
    Margaret Hachlaf Beringer, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County. We affirm.
    Beringer entered an open guilty plea to one count each of drug delivery
    resulting   in   death,1    a   felony    of   the   first   degree,   and   involuntary
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2506. Section 2506(a) provides:
    A person commits a felony of the first degree if the person
    intentionally administers, dispenses, delivers, gives, prescribes,
    sells or distributes any controlled substance or counterfeit
    controlled substance in violation of section 13(a)(14) or (30) of
    the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64),1 known as The
    Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, and
    another person dies as a result of using the substance.
    J-A05008-23
    manslaughter,2 a misdemeanor of the first degree. The trial court summarized
    the facts of this case as follows:
    [Beringer] and the victim had a friendly relationship. However,
    their relationship centered around drug use. On May 31, 2018,
    the victim contacted [Beringer], and told her she was “dope
    sick.”[3] The victim requested that [Beringer] obtain heroin for
    her. Despite the “close” relationship the pair had, [Beringer] had
    never been to the [Warminster, Bucks County] residence of the
    victim. The two exchanged messages about “the fire” or potency
    of the drugs [Beringer] was to obtain in Philadelphia. [Beringer]
    provided the victim with 14 blue bags containing suspected heroin
    and needles. The victim paid for the items. The drugs were used
    by the victim, in [Beringer’s] presence; [Beringer] subsequently
    left, leaving the [victim’s] 7-month-old child attended only by her
    intoxicated mother. Lab results confirmed the following: 11 bags
    stamped Hellcat were positive for fentanyl; 3 syringes were
    positive for heroin and fentanyl; 4 bags stamped Hellcat were
    positive for fentanyl; 4 bags stamped Santa Muerte were positive
    for heroin and fentanyl; and a silver metal-lid was positive for
    heron and fentanyl. . . . [Beringer] confirmed she had delivered
    drugs to the victim on the day she died.
    Trial Court Opinion, 10/21/22, at 2.
    At the guilty plea colloquy, Beringer acknowledged she faced a
    maximum term of 45 years’ imprisonment. See N.T. Guilty Plea Colloquy,
    9/21/21, at 13-16.4 On March 14, 2022, the court held a sentencing hearing,
    ____________________________________________
    2   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a).
    3 Beringer confirmed this meant the victim was sick from withdrawal from
    heroin. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 3/14/22, at 40.
    4A person convicted of drug delivery resulting in death under section 2506(a)
    of the Crimes Code “shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which shall
    be fixed by the court at not more than 40 years.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2506(b). A
    person convicted of involuntary manslaughter, a misdemeanor of the first
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    at the conclusion of which the Honorable Raymond F. McHugh sentenced
    Beringer to three to six years’ imprisonment. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing,
    3/14/22, at 58-59.5 On March 23, 2022, Beringer filed a motion for
    reconsideration of her below-mitigated-range sentence. On May 19, 2022,
    Judge McHugh held a hearing on that motion and, thereafter, denied relief.
    On June 17, 2022, Beringer filed this timely appeal. Both Beringer and
    Judge McHugh have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Beringer raises one issue
    for our review:       “Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing
    [Beringer] by imposing a manifestly excessive sentence and failing to consider
    all relevant factors?”      Appellant’s Brief, at 8.   Beringer’s claim on appeal
    challenges the discretionary aspects of her sentence.
    Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentence are not
    appealable as of right. Rather, an appellant challenging the
    sentencing court’s discretion must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction
    by (1) filing a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly preserving the
    issue at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify the
    sentence; (3) complying with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), which requires a
    separate section of the brief setting forth a concise statement of
    the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the
    discretionary aspects of a sentence; and (4) presenting a
    ____________________________________________
    degree, is subject to a maximum sentence of no more than five years. See
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(b) (“Involuntary manslaughter is a misdemeanor of the
    first degree.”); id. at § 106(b)(6) (“A crime is a misdemeanor of the first
    degree if it is so designated in this title or if a person convicted thereof may
    be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the maximum of which is not more
    than five years.”).
    5 The court sentenced Beringer below the mitigated range of the Sentencing
    Guidelines, which defense counsel acknowledged at the reconsideration of
    sentence hearing. See N.T. Reconsideration of Sentence Hearing, 5/19/22,
    at 31-32.
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    substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
    appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9781(b),
    or sentencing norms.
    Commonwealth v. Miller, 
    275 A.3d 530
    , 534 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations
    omitted).
    Here, Beringer filed a post-sentence motion for reconsideration and a
    timely notice of appeal, and she has included a Rule 2119(f) statement in her
    brief.6 In her Rule 2119(f) statement, Beringer contends the sentencing court
    “failed to consider all relevant factors such as [Beringer’s] family history, age,
    or rehabilitative needs.” See Appellant’s Brief, at 10-11. She also contends
    the sentence imposed was “manifestly excessive and unreasonable.” Id. at
    11.
    We    conclude     Beringer    has      raised   a   substantial   question.   See
    Commonwealth v. Derry, 
    150 A.3d 987
    , 992 (Pa. Super. 2016) (substantial
    question raised where appellant claimed court “failed to consider relevant
    sentencing criteria, including the protection of the public, the gravity of the
    underlying offense and the rehabilitative needs of [a]ppellant, as [section]
    9721(b) requires”) (citation omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Raven,
    
    97 A.3d 1244
    , 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding “an excessive sentence
    claim—in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider
    mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.”); Commonwealth v.
    ____________________________________________
    6 “If the defendant files a timely post-sentence motion, the notice of appeal
    shall be filed . . . within 30 days of the entry of the order deciding the
    motion[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2)(a).
    -4-
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    Dodge, 
    77 A.3d 1263
    , 1273 (Pa. Super. 2013) (claim sentencing court
    “disregarded rehabilitation and the nature and circumstances of the offense in
    handing down its sentence” presented substantial question). Thus, we grant
    Beringer’s petition for allowance of appeal and address the merits of her claim.
    Our standard of review of a sentencing claim is as follows:
    Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
    sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
    absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
    of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
    the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
    sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
    judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
    arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
    Commonwealth v. Shugars, 
    895 A.2d 1270
    , 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).
    After a comprehensive review, we conclude that the record belies
    Beringer’s claim that the sentencing court failed to consider her rehabilitative
    needs. The record reflects that Judge McHugh considered the circumstances
    surrounding this drug delivery, as well as Beringer’s troubled family history,
    her struggles with addiction, her lack of a prior record, and her admirable
    efforts at rehabilitation.   See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, supra at 56-60.
    Judge McHugh stated the following on the record:
    Any time I impose a criminal sentence[,] I’m required to consider
    the sentencing guidelines, and those guidelines in this case for
    drug delivery resulting in death in the mitigation range are four
    years, in the standard range, five to six-and-a-half years, and in
    the aggravated range[,] nine-and-a-half years. I also need to
    consider defendant’s criminal history, and I note that she has a
    prior record score of zero, and that [is] what I will consider. I
    have to consider the gravity of the offense as it relates to the
    impact on the life of the victim and the community. I do so,
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    obviously, in this case. There’s a person who is deceased, and I
    have letters from her family requesting me to impose the
    maximum sentence in this case, which is not unusual for a []
    family member of a victim to request that. I consider the statute
    here, and I consider the fact that Ms. Beringer did what she did at
    the request of the victim. She was contacted, she was asked to
    go get this. This isn’t somebody that’s driving around with an
    inventory of drugs in their car[.] She was specifically asked to get
    this, and she specifically got what she was asked to get.
    Nonetheless, that provision of those drugs led to the death of the
    victim, and that’s why we’re here. And I have to consider what’s
    appropriate in considering all those factors[.]          I’m very
    impressed by the rehabilitative treatment that the
    defendant has already received, all I hear from everyone
    who is here, and I was very impressed with the people from
    Sacred Heart [Recovery Residence] who came, and I do
    believe their testimony[;] I think they were very credible.
    I think that Ms. Beringer is very dedicated to sobriety, she
    obviously has some issues, but she’s working hard, and I
    think that I heard from the defense she just doesn’t stop.
    She’s just not going to be defeated, she’s going to continue
    to get treatment until she’s living a sober life. And I
    consider all that. And I consider the circumstances of the crime
    and the history, character[,] and condition of the defendant.
    Id. at 56-58 (emphasis added). Subsequently, at the hearing on Beringer’s
    motion for reconsideration of sentence, Judge McHugh heard additional
    testimony from several character witnesses, all of whom praised Beringer’s
    empathy, her positive outlook, and her commitment to helping others
    experiencing homelessness or addiction. N.T. Reconsideration of Sentence
    Hearing, supra at 5-24. In particular, the court heard testimony from Renata
    Hill, the residential services coordinator at Project Home Sacred Heart, where
    Beringer intends to return after serving her sentence. Hill, who also testified
    at sentencing, stated:
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    [W]e will continue to support [Beringer] once she does return, and
    [it] doesn’t matter when, but we will have an open door for her.
    [Beringer] is to understand—and we had this conversation—that
    we will create a structure for her that is a lot stricter than what
    we have in place right now, you know, in order for her to continue
    to reside there. She, for the most part, even in the past, when
    we had to enforce or—you know, reduce her time outside, she was
    willing and okay with that, followed rules and protocols with no
    problem. [Beringer] takes a lot of accountability. . . . I believe
    she can rehabilitate better in a structured environment such as
    Sacred Heart.
    N.T. Reconsideration of Sentence Hearing, supra at 19-20, 23.
    The record reflects that the sentencing court was acutely aware of
    Beringer’s rehabilitative needs and took those needs into account when
    imposing sentence.     Notably, at the hearing on reconsideration, defense
    counsel acknowledged as much.       See id. at 31 (defense counsel stating:
    “Judge, I certainly think you considered it, [h]owever, we did receive
    additional treatment letters and have contacted people who wanted to come
    up and testify that didn’t the first time[.]”) (emphasis added).     The court,
    however, as it is required, also considered the gravity of the offense, and its
    sentence reflects those considerations. See id. at 30 (Judge McHugh stating:
    “No matter how much treatment, no matter what her rehabilitative needs are,
    she’s responsible for the death of another human being.”); see also 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) (“[T]he court shall follow the general principle that the
    sentence imposed should call for total confinement that is consistent with
    section 9725 (relating to total confinement) and the protection of the public,
    the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim
    and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”). There
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    is no requirement that a sentencing court elevate consideration of
    rehabilitative needs over that of the gravity of the offense.
    In light of the foregoing, we find no abuse of discretion.   Shugars,
    supra. Accordingly, we affirm Beringer’s judgment of sentence.
    Judgement of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/26/2023
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1591 EDA 2022

Judges: Lazarus, J.

Filed Date: 4/26/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/26/2023