Witkowski, K. v. Yaniello, R. ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
KEN WITKOWSKI : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
ROXANNE YANIELLO : No. 1668 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered July 13, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Civil Division at No(s):
360-2019-D.R.
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED APRIL 26, 2022
Ken Witkowski (“Husband”) appeals from the divorce decree and order
incorporating the divorce master’s report and recommendation. Husband
argues that the trial court improperly found him in contempt for failing to
provide discovery responses and precluded him from presenting evidence
before a divorce master. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.
We affirm.
This case stems from a divorce action initially filed by Husband against
Roxanne Yaniello (“Wife”) in July 2019. The trial court adopted the divorce
master’s finding of facts, set forth as follows:
1. The parties stipulated that the ground for divorce was
irretrievable breakdown under Section 3301(d) of the Divorce
Code.
2: The parties were married on June 18, 2016.
3. The parties separated on June 9, 2019.
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4. [Husband] filed a Complaint in Divorce on July 17, 2019.
5. [Wife] filed an Answer and Counterclaim on September 11,
2019.
6. [Wife] testified in this matter.
7. [Wife] is a special education teacher at Newstory, a private
school.
8. [Husband] is disabled.
9. The parties during the course of their marriage resided at 709
Silkmon Road, Lake Ariel, PA. This property was originally titled
in the name of the [Wife] and the [Husband’s] Mother, whose
interest in the property was then transferred to [Husband],
leaving title during the marriage in the name of [Husband] and
[Wife].
10. [Wife’s] Exhibit 1 (D1) is the tax assessment from Wayne
County, listing a total value of the marital property of
$227,000.00.
11. [Wife’s] Exhibit 2 (D2) is the Statement of Delinquent Taxes,
which has delinquent taxes for 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and
2019. [Wife] claims that half the value of 2016, the entire value
of 2017 and 2018, and half the value of 2019 should be
determined to be marital debt. This amounts totals to
$18,634.47.
12. Neither party has a retirement account.
13. The 1988 Sylvan Boat was obtained during the marriage,
was in good condition at the time of separation, and was worth
approximately $2,000.00 at the time of separation. Husband has
retained possession of this property.
14. The 2010 Kawasaki Motorcycle was obtained during the
marriage, was in very good condition at the time of separation,
and was worth approximately $3,000.00 at the time of
separation. Husband has retained possession of this property.
15. The 2005 Kawasaki Motorcycle was obtained during the
marriage, was in very good condition at the time of separation,
and was worth approximately $2,500.00 at the time of
separation. Husband has retained possession of this property.
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16. The 2004 Yamaha Motorcycle was obtained during the
marriage, was in very good condition, and was worth
approximately $2,200.00 at the time of separation. Husband has
retained possession of this property.
17. The 2001 Jeep Wrangler was obtained during the marriage,
is in running, but no[t] good condition, and was worth
approximately $1,000.00 at the time of separation. Wife has
retained possession of this property.
18. The 2001 Chevrolet Camaro was obtained during the
marriage. It was unknown if this vehicle was operable at the
time of separation, and was worth approximately $1,000.00 at
the time of separation. Husband has retained possession of this
property.
19. The 2000 Chevrolet Camaro was obtained during the
marriage, was in fair condition on the date of separation, and
was worth approximately $2,000.00 on the date of separation.
Husband has retained possession of this property.
20. The 2000 Ford Pickup was obtained during the marriage, was
in good, operable condition on the date of separation, and was
worth approximately $1,000.00. Husband has retained
possession of this property.
21. Wife determined the value of these properties by looking up
similar vehicles on the internet, and researching the price of
scrap metal.
22. After the date of separation, Wife sold the following personal
property for the following amounts:
a. 1989 Ford S10: $400.00;
b. Pig Roaster: $250.00; and
c. York rake: $200.00.
[Wife] testified that she used this money for an electric bill
([Wife’s] Exhibit D4), however, the electric bill that was paid was
paid prior to the parties separation, while the property was sold
after the parties separation. [Wife] testified that she has not sold
any puppies, and did not transfer or sell any tools or other
property.
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23. Wife determined the values of these properties by asking
friends.
24. The parties are the owners of three rottweiler dogs, Maddie,
Simon and Lacey. Wife is in possession of Maddie, while Husband
is in possession of Simon and Lacey.
25. Prior to the parties[’] marriage [Husband] transferred two
horses, Levi and Coco, to [Wife] and her son. After the parties
separation [Wife] gave the horses away since no one was able to
care for the horses.
26. The parties have already separated the remainder of their
personal property.
27. During the course of the parties[’] marriage, [Wife] took out
a loan in her name in the amount of $5,268.57, to assist in the
payment of [Husband’s] child support obligation. [Wife]
submitted [Wife’s] Exhibit 5 (D5) which showed a loan balance
of $5,183.68 at the time of separation.
28. [Wife] has been married one time prior, while [Husband] has
been married three times prior to this marriage.
29. [Wife] is 48 years of age with a birth date of April 2, 1973.
30. [Wife] is in very good health with no physical or mental
health conditions.
31. [Wife] submitted [Wife’s] Exhibit 6 (D6) which is the [Wife’s]
2020 W-2, which showed [Wife’s] gross pay at $22,866.73.
32. [Husband] is currently disabled.
33. [Wife] also received unemployment compensation in 2020,
in the amount of $6,076.00, as evidenced by [Wife’s] Exhibit 7
(D7).
34. [Wife] does not receive any health benefits through her
employer, but does receive a $20,000.00 life insurance policy, as
well as, [sic] a 401(k) that she is contributing to.
35. [Wife] submitted [Wife’s] Exhibit 8 (D8) which is [Wife’s]
Monthly Cost of living. The total from D8 is $2,333.94, however
the utilities listed and the groceries listed are shared between
[Wife] and her boyfriend.
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36. [Wife] resides with her boyfriend Bruce and her son Jason,
who is still in high school.
37. [Husband] has filed bankruptcy in the past and has a
number of judgments against him that [Wife] was unaware of
before their marriage.
28. [Wife] did all of the cooking, indoor household work, lawn
maintenance, and some of the snow removal. [Husband] did
some of the snow removal and some of the household
maintenance.
29. [Husband] worked collecting rent for a rental property,
would repair and sell cars, and would also sell puppies that he
bred.
30. The parties[’] standard of living was middle class, they lived
paycheck to paycheck, and went out to dinner approximately
one time per week.
Divorce Master’s Report and Recommendation, 4/27/21, at 1-5.
After Husband’s initial divorce complaint, Wife filed, inter alia, a motion
to compel discovery in July 2020. Wife contended that on October 18, 2019,
she had served interrogatories and a request for production of documents on
Husband, and the deadline for responding had passed and Husband had
never responded. The trial court issued an order, on July 13, 2020, requiring
Husband to respond to Wife’s interrogatories and request for production of
documents within 20 days. However, by July 27, 2020, the trial court
withdrew that order upon a joint stipulation by the parties that Husband
would provide discovery responses, with objections, to Wife within 30 days.
Prior to the expiration of the 30 days, on August 13, 2020, Husband
filed for bankruptcy and obtained an automatic stay of the divorce
proceeding. The next day, the court entered an order effectuating the
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automatic stay. Wife obtained relief from the automatic stay from the
bankruptcy court, and the trial court lifted its stay and allowed the divorce
case to proceed.
By late November 2020, Husband had not complied with the stipulated
discovery order. Wife moved for contempt and sanctions pursuant to
Pa.R.C.P. 4019, on November 30, 2020, and the trial court issued a rule to
show cause. Husband countered with a motion to strike Wife’s motion and
vacate the court’s rule to show cause. At a hearing in March 2021, Husband
withdrew his motion to strike and requested more time to respond to Wife’s
discovery requests. He did not dispute having been properly served with
Wife’s discovery requests, or that he had never responded to them. The trial
court declined Husband’s request.
Approximately three weeks later, on April 21, 2021, the parties were
scheduled for a hearing before a divorce master. Shortly before the start of
the hearing, because Husband had still not complied with the stipulated
order, the court issued an order finding Husband in contempt. As a sanction,
it precluded him from offering any evidence in the divorce action. Husband
sought reconsideration of the preclusion sanction, and following a hearing,
the trial court denied reconsideration. The parties proceeded to a hearing
before the divorce master at which only Wife was permitted to offer
evidence.
One week later, on April 28, 2021, the divorce master filed her report
and recommendation. Husband again sought reconsideration of the
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preclusion order, which the trial court denied. He then filed exceptions to the
master’s report and recommendations. The trial court conducted a hearing
on Husband’s exceptions and denied them. On July 13, 2021, the trial court
issued a divorce decree and order incorporating the report and
recommendation of the divorce master. The instant timely appeal followed in
which Husband challenges both the April 21, 2021 order1 and the July 13,
2021 order. The trial court and Husband both complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Husband raises the following questions for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding
Husband in what amounts to indirect criminal contempt
without affording Husband the proper procedural
safeguards and without finding that all of the
requirements for indirect criminal contempt were met,
including that Husband acted with wrongful intent?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sanctioning
Husband for his failure to respond to Wife’s discovery
requests by preventing him from presenting any
testimony or evidence at the master’s hearing when the
trial court did not consider any of the required five
factors to determine whether such a severe sanction
was appropriate, and the evidence presented is
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1 During the trial court’s hearing on Husband’s reconsideration motion,
Husband requested the right to file what he considered to be an
interlocutory appeal from the April 21, 2021 order. See N.T. 4/21/21 at 9-
10. The trial court, also believing the order to be interlocutory, denied the
request. Given this particular procedural posture, we decline to find waiver
and consider Husband’s challenge to the April 21, 2021 order in the context
of the trial court’s July 13, 2021 final divorce decree and order. See Rohm
& Haas Co. v. Lin, 992 A.2d 132, 149 (Pa.Super.2010) (“Once an appeal is
filed from a final order, all prior interlocutory orders become reviewable”).
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insufficient to make a determination that these factors
have been met?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to
address Husband’s claims for alimony and counsel fees
and costs, and in making an equitable distribution
award based on a completely one-sided hearing without
sufficient evidence regarding all of the factors for the
parties’ economic claims.
Husband’s Br. at 6.
In his first issue, Husband contends that the trial court erred by failing
to acknowledge that its April 21, 2021 order imposed an indirect criminal
sanction upon him. He argues that the sanction constituted indirect criminal
contempt because it was not conditioned on the happening or non-
happening of an event. Thus, he was not able to purge the contempt. As
such, Husband argues that the court erred by failing to provide him with the
proper procedural safeguards required to impose sanctions for indirect
criminal contempt. He points out that he did not testify at the March 29,
2021 hearing. Further, he maintains that the evidence presented was
insufficient to support the trial court’s finding of contempt because it did not
establish that his failure to comply with the discovery order was willful or
reckless.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4019(a)(1) governs discovery
violations stating, in pertinent part: “The court may, on motion, make an
appropriate order if . . . a party fails to serve answers [or] sufficient answers
. . . to written interrogatories” or “otherwise fails to make discovery or to
obey an order of court respecting discovery.” Pa.R.C.P. 4019(a)(1)(i), (iv),
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(viii). Significantly here, Rule 4019(c)(4) allows the court to impose
punishment for contempt. Another subsection of the rule, Rule 4019(c)(2),
specifically allows the court to preclude the offending party from offering
evidence. It provides that the court may enter an order “refusing to allow
the disobedient party to support . . . designated claims[,] or prohibiting such
party from introducing in evidence designated documents, things or
testimony[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 4019(c)(2).
The difference between civil contempt and criminal contempt is “a
distinction between two permissible responses to contumacious behavior.”
Garr v. Peters, 773 A.2d 183, 190 (Pa.Super. 2001) (quoting Diamond v.
Diamond, 715 A.2d 1190, 1194 (Pa.Super. 1998)). The responses are
“classified according to the dominant purpose of the court.” Id. “If the
dominant purpose is to prospectively coerce the contemnor to comply with
an order of the court, the adjudication is civil.” Id. In contrast, if “the
dominant purpose is to punish the contemnor for disobedience of the court’s
order or some other contemptuous act, the adjudication of contempt is
criminal.” Id. Contempt is civil in nature rather than criminal, under
Pennsylvania law, if the contemnor can purge the contempt before
imposition of punishment. Id. at 191; Diamond, 715 A.2d at 1194.
“[T]hose accused of indirect criminal contempt are provided the safeguards
which statute and criminal procedures afford.” Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr. v.
Moran, 560 A.2d 133, 137 (Pa. 1989)
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To establish indirect criminal contempt, the movant must establish:
“(1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor
as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; (2) the contemnor had notice
of the order; (3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional;
and (4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.”
Commonwealth v. Walsh, 36 A.3d 613, 619 (Pa.Super. 2012).
Husband also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
preclusion sanction. “Because evidentiary sufficiency is a question of law,
our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa. 2013) (citation
omitted). We must determine whether, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the party that prevailed below, the evidence and all reasonable
inferences therefrom are sufficient to establish each element of indirect
criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Diamond, 715 A.2d at
1196.
In this case, we conclude that the trial court was well within its
purview when finding Husband in contempt. It is undisputed that at no time
did he ever attempt to comply with the order – an order entered with
Husband’s stipulation. Nor did it err by imposing a sanction precluding
Husband from offering any evidence. The discovery sanction of the
preclusion of evidence is explicitly permitted by our Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Pa.R.C.P. 4019(c)(2).
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Moreover, although Husband is correct in his classification of the
sanction as constituting indirect criminal contempt, he fails to specify how
such classification renders the sanction erroneous. The sanction’s provisions
are indicative of indirect criminal contempt because they do not allow
Husband to purge his contempt. The overall purpose of the sanction is to
punish Husband and vindicate the authority of the court. See Garr, 773
A.2d at 190-91; Nevertheless, Husband only sets forth the general
contention that the trial court failed to provide him with the proper
safeguards required when considering indirect criminal contempt. To this
end, he points out that he did not have the opportunity to testify at the
March 29, 2021 hearing because of a purported Covid-19 concern. However,
Husband fails to explain how his failure to appear constituted a failure on the
part of the trial court to provide procedural safeguards to Husband. Further,
Husband provides no pertinent legal authority regarding this claim. Thus, we
find Husband’s argument unavailing.
Further, Husband’s claim that the court erred by failing to conclude
that the evidence Wife provided was insufficient to establish the necessary
elements of indirect criminal contempt is also not meritorious. He avers that
the court erroneously found that his conduct in failing to respond to Wife’s
discovery request was willful and reckless. He emphasizes that he suffered
from head injuries and other ailments that allegedly affected his cognition.
However, in its opinion, the court aptly noted that the circumstances
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surrounding Husband’s noncompliance indicated that his conduct was willful
and reckless:
Here, [Husband’s] failure to comply with [Wife’s] request for
answers to interrogatories was willful and reckless because the
parties’ agreed to a joint stipulation which stated that [Husband]
would provide discovery. [Husband] then filed bankruptcy
thereby staying this action. Once [Wife] petitioned the
bankruptcy court and the bankruptcy court lifted the stay,
[Husband] still did not comply with the joint stipulation agreed
upon the parties. Nor did [Husband] seek to enlarge the time for
compliance with the joint stipulation which was reduced to a
court order by agreement.
Tr. Ct. Rule 1925(a) Op., 10/18/21, at 7.
We agree with the trial court. When the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, in this case Wife, there is ample
evidence to support the court’s conclusion that Husband’s conduct was done
with wrongful intent. See Walsh, 36 A.3d at 619; Husband did not respond
in any fashion to Wife’s discovery requests for over ten months despite both
a joint stipulation to do so and the knowledge that Wife had filed a motion to
compel seeking the sanction ultimately imposed. Husband’s first issue
warrants no relief.
In his second issue, Husband argues that the trial court erred by
imposing the sanction because it was too severe and did “not fit the crime.”
He claims that the court did not properly consider the required factors when
imposing the sanction. He contends that the court failed to take his alleged
cognitive impairment into account. Further, he maintains that the sanction
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was too severe because it resulted in Husband being unable to fairly dispute
or establish the value of marital assets.
It is well settled “that in the exercise of judicial discretion in
formulating an appropriate sanction order, the court is required to select a
punishment which ‘fits the crime.”’ Hein v. Hein, 717 A.2d 1053, 1056
(Pa.Super. 1998) (citation omitted) (holding that discovery sanction
precluding the offending party from presenting evidence in support of their
divorce matter was appropriate). We review the appropriateness of the
sanction “in light of four factors: 1) the prejudice caused to the opposing
party and whether the prejudice can be cured; 2) the defaulting party's
willfulness or bad faith in failing to comply with the discovery order; 3) the
number of discovery violations; and 4) the importance of the precluded
evidence in light of the failure.” Id.Further, “the integrity of the adjudication process requires that all
parties promptly and with thoroughness respond to discovery requests.
While this principle is applicable to all litigation, it is especially meaningful in
domestic relations matters.” Id. This Court has emphasized “that imposition
of severe [discovery] sanctions should generally be reserved for cases where
a court has previously compelled discovery and a party has violated that
order; an order compelling discovery “would serve as a warning that if there
is future non-compliance, sanctions will be imposed.” First Lehigh Bank v.
Haviland Grille, Inc., 704 A.2d 135, 139 (Pa.Super. 1997).
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In this case, we hold that the court did not error by imposing the
sanction. As noted by the trial court, Husband engaged in willful conduct
when he failed to comply with the stipulated July 27, 2020 discovery order.
Further, Wife filed a petition for contempt in November 2020 and a hearing
was held on the matter in March 2021. Thus, Husband was well aware that
his continual non-compliance would likely result in sanctions, yet he still did
not comply. See First Lehigh Bank, 704 A.2d at 139. In fact, even after
the contempt hearing, when Husband was on notice that the court was
considering precluding him from presenting evidence before the divorce
master, Husband still did not comply prior to the divorce master’s hearing.
Thus, Wife was certainly impeded from preparing for the hearing and
thereby prejudiced. See Hein, 717 A.2d at 1056. Moreover, we note that
unlike some of the cases cited by Husband which held that precluding
evidence was too severe a sanction in the case of a partial discovery failure,
here Husband failed to timely provide any of the requested materials. See
Roman v. Pearlstein, 478 A.2d 845, 849 (Pa.Super. 1984) (discovery
sanction precluding expert testimony regarding liability was too severe when
the discovery violation solely related to damages). In this case, we conclude
that the trial court’s sanction did “fit the crime.” Hence, Husband’s second
issue also merits no relief.
In his third issue, Husband contends that the trial court erred by
adopting the divorce master’s equitable distribution award, which was based
on only Wife’s evidence. He also claims that the court erroneously failed to
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consider his claim for alimony and counsel fees. He maintains that the court
thereby failed to effectuate economic justice between the parties.
“Our standard of review when assessing the propriety of an order
effectuating the equitable distribution of marital property is whether the trial
court abused its discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow
proper legal procedure.” Carney v. Carney, 167 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa.Super.
2017) (quoting Morgante v. Morgante, 119 A.3d 382, 386 (Pa.Super.
2015)). We “will not find an ‘abuse of discretion’ unless the law has been
overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised was manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown
by the evidence in the certified record.” Id. (citation omitted). When
reviewing “the propriety of an equitable distribution award, courts must
consider the distribution scheme as a whole.” Id. (citation omitted). In doing
so, court must “measure the circumstances of the case against the objective
of effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving a just
determination of their property rights.” Id. (citation omitted). Further, the
“master’s report and recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given
the fullest consideration, particularly on the question of credibility of
witnesses, because the master has the opportunity to observe and assess
the behavior and demeanor of the parties.” Id. (citation omitted)
Husband waived this issue. He did not include it in his exceptions to
the master’s report. Hence, it is waived. See Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-2(b); Cook
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v. Cook, 186 A.3d 1015, 1024-25 (Pa.Super. 2018) (finding issue waived
when not included in exceptions to master’s report).
In any event, it lacks merit. As discussed, the trial court permissibly
precluded Husband’s evidence. Thus, the master had only Wife’s evidence
regarding valuation, and Husband presented no evidence, including
regarding any claim for alimony or counsel fees. Thus, the court did not
abuse its discretion when adopting the master’s valuation of marital assets
and declining to award Husband alimony or counsel fees. See Carney, 167
A.3d at 131.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/26/2022
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