In the Int. of: C.J.R., Appeal of: C.R. ( 2023 )

J-A07039-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.J.R., III, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.R., FATHER : No. 2458 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered August 31, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000578-2019
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.M.R., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.R., FATHER : No. 2459 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered August 31, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000580-2019
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED MAY 1, 2023
Appellant, C.R. (Father), appeals from the August 31, 2022, decrees
entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, involuntarily
terminating his parental rights to his sons, C.J.R., III (C.), born in August of
2012, and J.M.R. (J.), born in December of 2014 (collectively, the Children).1
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1 While the trial court’s opinion states the parental rights of the Children’s
mother, S.M.J. (Mother), were previously involuntarily terminated on May 24,
2022, the August 31, 2022, notes of testimony indicate they were terminated
on November 16, 2021. See Trial Ct. Op., 11/1/22, at 1; N.T., 8/31/22, at
3. In any event, Mother did not appeal.
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Father argues: (1) the trial court’s decision to terminate under subsections 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) was not supported by clear and
convincing evidence; and (2) termination does not best serve the Children’s
needs under Subsection 2511(b).2 We affirm.
I. Facts & Procedural History
We glean the following relevant facts and procedural history from the
trial record, the August 31, 2022, notes of testimony, and the trial court’s
opinion. In December of 2014, on the day after J.’s birth, the Philadelphia
Department of Human Services (DHS) received a general protective services
(GPS) report, alleging J. was born prematurely at 28 weeks’ gestation, and
both he and Mother tested positive for methadone, opiates, and
benzodiazepines. See Trial Ct. Op., 11/1/22, at 2-3, 20. Mother admitted to
having a history of heroin and crack cocaine use, and to using heroin the
previous month. Id. at 3. J. was hospitalized in the neonatal intensive care
unit for two months. Id.
On April 9, 2015, DHS filed dependency petitions for J., as well as his
siblings, C. and A.L.R. — the latter of whom is not involved in this appeal. At
this time, J. was three months old and had a heart monitor due to his medical
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2 The Children’s guardian ad litem (GAL), Andrew Martino, Esquire, has filed
a brief in support of affirming the termination decrees. The Children’s legal
interests were represented by Susan Rubinovitz, Esquire, who has not filed a
brief.
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issues, and C. was approximately two and a half years old. See Trial Ct. Op.
at 5. On May 14th, the trial court adjudicated all three children dependent
but directed that they remain in Mother’s care under DHS supervision. At this
time, the trial court also
referred Father to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) for a forthwith
drug screen and a dual diagnosis assessment[, and] ordered that
if Father’s drug screen was negative, that [J.] could be moved to
Father’s home prior to the next hearing[. The Community
Umbrella Agency-Asociacion Puertorriquenos en Marcha [(CUA-
APM)] was ordered to complete a home assessment and
clearances of the home where [C.] resided[[.]
Id. at 5.
C. began residing with his (and J.’s) paternal grandmother, M.R., in
December of 2015, under DHS supervision. Trial Ct. Op. at 6. M.R. was
subsequently approved as a kinship provider. Id.
Meanwhile, “Father has been in and out of prison throughout the life of
this case,” although specific dates of incarceration are not apparent from the
record. See Trial Ct. Op. at 20. At the September 15, 2016, permanency
review hearing, the trial court directed “CUA to make outreach to Father,” and
permitted M.R., the grandmother, to take the Children to visit Father in prison.
Id. at 7. On May 5, 2017, Father participated in a single case plan (SCP)
meeting. His objectives were to: make his whereabouts known; report to the
CEU for an assessment and random drug testing; participate in housing and
parenting programs with the Achieving Reunification Center (ARC); and attend
supervised visits with the Children. See id. at 8; N.T., 8/31/22, at 6. This
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appears to be the only SCP meeting that Father participated in. See Trial Ct.
Op. at 11-15 (Father failed to participate in SCP meetings on May 23, 2018,
February 4 and December 16, 2019, May 29 and December 21, 2020, and
June 8 and 28, 2021). At the time of the December 6, 2018, permanency
review hearing, Father’s whereabouts were unknown. Id. at 8.
By the time of the April 19, 2018, permanency review hearing, C.
remained in placement with the paternal grandmother, M.R. Trial Ct. Op. at
9. J., however, was found not to be a dependent child, and supervision over
him was discharged. Twelve days later, however, on May 1st, CUA-APM
learned that on April 27th, Mother had left J. and his older sibling A.L.R. in the
care of two different friends, then failed to retrieve the Children or respond to
the friends’ calls. Id. The following day, CUA-APM made telephone contact
with Mother, who stated she was “terminated from her long-time methadone
maintenance program but would not provide a clear answer” why. Id. Over
the next several days: CUA-APM visited Mother’s home, but “she did not
answer the door” and did not respond to their telephone calls; and the friends,
who were caring for J. and A.L.R., were determined not to be appropriate
caregivers. Id.
Accordingly, J. and A.L.R. were placed in the care of M.R., the paternal
grandmother. Trial Ct. Op. at 10. On May 29, 2018, J. was re-adjudicated a
dependent child. Id. at 11. It appears Father was incarcerated at that time.
By the July 18, 2018, permanency review hearing, the Children were
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“medically up to date and [did] not receive any services.” At the November
6, 2018, hearing, Father was granted supervised visits with the Children at
the agency. Id. at 12.
At the February 6, 2019, permanency review hearing, the Children were
doing well, but DHS was “to continue in family finding . . . specifically to locate
appropriate family members for Children.” Trial Ct. Op. at 12. ACS “did PLS
[a parent locator search] on Father” and determined his address in
Philadelphia. Id.
II. Termination Petitions & Hearing
On August 2, 2019, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate both
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, averring they had not achieved full and
continuous compliance with their plan objectives. Nevertheless, the trial court
held permanency review hearings in: August and December of 2019; March,
July, and October of 2020; and January, March, and May of 2021. By the
December 17, 2019, hearing, Father was incarcerated, and at the July 28,
2020, hearing, a PLS was “ordered for” him. Id. at 13.
On September 24, 2020, DHS received a GPS report alleging: M.R., the
paternal grandmother, was neglecting the Children; J. was diagnosed with
autism but M.R. had not sought treatment for him; M.R. was prescribed
suboxone and may be selling her prescription, and she was diagnosed with
bipolar disorder but was not in treatment; and M.R. used “a gate to keep [J.]
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out of the kitchen because he has a habit of ‘raiding’ the refrigerator.” Trial
Ct. Op. at 14. That same day, they were placed together in foster care. Id.
At the next permanency review hearing, on October 28, 2020, the trial
court directed that Father would have supervised visitation for one hour, and
weekly and bonding evaluations would be conducted with both parents. At
that same hearing, as well as the next, on March 16, 2021, the court ordered
that Father would be referred to CEU for an evaluation. Trial Ct. Op. at 14-
15. By the time of the next hearing on May 25, 2021, hearing, however,
Father was incarcerated. Id. at 15. The permanency review order for this
hearing stated Mother was in moderate compliance with her plan objectives,
and that DHS withdrew its “goal change petitions as reunification is still viable
with Mother.” Trial Docket, CP-51-DP-0000929-2015 (J.), at 103; Trial
Docket, CP-51-DP-0000930-2015 (C.), at 93. It is not clear whether these
“goal change petitions” and the August 2, 2019, termination petitions are one
and the same.
In any event, on November 15, 2021, DHS again filed petitions for the
involuntary termination of both Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to C. and
J., pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).3 Mother’s
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3 At the termination hearing, however, counsel for DHS referred only to
earlier-filed termination petitions of August 2, 2019. See N.T. at 2.
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parental rights were terminated, possibly on November 16, 2021, or May 24,
2022. See Trial Ct. Op. at 1; N.T. at 3.
On August 31, 2022, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on
the termination petition as to Father’s parental rights. The Children were then
residing in separate foster homes, although the record does not readily
indicate when they were placed there. See N.T. at 11-12. C. was in fifth
grade, was in a treatment foster home, had an IEP, and was attending “CCTC”
weekly for therapy. Id. at 11, 12, 14. J. was in kindergarten, was in a general
foster home, had been evaluated for an IEP, and was “on a waiting list for
guild guidance for individual therapy.” Id. at 15. They did not appear at the
hearing, but both their guardian ad litem and legal counsel were present.
DHS presented one witness, CUA-APM case manager Tyeshia Grassy,
who had been involved in the Children’s case since 2018. She testified to the
following: the Children initially came into care at the end of 2014, due to
Mother and J.’s both testing positive for illegal substances at the time of J.’s
birth. N.T. at 4. APM had been providing services to the family since 2016.
Id. at 5. When Father was incarcerated, CUA made outreach to him. Id. His
plan objectives were: to make his whereabouts known; following release from
prison, to report to CEU for an assessment and random drug screen; to contact
CUA to arrange visitation and to visit the Children; and to participate in ARC’s
housing and parenting programs. Id. at 6. Father understood that
compliance with all of these objectives was required for reunification. Id. at
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5-6. In the periods when Father was not incarcerated, CUA attempted to refer
him to the CEU for evaluations and ARC for services, but he did not attend.
Id. at 6-7. Father was released from prison and had been at a recovery house
since July 27, 2022 (approximately five weeks before the hearing), but he did
not contact CUA until August 18th (one week before the hearing). Id. at 9.
Caseworker Grassy believed Father was employed, but he has not provided
proof. Id. at 8.
With regard to visitation, Caseworker Grassy testified that since 2018,
Father attended three visits at the agency, the most recent of which was one
week earlier. N.T. at 8-9. The visits “were fine” and had “no issues.” Id. at
9. The Children did not appear to be upset when the visits were over, and
when asked whether they had a child/parent bond with Father, Caseworker
Grassy replied, “[N]o, it was more so [sic] the [C]hildren were playing.” Id.
at 9-10. The paternal grandmother did report that Father was visiting the
Children when he was not incarcerated, but the Children were removed from
her home approximately two years earlier, in September of 2020. See id. at
10. Caseworker Grassy had concerns about reunification due to Father’s
“consistent” incarceration. Id. at 11. Meanwhile, each Child had a loving
parent/child relationship with his respective foster parent and was stable and
doing well in his foster home. Id. at 12-13. The Children had “child prep
services to . . . explain the adoption process” and both indicated they wished
to be adopted. Id. at 16.
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The Children’s legal counsel stated she had video visits with each child
separately, and they similarly told her they wished to be adopted. N.T. at 18.
Father testified to the following: within three days of being released
from prison, he “call[ed] to set up a visit with [the C]hildren” and did not get
a response, but on a second call, was able to talk to Caseworker Grassy. N.T.
at 19-20. Father’s residence at the recovery house was not mandatory, but
rather optional, and he intended to stay there six months “to ease back into
reality and get back on [his] feet.” Id. at 20. Father was working full time in
construction and all of his random drug screens were negative. Id. at 19. On
the same day as the hearing, Father had an appointment at ARC. Id. at 20.
Previously, through 2020, he visited the Children’s at his mother’s house every
day, and was active in their lives. Id. at 20-21. Father testified he and the
Children loved each other and had an important relationship, and he did not
want them to be adopted. Id. at 21.
Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court found DHS had
established grounds for termination under Subsections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
(8), and (b), and involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights. He timely
filed separate notices of appeal along with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) concise
statements of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court issued an
opinion, and this Court sua sponte consolidated the two appeals.
III. Father’s Issues & Relevant Law
Father raises the following issues for our review:
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1. Did the Trial Court err in terminating [Father’s] parental rights
under 23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(a)(1), 2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5), and
2511(a)(8)?
2. Did the Trial Court err in finding that termination of [Father’s]
parental rights best served the [C]hildren’s developmental,
physical and emotional needs under 23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(b)?
Father’s Brief at 7.
The relevant scope and standard of review are as follows:
In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
decree of the termination court is supported by competent
evidence. [We] accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
record, but it does not require the appellate court to accept the
lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. That is, if the
factual findings are supported, we must determine whether the
trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. An abuse
of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court
might have reached a different conclusion; we reverse for an
abuse of discretion “only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Thus,
absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient
evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must
stand. “We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the
record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is
supported by competent evidence.”
In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358-59 (Pa. 2021) (citations omitted).
The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section
2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511. The trial court must initially determine whether the conduct of the
parent warrants termination under Section 2511(a). It so, then the court
“consider[s] whether termination would best serve ‘the developmental,
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physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child’ under Subsection
2511(b).” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d at 359.
[T]he burden of proof is upon the party seeking termination to
establish by “clear and convincing” evidence the existence of the
statutory grounds for doing so. “[C]lear and convincing evidence
is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty, and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in
issue.’”
Id. at 358 (citations omitted). We need only agree with any one subsection
of Section 2511(a), along with Section 2511(b), to affirm the termination of
parental rights. In re Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa. Super.
2019) (en banc) (citation omitted).
Pertinently, Subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b) provide:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
* * *
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. . . .
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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2)
due to parental incapacity are not limited to affirmative misconduct, but
include acts of refusal and an incapacity to perform parental duties. In re
S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). This Court
has explained:
Unlike subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) does not
emphasize a parent’s refusal or failure to perform
parental duties, but instead emphasizes the child’s
present and future need for essential parental care,
control[,] or subsistence necessary for his physical or
mental well-being. Therefore, the language in subsection
(a)(2) should not be read to compel courts to ignore a
child’s need for a stable home and strong, continuous
parental ties, which the policy of restraint in state
intervention is intended to protect. This is particularly so
where disruption of the family has already occurred and
there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.
[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a continued inability to
conduct his[, or her] life in a fashion that would provide a safe
environment for a child, whether that child is living with the parent
or not, and the behavior of the parent is irremediable as supported
by clear and competent evidence, the termination of parental
rights is justified.” “A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long
period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability
of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or
disingenuous.”
Id. at 1104-05 (citations omitted). A parent is required to make diligent
efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
responsibilities. In re Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa. Super.
2017) (citation omitted).
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With respect to a parent who is incarcerated, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has held:
"[I]ncarceration neither compels nor precludes termination."
Instead, . . . incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a
determinative factor, in a court's conclusion that grounds for
termination exist under § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and
continued incapacity of a parent due to incarceration has caused
the child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence and that the causes of the incapacity cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 828 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).
IV. Subsection 2511(a)(2)
Here, with respect to Section 2511(a)(2), Father argues DHS failed to
present clear and convincing evidence that the causes of the Children’s
incapacity, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. Father’s Brief at
15. Father maintains he: was released from incarceration “less than a month
prior to the hearing[;]” “had taken steps to comply with all of CUA’s single
case plan objectives[;]” “obtained full time employment in order to . . .
support his children[;]” “signed up for parenting . . . and housing classes at
[ARC] and had all negative drug screens.” Id. at 14-15. Father contends he
has “demonstrated a serious intent, willingness, and capacity to care for his
children” and termination “would be detrimental to these children[,] who are
bonded with” him. Id. at 14. After careful review, we conclude Father is not
entitled to relief.
The trial court summarized the testimony, as we have set forth above,
and credited Caseworker Grassy’s testimony, but found Father not credible.
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See N.T. at 21-22; Trial Ct. Op. at 25. The court found, “[F]ather was never
an active figure in [the Children’s] lives, notwithstanding his own testimony[,]
which is self-serving, and not really believable.” N.T. at 21-22. At the
hearing, the court reasoned:
The objective facts are that [the Children] came into care [in]
2014. [Father] remained an absent figure in their lives[;] he
remained on the periphery of their lives and never remedied any
of the issues that brought the [C]hildren into care; never put
himself in the position to care for the [C]hildren. And . . . today
in court he says . . . I’m going to give myself about six months to
figure out where I’m heading, and in the meantime, I want the
[C]hildren to wait for me to straighten out my life, so they can
come live with me. That’s not the way it works.
Children are not asked to wait until you figure out who and
what you want to be. Children need and require parental contact
and they apparently have it with their current caregivers. . . .
Id. at 22.
In its opinion, the trial court further explained:
[E]ven though there was no affirmative act of Father that resulted
in the Children being forced into foster care, Father was not
present and active in their care. His absence caused them to be
without essential parental care and control.
Trial Ct. Op. at 24. Furthermore, the court considered that incarceration did
not toll Father’s responsibilities, and he did not present any evidence that he
utilized resources while in prison. Id.
Based on this record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding grounds for termination under Subsection 2511(a)(2).
The only evidence of any compliance with the objectives was Father’s three
supervised visits, the most recent of which was made one week before the
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termination hearing, and the testimony that Father previously visited the
Children at his mother’s house when he was not incarcerated. Even those
visits, however, ended two years earlier when the Children were removed from
the grandmother’s home.
We reiterate, “Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more
suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional needs.” In re
K.M.W., 238 A.3d 465, 474 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (citation omitted).
Additionally, “a parent’s ‘recent efforts to straighten out [his] life’ upon release
from incarceration does not require that a court ‘indefinitely postpone
adoption.’” Id. (citation omitted). We conclude the trial court did not err in
finding clear and convincing evidence that Father’s incapacity, neglect, or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).4
V. Subsection 2511(b)
In his second issue, Father argues the evidence was insufficient to
support termination under Subsection 2511(b). He reiterates he was recently
released from prison and working to achieve reunification. Father’s Brief at
17. In addition, Father asserts he is “willing and able to provide a loving and
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4 Because we can affirm the grounds for termination under Section
2511(a)(2), we need not consider Father’s arguments with respect to Section
2511(a)(1), (5), and (8). See Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d at 672.
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stable home” and that it “would be better for the [C]hildren to be together
with Father than separated in two different homes.” Id. No relief is due.
With respect to Subsection 2511(b), this Court has stated:
[T]he court must consider whether termination will meet the
child's needs and welfare. "Intangibles such as love, comfort,
security, and stability are involved when inquiring about the needs
and welfare of the child. The court must also discern the nature
and status of the parent-child bond, paying close attention to the
effect on the child of permanently severing the bond."
In this context, the court must take into account whether
a bond exists between child and parent, and whether
termination would destroy an existing, necessary and
beneficial relationship. When conducting a bonding
analysis, the court is not required to use expert
testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer
evaluations as well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does
not require a formal bonding evaluation.
In re Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d at 444 (citations omitted).
Furthermore:
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
The mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the
termination of parental rights. Rather, the orphans’ court must
examine the status of the bond to determine whether its
termination “would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial
relationship.” . . .
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have with
the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the
trial court should consider the importance of continuity
of relationships and whether any existing parent-child
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bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the
child.
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted).
Our Supreme Court has also stated, “Common sense dictates that courts
considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-
adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” In
re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013). In weighing Subsection 2511(b)
factors, “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind,” where
“[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation
to see to their healthy development quickly.” Id. at 269.
Here, there was no evidence that C., age 10, or J., seven years old, ever
lived with Father. There is no evidence, aside from Father’s testimony —
which the court found self-serving and not credible — that he performed his
parental duties, and there was no evidence where he would live following the
recovery house. See N.T. at 20-22. Caseworker Grassy testified she
observed the first two supervised visits between Father and the Children, the
dates of which are not apparent from the record. See id. at 9. Although the
caseworker stated there was “no issues” during the visits, she also opined she
did not observe the existence of a parent-child bond. Id. at 9-10. Rather,
Caseworker Grassy testified, she has observed a parent-child bond between
the Children and their respective foster parents, who are pre-adoptive
resources. Id. at 11-13. Further, Caseworker Grassy confirmed that the
Children are doing “very well” in their foster homes. Id. at 13. Although the
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Children “know their dad,” they both wished to be testified. Id. at 16-17.
Caseworker Grassy concluded the Children would not suffer irreparable harm
if Father’s parental rights were terminated. Id. at 11.
Based on the foregoing and the totality of the record evidence, we
discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in concluding that terminating
Father’s parental rights will serve the Children’s developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b).
VI. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the termination decrees pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Decrees affirmed.
Judge McLaughlin joins the Memorandum.
Judge Dubow Did Not Participate.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/1/2023
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