Com. v. Reid, K. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S10008-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    :
    KEMAR JOSHUA REID                       :
    :
    Appellant             :   No. 1988 EDA 2022
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 6, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0002730-2021
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                          FILED MAY 10, 2023
    Kemar J. Reid appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the
    Chester County Court of Common Pleas on July 6, 2022, following his
    conviction at a bench trial for driving under the influence (“DUI”) of a
    controlled substance. Additionally, Reid’s court-appointed counsel seeks to
    withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967). After
    careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel
    permission to withdraw.
    Prior to trial, Reid filed a motion to suppress physical evidence, certain
    statements, and derivative evidence. On May 3, 2022, a suppression hearing
    was held, after which the trial court denied the motion. The matter
    immediately proceeded to a non-jury trial. The testimony from the
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    suppression hearing was incorporated into the trial by agreement of the
    parties. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found Reid guilty of DUI.1
    On July 6, 2022, the trial court sentenced Reid to a mandatory minimum
    sentence of seventy-two hours to six months’ incarceration, plus fines and
    costs. This timely appeal followed.
    We turn first to counsel’s petition to withdraw. To withdraw pursuant to
    Anders, counsel must:
    1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
    making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
    determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy
    of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the
    [appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel
    or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy
    of the court’s attention.
    Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 
    83 A.3d 1030
    , 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
    banc) (citation omitted). With respect to the third requirement of Anders,
    that counsel inform the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s
    withdrawal, this Court has held that counsel must “attach to their petition to
    ____________________________________________
    1 Our review of the record reveals some ambiguity regarding Reid’s conviction.
    The criminal information filed by the Commonwealth includes only a single
    count against Reid. However, that count includes allegations that Reid violated
    75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a), (c), (d)(1)(i), (d)(1)(iii), (d)(2), and (d)(3). The trial
    court’s verdict sheet indicates it found Reid guilty of violating subsection
    (d)(2), while the sentencing guideline form prepared by the court indicates
    Reid was convicted of violating count 3 of the information, which is identified
    as a violation of subsection (d)(3). In any event, what is clear from the record
    is that the trial court found that Reid was intoxicated to the point where he
    was not capable of safely operating his vehicle. Since counsel’s Anders brief
    addresses the conviction under subsection (d)(2), we will do the same.
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    withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client advising him or her of their
    rights.” Commonwealth v. Millisock, 
    873 A.2d 748
    , 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).
    An Anders brief must comply with the following requirements:
    (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
    citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
    counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
    counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
    counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
    Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
    case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
    that the appeal is frivolous.
    Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
    , 361 (Pa. 2009). “[I]f counsel’s
    petition and brief satisfy Anders, we will then undertake our own review of
    the appeal to determine if it is wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Wrecks,
    
    931 A.2d 717
    , 721 (Pa. Super. 2007) (brackets added, citation omitted).
    We find counsel has complied with the preliminary requirements set
    forth in Anders. Counsel filed a petition to withdraw, certifying she has
    reviewed the case and determined that Reid’s appeal is frivolous. Further,
    counsel attached to her petition a copy of a letter she sent to Reid advising
    him of his rights, including his immediate right to proceed pro se and/or right
    to hire private counsel. Counsel also filed a brief, which includes a summary
    of the history and facts of the case, potential issues that could be raised by
    Reid, and her assessment of why those issues are meritless, with citations to
    relevant legal authority. Counsel has thus complied with the requirements of
    Anders. Further, Reid has not filed a response. As such, we proceed to a
    review of any issues outlined in the Anders brief.
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    In her Anders brief, counsel raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the
    evidence. Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the
    evidence is to determine whether, when viewed in a light most favorable to
    the verdict winner, the evidence at trial and all reasonable inferences
    therefrom are sufficient for the trier of fact to find that each element of the
    crimes   charged    is   established   beyond    a   reasonable    doubt.   See
    Commonwealth v. Dale, 
    836 A.2d 150
    , 152 (Pa. Super. 2003). The
    Commonwealth may meet this burden of proving every element of the crime
    by utilizing only circumstantial evidence. See Commonwealth v. Bruce, 
    916 A.2d 657
    , 661 (Pa. Super. 2007).
    “[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need
    not preclude every possibility of innocence.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). Any doubt
    raised as to the accused’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact-finder, so long as
    the evidence presented is utterly incapable of supporting the necessary
    inferences. See 
    id.
     This Court does not independently assess credibility or
    otherwise assign weight to evidence on appeal. See Commonwealth v.
    Kinney, 
    863 A.2d 581
    , 584 (Pa. Super. 2004).
    Reid was convicted for driving under the influence of a controlled
    substance under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2), which states:
    (d) Controlled substances—An individual may not drive, operate
    or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle under
    any of the following circumstances:
    ***
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    (2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or
    combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual's
    ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control
    of the movement of the vehicle.
    75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2).
    Viewed favorably to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, the evidence
    upon which Reid was convicted is as follows. Officer Jerry Ferriola, employed
    by the West Chester Borough Police Department testified that just before 2
    a.m. on July 23, 2021, he was walking near Barnaby’s, a bar in West Chester,
    Pennsylvania, when he saw Reid with another individual stumble down the
    steps of Barnaby’s with a staggered gait, and slurring his words as he spoke
    to other patrons. See N.T., 5/3/2022, at 9-11.
    Shortly thereafter, Officer Ferriola received a radio dispatch regarding a
    hit and run accident a block and a half from Barnaby’s. See id. at 11. When
    he arrived at the accident scene, Officer Ferriola saw an occupied silver car
    with front-end damage partially on the sidewalk with its headlights on. See
    id. at 12. Officer Ferriola also saw an unoccupied, white Acura with significant
    rear-end damage parked in front of the silver car. See id. There were no other
    vehicles in the area. When Officer Ferriola stepped out of his patrol car, Reid
    was exiting the silver car from the driver’s seat. See id. at 13. Reid’s car was
    running at the time with the key in the ignition. See id.
    Officer Ferriola attempted to talk with Reid, and observed that Reid was
    very emotional, difficult to converse with, and not answering questions. See
    id. at 14. Officer Ferriola noted Reid’s speech was slurred, he was unsteady
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    on his feet, and his eyes were bloodshot, glassy, and watery. See id. at 14-
    15. Officer Ferriola stated Reid was crying off and on throughout their
    conversation. See id. at 15. Reid and the passenger both told Officer Ferriola
    that their car was parked, and they were getting ready to leave, when another
    vehicle sideswiped them and continued on. See id.
    Officer Ferriola noted there was no damage to the driver’s side door that
    seemed consistent with Reid’s story. See id. at 16. The passenger gave a
    similar account of what happened. See id. at 18. Officer Ferriola, based on
    his training and experience, did not believe either of them were being truthful
    about what happened. See id.
    Officer Ferriola did not ask Reid to perform standardized field sobriety
    tests because of his original observation of Reid leaving the bar, the face-to-
    face contact with Reid near the vehicle, Reid’s lack of cooperation, as well as
    evidence of the accident that had occurred. See id. at 19.
    Officer Ross Blue, employed by the West Chester Borough Police
    Department, testified that Reid displayed objective signs and symptoms of
    alcohol intoxication: slurred speech, odor of alcohol, unsteady gait, bloodshot
    watery eyes, and emotions at a high point. See id. at 36. Officer Blue
    concluded Reid was too intoxicated to drive. See id. at 38. Officer Blue also
    testified that he observed an open container of an alcoholic beverage
    underneath the front passenger seat, as well as a partially smoked blunt in an
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    ashtray in the cup holder containing suspected marijuana. See id. at 48. The
    blunt was tagged into evidence. See id. at 49.
    Based on the above facts, there was sufficient evidence to establish that
    Reid drove his vehicle when he was incapable of safely driving. The question
    is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that Reid’s impaired ability
    to drive safely was the result of the influence of a drug – here, marijuana.
    “Section 3802(d)(2) does not require that any amount or specific quantity of
    the drug be proven in order to successfully prosecute under that section.”
    Commonwealth v. Williamson, 
    962 A.2d 1200
    , 1204 (Pa. Super. 2008).
    Whether expert testimony is necessary is a case-by-case determination, and
    depends upon “the specific drug at issue” and “the nature and overall strength
    of the Commonwealth's evidence.” Commonwealth v. Griffith, 
    32 A.3d 1231
    , 1239 (Pa. 2011).
    We find that the totality of the circumstances presented sufficient
    evidence to establish that Reid was under the influence of marijuana such that
    his ability to drive a vehicle was impaired. Both officers testified that Reid
    showed multiple signs of impairment. Officer Ferriola testified that Reid was
    emotional and distracted and would not answer questions, his speech was
    slurred, and his eyes were watery and bloodshot. See N.T., 5/3/2022, at 14-
    15. The results of the blood test stipulated to by both parties revealed Reid
    was under the active influence of THC when he was driving. See id. at 47.
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    Finally, Officer Blue testified that a partially smoked blunt with suspected
    marijuana inside was found in the vehicle’s cup holder. See id. at 48.
    Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we are
    satisfied that this evidence was sufficient to support Reid’s conviction of
    subsection 3802(d)(2) beyond a reasonable doubt. See Bruce, 
    916 A.2d at 661
    . As the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain the
    conviction, we affirm Reid’s judgment of sentence.
    Having reviewed the issue raised in counsel’s Anders brief, and after
    conducting our own independent review of the record, we agree with counsel
    that the within appeal is wholly frivolous.2 As such, we affirm the judgment of
    sentence and grant counsel leave to withdraw.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition for leave to withdraw granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/10/2023
    ____________________________________________
    2We note our independent review of the record did not reveal any additional
    non-frivolous issues for appeal.
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