Expungement Record of: H.M.J. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
EXPUNGEMENT OF RECORD OF: : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
H.M.J. : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: H.M.J. :
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: No. 14 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered October 14, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Civil Division at No(s):
No. 10228-2021
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and PELLIGRINI, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: JUNE 23, 2023
Appellant, H.M.J., appeals from the October 14, 2021 order denying her
petition to expunge the record of her involuntary mental health commitment
pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7302. We affirm.
The facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
November 24, 2019, Appellant arrived at her parents’ residence in Center
Township, Beaver County, Pennsylvania, with her boyfriend. N.T. Hearing,
10/14/21, at 53; see also Appellant’s Petition, 2/16/21, at *1 (unpaginated).
An altercation ensued between Appellant’s boyfriend and Appellant’s parents,
causing the police to be summoned to the residence. Id. Thereafter,
Appellant was taken to Heritage Valley Medical Center (“Medical Center”) in
Brighton Township, Beaver County, Pennsylvania, for an evaluation. Id. at
*2. Later, Appellant’s mother arrived at the Medical Center. Id. At that time,
Appellant’s mother requested that Appellant be involuntarily committed. In
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support of that request, Appellant’s mother claimed that, within the last 30
days, Appellant:
[j]umped out of a moving vehicle — does [not] care if she gets
killed or hurt. Started with a toxic abusive relationship
— leaving at all hours of the night. [J]ust walking down middle
of the road [three] — [four] times at night. [L]eft college at
[G]reensburg took an [U]ber until she did [not] have any more
money and was left [in] downtown Pittsburgh at [2:00 a.m.]
not having anyway to get anywhere. She tells us over and over
she does [not] want to be here[, that] she is a disappointment
and does [not] deserve anything. Campus police were checking
on her because of her outrage.
Application for Involuntary Emergency Examination & Treatment, 11/24/19,
at Part 1. Dr. Joseph Martibeller evaluated Appellant and observed that she
evidenced “poor insight [and] judgment, [engaged] with dangerous behaviors
recently[, and] stated [a] passive death wish.” Id. at Part VI. Based upon
the foregoing, Dr. Martibeller determined that Appellant needed “inpatient
psychiatric admission treatment.” Id. Accordingly, Appellant was
involuntarily committed to the Medical Center, and was released after 72
hours.
On February 16, 2021, Appellant filed a petition seeking expungement
of her record of involuntary commitment. In the petition, Appellant averred
that “there were not reasonable grounds to believe that [she] was severely
mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment as required for
commitment.” Appellant’s Petition, 2/16/21, at *4 (unpaginated). In
addition, Appellant claimed that “a [Section] 302 commitment was improper
under the circumstances a[s it] was merely utilized as a mechanism to
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separate [Appellant] from her boyfriend[, against] whom [Appellant’s] parents
[bore] animosity.” Id. Thus, Appellant asked the trial court to, inter alia,
vacate her involuntary commitment, expunge the records regarding her
involuntary commitment, and “[r]estore [Appellant] any and all of her civil
rights which may have been impaired as a result of her commitment.” Id. at
*5-*6. Although not expressly stated in Appellant’s petition, it is clear that
she sought relief pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(f)(1) and 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6111.1(g)(2) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act (“UFA”).
The trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s petition on October 14,
2021, as Appellant’s petition was opposed by the Pennsylvania State Police
(“PSP”). At the outset of the hearing, Appellant’s counsel introduced the
Section 302 commitment record into evidence, as well as another medical
record from the Medical Center. See N.T. Hearing, 10/14/21, at 4-5. In
addition, Appellant, as well as Appellant’s expert, Dr. Allan Pass, testified.
Importantly, PSP objected to various aspects of Dr. Pass’s testimony as
irrelevant to whether there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s
Section 302 commitment. Id. at 11-12. The trial court sustained PSP’s
objection, indicating that it would not consider Dr. Pass’s testimony with
respect to the issue of sufficiency. Id. at 14. The hearing concluded and,
that day, the trial court issued an order denying Appellant’s request for
expungement pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1(g)(2), holding that sufficient
evidence supported Appellant’s commitment. Id. at 81; see also Trial Court
Order, 10/14/21, at 1, citing In re. Vencil, 152 A.3d 235 (Pa. 2017). The
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trial court, however, restored Appellant’s right to possess a firearm pursuant
to 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6105(f)(1). N.T. Hearing, 10/14/21, at 82; see also Trial
Court Order, 10/14/21, at 1. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:1
1. Whether the [trial] court erred in determining that Appellant
[] waived her appellate rights for failure to file a timely
post-trial motion pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 227.1?
2. Whether the [trial] court erred in denying [Appellant’s]
petition for expungement of record of involuntary
commitment because the evidence and information available
was insufficient to sustain an involuntary commitment under
the law?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
In her first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding
that she “waived her appellate rights” because she failed to file a post-trial
motion. Trial Court Order, 11/9/21, at *1 (unpaginated). In particular, the
trial court held that, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 227.1, Appellant needed to file a
post-trial motion to preserve her appellate claims because the “substance of
the action” was like a trial, necessitating the filing of a post-trial motion. Id.
To support its finding that the “substance” of the instant action was trial-like,
the court cited to the fact that a hearing was held, “during which Appellant
offered exhibits into evidence and examined two witnesses,” and the court
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1 We have reordered Appellant’s appellate issues for ease of discussion and
disposition.
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“relied upon the hearing and documentary evidence when it denied Appellant
relief.” Id. at *2.
Rule 227.1 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
(c) Post-trial motions shall be filed within ten days after
(1) verdict, discharge of the jury because of inability to
agree, or nonsuit, in the case of a jury trial; or
(2) notice of nonsuit or the filing of the decision in the case
of a trial without jury.
Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(c)(1)-(2). A comment to Rule 227.1, however, states that a
“motion for post-trial relief may not be filed to matters governed exclusively
by the rules of petition practice.” Id., cmt. A “petition” is defined as “any
other application which is designated by local rule, numbered Local Rule
206.1(a), to be governed by Rule 206.1 et seq.” Pa.R.C.P. 206.1(a)(2). In
Beaver County Local Rule 206.1(a)(9), it states that “[a]ny [] application
requesting a [r]ule to [s]how [c]ause under any rule, statute, or case
authority” is “included in the definition of ‘[p]etition.’” Id. Local Rule 206.1
also provides that
[e]ach petition filed with the [c]ourt shall contain a proposed
order for the [c]ourt’s consideration. Said proposed order shall
follow the provisions of Pa.R.C.P. 206.5, with alternative
provisions in paragraph (d)(4) and (5), so that the [c]ourt may
determine whether to proceed with depositions or an
evidentiary hearing on disputed issues of material fact.
Id.
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Herein, Appellant’s initial application was entitled “petition for
expungement of record of involuntary commitment” and sought relief
pursuant to Sections 6105(f)(1) and 6111.1(g)(2) of the Pennsylvania UFA.
In her prayer for relief, Appellant requested, inter alia, the trial court to:
Issue a [r]ule upon the [PSP, the] Medical Center, and such
other agencies as the [c]ourt deems appropriate, to show cause
why [Appellant] should not be granted the relief requested
herein; that is, that her commitment should not be vacated and
her official and unofficial records should not be expunged and
destroyed.
Appellant’s Petition, 2/16/21, at *5 (unpaginated). Upon receipt of Appellant’s
submission, the trial court issued an order stating, in relevant part, as follows:
1. A [r]ule is issued upon . . . [PSP] and [the] Medical Center,
to show cause why [Appellant] is not entitled to the relief
requested.
2. [PSP and the Medical Center] shall file an Answer to the
Petition within [20] days of service[.]
3. The Petition shall be decided by Pa.R.C.P. 206.7.
Trial Court Order, 2/16/21, at 1 (emphasis added). In compliance with the
trial court’s order, the PSP filed an Answer “in response to the ‘Petition for
Expungement of Record of Involuntary Commitment (Petition),’” disputing
various facts set forth therein. PSP’s Answer, 5/5/21, at *1 (unpaginated).
Thereafter, the parties conducted discovery, as permitted by the trial court’s
February 16, 2021 order and, on October 14, 2021, the trial court conducted
an evidentiary hearing. See Trial Court Order, 2/16/21, at 1; see also N.T.
Hearing, 10/14/21, at 1-83.
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Upon review, we conclude that this matter was “governed exclusively
by the rules of petition practice” and, as such, Appellant was not permitted to
file a post-trial motion. Pa.R.C.P. 227.1, cmt. First and foremost, Appellant
filed an application seeking relief pursuant to Sections 6105(f)(1) and
6111.1(g)(2) of the Pennsylvania UFA, both of which require an individual to
seek relief through the filing of a petition. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(f)(1)
(“Upon application to the court of common pleas under this subsection by an
applicant subject to the prohibitions under subsection (c)(4), the court may
grant such relief as it deems appropriate if the court determines that the
applicant may possess a firearm without risk to the applicant or any other
person.”); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1(g)(2) (“A person who is involuntarily
committed pursuant to section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act may
petition the court to review the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the
commitment was based.”). In fact, this Court has previously held that
post-trial motions are not permitted in matters where relief has been
requested pursuant to either Section 6105(f)(1) or Section 6111.1(g)(2). See
In re M.B., 2018 WL 1387082, at *8, n.6 (Pa. Super. Mar. 20, 2018)
(unpublished memorandum) (explaining that the PSP was “not permitted to
file a post-trial motion” because relief was sought pursuant to Section
6111.1(g)(2)).
Moreover, a review of the record clearly reveals that, from the outset,
the parties and the court treated the matter as one governed by petitions
practice and that this continued through the October 14, 2021 hearing.
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Indeed, in Appellant’s initial application, entitled “petition for expungement of
record of involuntary commitment,” Appellant asked the trial court to issue a
rule to show cause. Hence, Appellant’s initial application met the definitional
requirements of a “petition” as set forth in Beaver County Local Rule
206.1(a)(9). Thereafter, in its initial order, the trial court issued a rule to
show cause, specifically directing an “Answer” be filed in response to
Appellant’s “[p]etition,” and further noted that the “[p]etition” would be
decided in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 206.7. Trial Court Order, 2/16/21, at 1;
see Pa.R.C.P. 206.7 (explaining the procedure after an issuance of a rule to
show cause in petition’s practice). In addition, as permitted by Beaver County
Local Rule 206.1(a), the parties took discovery and, eventually, participated
in an “evidentiary hearing on disputed issues of material fact.” Id. Thus,
Appellant’s decision to “offer exhibits into evidence and examine[] two
witnesses” did not transform the “substance” of the October 14, 2021 hearing
into a trial. Trial Court Order, 11/9/21, at *1-*2. To the contrary, such
actions were consistent with Beaver County Local Rule 206.1(a). Based upon
the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erroneously found that
Appellant waived her appellate issues for failure to file a post-trial motion.
Accordingly, we shall address the merits of Appellant’s claim.
In her second issue, Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence
to support her involuntary commitment. In particular, Appellant argues that,
during the October 14, 2021 hearing, Dr. Pass demonstrated that
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there was a complete dearth of any independent evidence of
intent to self-harm in the record, there was a failure of the
committing physicians to make appropriate inquiries into
[Appellant’s mother’s] point of reference to the allegations, and
there was an absence of a direct correlation between
[Appellant’s] mother’s statement and Appellant’s alleged
self-harm.
Appellant’s Brief at 24. Accordingly, Appellant asks this Court to reverse the
trial court’s determination and “order the expungement of [her] record of
involuntary commitment pursuant to Section 6111.1(g)(2) of the UFA.” Id.
at 25.
Our Supreme Court recently explained:
The legislature enacted Pennsylvania's Mental Health
Procedures Act (MHPA), 50 P.S. §§ 7101-7503, to establish
procedures “to assure the availability of adequate treatment to
persons who are mentally ill.” 50 P.S. § 7102. The MHPA's
provisions “shall be interpreted in conformity with the principles
of due process to make voluntary and involuntary treatment
available where the need is great and its absence could result
in serious harm to the mentally ill person or to others.” Id.
One treatment option the MHPA governs is involuntary
emergency examination and treatment, commonly referred to
as a “302 commitment.” See 50 P.S. § 7302. Section 302 of
the MHPA provides that an involuntary emergency examination
of a person may occur upon a physician's certification. 50 P.S.
§ 7302(b). If the examining physician determines “that the
person is severely mentally disabled and in need of emergency
treatment, treatment shall be begun immediately” and may
continue for up to 120 hours. 50 P.S. § 7302(b), (d); see also
50 P.S. § 7301(a) (providing a person who is “severely mentally
disabled and in need of treatment” may be subject to
“involuntary emergency examination and treatment”).
***
The Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 (UFA), 18
Pa.C.S. §§ 6101- 6128, makes it unlawful for a person who has
been involuntarily committed under Section 302 to “possess,
use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture” a firearm or to
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obtain a license to conduct any of those activities. 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 6105(a)(1), (c)(4). However, the UFA provides two ways for
the subject of a 302 commitment to obtain relief from the
Section 6105(a)(1) firearm restrictions. The one at issue in this
case is a court-ordered expungement of the 302 commitment
record under Section 6111.1(g)(2), which provides:
(g) Review by court.—
***
(2) A person who is involuntarily committed pursuant
to section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act
may petition the court to review the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which the commitment was based. If
the court determines that the evidence upon which
the involuntary commitment was based was
insufficient, the court shall order that the record of
the commitment submitted to the Pennsylvania
State Police be expunged. A petition filed under this
subsection shall toll the 60-day period set forth
under section 6105(a)(2).
***
18 Pa.C.S. § 6111.1(g)(2).[fn*2]
This Court clarified the appropriate review of a Section
6111.1(g)(2) petition to expunge a 302 commitment record
based on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 302
commitment in [Vencil, supra]:
[U]nder section 6111.1(g)(2), a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a 302 commitment
presents a pure question of law, and the court's sole
concern is whether, based on the findings recorded by the
physician and the information he or she relied upon in
arriving at those findings, the precise, legislatively-defined
prerequisites for a 302 commitment have been satisfied
and are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
We emphasize that the trial court's review is limited to the
findings recorded by the physician and the information he
or she relied upon in arriving at those findings, and
requires deference to the physician, as the original
factfinder, as the physician examined and evaluated the
individual in the first instance, was able to observe his or
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her demeanor, and has particularized training, knowledge
and experience regarding whether a 302 commitment is
medically necessary.
Vencil, 152 A.3d at 246 (rejecting de novo review subject to
clear and convincing burden of proof for Section 6111.1(g)(2)
petitions).
[fn*2] The second means for the subject of a 302 commitment
to obtain relief from the Section 6105(a)(1) firearms
restrictions is to petition the trial court to grant relief based on
a finding that “the applicant may possess a firearm without risk
to the applicant or any other person.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(f)(1).
In re B.W., 250 A.3d 1163, 1165–1167 (Pa. 2021) (parallel citations and
some footnotes omitted) (footnotes in original).
“An individual is severely mentally disabled if, as a result of mental
illness, his capacity . . . to care for his own personal needs is so lessened that
he poses a clear and present danger of harm . . . to [herself].” Vencil, 152
A.3d at 237, quoting 50 P.S. § 7301(a). An individual is a “clear and present
danger” if, within the past 30 days:
(i) the person has acted in such manner as to evidence that he
would be unable, without care, supervision and the continued
assistance of others, to satisfy his need for nourishment,
personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety,
and that there is a reasonable probability that death, serious
bodily injury or serious physical debilitation would ensue within
30 days unless adequate treatment were afforded under this
act[.]
50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2)(i). Importantly, if subsection 7301(b)(2)(i) applies, “no
demonstration of an overt act is necessary to involuntarily commit the
individual under Section 303 of the [MHPA].” In re S.B., 777 A.2d 454, 459
(Pa. Super. 2000).
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Herein, the trial court explained its rationale for denying Appellant’s
expungement request during the October 14, 2021 hearing. Initially, the trial
court highlighted the circumstances leading up to Appellant’s involuntary
commitment, including the altercation between her boyfriend and parents, as
well as Mother’s statement set forth within the Section 302 commitment
application. Then, the court noted that, following Mother’s application, the
physician on duty, Dr. Martibeller, evaluated Appellant and found “that her
behaviors were a danger to herself” necessitating commitment pursuant to 50
P.S. § 7301(b)(2)(i). N.T. Hearing, 10/14/21, at 80. Finally, the court
reviewed Dr. Pass’s testimony. At the outset, the court stated it found Dr.
Pass to be credible with respect to his testimony that Appellant “did not suffer,
at least currently, from any type of . . . psychopathology.” Id. The court
noted, however, that Dr. Pass admitted that
a skilled clinician would be able to determine whether a 302
would be necessary, and that he further agreed that a
face-to-face evaluation is important so that there [is] a
determination of whether there was lying or untruthfulness, and
that the behaviors like walking down the [middle of a] road . .
. [and] jumping out of a car would pose a threat of harm, and
that statements such as I do[ not] care and I do[ not] deserve
anything are evidence of a depressed [mental state].
Id. at 81. Accordingly, the court stated:
I find that [Appellant’s] request for expungement pursuant to
[Section] 6111.1(g)(2) is denied. Upon review of the [c]ourt
by a preponderance of the evidence, I find that the commitment
of [Appellant] was made to be sufficient, and I was relying on
the requirements of the Vencil case. Unfortunately, I have to
look at it through, through that scope. I know that [is] not what
[Appellant] wanted to hear.
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Id.
Upon review, we preliminarily note that the trial court properly
disregarded Dr. Pass’s expert testimony with respect to his assessment of
whether there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s Section 302
commitment. Indeed, as clearly stated in Vencil, Dr. Pass’s testimony was
utterly irrelevant to this inquiry at the October 14, 2021 hearing, as well as
on appeal. See Vencil, 152 A.3d at 239, n.3 and 246; (confining its
“statement of the case to the facts and findings as recorded by the physician
who evaluated Vencil . . . because any other evidence or information is
irrelevant for purposes of a [S]ection 6111.1(g)(2) review”); see also B.W.,
250 A.3d at 1169, n.3 (explaining that B.W. and his girlfriend’s testimony was
“irrelevant to a Section 6111.1(g)(2) review under Vencil” and would not be
considered by the court).
Moreover, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that,
based upon the information provided to the Dr. Martibeller, as well as Dr.
Martibeller’s evaluation, there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s
involuntary commitment. Indeed, Mother’s statement demonstrated that,
within the last 30 days, Appellant jumped out of a moving vehicle, walked
down the middle of a road at night, and was in an abusive relationship.
Application for Involuntary Emergency Examination & Treatment, 11/24/19,
at Part 1. Hence, Mother’s statement showed that Appellant engaged in risky
behavior, demonstrated disregard for her personal safety, and exhibited
behavior that could result in death or serious bodily injury. See 50 P.S.
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§ 7301(b)(2)(i). In addition, Dr. Martibeller personally evaluated Appellant
and concluded that she demonstrated “poor insight [and] judgment” as well
as a “passive death wish” necessitating “inpatient psychiatric admission
treatment.” Application for Involuntary Emergency Examination & Treatment,
11/24/19, at Part VI. In essence, Dr. Martibeller identified, based on his
interview and Appellant’s Section 302 commitment application, a call for
professional supervision and psychiatric treatment to address Appellant’s need
for self-protection and diminish an established probability that Appellant’s
behavior would lead to her death or serious bodily injury. The trial court, as
required, viewed this finding in a light most favorable to the physician and, in
so doing, concluded that there was sufficient evidence that Appellant was
“severally mentally disabled” pursuant to Section 7301(b)(2)(i). We discern
no abuse of discretion in making such a determination.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/23/2023
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