Com. v. Flamer, J. ( 2023 )

J-S13012-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JEFFERY FLAMER :
:
Appellant : No. 2144 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 15, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0003093-2010
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JUNE 26, 2023
Appellant Jeffery Flamer appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following the revocation of his probation and resentencing. Appellant
challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence and contends that the
trial court failed to provide reasons for a sentence of total confinement and
abused its discretion when it failed to consider Appellant’s rehabilitative needs.
Following our review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of
this matter as follows:
On January 31, 2011, [Appellant] pled guilty to robbery, graded
as a felony of the first degree, and one violation of the Uniform
Firearms Act (VUFA): § 6105, carrying a firearm as a person not
to own or possess firearms, graded as a felony of the second
degree. Appellant was sentenced to his negotiated sentence of
2½ to 5 years [of] state incarceration plus 3 years [of] reporting
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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probation. This court ordered that [Appellant] receive job training
and earn his GED while in custody. This court further ordered that
upon release, [Appellant] was to seek and maintain employment
and stay out of trouble with the law.
On February 7, 2020, a mental health evaluation was performed,
at which time [Appellant] was diagnosed with post-traumatic
stress disorder and an unspecified personality disorder with
narcissistic and paranoid features. The report also indicated that
[Appellant] had a history of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
and oppositional defiant disorder, and that the primary focus of
long-term treatment should be for his personality defenses. The
report further stated [that] much of [Appellant’s] provocative
behaviors serve a defensive purpose as well, in that he requires
an audience in order to act out his insecurities through his
grandiose displays. The interviewer has learned anecdotally that
[Appellant] often occupies the courtroom engaging in this type of
behavior. [Appellant’s] problems are deeply ingrained in his
personality. On February 25, 2020, [Appellant] appeared before
this court for a status hearing regarding his probation.
[Appellant’s] probation officer Christina Nestel stated that she did
not believe [Appellant] was suited for community supervision at
this point. The supervision summary dated February 19, 2020[,]
indicated that [Appellant] failed to provide GED verification,
refused to make payments towards fines and costs, and continued
to remain uncooperative. After reviewing [Appellant’s] mental
health report and reading much of it into the record, this court
stated [that] they are also recommending that [Appellant] be
supervised by the mental health unit of the probation department
so I’ll order [Appellant] to be supervised by the mental health
[unit] and we’ll give this a status date for his compliance with a
referral for mental health therapy. This court further stated:
I’ll allow the probation to continue. [Appellant] is to be
supervised by the mental health unit of the probation
[department]. [Appellant] is to comply with all treatment
recommendation and report to the mental health unit as
required. He’s to undergo random urinalysis and seek and
maintain employment. He is to pay $25 per month toward
costs and fines, cost and supervision fees and the matter is
continued for [a] status [hearing] on May 5th. Those
conditions of the sentence that I just mentioned were the
same conditions of sentence that I imposed when
[Appellant] was sentenced back on January 31st. I also
imposed a stay-away order in favor of the victim in this case.
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The following month, the courts were closed due to the COVID-19
pandemic. The next status hearing was listed for August 4, 2020.
At that time, this court ordered probation to continue but
requested an updated summary from the probation department.
A summary dated July 28, 2020[,] indicated that [Appellant] had
not made contact with the mental health treatment facility in
several weeks.
This matter was listed again on January 14, 2021, at which time
this court allowed probation to continue even though [Appellant]
was still not receiving any mental health treatment. On February
17, 2021, this court conducted another status hearing. The
probation summary recommended that probation continue with a
status hearing scheduled for 30 days to check on compliance,
indicating that [Appellant] had been in contact with his probation
officer in the mental health unit but still had failed to receive any
mental health treatment. [Appellant’s] counsel William Reilly
confirmed that [Appellant] had yet to receive any mental health
treatment. This court issued a detainer and instructed
[Appellant’s] counsel to tell [Appellant] that he’ll have to get his
mental health treatment perhaps in custody since he is refusing
to do it from the street.
On September 15, 2021, [Appellant] appeared before this court
for a violation hearing. First, this court reviewed the probation
summary, which stated, during the course of [Appellant’s]
probation, he was to be supervised by the mental health unit of
the probation department and was not in compliance because he
was not in contact with his mental health facility. This report
indicates that back in July of 2020, [Appellant] was directed to re-
engage with the mental health facility and refused to do so. The
summary reported that [Appellant] had two outstanding warrants
for a robbery and an incident involving terroristic threats. On April
29, 2021, [Appellant] was shot in the calf, at which time he was
taken into custody. Both of his open bills were dismissed on
September 9, 2021[,] for lack of prosecution. [Appellant’s]
probation was scheduled for natural expiration on May 13, 2021;
however, [Appellant] committed technical violations prior to its
expiration. The probation department recommended that this
court revoke [Appellant’s] probation, lift the detainer, and
sentence him to time-served.
[Appellant] stated that he did an in-take interview for mental
health treatment but that “COVID happened” and he did not enroll
in any mental health treatment thereafter. He stated that he
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enrolled in cosmetology school and then suffered a gunshot wound
to the leg.
Anthony Gil, Esquire, on behalf of the Commonwealth, argued that
[Appellant] had mental health issues that he failed to address and
that he continued to rationalize his own failure to act. Mr. Gil
further argued that [this court] should order that [Appellant]
engage in some type of mental health treatment, and in such a
manner that will force him to do so, but left the sentence to this
court’s discretion.
[Appellant’s] counsel Jena Simonds, Esquire of the Defenders
Association of Philadelphia argued that this court needed to
conduct a Grazier hearing because [Appellant] wanted to
represent himself and that he had represented himself before.
[Appellant’s counsel] argued that she believed her office was
backup for [Appellant] during the VOP hearing. The court clerk
then reviewed [Appellant’s] docket, and identified which lawyer
[had] represent[ed Appellant] on each date. The record showed
that the Defender Association of Philadelphia had been
representing [Appellant] at each listing while he was out on bail.
At [Appellant’s] counsel’s request, this court then conducted an
on-the-record inquiry as to whether [Appellant] should be
permitted to represent himself. At the conclusion of questioning,
this court denied [Appellant’s] request, finding that he did not
understand what is necessary to represent yourself and follow the
rules of the court. Throughout the hearing, [Appellant]
interrupted and spoke over others, and repeatedly claimed he did
not understand and was unable to follow along.
[Appellants’ counsel] argued that even though [Appellant] did not
get mental health treatment, he did do the intake interview and
he was trying to do what he was supposed to do by enrolling in
school. [Appellant’s counsel] recommended a sentence of time-
served and that this court lift any detainers.
[Appellant] stated that he also wanted to receive time served. He
stated that he wanted to go back to school and get his career off
the ground. [Appellant] stated that he should be given credit for
at least trying.
After hearing from all parties, this court found [Appellant] in
technical violation of his probation for failure to comply with these
specific instructions of the court to get mental health treatment.
This court revoked [Appellant’s] probation and sentenced him to
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6 to 12 months [of] county incarceration plus 3 years [of]
reporting probation, with credit for time serve[d] since a detainer
was lodged. This court ordered that [Appellant] be paroled
directly to a mental health program, with [the] sheriff to transport,
and thereafter receive supervision from the mental health unit of
the probation department, seek and maintain employment,
undergo random urinalysis, and strictly comply with all
recommendations of the mental health treatment facility including
medication.
After sentencing, [Appellant] continued to ask numerous
questions about his sentence, claiming that he did not understand
what was going on. Both [Appellant’s counsel] and this court
attempted to explain his sentence to him several times; however,
[Appellant] repeatedly stated that he did not understand. This
court then had [Appellant] and his counsel go into a booth so that
she could answer any further questions.
On September 27, 2021, [Appellant] filed a motion for
reconsideration of sentence. On October 13, 2021, [Appellant]
filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court. On October 14,
2021, [Appellant], through the Defenders Association, filed a
motion for early parole, asking this court to vacate the condition
that [Appellant] go to a mental health treatment facility with
sheriff to transport and instead allow [Appellant] to live with his
cousin and receive outpatient mental health treatment at Wedge
Juniper.
On December 14, 2021, [Appellant] filed a motion for new
counsel, stating that he had a conflict of interest with the
Defenders Association. On January 4, 2022, the Defenders
Association filed a petition to remand the case to the trial court
for a [Grazier] hearing on Appellant’s request to proceed pro se
on appeal.
On January 12, 2022, this court ordered that [Appellant] file a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On January 13, 2022, this court denied
[Appellant’s] motion for early parole, citing judicial discretion and
[Appellant’s] need for mental health treatment. On January 25,
2022, the Defender Association filed a 1925(b) statement.
On February 1, 2022, the Superior Court remanded the matter
and ordered that this court conduct a Grazier hearing to
determine whether [Appellant] could proceed pro se on appeal.
This court listed the matter for a video hearing on March 21, 2022,
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after which Court Administration rescheduled the matter for April
4, 2022. On April 4, 2022, when this case was called, this court
was informed that [Appellant] had been released from custody on
February 15, 2022; therefore, the scheduled video Grazier
hearing could not take place. That same day, [Appellant]
appeared at the courthouse at 12:30 pm and was directed to
report immediately to his probation officer directly from the
courthouse. He failed to do so and warrant cards were issued.
When he was released from custody on February 15, 2022,
[Appellant] was transported to Wedge South for treatment;
however, the mental health unit was unable to verify [Appellant’s]
progress or attendance since then because [Appellant] refused to
sign an Authorization of Release Form. On April 25, 2022,
[Appellant] was taken into custody as a result of the wanted cards
issued April 5, 2022. According to the probation summary dated
April 28, 2022, [Appellant] appeared unscheduled at the probation
department on April 5, 2022, but left after twenty minutes,
claiming he had other things to do. On May 19, 2022, this court
found [Appellant] in criminal contempt for failure to report to his
probation officer from the courthouse on April 4, 2022, . . .
On June 1, 2022, [Appellant] filed another motion for new counsel,
once again arguing that he had a conflict with the Defenders
Association because they were bar-licensed attorneys. On June
13, 2022, the Superior Court issued an order stating that due to
[Appellant’s] flight, he had forfeited his right to proceed pro se
and would continue to be represented by the Defenders
Association.[1]
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1 This Court’s order stated in relevant part, as follows:
In light of the trial court’s April 13, 2022 order indicating that it
was unable to conduct a waiver of counsel hearing pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998) due to
Appellant’s flight, Appellant has forfeited his right to proceed pro
se and the Defender Association of Philadelphia shall continue to
represent Appellant in this appeal.
Order, 6/13/22. Appellant absconded in April of 2022, after the trial court
revoked his probation and resentenced him, and after he filed his notice of
appeal. Therefore, Appellant’s flight was not a factor in the revocation of
probation or revocation sentence imposed on September 15, 2021.
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Trial Ct. Op., 8/2/22, at 1-8 (formatting altered and footnote and some
citations omitted). The record reflects that Appellant and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant raises the follows in issues:
1. A court shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon
revocation of probation unless it finds that: (1) the defendant
has been convicted of a new crime; or (2) the conduct of the
defendant indicates that it is likely that he will commit another
crime if he is not imprisoned; or (3) such a sentence is essential
to vindicate the authority of the court. Where none of these
factors applied to Appellant, did not the lower court abuse its
discretion when it sentenced him to incarceration?
2. A sentencing court abuses its discretion when it imposes a
sentence in excess of what is necessary to address the gravity
of the offense, the protection of the community and the
defendant’s rehabilitative needs. Where Appellant was not a
danger to the community and the court failed to consider
Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, did not the lower court impose
a sentence violative of the Sentencing Code and the norms that
underlie the sentencing process?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.2
Appellant’s issues implicate the discretionary aspects of his sentence,
and we note that “[t]he right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects
of a sentence is not absolute[.]” Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127,
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2 We note that Appellant raised three additional issues in his Rule 1925(b)
statement that the trial court addressed in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Rule
1925(b) Statement, 1/25/22; Trial Ct. Op., 8/2/22, at 8-18. However,
Appellant has not included those issues in his appellate brief and abandoned
those issues on appeal. Accordingly, we deem those issues waived. See
Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908, 912 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(“[A]n issue identified on appeal but not developed in the appellant’s brief is
abandoned and, therefore, waived.” (citation omitted)).
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132 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). Rather, where an appellant
challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence, the appeal should be
considered a petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. W.H.M.,
Jr., 932 A.2d 155, 163 (Pa. Super. 2007).
As this Court explained in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162(Pa. Super. 2010), an appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of a
sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
Pa.R.Crim.P. [708(E)]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under
the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b).
Id. at 170 (formatting altered and citation omitted).
In the instant case, following the revocation of his probation, Appellant
filed a timely motion to reconsider and modify his sentence, a timely appeal,
and has included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief. Accordingly,
Appellant is in technical compliance with the requirements to challenge the
discretionary aspects of his sentence, therefore, we will proceed to determine
whether Appellant has raised a substantial question. See id.
The determination of whether there is a substantial question is made on
a case-by-case basis, and this Court will grant the appeal only when the
appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions
were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code;
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or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
process. Id.
In the instant case, Appellant contends that the trial court failed to
consider relevant sentencing factors from 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) and abused
its discretion by imposing a sentence of total confinement for technical
violations. Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. We conclude that Appellant has raised
a substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Derrickson,
242 A.3d 667, 680 (Pa. Super. 2020) (holding that a claim that the trial court
failed to consider sentencing criteria required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b),
including the defendant’s rehabilitative needs, presents a substantial
question), appeal denied, 253 A.3d 213 (Pa. 2021); Commonwealth v.
Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding that the imposition
of a sentence of total confinement after the revocation of probation for a
technical violation of probation raises a substantial question).
Our standard of review is as follows:
The imposition of sentence following the revocation of probation
is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, which,
absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal.
An abuse of discretion is more than an error in judgment – a
sentencing court has not abused its discretion unless the record
discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Commonwealth v. Starr, 234 A.3d 755, 760-61 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation
omitted).
The court shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon
revocation unless it finds that: (1) the defendant has been
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convicted of another crime; or (2) the conduct of the defendant
indicates that it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is
not imprisoned; or (3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate
the authority of the court.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c) (formatting altered). Before the trial court may revoke
probation, the court must find, “based on the preponderance of the evidence,
that the probationer violated a specific condition of probation or committed a
new crime[.]” Commonwealth v. Parson, 259 A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa. Super.
2021) (citations omitted).
In addition, in all cases where the court resentences an offender
following revocation of probation[,] the court shall make as a part
of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing,
a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed
and failure to comply with these provisions shall be grounds for
vacating the sentence or resentence and resentencing the
defendant.
Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1044 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted and formatting altered); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b); see also Pa.R.Crim.P.
708[(D)(2)] (indicating at the time of sentence following the revocation of
probation, “[t]he judge shall state on the record the reasons for the sentence
imposed.”). However, “[the] trial court need not undertake a lengthy
discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the
statute in question, but the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing
court’s consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the offender.”
Colon, 102 A.3d at 1044 (citation omitted). Moreover, “our review is limited
to determining the validity of the probation revocation proceedings and the
authority of the sentencing court to consider the same sentencing alternatives
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that it had at the time of the initial sentencing.” Parson, 259 A.3d at 1019
(citation omitted and formatting altered); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b).
Appellant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by making
only a “blanket statement” that incarceration was needed to vindicate the
authority of the court and that “Appellant did nothing to slight the court’s
authority.” Appellants’ Brief at 17.
As noted, the trial court ordered mental health treatment as a condition
of Appellant’s probation. Although Appellant failed to satisfy this condition,
the trial court initially provided Appellant multiple opportunities to obtain such
treatment while he remained on probation. However, Appellant failed to enroll
in and obtain mental health treatment, and Appellant’s failure to engage in
mental health treatment constituted a violation of the terms and conditions of
his probation. The trial court revoked Appellant’s probation, and as noted,
resentenced Appellant to a term of six to twelve months of incarceration
followed by three years of probation with immediate parole to a mental health
facility. The trial court stated:
This record is absolutely clear that this sentence is absolutely
necessary to vindicate the authority of the [c]ourt, as well as to
protect society from [Appellant], given that he had a violent
robbery. He was charged with two new cases he says against his
girlfriend, those were withdrawn.[3] But [Appellant] has serious
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3As the trial court pointed out, these charges were later withdrawn. However,
we note that a sentencing court may consider a defendant’s prior arrests which
did not result in convictions, as long as the court recognizes that the defendant
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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mental health issues that have gone on for a long period of time
that he has not addressed. And he needs to address his mental
health issues.
N.T., 9/15/21, at 45.
In its opinion, the trial court explained:
[Appellant] was given multiple opportunities to rectify this
situation but chose to blatantly disregard this [c]ourt’s order. This
[c]ourt conducted status hearings on August 4, 2020, January 14,
2021, and February 17, 2021. Each time, this [c]ourt allowed
[Appellant’s] probation to continue in order to give [Appellant]
more time to comply, and each time [Appellant] failed to do so.
At the violation hearing, [Appellant] admitted that he did not get
any mental health treatment and knew that he was ordered to do
so. Based upon [Appellant’s] conduct, this [c]ourt properly found
[Appellant] in technical violation and sentenced him to 6 to 12
months county incarceration plus 3 [years of] reporting probation
in order to vindicate the authority of the court.
Trial Ct. Op., 8/2/22, at 18.
On this record, the trial court concluded that Appellant had serious
mental health issues that required treatment, made such treatment a specific
condition of probation, addressed Appellant’s repeated failures to obtain
mental health treatment, and initially afforded Appellant more time to obtain
mental health treatment while remaining on probation. N.T., 9/15/21, at 45.
Further, the trial court explained that probation had failed as a mode of
rehabilitation, Appellant demonstrated that he was unfit for supervision, and
as such, found Appellant posed a threat to society. Id.
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was not convicted. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 481 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa.
Super. 1984).
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On this record, we conclude that Appellant’s argument that the trial
court made merely a blanket statement concerning vindication is meritless.
The trial court explained that Appellant violated the specific conditions of his
probation, provided its rationale for revoking Appellant’s probation and
imposing a sentence of total confinement, and it set forth the reasons why
Appellant’s sentence was necessary to vindicate the authority of the court.
We conclude that Appellant is due no relief.4
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4 Appellant also argues that the decision in Commonwealth v. Cottle, 426
A.2d 598 (Pa. 1981), supports his claim that a sentence of incarceration was
unwarranted. See Appellant’s Brief at 17. In Cottle, the appellant voluntarily
appeared before the trial court during the trial of another defendant. Cottle,
426 A.2d at 599. Although the appellant was admonished to remain silent by
the trial court, he approached the bench and confessed to a robbery for which
he had never been charged. Id. Because of his forthrightness and honesty,
the trial court imposed a sentence of six to twenty-three months of
incarceration followed by five years of probation. Id. For three years, the
appellant complied with the terms of his probation. However, at one point,
the appellant missed scheduled meetings with his probation officer. Id. The
trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and imposed the statutory
maximum sentence of total confinement. Id. Although this Court affirmed,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the statutory maximum sentence
and remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court explained:
It is our judgment that under these unique facts it cannot be said
that the imposition of the maximum sentence was ‘essential’ to
vindicate the court’s authority.
. . . To ignore Mr. Cottle’s efforts in his own behalf and act solely
on the basis of his failure to comply with the court’s directive,
would place form over substance. It would ignore the ultimate
objective that has been achieved and the fact that, that
accomplishment resulted from the efforts of the offender himself.
We are here faced with a man who has demonstrated that he is
now able to live successfully in the community. The imposition of
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing
to consider his rehabilitative needs. Appellant’s Brief at 20-22.
As noted previously, the trial court sentenced Appellant to six to twelve
months of incarceration followed three years of reporting probation. See
Sentencing Order, 9/15/21, at 1-2. The trial court gave Appellant credit for
time served with immediate parole to a mental health treatment facility. See
id. Prior to imposing sentence, the trial court considered the factors set forth
in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), including the protection of the public, the gravity of
Appellant’s crimes in relation to the impact on the life of the victim and the
community, and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. Indeed, the trial court
repeatedly addressed the fact that Appellant’s mental health issues are
paramount in his rehabilitation, and the trial court noted that consistent
attempts to allow Appellant to obtain such treatment while on probation had
failed. N.T., 9/15/21, at 7, 14, 26, 37.
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the maximum sentence at this point in Mr. Cottle’s life would be
more punitive than corrective in nature. Moreover, it may very
well destroy that which has already been accomplished, i.e., his
readjustment.
Id. at 602. Unlike the appellant in Cottle, Appellant never sought the court-
ordered mental health treatment while on probation. Rather, Appellant has
continuously failed to obtain mental health treatment and demonstrated that
he is unwilling or unable to meet the conditions of his probation. See Trial Ct.
Op., 8/2/22, at 18. The trial court concluded that a sentence of total
confinement was necessary to vindicate the authority of the court and provide
for Appellant’s rehabilitative needs which included mental health care. See
N.T., 9/15/21, at 45. Clearly, the circumstances in Cottle are distinguishable
from the instant case, and cannot be applied to disturb the trial court’s
revocation sentence. See Colon, 102 A.3d at 1044; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c).
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The trial court explained:
This [c]ourt had given [Appellant] multiple opportunities to work
on his issues while out on probation. Unfortunately, [Appellant]
chose not to do so and instead was arrested for a robbery and
later arrested again for making terroristic threats on SEPTA, a
Philadelphia public transportation authority. Revocation and a
county sentence with immediate parole to a mental health
treatment facility was an appropriate sentence under the
circumstances since [Appellant] demonstrated that he was
unwilling to do so on his own. As stated above, there is no
requirement that [the trial court] impose the minimum possible
sentence. Rather, based upon [Appellant’s] ongoing failure to
comply with the terms and conditions of probation as well as his
serious mental health issues that had yet to be adequately
addressed, this [c]ourt found it appropriate to sentence
[Appellant] to a term of 6 to 12 months county incarceration plus
3 years reporting probation with parole to a mental health facility.
Trial Ct. Op., 8/2/22, at 21 (formatting altered).
While acknowledging that the charges were withdrawn, the trial court
noted that the Commonwealth charged Appellant with robbery and making
terroristic threats while he was on probation. Moreover, although the trial
court provided multiple opportunities for Appellant to obtain mental health
treatment while he remained on probation, Appellant refused to do so. See
Trial Ct. Op., 8/2/22, at 18; N.T., 9/15/21, at 6-17; 45. The trial court
concluded that Appellant’s rehabilitative needs necessitated mental health
treatment, and Appellant repeatedly demonstrated his refusal to satisfy this
condition of his probation. See N.T., 9/15/21, at 6-17, 45. As such, the trial
court concluded that the sentence of was necessary to achieve this goal. See
N.T., 9/15/21, at 45.
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For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court amply considered
Appellant’s rehabilitative needs including mental health treatment. See
Derrickson, 242 A.3d at 680; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Moreover, the record
reflects that the trial court stated its reasons for the sentence imposed and its
consideration of the facts of the case and Appellant’s character, and we discern
no abuse of discretion. See Colon, 102 A.3d at 1044; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b);
Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(D)(2). Accordingly, Appellant is due no relief, and we affirm
Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/26/2023
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