Term. of Par. Rights to C.J., Appeal of: D.M.H. ( 2023 )


Menu:
  • J-S15016-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
    IN RE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    RIGHTS TO C.J., A MINOR                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: D.M.H., MOTHER                  :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 1614 MDA 2022
    Appeal from the Order Entered October 24, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
    Orphans' Court at No: 2022-4594 A
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                     FILED: JUNE 27, 2023
    D.M.H. (“Mother”), appeals from the October 24, 2022 decree granting
    the petition filed by Centre County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) to
    involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her son, C.J. (“Child”), born in
    November 2015.1 We affirm.
    We glean the relevant facts and procedural history from the certified
    record.    CYS became aware of this family in 2008 due to concerns over
    Mother’s substance abuse after she gave birth to her first child.          N.T.,
    10/20/2022, at 90. CYS obtained emergency protective custody of the child,
    and after reunification attempts were unsuccessful, Mother’s parental rights
    ____________________________________________
    1 By separate decree entered on the same date, the orphans’ court voluntarily
    terminated the parental rights of biological father, J.E.J. Father did not file a
    notice of appeal or participate in the instant appeal.
    J-S15016-23
    were involuntarily terminated. Id. Four years later, in June 2012, Mother
    gave birth to her second child. Id. CYS did not provide services because the
    second child was, ultimately, privately adopted. Id. at 90-91.
    Thereafter, CYS became involved with the family again in April 2016,
    when Child was six months old. Id. at 91. CYS learned that Mother was
    leaving Child alone and not supervising him properly. Id. CYS offered Mother
    parenting services, but she failed to participate in the suggested programs.
    Id. CYS contacted paternal grandparents who filed for, and were awarded,
    emergency custody of Child.2 Id. at 91-92.
    In October 2020, when Child was almost five years old, CYS received a
    report regarding concerns over paternal grandparents’ substance abuse, home
    conditions, domestic violence, and mental health. Id. at 93. CYS conducted
    an investigation, and Child divulged that paternal grandfather is mean and
    that his grandfather choked him. Id. at 94. However, according to Dylan
    James, CYS caseworker, it was difficult to speak with Child because he was
    developmentally delayed and was still wearing diapers. Id.
    Casey Lea Rockey, licensed clinical social worker and Child’s therapist,
    testified regarding his developmental delays.
    ____________________________________________
    2 During the custody matter, CYS again offered Mother parenting services.
    N.T., 10/20/2022, at 92. However, Mother still did not participate in the
    services. Id. Additionally, at this time, CYS became concerned with Mother’s
    use of marijuana. Id.
    -2-
    J-S15016-23
    At the time of the initial referral and prior to my involvement,
    [Child] was not yet potty-trained. His speech was delayed. He
    was often observed doing behaviors that [] are referred to as
    stimming. He would clap his hands, spin, and engage in repetitive
    behaviors. He also struggled to regulate his emotions and engage
    in appropriate behaviors. He was what [Child] calls and the team
    working with him call humping when he was distressed, meaning
    he would thrust his pelvic area against things, stuffed animals, the
    bed, to self-soothe[.]
    Id. at 12. Ms. Rockey also stated that Child is borderline intellectually disabled
    and has trouble focusing. Id. at 15.
    CYS obtained emergency custody of Child on October 26, 2020.
    Following a shelter care hearing on October 29, 2020, Child remained in the
    care and custody of CYS. Id. at 95. CYS determined that, at that time, Child
    could not be placed with Mother because she had very limited, if any, contact
    with him. CYS also had concerns regarding Mother's mental health and her
    history with CYS. Id. at 96. The court adjudicated Child dependent in January
    2021. Id. at 95. On January 25, 2021, he was placed with pre-adoptive
    foster parents. Id. at 48.
    In March 2021, Child began therapy for behavioral challenges,
    intellectual delays, and developmental delays with Ms. Rockey, who concluded
    Child had suffered significant trauma and diagnosed him with Post-Traumatic
    Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), and disassociation.       Id. at 11-12, 15-16.       Ms.
    Rockey described disassociation as follows:
    [T]he easiest way to describe [disassociation], is everyone
    disassociates on some level, and if you think of it in terms of you’re
    driving your car home from work, you get out of your car, and
    you’re, oh, my goodness, I don’t even remember driving to work,
    -3-
    J-S15016-23
    so your body is clearly doing what it’s supposed to do, but your
    brain has checked out.
    [Child] experiences that in a clinical way. He disassociates and
    his brain checks out more frequently than normal to a clinical
    level[.]
    Id. at 16-17. Ms. Rockey attributed Child’s diagnosis to “issues of abuse and
    neglect throughout [Child’s] life leading up to the removal of [Child] by [CYS.]”
    Id. at 15. Further, Ms. Rockey testified that Mother did not recognize “that
    Child’s behaviors were not normal.” Id.
    During her testimony in this matter, Ms. Rockey emphasized that it is
    imperative for Child’s caregivers to understand his trauma triggers, trauma
    responses, and the behaviors that he experiences when he is confronting his
    trauma because “every time [Child] is triggered, he gets into either a hypo[-
    ]arousal state, which is like a freeze state, or a hyper[-]arousal state, which
    is the fight state, so you might see him bouncing off the chair.” Id. at 17.
    For example, Ms. Rockey testified that Child sometimes “does a laugh that is
    clearly not a fun laugh[,]” and then he freezes which signals Child is
    distressed. Id.
    In furtherance of Child’s permanency goal of reunification, Family
    Intervention Crisis Services (“FICS”) provided Mother with the following
    reunification goals: (1) provide a stable, consistent, and healthy lifestyle; (2)
    demonstrate the ability to support herself and Child; and (3) promote the
    healthy growth and development of Child. Id. at 103.
    -4-
    J-S15016-23
    FICS provided Mother with educational sessions to teach her about the
    trauma Child experienced, his unique emotional needs, and techniques to
    utilize when he is distressed.        Id. at 105-106.   For example, Mother was
    taught a deep-breathing technique to use when Child becomes distressed. Id.
    at 28. Ms. Rockey also met with Mother to educate her on these topics.3 Id.
    at 25-26.     Ms. Rockey and Tara Chappell, reunification counselor at FICS,
    testified that Mother displayed minimal growth as she was not consistently
    attuned to Child’s needs or able to recognize when Child was in distress. Id.
    at 28-30, 117.
    On August 17, 2022, CYS filed for the involuntary termination of
    Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and
    (b).    The orphans’ court conducted an evidentiary hearing on October 20,
    2022, when Child was six years old, wherein he was represented by a guardian
    ad litem (“GAL”) and separate legal counsel.4
    ____________________________________________
    3Ms. Rockey met with Mother ten times between May 2021 and August 2022.
    N.T., 10/20/2022, at 28. Mother did not start regularly meeting with Ms.
    Rockey until July 2022. Id. at 26.
    4   The GAL filed a brief in support of termination of Mother’s parental rights.
    -5-
    J-S15016-23
    CYS presented the testimony of Ms. Rockey, licensed clinical social
    worker,5 Mr. James, CYS caseworker, and Ms. Chappell. Mother was
    represented by counsel and testified on her own behalf.
    By decree dated October 20, 2022, and entered October 24, 2022, the
    court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23
    Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). On November 18, 2022, Mother
    timely filed a notice of appeal and concise statement of errors complained of
    on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The orphans’ court
    filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on November 30, 2022.
    On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for review:
    1. Did the lower [c]ourt err in involuntarily terminating Mother’s
    parental rights where CYS did not prove by clear and
    convincing evidence all of the elements required to effectuate
    an involuntary termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§]
    2511(a)(2)?
    2. Did the lower [c]ourt err in involuntarily terminating Mother’s
    parental rights where CYS did not prove by clear and
    convincing evidence all of the elements required to effectuate
    an involuntary termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§]
    2511(a)(5)?
    3. Did the lower [c]ourt err in involuntarily terminating Mother’s
    parental rights where CYS did not prove by clear and
    convincing evidence all of the elements required to effectuate
    an involuntary termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§]
    2511(a)(8)?
    ____________________________________________
    5  Mother’s counsel stipulated that Ms. Rockey is an expert in the field of
    licensed clinical social work and trauma therapy. N.T., 10/20/2022, at 19.
    -6-
    J-S15016-23
    4. Did the lower [c]ourt err in involuntarily terminating Mother’s
    parental rights where CYS did not prove by clear and
    convincing evidence all of the elements required to effectuate
    an involuntary termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§]
    2511(b)?
    Mother’s Brief at 4.
    Our standard of review in this context is well-settled:
    In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
    appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
    decree of the termination court is supported by competent
    evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
    accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility
    determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
    trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an
    appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it
    has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.
    An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
    reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
    facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
    may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
    of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
    will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
    courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
    hearings.
    In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court
    must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions
    concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with
    the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and
    support.    Termination of parental rights has significant and
    permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such,
    the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to
    establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence,
    which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
    as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
    hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
    Interest of M.E., 
    283 A.3d 820
    , 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal citations
    and quotation marks omitted).
    -7-
    J-S15016-23
    The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed at statute by
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 of the Adoption Act, which necessitates a bifurcated
    analysis that first focuses upon the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental
    conduct that may warrant termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1)-(11).
    M.E., supra at 830. If the court determines that a petitioner has established
    grounds for termination under at least one of these subsections by “clear and
    convincing evidence,” the court then assesses the petition under Section
    2511(b), which focuses primarily upon the child’s developmental, physical and
    emotional needs and welfare. Id. at 830 (citing In re T.S.M., 
    71 A.3d 251
    ,
    267 (Pa. 2013)); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). This Court “need only
    agree with any one subsection of § 2511(a), in addition to § 2511(b), in order
    to affirm the termination of parental rights.” M.E., supra at 830 (citing In re
    B.L.W., 
    843 A.2d 380
    , 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc)).
    Our analysis in this proceeding implicates Section 2511(a)(2) and (b),
    which provide as follows:
    (a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
    be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
    grounds:
    ...
    (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
    or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
    essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
    his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
    causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
    will not be remedied by the parent.
    ...
    -8-
    J-S15016-23
    (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
    of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
    physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
    of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
    environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
    income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
    control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
    to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
    efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
    which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
    filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
    Pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the party petitioning for termination
    must establish: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or
    refusal by the parent; (2) which caused the child to be without essential
    parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the
    incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See In
    re Adoption of A.H., 
    247 A.3d 439
    , 443 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citing 23
    Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)).      “The grounds for termination due to parental
    incapacity   that   cannot   be   remedied   are   not   limited   to   affirmative
    misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as
    well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re S.C., 
    247 A.3d 1097
    ,
    1104 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quoting In re Adoption of C.D.R., 
    111 A.3d 1212
    ,
    1216 (Pa. Super. 2015)) (internal citation omitted).
    Mother argues that she was making sufficient progress toward resolving
    the issues that led to Child’s placement. Mother’s Brief at 14. She contends
    that she remedied most of the problems and the court should have allowed
    -9-
    J-S15016-23
    her to continue to resolve any remaining issues. Id. at 14-15. Mother refers
    to her own testimony regarding her progress and submits that even CYS and
    FICS agree that she had obtained stable housing. Id. at 23. She further
    argues that despite incomplete budget sheets, she has always been able to
    pay her bills. Id. Mother concludes that nearly all the conditions that led to
    Child’s placement have been remedied and she should be allowed to continue
    her progress on any perceived outstanding issues. Id. at 24.
    Mother’s arguments are unpersuasive. In determining that CYS met its
    burden by clear and convincing evidence, the orphans’ court stated the
    following:
    Mother has demonstrated an inability to appropriately care for the
    physical, emotional, and mental well-being of [] Child. Prior to
    [Child’s] removal from the [paternal] grandparents’ home . . .
    emergency custody was awarded to [paternal] grandparents due
    to Mother’s [] inability or unwillingness to provide for the basic
    care and supervision of [] Child through her actions and her
    refusal to act in Child’s best interest. Mother was offered a
    number of services including reunification services, for over a year
    in order to improve and demonstrate her ability to properly care
    for [] Child. Although Mother regularly attended meetings and
    visits with [] Child, she repeatedly failed to make any significant
    progress with respect to the therapeutic techniques necessary to
    help [Child] self-regulate and live in a safe, consistent
    environment. Mother also failed to progress through her own
    therapy, ceasing her attendance in July 2022. During visits with
    [Child], Mother struggled to appropriately recognize [Child] as a
    traumatized child. To this end, Mother was never able to move to
    fully unsupervised visits with [Child]. Mother has exhibited an
    inability to appropriately engage with and care for [Child], given
    his unique and demanding needs.
    ...
    - 10 -
    J-S15016-23
    Mother has failed to recognize the problems which led to [Child’s]
    placement and never took significant action to remedy the
    concerns CYS and FICS had about [Child] remaining in or
    returning to Mother’s care, save for rectifying the agencies’
    concern regarding appropriate housing. Mother did not properly
    avail herself of the services offered by the agencies, and failed to
    show she had made progress in reaching goals necessary for
    reunification. Mother did not sufficiently progress in her goals or
    show improvement in her parenting ability.
    Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/30/2022, at 6-7.
    The certified record supports the orphans’ court’s findings. Ms. Rockey
    testified that Child’s caregivers need to be attuned to his emotional needs “24
    hours a day, seven days a week.” N.T., 10/20/2022, at 17-18. She further
    stated that Child “needs a home that is going to create a sense of stability,
    predictability, and consistency. [H]e needs structure.”     Id. at 19. Without
    stability, Ms. Rockey testified that Child will carry his trauma into adulthood.
    Id. at 22-23.
    CYS and FICS provided Mother with ample opportunities to remedy her
    inability to properly parent Child. Mother attended sessions offered by FICS.
    N.T., 10/20/2022, at 104. She also attended sessions with Child’s therapist,
    Ms. Rockey, albeit on a more limited basis, notwithstanding Ms. Rockey’s
    recommendation that she attend more frequently.6 Id. at 26. Despite these
    efforts, Ms. Rockey and Ms. Chappell, reunification counselor at FICS, stated
    ____________________________________________
    6 Mother did not begin weekly sessions with Ms. Rockey until July 2022, after
    she stated that “it would be contrary to [Child’s] health and well-being to
    return to [Mother]. N.T., 10/20/2022, at 50.
    - 11 -
    J-S15016-23
    that Mother made minimal, inconsistent progress in identifying Child’s triggers
    and responding appropriately when Child feels distressed. Id. at 28, 60-61,
    117.
    Ms. Rockey stated that Mother took “copious notes” during their
    sessions, but she struggled to implement the techniques. Id. at 26. She
    indicated that Mother began to acknowledge that Child was traumatized, but
    she was not able to “create a safe environment where [Child] could have his
    needs met.” Id. at 28-29, 82-85. Ms. Rockey explained:
    Healthy, well-adjusted, resilient, cared-for children think, my
    mom is going to meet my needs, my dad is going to meet my
    needs, I’m safe, I’m loved, I’m cared for. [Child] does not think
    that way. [Child] thinks, I’m not worthy, I’m not going to get my
    needs met, I’m not cared for, I’m not safe, even in situations
    where every other person in the room can see that [Child] is safe
    . . . and then you see those trauma behaviors and those responses
    from [Child].
    Id. at 22.
    Ms. Rockey testified that although Mother began to attend therapy more
    regularly in July 2022, “[she still] wasn’t able to recognize trauma responses,
    the trauma triggers, wasn’t able to consistently be attuned to [Child’s]
    needs[.]” Id. at 26. Ms. Rockey identified “baby talk” as a trauma trigger
    that would cause Child to disassociate, but Mother could not consistently
    refrain from using it. Id. at 34. Additionally, when Child would disassociate,
    she “wasn’t able to use any of the grounding techniques to help [Child] come
    out of the disassociation[.]” Id. at 34-35.
    - 12 -
    J-S15016-23
    Ms. Chappell confirmed that Mother still struggles with using baby talk,
    “which then causes [Child] to regress throughout the entirety of the visit.” Id.
    at 114. Ms. Chappell further stated that Mother could not consistently utilize
    regulating and calming techniques with Child. Id. at 113. Ms. Chappell stated
    the following on direct examination regarding Mother’s progress:
    Q: How would you describe or characterize [Mother’s], through
    services you have offered, her progress in meeting [Child’s] needs
    at visits?
    A: I would say it’s been minimal. We got [Mother] to a point
    where she was able to recognize when [Child] is getting hyper[-
    ]aroused or hypo[-]aroused, but really struggles to be consistent
    at this, same with implementing the calming techniques or the
    grounding techniques. At times, she’s able to do it, but she’s
    struggled with being consistent. Staff always had to be active in
    the visits to really help [Child] coregulate.
    Id. at 117.
    Mother also never progressed beyond supervised visits.         Id. at 119.
    Visits were initially two hours but were decreased to one hour “in an attempt
    to help [Mother] create [a] safe holding environment for Child, [but] that
    never happened.” Id. at 29. Ms. Rockey also testified as follows on cross-
    examination:
    Q: Have [visits] ever taken place at all in [Mother’s] home?
    A: Absolutely not.
    Q: Well, you say absolutely not. Is there some reason why that
    could not be tried to see how [Child] would react to the home
    environment that she would provide for him if he were returned
    to her?
    - 13 -
    J-S15016-23
    A: As [Child’s] therapist, I would not suggest that, because even
    in a neutral location, she has not been able to create a safe,
    predictable environment. So, in a home, I would not encourage
    or recommend that, given [Child’s] therapeutic needs.
    Id. at 49. For example, as related supra, Mother would trigger Child by baby
    talking. Thereafter, she was not able to utilize the techniques to ground Child.
    Id. at 33-35.
    Commencing in November 2021, Mother began attending therapy on a
    monthly basis. Id. at 77, 107. Ms. Rockey and Ms. Chappell encouraged
    Mother to attend therapy more often. Id. at 77, 107. Ms. Rockey also told
    Mother she wanted to speak with her therapist to discuss Child’s needs, but
    she never heard from the therapist or Mother to schedule the conversation.
    Id. at 78. Ms. Rockey stressed to Mother that she “work on managing her
    anxiety and work on her trauma history so that she could be more aware and
    attuned to [Child and create] a healthy attachment with [him].” Id. at 27.
    At some point prior to July 2022, Mother began seeing her therapist weekly.
    Id. at 107. However, in July 2022, Mother ceased therapy altogether, which,
    as best we can discern, resulted in her discharge. Id.
    Finally, on direct examination, Ms. Rockey testified that she does not
    believe Mother will be able to provide Child with a stable environment.
    Q: Based on your work in this matter, your experience with
    everything in this case, how much time would be required for
    [Mother] to get to the point of being able to provide this safe,
    stable, predictable and consistent environment for [Child]?
    A: I don’t know that she can ever get there unless and until she
    learns to manage her anxiety and resolves her trauma, and
    - 14 -
    J-S15016-23
    outside of that, what I talked with [Mother] about is, I don’t --
    more importantly for me, I don’t see [Child] ever getting there to
    feel safe and secure with her if those things don’t change, and
    unfortunately, in almost two years, that hasn’t changed. I believe
    [Child] will be in placement two years and maybe five days around
    October 25, if I recall, and so, in two years, [Mother was not] able
    to make progress to make him even feel safe, let alone attach and
    form a healthy attachment to [her].
    Id. at 46-47.
    Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the
    orphans’ court in concluding that Mother’s minimal progress warrants
    termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). The record demonstrates that
    Mother’s repeated and continued inability to properly identify Child’s triggers
    and to properly implement the necessary techniques when parenting Child has
    caused Child to be without essential parental care, control, or subsistence
    necessary for his physical and mental well-being.       Further, the cause of
    Mother’s incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.
    Turning to Section 2511(b), we are required to “give primary
    consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
    of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). It is well-established that this inquiry
    “requires the trial court to consider the nature and status of bond between a
    parent and child.” M.E., supra at 837 (citing In re E.M., 
    620 A.2d 481
    , 484-
    85 (Pa. 1993)). “When examining the effect upon a child of severing a bond,
    courts must examine whether termination of parental rights will destroy a
    ‘necessary and beneficial relationship,’ thereby causing a child to suffer
    ‘extreme emotional consequences.’”     In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d
    - 15 -
    J-S15016-23
    937, 944 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting E.M., supra, at 484-485). However, the
    “bond examination” is only one amongst many factors to be considered in
    assessing the soundness of termination:
    In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
    emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
    the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
    the child might have with the foster parent. In determining needs
    and welfare, the court may properly consider the effect of the
    parent's conduct upon the child and consider whether a parent is
    capable of providing for a child's safety and security or whether
    such needs can be better met by terminating a parent's parental
    rights.
    M.E., supra at 837 (internal citations omitted).
    Mother argues that her testimony evidences a strong bond between her
    and Child. Mother’s Brief at 25. She contends that she loves Child, that he
    calls her “Mommy,” and that termination of her parental rights would make
    him sad.   Id. at 25-26.    Accordingly, Mother concludes that CYS did not
    provide clear and convincing evidence that termination would best serve the
    developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of Child pursuant
    to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Id. at 30.
    The orphans’ court determined that foster parents have provided Child
    with a stable and loving environment. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/30/2022,
    at 9. The court stated that “Mother has failed to make significant progress in
    attuning to and addressing [Child’s] special needs, [while] the foster parents
    have been consistently successful in utilizing the therapeutic techniques
    - 16 -
    J-S15016-23
    necessary to provide [Child] with safety and stability.” Id. at 10. The court
    concluded the following:
    In this case, terminating Mother’s parental rights would not
    destroy any existing, necessary or beneficial relationship for
    [Child]. [Child] has not been in Mother’s care without supervision
    for at least twenty-two months since [Child’s] removal from his
    [paternal] grandparents’ home and for a considerable amount of
    time prior to removal. Terminating Mother’s parental rights will
    not cause irreparable harm . . . and any possible harm can be
    dealt with through services provided by CYS and cooperation with
    the foster parents.
    Id. at 9.
    We discern no abuse of discretion. As related supra, “[Mother was not]
    able to make progress to make [Child] even feel safe, let alone attach and
    form a healthy attachment to [her].” N.T., 10/20/2022, at 47. Importantly,
    Ms. Rockey testified:
    I don’t see any detriment to [Child] therapeutically if that were to
    happen. [Child] really identifies his foster parents as his family. .
    . [Child] doesn’t ask to see [Mother] and [Father]. In fact, he
    talks about not liking going to visits, that he doesn’t like the way
    it feels . . . .”
    Id. at 41. Conversely, Ms. Rockey stated that she has concerns if termination
    is not granted because “[h]e needs permanency. He needs to know, I’m going
    to be in this place and I’m going to be safe every day.” Id. at 42.
    Ms. Rockey further stated that Child feels safe with his foster parents as
    follows:
    It was a challenge, and the foster parents put in a lot of time and
    energy helping [Child] to understand that he’s safe and that they
    are going to love him and take care of him while he was in their
    home, and they brought him to therapy, participated in therapy,
    - 17 -
    J-S15016-23
    and we’re not talking one time a week. Like, they are going to
    therapy two times a week, and that’s specific for [Child].
    Id. at 19. On direct examination, Ms. Chappell confirmed that foster parents
    make Child feel safe and that termination of Mother’s parental rights is best
    for Child’s needs. She explained:
    Q: Has your agency had the opportunity to observe [Child] with
    his foster family?
    A: Yes.
    Q: What have your observations been?
    A: During those visits, [Child] often remains calm. During times
    that he does get overstimulated and things -- the foster parents
    are, you know, consistent at stepping in to promote those
    coregulation techniques, if needed, to make sure that he’s able to
    regulate his emotions.
    Q: So[,] it’s not a scenario where [Child] is now a perfect child or
    the foster family perfectly addresses all of his needs, but they’re
    able to utilize what they have learned in order to help him feel he
    has that safe space?
    A: Yes.
    Q: Does your agency have any concerns about the foster family’s
    ability or willingness to continue to do this in the future for any of
    [Child’s] ever-changing needs?
    A: No, they always advocate for [Child] and his needs.
    Q: Does your agency believe that termination and adoption would
    be in [Child’s] best interest?
    A: Yes.
    Q: Why?
    A: You know, [Child] struggles . . . with having a safe and secure
    environment. That’s something that we were never able to get to
    - 18 -
    J-S15016-23
    with [Mother] through the meetings and the visits. You know,
    with a two-hour visit, [Mother] still struggles with baby talking at
    pretty much every visit, which causes [Child] to regress. He needs
    the stability and consistency in order to . . . continue working on
    his trauma history and things like that.
    Id. at 121-122.    Consequently, Mother’s argument fails, and the orphans’
    court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination best serves
    Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to
    Section 2511(b).
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decree terminating Mother’s
    parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
    Decree affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 06/27/2023
    - 19 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1614 MDA 2022

Judges: Stabile, J.

Filed Date: 6/27/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/27/2023