Term. of Par. Rights to: K.I.P., Appeal of: L.G.A. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
TO: K.I.P., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: L.G.A. A/K/A L.G.G., :
MOTHER :
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: No. 1544 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered October 18, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2022-0120a
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
TO: R.P.P., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: L.G.A A/K/A L.G.G., :
MOTHER :
:
:
: No. 1545 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered October 18, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2022-0121a
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.P.P., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.P., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1589 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered October 18, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2022-0121a
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IN THE INTEREST OF: K.I.P., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.P., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1590 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered October 18, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2022-0120a
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JUNE 28, 2023
L.G.A. a/k/a L.G.G. (“Mother”) and C.P. (“Father”) (collectively,
“Parents”) appeal from the October 18, 2022 decrees involuntarily terminating
their parental rights to K.I.P., born in January 2020, and R.P.P., born in March
2021.1 After careful review, we affirm.
We glean the factual and procedural history of this matter from the
certified record. The York County Office of Children, Youth & Families (“CYF”
or “the agency”) first became involved with this family in May 2021, after the
agency received multiple reports of domestic disputes from both General
Protective Services (“GPS”) and Child Protective Services (“CPS”) over several
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1 Parents, who are not married, filed separate appeals in the above-captioned
matters. On November 23, 2022, this Court consolidated Mother’s appeals at
1544 and 1545 MDA 2022. On December 15, 2022, we similarly consolidated
Father’s appeals at 1589 and 1590 MDA 2022. These consolidated appeals
are inextricably interrelated in that they both implicate Parents’ respective
parental rights to K.I.P. and R.P.P. Thus, we will address the issues raised by
Parents collectively in this writing, where it is appropriate.
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months. These concerns culminated in an incident on May 1, 2021, when
officers of the York Area Regional Police responded to the family’s residence
and found Mother, Father, and K.I.P. suffering from injuries. Mother and K.I.P.
suffered minor facial injuries and Father received serious cuts to his fingers
after Mother attacked him with a knife. See Amended Status Review
Recommendation, 1/21/22, at 2-3. The juvenile court awarded emergency
custody of both children to CYF, and one week later, it determined that legal
and physical custody should remain with CYF. On May 18, 2021, the juvenile
court adjudicated K.I.P. and R.P.P. dependent, and eventually placed the
children in their current foster home, which is a pre-adoptive resource. See
N.T., 10/17/22, at 157.
The family’s service plan (“FSP”) issued the same month as the
dependency adjudication established an initial permanency goal of
reunification. Parents were permitted joint, supervised visitations with K.I.P.
and R.P.P. twice every week. These joint visitations eventually became
separate in March 2022 at the request of both parties. During the course of
this case, neither Mother nor Father ever progressed to unsupervised
visitations with K.I.P. or R.P.P. Id. at 22, 56. Furthermore, the frequency of
visits progressively decreased for Parents between May 2021 and July 2022.
By the time CYS filed the underlying termination petitions in this matter,
Father’s visits were occurring only once every two weeks due to substance
abuse concerns. Id. at 82-83; see also Revised Permanency Plan, 7/8/22,
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at 9. Similarly, Mother’s visits had declined to just once every week. See
Revised Permanency Plan, 7/8/22, at 9.
Parents were assigned several goals under the permanency plan,
including, inter alia, addressing their domestic violence issues, completing
mental health, parenting, drug and alcohol, and anger management
assessments, and following through on the resulting recommendations.
Following her disclosure that she was suffering from anxiety and postpartum
depression, Mother was also individually directed to attend appropriate mental
health therapy and participate in medication management.
Between June 2021 and July 2022, Parents were also enrolled in several
support and educational programs, including PA Child Trauma Intensive
Family Support Services (“TIFSS”), Pressley Ridge Intensive Family Services
(“Pressley Ridge”), Catholic Charities Intensive Family Services (“Catholic
Charities”), and the Commonwealth Clinical Group (“CCG”). Father also
received services and counseling from TRIAD for Domestic Violence (“TRIAD”).
In June 2021, Parents began TIFSS, which is an intensive program focused
upon parental reunification and included therapy, parenting education, and
supervised visitations. See N.T., 10/17/22, at 22-24. However, Parents were
unsuccessfully discharged from this program in December 2021 due to their
intractable conflicts with, and threats against, the staff. See Permanency
Review Order, 1/19/22, at 2-3; N.T., 10/17/22, at 20-24.
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Thereafter, Parents began parental education and supervised visitations
through Pressley Ridge beginning in January 2022. Id. at 50-51. Ultimately,
Mother was discharged unsuccessfully from this program in April 2022 due to
her “hostile” behavior towards the staff. Id. at 52-56. Indeed, Mother’s
conduct became sufficiently problematic that Pressley Ridge issued a “no
trespassing” letter to her. Id. at 53. Father also did not successfully complete
the program before the filing of the termination petitions. Id. at 54. Mother
then began receiving advocacy services from Catholic Charities in April 2022.
However, she was ultimately also discharged unsuccessfully from that
program in July 2022. Id. at 97-98. Parents were also enrolled in services
provided by CCG beginning in March 2022, which were focused upon
stabilizing Mother’s emotions and addressing Father’s domestic violence
issues. See N.T., 10/17/22, at 130-31, 215-16. Mother was still in therapy
and counseling through CCG as of October 2022. Id. at 130-31. By contrast,
Father successfully completed domestic violence counseling with TRIAD in
February 2022 and CCG in June 2022. Id. at 215-16.
Nonetheless, the physical conflicts between Mother and Father persisted
throughout this period. On November 4, 2021, Father called and reported to
the agency that Mother had attacked him with “two knives.” Status Review
Recommendation, 1/21/22, at 2. Similarly, in February 2022, CYF learned
there was another physical altercation between Parents, wherein Father struck
Mother following a verbal altercation initiated by Mother. See CYF
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Permanency Report, 3/2/22, at 3; see also N.T., 10/17/22, at 54-55.
Accordingly, both Mother and Father were perpetrators of violence within their
relationship. Due to this ongoing turmoil, Parents were purported to have
separated sometime in March 2022. Id. at 171, 193. In approximately
August of 2022, Father relocated to live with family in New Jersey. Id. at 146.
On July 5, 2022, CYF filed separate petitions to involuntarily terminate
Parents’ rights to K.I.P. and R.P.P. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2),
(5), (8), and (b).2 A joint termination hearing was held on October 17, 2022,
at which CYF presented testimony from its caseworker Elyse Nangle and TIFSS
therapist Mariela Acre. There was extensive testimony from Pressley Ridge
personnel, including family therapist Susan Brodbeck and family advocate
Julia Harrison. Representatives from Catholic Charities also appeared,
including family advocate Brittany Sunday. Mother testified and adduced
testimony from, inter alia, CCG outpatient therapist Clarissa Richardson.
Father testified on his own behalf and presented no additional evidence.
Finally, we note that the records and orders from the underlying dependency
proceedings were admitted into the record without objection. See N.T.,
10/17/22, at 5-6.
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2 On July 12, 2022, the orphans’ court filed orders pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2313(a) that appointed Douglas J. Kozak, Esquire, to serve as legal counsel
for then-two-and-one-half-year-old K.I.P. and appointed Christopher Moore,
Esquire, as legal counsel for sixteen-month-old R.P.P.
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On October 18, 2022, the orphans’ court granted the petitions and
involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father as to K.I.P.
and R.P.P. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On
November 8, 2022, Mother filed timely notices of appeal at both above-
captioned cases and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(i) and (b). On November 16, 2022, Father also
filed timely notices of appeal at both cases along with concise statements of
errors. Thereafter, the orphans’ court issued responsive opinions pursuant to
Rule 1925(a) addressing the claims of Mother and Father separately.
In her brief to this Court, Mother broadly asserts that there were
insufficient grounds for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2),
(5), (8), and (b). See Mother’s brief at 6-7. The claims enumerated in
Father’s appellate brief mirror these arguments. See Father’s brief at 5-6. As
discussed further infra, our analysis will focus exclusively on § 2511(a)(8) and
(b). In pertinent part, both Mother and Father assert that the orphans’ court
erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion by: (1) holding that the
conditions which led to the removal of K.I.P. and R.P.P. continued to exist and
that termination will best serve their needs and welfare pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(8); and (2) finding that termination was appropriate with respect
to the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of K.I.P. and
R.P.P. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). See Mother’s brief at 6-7; Father’s
brief at 6. We will address Mother’s and Father’s respective claims in turn.
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The following basic legal principles will guide our review:
In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
decree of the termination court is supported by competent
evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility
determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an
appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it
has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.
An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
hearings.
In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court
must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with
the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and
support. Termination of parental rights has significant and
permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such,
the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to
establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence,
which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa.Super. 2022) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed at statute by
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 of the Adoption Act, which necessitates a bifurcated analysis
that focuses first upon the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental conduct
that may warrant termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(1)-(11). M.E., supra at
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830. If the orphans’ court determines that a petitioner has established
grounds for termination under at least one of these subsections by “clear and
convincing evidence,” the court then assesses the petition under § 2511(b),
which focuses primarily upon the child’s developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare. Id. at 830 (citing In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251,
267 (Pa. 2013)); see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). This Court “need only agree
with any one subsection of § 2511(a), in addition to § 2511(b), in order to
affirm the termination of parental rights.” T.S.M., supra at 267 (citing In re
B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc)).
In the instant case, the orphans’ court found that termination was
appropriate pursuant to § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). However, we need
only agree with one such subsection, in addition to § 2511(b), in order to
affirm involuntary termination. Thus, our analysis in this proceeding
implicates § 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
....
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the child.
....
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(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).
In order to satisfy § 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove that: (1) the
child has been removed from the parent’s care for at least 12 months; (2) the
conditions which led to the removal or placement still exist; and (3)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child. See In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa.Super. 2018).
Furthermore, termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) does not require an
evaluation of a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led
to the removal or placement of the child. See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434,
446 (Pa.Super. 2017). Rather, our inquiry is focused upon whether the at-
issue conditions have been remedied such that “reunification of parent and
child is imminent at the time of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11
(Pa.Super. 2009). This Court has acknowledged:
[T]he application of Section (a)(8) may seem harsh when the
parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems
that had led to removal of her children. By allowing for
termination when the conditions that led to removal continue to
exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a child's
life cannot be held in abeyance while the parent is unable to
perform the actions necessary to assume parenting
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responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not subordinate
indefinitely a child's need for permanence and stability to a
parent's claims of progress and hope for the future. Indeed, we
work under statutory and case law that contemplates only a short
period of time, to wit eighteen months, in which to complete the
process of either reunification or adoption for a child who has been
placed in foster care.
Id. at 11-12 (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).
Finally, this Court has explained that,
while both [§] 2511(a)(8) and [§] 2511(b) direct us to evaluate
the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to resolve
the analysis relative to [§] 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing the
“needs and welfare” of [the child], as proscribed by [§] 2511(b);
as such, they are distinct in that we must address [§] 2511(a)
before reaching [§] 2511(b).
In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc).
With respect to § 2511(b), we are required to “give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). It is well-established that this query
“requires the trial court to consider the nature and status of bond between a
parent and child.” M.E., supra at 837 (citing In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 484-
85 (Pa. 1993). Furthermore, “[w]hen examining the effect upon a child of
severing a bond, courts must examine whether termination of parental rights
will destroy a ‘necessary and beneficial relationship,’ thereby causing a child
to suffer ‘extreme emotional consequences.’” In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177
A.3d 937, 944 (Pa.Super. 2017) (quoting E.M., supra, at 484-485).
However, the “bond examination” is only one amongst many factors to be
considered in assessing the soundness of termination:
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In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
the child might have with the foster parent. In determining needs
and welfare, the court may properly consider the effect of the
parent's conduct upon the child and consider whether a parent is
capable of providing for a child's safety and security or whether
such needs can be better met by terminating a parent's parental
rights.
M.E., supra at 837 (internal citations omitted). Finally, “common sense
dictates that courts considering termination must also consider whether the
children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their
foster parents.” T.S.M., supra at 268. Accordingly, we emphasize that “the
strength of emotional bond between a child and a potential adoptive parent is
[also] an important consideration” in a “best interests” assessment pursuant
to § 2511(b). I.J., supra at 13.
We will begin by addressing the orphans’ court’s findings as to Mother
pursuant to § 2511(a). With respect to § 2511(a)(8), she asserts that the
orphans’ court findings were not supported by competent evidence: “Since
the basis for the removal of the children was domestic violence issues, and
there was no evidence established at the hearing that there had been any
domestic violence issues for over six months before the hearing, the [a]gency
failed to meet its burden under . . . [§ 2511](a)(8).” Mother’s brief at 30-31.
As a threshold matter, we note that Mother is mistaken to the extent
that she suggests that domestic violence was the only issue that precipitated
the removal of K.I.P. and R.P.P. from her care. Rather, the agency also
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became concerned regarding Mother’s mental health. Indeed, the stipulation
of facts signed by Mother’s counsel indicates that, upon first making contact
with CYF in May 2021, Mother averred that she needed help with, inter alia,
her “mental health.” Stipulation of Facts, 9/26/22, at ¶ 6. The record
indicates Mother suffers from anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and
postpartum depression. See N.T., 10/17/22, at 112, 168.
Thus, rather than a narrow conclusion predicated solely upon the mere
frequency of confirmed domestic violence between Parents, the orphans’ court
framed its findings under § 2511(a)(8) as a broad conclusion that Mother’s
“self-regulation issues” had not improved by the time of the termination
hearing. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/22, at 20. Specifically, the orphans’
court found that, “though Mother engaged in therapy to treat her various
issues throughout the tenure of these cases, the multiple teams of service
providers never saw enough improvement to increase the frequency of
Mother’s visitation or downgrade the levels of supervision necessary for those
visitations.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/22, at 21. As expounded upon infra,
with respect to the needs and welfare of K.I.P. and R.P.P. under § 2511(a)(8),
the orphans’ court noted that “termination best serves the needs and welfare
of the children in that all service providers queried on the topic, as well as
Father, found that the foster situation was good for the children.” Id.
(emphasis in original).
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Preliminarily, with respect to the first prong of § 2511(a)(8), there is no
dispute that both K.I.P. and R.P.P. have been removed from Mother’s care for
the requisite twelve months. Turning to the second prong, we note that there
is also ample evidence demonstrating that Mother’s mental health and
domestic violence issues continue unabated. On two separate occasions
during the course of this case, Mother assaulted Father with a knife. See
Amended Status Review Recommendation, 1/21/22, at 2-3. Mother’s
argument that there have been no subsequent incidents fails to acknowledge
the seriousness of these events. TIFSS therapist Mariela Arce also reported
that Mother was “hearing voices from a ghost” during a hospital visit in
November 2021. Permanency Review Order, 1/19/22, at 3.
Concomitantly, the record also reflects that Mother has been largely
unsuccessful in addressing these issues. She has been involuntarily
discharged from three different service providers during the lifetime of this
case: (1) TIFSS in December 2021 for behavioral issues and threats made
against the staff; (2) Pressley Ridge in April 2022 due to “hostile” behavior;
and (3) Catholic Charities in July 2022 due to the court’s entry of the goal
change order precluding reunification. See N.T., 10/17/22, at 20-24, 52-56,
97-98. The respective testimonies of Ms. Acre, Ms. Brodbeck, and Ms. Sunday
confirm these discharges were unsuccessful, i.e., services concluded before
Mother addressed her underlying issues. Id.
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Moreover, while Mother has been successfully participating in
therapeutic services provided by CCG since March 2022, these efforts have
not yielded any salient improvement in her condition. Ms. Richardson testified
that Mother still suffered from significant, unresolved emotional turmoil and
that she had not yet begun to process her domestic violence issues:
Q. All right. So you’re saying that the eight sessions that
you’ve had with [M]other have focused on entirely the emotional
distress or whatever is bothering her in that moment when she
comes in.
A. Correct.
Q. So you haven’t had a chance to address domestic
violence and anger management with [M]other because of that.
Is that right?
A. Anger management and domestic violence was [sic]
brought up because it was part of her distress, but the main focus
was on stabilizing her motions as opposed to processing the
domestic violence.
Q. Okay. So would you say that you have a lot more
work to accomplish with [M]other yet?
A. Yes, we have work that needs to be done.
Q. All right. And there is no estimated discharge or time
frame for discharge. Is that right?
A. Not at this time, no.
N.T., 10/17/22, at 130-31. Ms. Nangle testified similarly that Mother had not
yet achieved resolution of either her mental health or her domestic violence
issues. Id. at 176-77. Based upon the foregoing, we find ample evidence
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supporting the orphans’ court’s finding that the conditions that led to the
removal of K.I.P. and R.P.P. continue to exist as to Mother.
Turning to the third and final prong of § 2511(a)(8), the orphans’ court
concluded that termination would best serve the needs and welfare of K.I.P.
and R.P.P., who were approximately two and one-half and one and one-half
years old, respectively, at the time of termination. Specifically, the court
based this determination largely upon the unanimous opinions of the service
providers who had the opportunity to observe K.I.P. and R.P.P. in foster care
and testified at the termination hearing. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/22, at
21 (“[T]he termination best serves the needs and welfare of the children in
that all service providers queried on the topic . . . found that the foster
situation was good for the children.”). There is more-than-adequate support
in the certified record for the orphans’ court’s findings.
From the outset, we note that Mother and Father’s fraught relationship
led to a suspected physical injury to K.I.P. at the onset of CYF’s involvement
with this family. See Amended Status Review Recommendation, 1/21/22, at
2-3. By contrast, after observing both K.I.P. and R.P.P. in the pre-adoptive
foster home, Ms. Brodbeck reported that “there was definitely a positive
relationship between foster parents and the children. [The children] definitely
felt comfortable and safe with them as well.” N.T., 10/17/22, at 62. She
described both K.I.P. and R.P.P. receiving appropriate direction, discipline, and
freedom to play in their foster home. Id. Ms. Nangle relayed the same
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observations in her testimony, wherein she averred that “these boys are very
well taken care of” in their foster home. Id. at 151. Ms. Harrison also reported
that the children were happy and comfortable. Indeed, as previously
indicated, even Father was supportive of the children’s foster placement. Id.
at 218 (“I am happy. I love [foster parents]. They are good people. They
are good parents.”). In comparison to the uncertainty and risk of physical
harm that existed in the children’s familial home, there seems to be little
dispute in the record that termination of parental rights in anticipation of
adoption will serve the needs and welfare of both K.I.P. and R.P.P.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, we find that the orphans’ court
properly found sufficient evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to § 2511(a)(8), in that: (1) more than twelve months had elapsed
from the time of removal when the agency sought termination; (2) the
conditions that precipitated removal continue to persist, i.e., Mother’s mental
health and domestic violence issues are unresolved; and (3) termination in
favor of adoption by foster parents will serve the needs and welfare of K.I.P.
and R.P.P.
Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to at least one
subsection of § 2511(a), we now turn to consider the propriety of terminating
Mother’s parental rights in light of the provisions of § 2511(b), which, as we
previously highlighted, afford primary consideration to “the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
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Mother asserts the orphans’ court failed to “give significant weight to the bond
between [M]other and the children” or to “consider whether termination would
destroy the existing beneficial relationship between [M]other and the
children.” Mother’s brief at 34. For its part, the orphans’ court’s rationale did
“not deny that there are bonds of sorts between Mother and the children,” but
concluded any bond with Mother was unhealthy and that the children “were
primarily bonded, and healthily so,” with foster parents. Trial Court Opinion,
12/5/22, at 22-23 (emphasis in original). Thus, it found termination to be the
“demanded” course of action to serve K.I.P.’s and R.P.P.’s “best interests.”
Id. at 23.
Instantly, Mother’s arguments are focused upon the bond examination
mandated by Pennsylvania law. See E.M., supra, at 484-485. In addition to
the forgoing discussion addressing the children’s needs and welfare pursuant
to § 2511(a)(8), we observe that the certified record belies Mother’s
contention that she has a well-established bond with R.P.P. To the contrary,
Ms. Brodbeck described multiple occasions during which Mother asserted that
she was unable to feel a bond with R.P.P. See N.T., 10/17/22, at 57.
Furthermore, Ms. Brodbeck also reported that Mother used domestic chores
to essentially avoid interacting with both children during supervised
visitations. Id. at 59. While Ms. Sunday testified that she believed that there
was a bond between the children and Mother, assuming, arguendo, that some
manner of bond exists between Mother and the children, the evidence of
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record establishes that the stronger, healthier bond in this matter exists
amongst K.I.P., R.P.P., and foster parents.
For this point, the orphans’ court largely relied upon the testimony of
Ms. Nangle, who averred as follows with respect to the bond analysis:
Q. Now both of the children were fairly young when they came
into care into their current home. Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So in the last year and a half or so the day-to-day needs
have been met by the resource family?
A. Yes.
Q. When we weigh the bond that the children have with the
resource family versus [M]other, where does the stronger parental
bond lie?
A. The foster [parents].
Q. And when we weigh the bond that the children have with
the resource family versus [F]ather, where does the stronger bond
lie?
A. Foster [parents].
Q. And why do you believe that the stronger bond lies with the
resource parents rather than [M]other and [F]ather?
A. The day-to-day care. The children are always with foster
parents, and [Mother and Father] only see the children once a
week or once every other week.
Id. at 153-54.
This testimony underscores the undisputed fact that Mother never
progressed to unsupervised visitations with either K.I.P. or R.P.P.
Furthermore, as detailed above, her efforts to ameliorate the issues that
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caused the children’s removal have been unsuccessful. Ms. Richardson
confirmed that there is no knowable time frame for Mother to achieve her
emotional and mental self-regulation goals. In this particular legal context,
the permanency needs of the children must receive greater and more
immediate consideration than the aspirations of even well-meaning parents.
See I.J., supra at 11-12 (emphasizing that this Court “cannot and will not
subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a
parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future”).
Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion in the
orphans’ court finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights will best
serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of K.I.P.
and R.P.P. pursuant to § 2511(b). Thus, we will affirm the decrees entered
by the orphans’ court terminating Mother’s parental rights.
We now turn to Father’s appellate issues. With respect to § 2511(a)(8),
Father asserts that the domestic violence issues that caused the removal of
the children no longer exist.3 See Father’s brief at 17-18. However, Father’s
arguments also concede that “[t]he domestic violence in this family was
clearly exacerbated by the toxic relationship between Mother and Father.” Id.
at 18. Father alleges that his relationship with Mother has since ended,
asserting, like Mother, that there have been no incidents of domestic violence
____________________________________________
3 During the lifetime of this case, Father has presented with a number of
substance abuse issues.
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since the couple allegedly separated in March 2022. Id. The orphans’ court
found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(8), based on
its conclusion that Father’s domestic violence issues remained unresolved.
See Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/22, at 18-20. We agree.
Initially, there is no dispute that CYF has fulfilled the first prong of
§ 2511(a)(8) in that the children have been removed from Father’s care for
the requisite twelve months. As above, we find that Father’s arguments
concerning the second prong gravely minimize the cascading incidents of
violence committed by the parties in this case. For his part, Father admitted
to beating Mother and having an ongoing problem with anger management.
See N.T., 10/17/22, at 217 (“You know, I caused a lot of the issues or anger
issues are because of me. . . . I have a problem with my hands. I used to
beat her[.]”). Father likewise presented with a spotty record of service
compliance. See N.T., 10/17/22, at 20-24, 154. Although Father completed
some of the educational programs, the orphans’ court noted that such
completion is not an automatic indicator of beneficial progress. Specifically,
the incident in February 2022 wherein Father struck Mother took place mere
days after he “successfully” graduated from TRIAD’s domestic violence
diversion program. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/22, at 18-19 (“Father was
successfully discharged from programming for domestic violence within days
of his assaulting Mother, which militates against a finding that Father has truly
addressed this concern[.]”); see also N.T., 10/17/22, at 55, 61, 65. Like the
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orphans’ court, we find this juxtaposition clearly bespeaks unresolved
domestic violence issues for Father. Mere completion of mandated
programming means little if it does not result in behavioral correction.
Moreover, although Father claims that the end of the parties’
relationship has ended all domestic violence concerns, there is conflicting
evidence in the record indicating that Mother and Father continued their
relationship and mischaracterized the nature of their alleged separation to the
court as reported by Ms. Brodbeck and Ms. Nangle. Id. at 62-63, 156.
Overall, the record supports the orphans’ court finding that Parents’ continued
relationship remained a cause of concern at the time of termination. Id. at
123. Based on the foregoing, we find the second prong of § 2511(a)(8) is
also satisfied with respect to Father, in that his domestic violence issues
continued to exist at the time CYF petitioned for termination.
As Father has confined his discussion of § 2511(a)(8) to the first and
second prong of this statute, we address the third prong of section (a)(8) in
disposing of Father’s overlapping challenge to the orphans’ courts needs and
welfare analysis pursuant to § 2511(b). Instantly, Father asserts that he has
a “healthy parental bond” with the children, which will result in negative
“emotional consequences” if severed. Father’s brief at 22. While
acknowledging that Father has an undeniable bond with both K.I.P. and R.P.P.,
the orphans’ court found that the children’s exposure to the negative aspects
of Parents’ relationship coupled with the strength of the children’s bond with
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foster parents augured in favor of termination. See Trial Court Opinion,
12/5/22, at 20-21. For the reasons discussed above, we find no fault in the
orphans’ court’s finding.
Like the orphans’ court, we credit the existence of the bond that exists
amongst Father, K.I.P., and R.P.P., which is undisputed in the record.
However, contrary to Father’s averments, that bond is not entirely positive.
As noted by the orphans’ court, Father’s involvement in the children’s lives
has exposed K.I.P. to physical harm and both minors to emotional chaos in
the form of Parents’ fraught and violent relationship. See id. at 21
(“[C]onsidering the children were exposed to at least some of Father’s faults,
in toto, the [c]ourt found that Father’s relationship with the children was a
toxic soup.”). We also emphasize that Father’s still-supervised visits with the
children have decreased to just one visit every two weeks. Contrary to the
averments in his brief, Father testified that he was pleased with the children’s
foster placement. See N.T., 10/17/22, at 218. As with Mother, the stronger,
healthier bond in the lives of both K.I.P. and R.P.P. clearly resides with foster
parents. Id. at 153-54.
Based on the above analysis, we find that termination of Father’s
parental rights will best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional
needs and welfare of K.I.P. and R.P.P. pursuant to § 2511(b). Accordingly,
we affirm the decrees terminating Parents’ respective parental rights.
Decrees affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 06/28/2023
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