Com. v. Owens, P. ( 2023 )

J-S16007-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
PRESTON MEKAL OWENS : No. 2170 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-45-CR-0002592-2021
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY 5, 2023
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the trial court’s
August 22, 2022 order suppressing evidence derived from a warrant search
of a vehicle rented to Appellee, Preston Mekal Owens (“Appellee”).1 At issue
is whether the police possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct the
investigation that led to the warrant. The trial court found that the police
lacked reasonable suspicion. After careful review, we affirm.
On June 24, 2021, Pennsylvania State Trooper Dario Korpita stopped a
grey Jeep, driven by Appellee, on Interstate 80 in Monroe County. As
discussed in greater detail infra, after the conclusion of the traffic stop,
Trooper Korpita questioned Appellee and his passenger, Naja Hicks, and held
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1 The Commonwealth certified in its notice of appeal that the order in question
would terminate or substantially handicap its prosecution of Appellee pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction.
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the pair for over an hour to conduct a canine sniff search of the vehicle.2
During the sniff search, the canine officer alerted for the presence of illicit
substances in the Jeep. A subsequent warrant search yielded a handgun, illicit
drugs, and drug paraphernalia. In a written statement, Appellee took
responsibility for the Jeep’s contents. As a result, the Commonwealth charged
Appellee with Firearms Not to be Carried Without a License, Possession With
Intent to Deliver, Possession of a Controlled Substance, Possession of a Small
Amount of Mari[j]uana, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and Driving While
Suspended.3
On January 14, 2022, Appellee filed a pretrial motion seeking to
suppress his inculpatory statement and all evidence derived from the vehicle
search. Appellee alleged that Trooper Korpita lacked the reasonable suspicion
necessary to continue his questioning after the completion of the traffic stop,
to detain the Jeep’s occupants, and to conduct the sniff search.
On March 21, 2022, and July 14, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on
Appellee’s motion. The Commonwealth presented testimony from Trooper
Korpita, played the motor vehicle recording (“MVR”) for the court, and entered
the MVR into evidence. Appellee did not present evidence at the hearing.
On July 27, 2022, the trial court convened another hearing to announce
its decision to grant Appellee’s suppression motion. The court determined that
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2 Appellee and Hicks were joined in the Jeep by Khalil Jackson.
3 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1); 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (a)(16), (a)(31),
(a)(32); and 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(a), respectively.
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Trooper Korpita subjected Appellee to an illegal detention when he continued
his investigation after the conclusion of the traffic stop. As a result, the court
suppressed Appellee’s inculpatory statement and the evidence derived from
the warrant search as fruit of an illegal detention.
On August 22, 2022, the trial court filed an order consistent with its
July 27th pronouncement. The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal,
and both it and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, the Commonwealth challenges the trial court’s finding that
Trooper Korpita lacked reasonable suspicion to continue his investigation after
the conclusion of the traffic stop. Commonwealth’s Br. at 4-5.4 The
Commonwealth does not dispute that the evidence found in the warrant search
and Appellee’s inculpatory statement derived from Trooper Korpita’s
investigatory detention.
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4 The Commonwealth also raises challenges to the trial court’s (1) alleged
finding that the traffic stop was illegal, and (2) determination that Trooper
Korpita’s testimony lacked credibility regarding his reasoning for conducting
the underlying traffic stop. Commonwealth’s Br. at 3-4, 13-18.
Although the trial court’s on-the-record ruling and subsequent written order
did not specifically address these issues, our reading of the order in the
context of the broader record makes clear that the court suppressed the
underlying evidence based on a finding that Trooper Korpita lacked reasonable
suspicion to extend the traffic stop to conduct the canine sniff search. See
N.T. Hr’g, 7/27/22, at 5 (recognizing the legality of the stop); Trial Ct. Op.,
10/7/22, at 4 (“Although we find that the Trooper’s initial stop of [Appellee]
was legal, we find that the extension of the stop was not.”). Thus, we need
not address the Commonwealth’s arguments premised on its erroneous
conclusion that the trial court found that the traffic stop was illegal.
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On review of a grant of a suppression motion, our review “is limited to
determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
correct.” Commonwealth v. Stem, 96 A.3d 407, 409 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted). “[O]ur scope of review is limited to the factual findings and
legal conclusions of the suppression court.” In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080
(Pa. 2013). We defer to the suppression court, “as factfinder[,] to pass on the
credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.”
Commonwealth v. Elmobdy, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003).
“[H]owever, we maintain de novo review over the suppression court's legal
conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473, 476 (Pa. 2010).
We categorize police interactions with members of the public into three
general tiers of increasing intrusiveness, which require increasing levels of
suspicion that a defendant is engaging in criminal activity: (1) mere
encounters, which require no suspicion; (2) investigative detentions, which
require reasonable suspicion; and (3) custodial detentions, which require
probable cause. Commonwealth v. Collins, 950 A.2d 1041, 1046 (Pa.
Super. 2008).
“Where the purpose of an initial traffic stop has ended and a reasonable
person would not have believed that he was free to leave, the law
characterizes a subsequent round of questioning by the police as an
investigative detention or arrest.” Commonwealth v. Green, 168 A.3d 180,
184 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). Thus, at the point where the purpose
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of the initial traffic stop has concluded, the police must possess reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is occurring in order to continue the detention.
Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2002). See
also Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348, 354-55 (2015).
Demonstrating reasonable suspicion requires that the detaining officer
“articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion
or hunch” that the defendant has engaged in criminal activity
Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d 1242, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(citation omitted). In determining whether the Commonwealth has met this
burden, courts must make an objective inquiry into whether, based on “the
facts available to [the] police at the moment of intrusion[,]” a person “of
reasonable caution” would believe that the defendant has engaged in criminal
activity. Id. (citation omitted). At the moment a mere encounter becomes an
investigative detention, police must already have the requisite reasonable
suspicion that the defendant engaged in criminal activity to support that
detention. Commonwealth v. Mackey, 177 A.3d 221, 232 (Pa. Super.
2017). “Reasonable suspicion cannot be based on information discovered after
the detention has begun.” Id.The evidence presented at the March 21 and July 14, 2022 suppression
hearings established that Trooper Korpita initiated the traffic stop because
Appellee was driving at excessive speed and following another car too closely.
N.T. Hr’g, 3/21/22, at 4-5. When he approached the vehicle, Trooper Korpita
found Appellee smoking a cigar. Id. at 8-9. He also saw several backpacks
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and duffel bags in the back of the Jeep. Id. at 10. Trooper Korpita determined
that the vehicle was a rental and Appellee’s license was suspended. Id. at 5,
12.
During the stop, Trooper Korpita asked about the group’s travel
itinerary. Appellee stated that the group had left Georgia early that morning,
and were headed for Brooklyn, New York. Id. at 13-15. Appellee initially
stated that the group was going to two graduation ceremonies, one for a niece
graduating from 8th grade, the other from college. Id. Appellee then amended
his statement, explaining that his older niece was graduating from high school
and would soon be attending college. Id.; MVR at 8:47-9:08.
Approximately 8 minutes into the traffic stop, Trooper Korpita informed
Appellee that if Hicks was licensed and able to drive, he would release the
group. MVR at 10:06-10:26; 11:30.5 To determine if Hicks had a valid license,
Trooper Korpita asked Appellee for Hicks’ information. Id. at 10:06-10:26.
After entering Hicks’ information into his computer, Trooper Korpita returned
to the Jeep and confirmed with Hicks that she was capable of driving. Id. at
11:38-12:09. At this point, the initial purpose of the traffic stop was satisfied
and the investigative detention had ended.
Notwithstanding the completion of the traffic stop, Trooper Korpita
continued to question Hicks about the group’s itinerary and conducted another
round of questioning of Appellee. The Trooper also held the group for over an
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5 Trooper Korpita first engaged the Jeep at approximately the 2:00 mark of
the MVR.
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hour while awaiting a canine unit and subjected the Jeep to a canine sniff
search. During the additional questioning, Hicks told Trooper Korpita that
they were traveling to New York, New York. Hr’g, 3/21/22, at 18-20. Based
on this information, and because Appellee had said they were traveling to
Brooklyn, New York, Trooper Korpita concluded there was a discrepancy in the
travel itineraries that was “significant.” Hr’g, 3/21/22, at 18-20. Trooper
Korpita only learned of this alleged discrepancy after the traffic stop had
ended. Id.
The trial court found that once Trooper Korpita determined that Hicks
was able to drive, the traffic stop had been completed. N.T. Hr’g, 7/27/22, at
7. Trooper Korpita, therefore, required reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity to continue his questioning. The court found that Trooper Korpita
relied on the following factors to continue the detention: (1) the car was
rented in Appellee's mother's name, who was not present in the vehicle; (2)
Appellee was smoking in the rental; (3) Appellee did not know passenger's
exact age; (4) Appellee was driving with an expired license; and (5) Appellee
and Hicks gave “differing” travel itineraries. Trial Ct. Op., 10/7/22, at 5; N.T.
Hr’g, 7/27/22, at 5-7. The trial court concluded that these factors did not rise
to the level that Trooper Korpita had a reasonable suspicion that Appellee had
committed a crime. Rather, these factors at best, demonstrated a
unparticularized suspicion or hunch that Appellee was engaged in criminal
activity. As a result, the court suppressed all evidence derived in the
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subsequent warrant search and Appellee’s inculpatory statement as fruit of an
illegal detention.
The record supports the trial court’s factual findings and we discern no
error in its conclusion that Trooper Korpita lacked a reasonable suspicion that
Appellee was engaged in criminal activity. We agree with the legal conclusion
of the trial court that smoking a cigar, driving a rental car, and not knowing a
passenger’s exact age did not create a reasonable suspicion that Appellee was
engaged in criminal activity.6
Because Trooper Korpita lacked sufficient facts to warrant a reasonable
officer to believe that Appellee was engaged in criminal activity, the
suppression court properly suppressed the evidence resulting from the
detention. We affirm.
Order affirmed.
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6 Trooper Korpita stated at the suppression hearings that he called out the
canine unit because of differing travel itineraries and the odor of marijuana in
the vehicle. Hr’g, 3/21/22, at 19. However, Trooper Korpita first stated that
he smelled marijuana only after the canine unit arrived. Hr’g 7/14/22, at 18.
The trial court did not consider the odor of marijuana as a factor in its
reasonable suspicion analysis. N.T. Hr’g, 7/27/22, at 5. Moreover, because
the traffic stop had ended, and Trooper Korpita did not learn of what he
characterized as differing travel itineraries until after he had begun his second
investigative detention, his learning of “conflicting itineraries” is irrelevant to
the “reasonable suspicion” analysis. Hr’g, 3/21/22, at 18-20.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/5/2023
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