Com. v. Bowers, R. ( 2023 )


Menu:
  • J-S17003-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    :
    RYAN PHYLLIP BOWERS                      :
    :
    Appellant              :    No. 1390 WDA 2022
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 19, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-43-CR-0001526-2014
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                       FILED: June 2, 2023
    Ryan Phyllip Bowers appeals from the order, entered in the Court of
    Common Pleas of Mercer County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the
    Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review,
    we affirm.
    We previously summarized the factual history of this case as follows:
    [Bowers] was arrested and charged with several crimes stemming
    from the murder of Michael Anthony Johns[]. [Bowers] and
    Patrick McCamey arrived at Johns’ home with the intention of
    committing a burglary/robbery. Upon arrival, an altercation
    ensued, ultimately resulting in Johns’ death. Both [Bowers] and
    McCamey were stabbed by Johns during the struggle. . . .
    [Bowers] proceeded to a jury trial, and on [May 18], 201[5,] was
    found guilty of . . . [,] inter alia, robbery, burglary, two counts of
    second-degree murder, and third-degree murder. . . .               On
    November 25, 201[5], [Bowers] was sentenced to [] concurrent
    terms of life imprisonment for each count of second-degree
    murder and concurrent terms of imprisonment of 10-20 years for
    third-degree murder and criminal conspiracy[,] respectively.
    J-S17003-23
    Commonwealth v. Bowers, 
    159 A.3d 603
     (Pa. Super. 2016) (Table).
    We affirmed Bowers’ judgment of sentence on November 30, 2016, see
    
    id.,
     and our Supreme Court denied Bowers’ petition for allowance of appeal
    on May 11, 2017. See 
    id.,
     appeal denied, 
    169 A.3d 520
     (Pa. 2017).
    On September 15, 2017, Bowers filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, his
    first. Bowers was appointed counsel, who filed two amended petitions in which
    he raised challenges to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to object “to
    the Commonwealth introducing [Bowers’] confession[,] wherein [Bowers]
    indicated he was ‘on paper[,]’” and challenged the legality of Bowers’
    sentence. See Commonwealth v. Bowers, 
    203 A.3d 363
     (Pa. Super. 2018)
    (Table). Ultimately, on April 16, 2018, the PCRA court granted in part, and
    denied in part, Bowers’ PCRA petition. In particular, the PCRA court granted
    relief on Bowers’ sentencing claim and vacated his judgment of sentence, but
    denied    Bowers’     petition    with    respect   to   trial   counsel’s   purported
    ineffectiveness. On May 4, 2018, the trial court resentenced Bowers to one
    term of life imprisonment, and to serve a concurrent term of five to 20 years
    for his criminal conspiracy conviction. 
    Id.
     Bowers filed an untimely appeal,
    which this Court quashed.1 
    Id.
    On December 23, 2020, more than 18 months later, Bowers filed a
    second pro se PCRA petition in which he alleged that prior PCRA counsel was
    ____________________________________________
    1 On June 4, 2018, Bowers had appealed from the April 16, 2018 order
    granting in part, and denying in part, his PCRA petition. 
    Id.
     For that reason,
    this Court concluded that Bower’s appeal was untimely and quashed his
    appeal. See 
    id.
    -2-
    J-S17003-23
    ineffective for failing to file a timely notice of appeal from the order denying
    his first PCRA petition. Ultimately, the PCRA court dismissed the petition as
    untimely. Bowers filed a timely pro se notice of appeal, and the PCRA court
    appointed counsel, who determined that the PCRA petition was untimely and
    sought to withdraw the appeal and from representation. On November 21,
    2021, this Court granted counsel’s request to withdraw and discontinued the
    appeal.
    On March 28, 2022, Bowers filed a third pro se PCRA Petition titled
    “Motion for Reinstatement of Appellant Rights nunc pro tunc” that the PCRA
    court denied. Shortly thereafter, Bowers filed a motion for reconsideration
    that the PCRA also denied.
    On September 22, 2022, Bowers filed his fourth pro se PCRA Petition,
    the instant petition. The PCRA court dismissed the petition on October 19,
    2022.2 Bowers filed a timely notice of appeal.3
    ____________________________________________
    2The order is dated October 18, 2022, but was not entered on the docket until
    October 19, 2022.
    3 Bowers did not file his notice of appeal until November 21, 2022, three days
    late. On December 19, 2022, this Court issued a Rule to Show Cause why
    Bowers’ appeal should not be quashed as untimely. Bowers filed a Response,
    in which he attached a copy of his prisoner cash slip. This Court discharged
    the Rule to Show Cause and deferred the issue to the merits panel.
    Bowers is pro se and incarcerated and, therefore, may benefit from the
    “prisoner mailbox rule.” See Pa.R.A.P. 121(f) (“A pro se filing submitted by a
    person incarcerated in a correctional facility is deemed filed as of the date of
    the prison postmark or the date the filing was delivered to the prison
    authorities for purposes of mailing as documented by a properly executed
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -3-
    J-S17003-23
    Bowers now raises the following claims on appeal:
    (1) [Trial counsel was ineffective for] not objecting when the
    Commonwealth played a taped recording in which [Bowers] stated
    he was “on paper.”
    (2) [Trial counsel was ineffective for] not asking for a curative
    instruction when the Commonwealth played a recording in which
    [Bowers] stated he was “on paper.”
    (3) Trial counsel was ineffective for] not moving for mistrial as
    requested by [Bowers] when the Commonwealth played a taped
    recording of [Bowers] stating he was “on paper.”
    Brief for Appellant, at 2 (unnumbered).
    “On appeal from the denial of relief under the [PCRA], the standard of
    review is whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record
    and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 
    5 A.3d 177
    , 182 (Pa.
    ____________________________________________
    prisoner cash slip or other reasonably verifiable evidence.”). The cash slip
    indicates that Bowers delivered his notice of appeal to prison authorities on
    November 15, 2022. Therefore, Bowers’ notice of appeal is considered to be
    timely filed.
    Moreover, we note that the record does not reflect that the PCRA court’s order
    dismissing Bowers’ PCRA petition was ever served on Bowers.                    See
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c) (trial court docket “shall contain . . . the date of
    service of the order or court notice”); Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1) (“in computing any
    period of time under these rules involving the date of entry of an order by a
    court . . ., the day of entry shall be the day the clerk of the court . . . mails or
    delivers copies of the order to the parties.”); see also Commonwealth v.
    Carter, 
    122 A.3d 388
    , 390-92 (Pa. Super. 2015) (appeal period does not run
    until clerk of courts mails or delivers copies of order to parties shown on
    docket); Commonwealth v. Jerman, 
    762 A.2d 366
    , 368 (Pa. Super. 2000)
    (where trial court docket did not indicate clerk of courts furnished copy of final
    order to appellant, this Court “assume[d] the period for taking an appeal was
    never triggered,” and considered appeal timely filed). Thus, even if Bowers
    had not benefited from the prisoner mailbox rule, we would construe this
    failing to be a breakdown in court processes that excused Bowers’ otherwise
    untimely filing.
    -4-
    J-S17003-23
    2010). Additionally, any PCRA petition “shall be filed within one year of the
    date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment
    of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review, including
    discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking
    review.”   Id. at § 9545(b)(3).     The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are
    jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the merits of the issues
    raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed. Commonwealth v. Albrecht,
    
    994 A.2d 1091
    , 1093 (Pa. 2010).
    Instantly, Bowers’ judgment of sentence became final, for the purposes
    of the PCRA, on June 4, 2018, when the time expired for him to file a direct
    appeal to this Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), (3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a)
    (providing 30 days to file notice of appeal). Thus, Bowers had until June 4,
    2019, to file a timely petition under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1),
    (3). Bowers’ instant petition was filed on September 22, 2022, over three
    years later. Thus, it is patently untimely.
    However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely petition if the
    petitioner can explicitly plead and prove one of the three exceptions set forth
    at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). These three exceptions are as follows:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
    interference by government officials with the presentation of the
    claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
    or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
    -5-
    J-S17003-23
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
    the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
    of due diligence; or
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
    by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
    of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
    has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
    Id. Any petition invoking one of these exceptions “shall be filed within one
    year of the date the claim could have been presented.” Id. at § 9545(b)(2).
    “The PCRA petitioner bears the burden of proving the applicability of one of
    the exceptions.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 
    171 A.3d 675
    , 678 (Pa. 2017).
    Bowers does not plead, let alone prove, any exception to the PCRA’s
    timeliness requirements. Accordingly, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to
    review Bowers’ untimely PCRA petition, and, thus, we affirm the PCRA court’s
    order dismissing his petition. See Albrecht, supra.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/2/2023
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1390 WDA 2022

Judges: Lazarus, J.

Filed Date: 6/2/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/2/2023