Premium Mngt., LLC v. Tobacco Outlet Minimart ( 2023 )


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  • J-S08031-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
    PREMIUM MANAGEMENT, LLC                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    TOBACCO OUTLET MINIMART 1, INC.            :
    D/B/A UNI-MART                             :
    :   No. 1163 MDA 2022
    Appellant               :
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered September 13, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Civil Division at
    No(s): CV-2020-00854-CV
    BEFORE:      OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                                 FILED: JUNE 1, 2023
    Appellant, Tobacco Outlet Minimart 1, Inc. d/b/a Uni-Mart (Defendant),
    appeals from a judgment entered against it following a nonjury trial in a
    breach of contract action brought by Premium Management, LLC (Plaintiff).
    For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
    On August 26, 2020, Plaintiff filed this action against FN Mart, Inc. d/b/a
    Uni-Mart (FN) and Mantu Sah, the owner and president of Defendant. Plaintiff
    filed an amended complaint against FN, Sah, and Defendant on November 2,
    2020, and FN and Sah were subsequently dismissed as defendants on a joint
    motion of Plaintiff and Defendant.
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S08031-23
    In its amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged that it and Defendant signed
    a written contract on March 16, 2019 for placement of electronic skill games
    in Defendant’s Uni-Mart store in McSherrystown, Pennsylvania for a period of
    three years, with revenues from the games to be divided between Plaintiff and
    Defendant. Amended Complaint ¶¶6-12.1 This contract provided that in the
    event of a breach by Defendant, Plaintiff would be entitled to recover as
    liquidated damages its share of average weekly revenues from the games
    multiplied by the number of remaining weeks of the contract’s three-year term
    and its costs and attorney fees in any action to enforce the contract. Id. ¶¶18,
    21. Plaintiff alleged that from March 16, 2019 to June 4, 2020, Defendant had
    Plaintiff’s games at its Uni-Mart store and Plaintiff and Defendant divided the
    revenue from the games in accordance with the contract, but that Defendant
    removed the games from its store on June 4, 2020 and replaced them with
    coin-operated machines supplied by persons other than Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶13-
    16. Plaintiff alleged that the removal of its games before the expiration of the
    contract’s three-year term was a breach of the contract and sought the
    liquidated damages, costs, and attorney fees provided by the contract. Id.
    ¶¶17-19, 23-24.
    ____________________________________________
    1 Although Defendant’s store was not in Lycoming County, the action was
    brought in Lycoming County because the contract had a forum selection clause
    providing that the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County had exclusive
    jurisdiction over any claims or lawsuits regarding the contract. 3/16/19
    Contract ¶12(e); N.T. Trial at 11.
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    J-S08031-23
    Defendant, represented by counsel, filed an answer and new matter in
    which it admitted that it entered into a contract with Plaintiff on March 16,
    2019 under which it agreed to place Plaintiff’s electronic skill games in its Uni-
    Mart store in exchange for receiving 60% of the revenues from the games,
    with Plaintiff to receive 40% of the revenues. Answer and New Matter ¶¶6-7.
    Defendant admitted in this answer that it removed the games, but alleged
    that it did so because Plaintiff breached the contract by unilaterally attempting
    to change the revenue split to 50-50.         Id. ¶¶6, 13-16.      Neither party
    demanded a jury trial.
    The trial court entered a scheduling order requiring completion of
    discovery by May 11, 2021, scheduling the final pretrial conference for
    December 6, 2021, and ordering that the case would be tried in the January-
    February 2022 trial term. Trial Court Order, 2/1/21. On November 12, 2021,
    counsel for Defendant moved to withdraw on the ground that Defendant was
    not paying his fees, and the court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw on
    December 6, 2021.        Motion to Withdraw as Counsel; Trial Court Order,
    12/6/21. On December 20, 2021, the trial court entered a scheduling order
    setting the trial date for February 7, 2022. Trial Court Order, 12/20/21.
    The case was tried to the court without a jury on February 7, 2022.
    Defendant did not retain new counsel before the case came to trial and the
    only individual who appeared for or on behalf of Defendant at trial was Sah.
    N.T. Trial at 3-6.   Although neither Sah nor Defendant had requested an
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    J-S08031-23
    interpreter in advance of trial, because Sah’s native language was Hindi and
    he expressed some difficulty fully understanding English, the trial court
    obtained a Hindi interpreter who connected to the proceedings by telephone
    and translated the proceedings and Sah’s questions and answers for him. Id.
    at 8-17. Plaintiff called two witnesses, its representative who negotiated and
    signed the written contract and Sah, who signed the written contract on behalf
    of Defendant. Id. at 22-60. The trial court permitted Sah to cross-examine
    Plaintiff’s representative and to testify himself. Id. at 46-54, 61-65, 70-71,
    74-77. Following the testimony, the trial court entered a verdict in favor of
    Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $88,847.37, consisting of
    $73,807.32 in liquidated damages, $13,455.00 in attorney fees, and
    $1,585.05 in costs. Id. at 77, 79; Trial Court Order, 2/7/22.
    On February 17, 2022, Defendant, represented by new counsel that it
    retained after the trial, filed a timely motion for post-trial relief in which it
    asserted, inter alia, 1) that the trial court erred in finding that there was a
    valid contract because the evidence was insufficient to show that there was a
    meeting of the minds and 2) that the trial court erred in proceeding with the
    trial when Defendant was not represented by counsel because a corporation
    can appear in court only through an attorney. On July 22, 2022, the trial court
    denied Defendant’s motion for post-trial relief. Trial Court Opinion and Order,
    7/22/22. Judgment was entered on September 13, 2022 in favor of Plaintiff
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    J-S08031-23
    and against Defendant in the amount of $88,847.37. Defendant, represented
    by a third, different lawyer, timely appealed from this judgment.2
    In this appeal, Defendant raises two issues for our review: 1) whether
    it is entitled to a new trial because it was represented at trial only by Sah, an
    officer of the corporation who is not an attorney; and 2) whether it is entitled
    to judgment in its favor because there was no meeting of the minds and
    therefore was no valid contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. Appellant’s
    Brief at 8. Neither of these issues merits relief.
    We review Defendant’s first claim under the following standard:
    We will reverse a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a new
    trial only if the trial court abused its discretion. We must review
    the court’s alleged mistake and determine whether the court erred
    and, if so, whether the error resulted in prejudice necessitating a
    new trial.
    Barrett v. M&B Medical Billing, Inc., 
    291 A.3d 371
    , 375 (Pa. Super. 2022)
    (quoting Carlini v. Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc., 
    219 A.3d 629
     (Pa. Super.
    2019)). This claim fails because the error of which Defendant complains as a
    matter of law does not constitute a ground for relief for a party in Defendant’s
    position and did not prejudice it.
    ____________________________________________
    2 Appellant filed its appeal prematurely on August 22, 2022, before any
    judgment had been entered. Because judgment was entered on September
    13, 2022, Appellants’ appeal is timely and is properly before us. Pa.R.A.P.
    905(a)(5) (“A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a determination
    but before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such
    entry and on the day thereof”); Barrett v. M&B Medical Billing, Inc., 
    291 A.3d 371
    , 374 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2022).
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    J-S08031-23
    Defendant is correct that a corporation generally cannot appear in court
    pro se or be represented by a non-lawyer officer or representative. Phoenix
    Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Radcliffe on the Delaware, Inc., 
    266 A.2d 698
    , 701 (Pa. 1970); Barrett, 291 A.3d at 376; Walacavage v. Excell 2000,
    Inc., 
    480 A.2d 281
    , 284-85 (Pa. Super. 1984).         Filings on behalf of a
    corporation by a non-lawyer representative may therefore properly be
    stricken. Walacavage, 
    480 A.2d at 283-84
    . In addition, where a corporation
    appeared without counsel and a non-lawyer represented the corporation at a
    trial or hearing, the opposing party may challenge the judgment. Barrett,
    291 A.3d at 377-78 (plaintiff entitled to new trial where non-lawyer
    representative of defendant corporation cross-examined plaintiff and raised
    issues at trial on behalf of corporation).
    The rule that a corporation cannot be represented by a non-lawyer,
    however, does not provide grounds for a corporation to set aside an adverse
    civil judgment from a trial where it chose to appear without counsel. Phoenix
    Mutual Life Insurance Co., 266 A.2d at 701-02. In Phoenix Mutual Life
    Insurance Co., a corporation was represented at the trial of a mortgage
    foreclosure action by a non-lawyer officer who was one of its three
    stockholders, after its prior counsel had been permitted to withdraw
    approximately two months earlier for non-payment of fees and the corporation
    had not retained new counsel before the trial. Id. at 699-700. Our Supreme
    Court held that under those circumstances, the corporation was not entitled
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    J-S08031-23
    to relief from the judgment against it. Id. at 701-02. The Court ruled that
    although a corporation can usually only be represented by a lawyer,
    proceeding with trial despite the defendant corporation’s lack of legal
    representation was proper because the corporation had sufficient time to
    retain counsel and that the corporation therefore “will not be permitted to
    complain that the court erred in permitting [the non-lawyer officer] to provide
    it with some representation.”     Id.    The Court noted that permitting the
    corporation to defer trial and challenge the judgment on this basis would mean
    that a corporation that fails to pay its obligations could “avoid or postpone a
    [judgment against it] by failing to pay its lawyers.” Id. at 701.
    That is the situation here. This case is a civil case for breach of contract
    in which Plaintiff sought a money judgment against Defendant. Defendant
    was not represented by counsel at trial because its counsel had been permitted
    to withdraw as a result of Defendant’s failure to pay for his services.
    Defendant had two months to retain new counsel between December 6, 2021,
    when counsel was permitted to withdraw, and the February 7, 2022 trial. No
    new counsel, however, had entered any appearance for Defendant as of the
    date of trial, and there is nothing in the record indicating that Defendant made
    any effort before trial to hire any attorney other than the attorney who had
    withdrawn from the case. N.T. Trial at 4-6. Defendant, having failed to retain
    counsel despite adequate opportunity to do so, therefore cannot seek relief on
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    J-S08031-23
    the ground that it was represented by a non-lawyer at the trial. Phoenix
    Mutual Life Insurance Co., 266 A.2d at 702.
    In any event, Defendant has not shown that permitting its non-lawyer
    officer Sah to represent it at trial caused it prejudice. Because Defendant had
    already had adequate time to obtain counsel and failed to do so, enforcement
    of the requirement that a corporation can be represented only by an attorney
    would not have provided Defendant with any legal representation at the trial
    or additional delay to obtain counsel. Instead, enforcement of this rule would
    have only resulted in precluding Defendant from cross-examining Plaintiff’s
    representative, challenging Plaintiff’s case, and presenting its own case.
    Barrett, 291 A.3d at 378; Walacavage, 
    480 A.2d at 283
    .
    Defendant does not point to anything in Sah’s representation that
    brought out evidence adverse to it. The evidence from Sah and Defendant
    that supported the trial court’s verdict was in Sah’s direct testimony as a
    witness called by Plaintiff and an admission from Defendant’s answer, when it
    was represented by counsel, that was introduced by Plaintiff. N.T. Trial at 57-
    61.   That evidence would have come in even if Sah did not represent
    Defendant at trial. Rather, Defendant argues only that Sah did not examine
    witnesses or present Defendant’s case as well as an attorney would have.
    Appellant’s Brief at 15-16. Because enforcement of the requirement that only
    an attorney could represent Defendant would have prevented Defendant from
    participating in the trial altogether, rather than resulting in representation by
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    J-S08031-23
    counsel, and Defendant has not shown that Sah’s representation made its
    case worse than it would have been with no participation by Defendant as an
    entity at all, the trial court correctly concluded that Defendant was not
    prejudiced by its decision to permit Sah to represent it.        See Trial Court
    Opinion and Order, 7/22/22, at 2; Trial Court Opinion, 10/14/22, at 6-7.
    Defendant’s remaining claim asserts that the evidence was insufficient
    to support the trial court’s breach of contract verdict against it.
    Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial verdicts is
    to determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported
    by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed
    error in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial
    judge must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the
    verdict of a jury. We consider the evidence in a light most
    favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court only
    if its findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence in
    the record or if its findings are premised on an error of law.
    Barrett, 291 A.3d at 375 (quoting Bank of New York Mellon v. Bach, 
    159 A.3d 16
     (Pa. Super. 2017)).
    To obtain a judgment for breach of contract, Plaintiff was required to
    prove the following elements: (1) the existence of a contract, including its
    essential terms, (2) that the defendant breached a duty imposed by the
    contract, and (3) resultant damages.        McCausland v. Wagner, 
    78 A.3d 1093
    , 1101 (Pa. Super. 2013); Hart v. Arnold, 
    884 A.2d 316
    , 332 (Pa. Super.
    2005). The only element of breach of contract that Defendant claims that the
    evidence does not support is the existence of the contract and its terms.
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    J-S08031-23
    Defendant’s claim that Plaintiff did not prove the contract between it and
    Plaintiff and the terms of that contract is without merit.     At trial, Plaintiff
    introduced evidence that Defendant agreed to a contract on March 16, 2019,
    under which Plaintiff’s games were placed in its store for three years in
    exchange for 60% of the revenues from the games, with Plaintiff to receive
    40% of the revenues, and that the contract provided for liquidated damages
    consisting of Plaintiff’s share of average weekly revenues multiplied by the
    number of weeks remaining in the contract term in the event that Defendant
    removed the Plaintiff’s games from the store during the contract term and also
    provided for attorney fees.     N.T. Trial at 23-35, 38-39, 57-58; 3/16/19
    Contract. The trial court found this testimony credible. Trial Court Opinion,
    10/14/22, at 3-4.
    Defendant argues that agreement on the terms of the contract was not
    proven because there were two contract documents, the March 16, 2019
    contract and an April 11, 2019 document, whose terms were not the same.
    This claim fails, however, because the evidence at trial showed that the only
    contract document to which Plaintiff and Defendant agreed was the March 16,
    2019 contract. Plaintiff’s representative testified that both parties signed the
    March 16, 2019 contract and that April 11, 2019 document was never signed
    or agreed to by the parties. N.T. Trial at 26-29, 49-50. Sah testified that he
    signed the March 16, 2019 contract and had authority to sign contracts for
    Defendant, and Defendant in its answer to Plaintiff’s complaint admitted that
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    J-S08031-23
    Sah signed the March 16, 2019 contract on its behalf and that Sah did not
    sign the April 11, 2019 document. Id. at 57-58; Answer and New Matter ¶7.
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that neither of Defendant’s
    claims of error merit relief. Accordingly, affirm the trial court’s judgment in
    favor of Plaintiff.
    Judgment affirmed.
    Judge McCaffery joins the memorandum.
    Judge Olson concurs in the result.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/01/2023
    - 11 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1163 MDA 2022

Judges: Colins, J.

Filed Date: 6/1/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/1/2023