Com. v. Press, C. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
CLIFFORD PRESS : No. 2998 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered November 3, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-45-CR-0000478-2022
BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 15, 2023
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the November 3,
2022 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County that
granted habeas corpus relief to Clifford Press (“Press”) on the charges of
criminal trespass and criminal mischief.1 We reverse the order and remand
this case for further proceedings.
The facts of the case as established by the record are as follows. On
January 31, 2021, the homeowner contacted the Pocono Mountain Regional
Police and requested that the police respond to her residence to assess
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3503(a)(1)(i) and 3304(a)(5), respectively.
It is well-established, that this Court has jurisdiction over the
Commonwealth’s appeal from a trial court order dismissing criminal charges
based on a pre-trial motion for writ of habeas corpus. Commonwealth v.
Merced, 265 A.3d 786, 790 (Pa. Super. 2021).
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damage caused by Press and to secure the property. N.T., 1/13/22, at 6, 30,
Defense Exhibit D-2.2 The homeowner resides in the State of New York and
the residence, which serves as a second home, is located in Pennsylvania. Id.
at 5. Due to weather conditions, the homeowner was unable to visit the
residence for several days after the incident. Id. at 7.
It is undisputed that on January 31, 2021, Press was walking his dog
near the residence when the dog escaped its collar and leash in an effort to
chase a raccoon. Id. at Defense Exhibit D-1 The dog chased the raccoon into
a crawl-space beneath the residence and was unable to free itself from the
crawl-space.3 Id. In an effort to rescue the dog, Press entered the
homeowner’s residence through a window and removed floorboards from the
first-floor level of the residence in order to access the crawl-space. Id. Press
contacted the homeowner to report that he entered the residence and caused
damage to the residence while rescuing his dog. Id.
On May 2, 2021, Press was charged with the aforementioned crimes.
On March 11, 2022, Press filed a motion for writ of habeas corpus, requesting
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2 At the hearing on Press’ motion for writ of habeas corpus, the notes of
testimony from the preliminary hearing held on January 13, 2022, were
admitted as Commonwealth Exhibit C-1. See N.T., 10/20/22, at 4. For
identification purposes, we refer to Commonwealth Exhibit C-1 as “N.T.,
1/13/22, at ___.”
3 The homeowner described the crawl-space as a space beneath the first floor
of the residence that had an earth foundation and was accessible through an
opening under the rear deck of the residence. N.T., 1/13/22, at 20, 25. There
was no immediate access point to the crawl-space from inside the residence.
Id. at 19-20.
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that the trial court dismiss the criminal charges on the ground that the
Commonwealth failed to prove a prima facie case, namely to prove the mens
rea element of each of the criminal charges. Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
3/11/22, at 3-4. On April 12, 2022, Press filed a brief in support of his motion.
On June 1, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a brief in opposition to Press’
motion. On June 7, 2022, Press filed a reply brief. A hearing on Press’ motion
was held on June 23, 2022, and October 20, 2022. On November 3, 2022,
the trial court granted Press habeas corpus relief and dismissed the
aforementioned criminal charges. This appeal followed.4
The Commonwealth raises the following issue for our review: “Whether
the [trial] court erred by failing to view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth in dismissing the criminal trespass charge and criminal
mischief [charge] at the habeas [corpus] hearing?” Commonwealth’s Brief at
5.
The Commonwealth’s issue raises a challenge to the trial court’s order
granting Press’ motion for habeas corpus relief. A motion for writ of habeas
corpus is the appropriate vehicle to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the Commonwealth’s prima facie case for a criminal charge filed
against a defendant. Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109, 1112
(Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 83 A.3d 414 (Pa. 2013). “[T]he evidentiary
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4 Both the Commonwealth and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule
of Appellate Procedure 1925.
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sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s prima facie case for a charged crime is a
question of law as to which our standard of review is de novo and our scope
of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Wroten, 257 A.3d 734, 742
(Pa. Super. 2021); see also Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 172 A.3d 5, 12
(Pa. Super. 2017) (stating, “the evidentiary sufficiency, or lack thereof, of the
Commonwealth's prima facie case for a charged crime is a question of law”).
It is well-established that, in order for criminal charges to be “held over”
for trial, the Commonwealth bears the burden, at a preliminary hearing, of
establishing a prima facie case that the crime was committed and that the
accused is probably the one who committed it. Commonwealth v. Weigle,
997 A.2d 306, 311 (Pa. 2010). A preliminary hearing is not a trial, but rather,
the “principal function of a preliminary hearing is to protect an individual's
right against an unlawful arrest and detention.” Id.A prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces
evidence of each of the material elements of the crime charged
and establishes probable cause to warrant the belief that the
accused committed the offense. Furthermore, the evidence need
only be such that, if presented at trial and accepted as true, the
[trial court] would be warranted in permitting the case to be
decided by the jury.
Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support the
Commonwealth’s prima facie case, we are cognizant of the following
principles.
In reviewing the determination of whether the Commonwealth
met its burden of establishing a prima facie case for a charged
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crime, the trial court is afforded no discretion in ascertaining
whether, as a matter of law and in light of the facts presented to
it, the Commonwealth [] carried its pre-trial, prima facie burden
to make out the elements of a charged crime. Hence, we are not
bound by the legal determinations of the trial court. Furthermore,
it is inappropriate for the trial court to make weight or credibility
determinations when assessing whether the Commonwealth
established a prima facie case.
Inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence of record which
would support a verdict of guilty are to be given effect at a
preliminary hearing, and the evidence must be read in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth's case. The use of
inferences is a process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition
sought to be established is deduced as the logical consequence
from the existence of other facts that have been established. The
“more-likely-than-not” test, must be applied to assess the
reasonableness of inferences relied upon in establishing a prima
facie case of criminal culpability.”
Wroten, 257 A.3d at 742-743. (citations, brackets, and some quotation
marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Santos, 876 A.2d 360, 363
(Pa. 2005) (stating, “the evidence must be considered in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth so that inferences that would support a guilty
verdict are given effect”).
Section 3503(a)(1)(i) of the Crimes Code states that a person is guilty
of criminal trespass “if, knowing that he[, or she,] is not licensed or privileged
to do so, he[, or she,] enters, gains entry by subterfuge[,] or surreptitiously
remains in any building or occupied structure or separately secured or
occupied portion thereof[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(i). Thus, the
Commonwealth must prove that a defendant (1) knew he or she was not
licensed or privileged to enter the premises (the mens rea element) and (2)
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he or she entered the premises. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 10 A.3d
341 (Pa. Super. 2010).
The term “knowing” or “knowingly” is defined by Section 302 of the
Crimes Code, in pertinent part, as follows:
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an
offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his[, or her,] conduct or
the attendant circumstances, he[, or she,] is aware that his[, or
her,] conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(2)(i); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 103 (equating the terms
“knowing” and “knowingly”). Thus, to do something knowingly involves a
consciousness to act.
Section 3304 of the Crimes Codes states that “[a] person is guilty of
criminal mischief if he[, or she,] intentionally damages real or personal
property of another[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(5). “A person acts
intentionally with respect to a material element of an offense when[,] if the
element involves the nature of his[, or her,] conduct or a result thereof, it is
his[, or her,] conscious objective to engage in conduct of that nature or to
cause such a result[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(1)(i). Thus, to intentionally
damage real or personal property of another, an individual must be
consciously aware that his or her conduct or action will result in damage and
proceed in the face of this awareness.
In granting Press’ request for habeas corpus relief, the trial court
explained,
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[Press] acted with no malice when he attempted to save his dog,
who was trap[ped] under [the residence] and being attacked by a
raccoon. The facts here are undisputed. On January 31, 2021,
[Press] was walking his dog when the dog slipped its collar and
chased a raccoon under a [residence. Press] could not get to his
dog but could hear that it was under distress and felt that it may
soon die. For the sole purpose and with the intent of rescuing his
dog, [Press] enter[ed] the [residence] through a secured window
by lifting the latch. He proceeded to break a small section of floor
and retrieved his dog, securing the [residence] as he left. [Press]
then went to a neighbor, retrieved the contact information for the
homeowner and contacted her, explaining what had just
transpired. [Press] offered to pay for damages. From these facts
we can see that [Press’] clear intent was to rescue his dog from
the raccoon. There is no malicious intent, mens rea, or evil motive
by [Press] to commit a trespass or mischief, only to save his dog.
Thus, the intent requirement for criminal trespass and criminal
mischief are not satisfied, and the Commonwealth cannot produce
evidence of each of the material elements of the crimes charged.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 5-6.
In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, as the party with the burden of proof, we find that the
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case for
criminal trespass and criminal mischief. Turning first to the criminal trespass
charge, the Commonwealth was required to demonstrate probable cause
sufficient to establish that Press entered the residence with the knowledge
that he did so without license or privilege. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 302(b)(2)(i)
and 3503(a)(1)(i). The fact that Press knew, or was consciously aware, that
he entered the residence without license or privilege may be inferred from his
manner of entry. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 477 A.2d 1342, 1348
(Pa. Super. 1984) (stating that, the fact that a defendant knew he lacked
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license or privilege to enter the building may be “inferred from the evidence
of the time and manner of his entry”); see also Commonwealth v. Benito,
133 A.3d 333, 336 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 141 A.3d 477 (Pa.
2016). The evidence presented in the case sub judice demonstrates that Press
entered the residence “through a secure[d] window by lifting the latch.” N.T.,
1/13/22, at Defense Exhibit D-2; see also N.T., 1/13/22, at 5-6 (reiterating
that Press informed the homeowner that “he went in through a window”);
N.T., 1/13/22, at 43 (agreeing that Press informed the police that he “entered
the house through a window”); Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 5 (stating,
“[Press] enter[ed] the [residence] through a secured window by lifting the
latch”). Because the window through which Press entered the residence was
secured, i.e. locked or latched, it may be inferred that Press knew, or was
consciously aware, that the homeowner intended for individuals to be
prohibited from entering the residence and that by unlocking or unlatching the
window to gain entry he was knowingly entering the residence without license
or privilege. Therefore, the Commonwealth established a prima facie case for
criminal trespass by demonstrating the requisite level of culpability, namely
that Press knowingly entered the residence without license or privilege.5
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5 We find the trial court’s requirement that the Commonwealth demonstrate
malice in order to establish a prima facie case of criminal trespass and criminal
mischief, as discussed infra, to be misplaced. See Trial Court Opinion,
1/11/23, at 5 (stating, “[Press] acted with no malice when he attempted to
save his dog”).
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As for the crime of criminal mischief, the Commonwealth was required
to demonstrate probable cause sufficient to establish that Press intentionally
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“Malice is a legal term, implying much more than ill-will, spite, or
a grudge. It comprehends not only a particular ill-will, but every
case where there is wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart,
cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of
social duty, although a particular person may not be intended to
be injured.”
Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623, 632 (Pa. 2005), citing
Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 15 (1868). We agree that “malice” is
embraced or encompassed within the culpability terms “intentionally,”
“knowingly,” and “recklessly.” See Commonwealth v. Moll, 543 A.2d 1221,
1222 (Pa. Super. 1988) (stating, “malice is [] embraced within the elements
of intent, knowledge[,] and recklessness”); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302,
Comments (stating, “The purpose of [Section 302] is to clearly define the
various mental states upon which criminal liability is to be based. Under
existing law the words “wilfully” or “maliciously” are used in many cases. []
However, these words have no settled meaning.”). In other words, if the
Commonwealth demonstrates that a person acted with malice, then the
Commonwealth has also proven that the person acted intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly. A showing of malice, however, is not required in
every instance to prove a criminal charge where the requisite level of
culpability, as defined by the statute, requires that a person acted
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. It is well-established that courts must
look to the statutorily defined criminal offense to determine the requisite level
of culpability. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 243 A.2d 511, 515 (Pa. Super.
1975) (stating that, the level of culpability that must be proven “is a matter
of construction, to be determined from the language of the statute and from
the manifest purpose and design”); see also Commonwealth v. McHale,
858 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Pa. Super. 2004) (explaining that, a showing of
“malice” is required to prove aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2702(a)(1) because the requisite level of culpability – intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly – is quantified in the statute by the phrase “extreme
indifference to the value of human life”).
Pursuant to the statutorily defined criminal offenses of criminal trespass and
criminal mischief pertinent to the case sub judice, we do not find that the
subject offenses require the Commonwealth to demonstrate malice.
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damaged the flooring of the residence. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 302(b)(2)(i) and
3304(a)(5). The evidence demonstrated that, upon entering the residence,
Press located the portion of the flooring under which the dog was trapped and,
in order to rescue the dog, he “started to break a small section of the floor.”
N.T., 1/13/22, at Defense Exhibit D-2 (emphasis added); see also N.T.,
1/13/22, at 34 (stating that, Press informed the police that he “needed to
remove the floorboards to retrieve his dog”). After rescuing the dog and
securing the residence, Press contacted the homeowner and offered to pay for
the damage he caused to the floor. N.T., 1/13/22, at 15 (stating, Press offered
to have a person repair the floor); see also N.T., 1/13/22, at 35 (stating that,
Press informed the police that he contacted the homeowner “to take care of
the damages”). It may be inferred from Press’ subsequent offer to remediate
the damage caused to the flooring that he intentionally damaged (or broke)
the flooring to rescue his dog.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law in
granting Press’ request for habeas corpus relief. Consequently, we reverse
the November 3, 2022 order granting his motion for writ of habeas corpus.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/15/2023
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