In Re: The Adoption of: D.L.S. Appeal of: C.M. ( 2023 )

J-S22032-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF: D.L.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: C.M., MOTHER :
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: No. 183 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered January 11, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County
Orphans’ Court at 34 of 2022
IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF: J.L.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: C.M., MOTHER :
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: No. 184 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered January 11, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County
Orphans’ Court at 35 of 2022
IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF: E.J.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: C.M., MOTHER :
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: No. 185 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered January 11, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County
Orphans’ Court at 036-2022
IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF: B.L.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
J-S22032-23
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APPEAL OF: C.M., MOTHER :
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: No. 186 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered January 11, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County
Orphans’ Court at 037-2022
BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: AUGUST 1, 2023
C.M. (Mother) appeals from the order granting the petition of
Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau (Agency) for termination of her
parental rights to D.L.S., J.L.S., E.J.S., and B.L.S. (Children).1 We affirm.
CASE HISTORY
The orphans’ court recounted the factual and procedural history prior to
the Agency filing the termination petition on June 1, 2022. The orphans’ court
stated:
The minor children, [D.L.S.] (born June [], 2020), [J.L.S.]
(born September [], 2018), [E.J.S.] (born September [], 2017),
and [B.L.S.] (born August [], 2016), were born to [Father] (age
36) and [Mother] (age 31). Mother has an older son named [Da.,]
who is not a party to these proceedings. The parties have never
been married.
The [Agency] began working with this family in June
of 2019, after numerous referrals were received regarding
lack of supervision, poor housing conditions, lack of
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1 The orphans’ court also terminated the parental rights of the Children’s
father, B.T.S. (Father), who has not appealed.
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discipline, and illegal drug use by Mother and Father. The
[Agency] filed a Dependency Petition on August 17, 2020, alleging
lack of supervision for the [C]hildren and illegal drug use. There
was a specific incident in which Mother had fallen asleep while the
[C]hildren were in the bathtub and emergency custody was taken.
Father was not present at the time. [Mother’s older son, Da.,]
was not at the home when emergency custody was taken and he
was not removed from [Mother’s] care.
An Adjudication and Disposition Hearing was held on August
28, 2020, and [C]hildren were found to be dependent. Mother
[was] ordered to undergo a drug and alcohol evaluation; undergo
a mental health/psychiatric evaluation and comply with any
recommended treatment; undergo random drug screens;
participate in a parenting assessment and complete any
recommended parenting instruction; participate in life skills
services; obtain and maintain stable and appropriate housing; and
secure and maintain a verifiable and legal source of income.
A Permanency Review Hearing was held on February 8,
2021. Mother was found to have moderate compliance with
the permanency plan[, yet] minimal progress towards
alleviating the circumstances which le[]d to [C]hildren’s
placement. …
[Mother was] ordered to continue drug and alcohol
treatment; comply with random drug screens; continue mental
health treatment; participate in a parenting assessment;
participate in parenting instruction; maintain adequate housing
and employment; and participate in life skills services.
A Permanency Review Hearing was held on August 9, 2021.
Mother had substantial compliance with the permanency
plan[, yet] made minimal progress towards reunification.
Mother was successfully discharged from [Southwestern
Pennsylvania Human Services (SPHS),] and did a parenting
assessment. The assessment showed Mother was at high risk for
child maltreatment due to her high distress. Mother received
hands-on parenting [support] at visits and continued to struggle
with nutrition and supervision. Mother lost housing during the
review period and moved into a three-bedroom apartment. While
Mother did not provide documenta[tion] of mental health
treatment, she was reportedly attending Kreinbrook for
treatment. … Providers reported that [Mother] made no
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substantial progress with [] parenting skills during the review
period. [Mother was] ordered to continue with the previously
court-ordered services.
A third Permanency Review Hearing was held on February
14, 2022. Mother had moderate compliance with the
permanency plan[, yet] made minimal progress towards
reunification. Providers were concerned for Mother’s marijuana
use, although she had a medical marijuana card. Mother regularly
attended visits and treatment. … Monitored visits were attempted
but went back to supervised because of safety concerns and the
visits being chaotic. [Mother] continued to struggle with
understanding, retaining and implementing parenting instruction.
…
[Mother] continued to have supervised visits three times a
week with the Children’s Institute; parenting and life skills through
the Children’s Institute; and couples counseling through Catholic
Charities. [Mother was] ordered to continue all previously court-
ordered services until successful completion.
The fourth Permanency Review Hearing was held on May 16,
2022. Mother had substantial compliance with the
permanency plan[, yet] made minimal progress towards
reunification. Mother continued to receive drug and alcohol
treatment and participate in parenting sessions. Mother had a
mental health evaluation and was recommended weekly therapy.
She continued to struggle with retaining parenting
information and there were numerous safety concerns over
the review period. …
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 3-6 (emphasis added).
On June 1, 2022, the Agency petitioned for termination of Mother’s
parental rights. The Agency also petitioned for termination of Father’s
parental rights. The orphans’ court held a termination hearing as to both
parents over the course of five days, on October 6, 20, and 28, 2022,
November 22, 2022, and December 9, 2022.
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On January 11, 2023, the orphans’ court entered an opinion and order
terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights. As noted, Father did not
appeal. Mother timely filed a notice of appeal at each of the four Children’s
dockets, as well as a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. On
February 13, 2023, the orphans’ court filed an order stating the “rationale
behind the [orphans’ c]ourt’s Order can be found in the Order of Termination
filed on January 11, 2023.” Order Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). This Court
consolidated the appeals sua sponte on February 27, 2023.
ISSUES
Mother presents the following eight questions:
I. Whether the Honorable Trial Court erred in finding by clear
and convincing evidence that the moving party met its
burden as to terminating the parental rights of Mother under
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)[?]
II. Whether the Honorable Trial Court erred in finding by clear
and convincing evidence that the moving party met its
burden as to terminating the parental rights of Mother under
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)(5)[?]
III. Whether the Honorable Trial Court erred in finding by clear
and convincing evidence that the moving party met its
burden as to terminating the parental rights of Mother under
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8)[?]
IV. Whether the Honorable Trial Court erred in finding by clear
and convincing evidence that the moving party met its
burden under 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(b) that the best interests of
the Child are met by terminating Mother’s parental rights[?]
V. Whether the Honorable Trial Court erred in terminating
Mother’s parental rights despite the establishment of a bond
between Mother and Child, and despite the fact that many
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of the conditions which led to removal of the Child have been
alleviated by Mother[?]
VI. Whether the Honorable Trial Court erred in terminating
Mother’s parental rights, despite Mother’s consistently high
level of compliance with Court-Ordered services throughout
the history of the case[?]
VII. Whether the Honorable Trial Court erred in terminating
Mother’s parental rights to child[ren,] B.L.S. and J.L.S.,
given that the [Agency] proffered testimony by its lone
expert witness stating that he could not recommend
termination of [Mother’s] rights to B.L.S. and J.L.S[?]
VIII. Whether the Honorable Trial Court erred in terminating
Mother’s parental rights, given the Agency’s failure to
provide Court-Ordered [Parent/Child Interactional Therapy
(PCIT)] for child B.L.S[?]
Mother’s Brief at 4-5.
In her argument, Mother combines her eight questions into three issues.
See Mother’s Brief at 26, 45, 49. Like Mother and the Agency, we address
Mother’s issues as follows:
I. [Whether t]he Agency met its burden by clear and
convincing evidence that Mother’s parental rights should be
terminated under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), or
(a)(8)[?]
II. [Whether t]he Agency met its burden by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental
rights would be in the best interests of [C]hildren under 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)[?]
III. [Whether the Orphans’] Court … err[ed] in terminating
Mother’s parental rights to Children B.L.S. and J.L.S. given
that the Agency proffered testimony by its lone expert
witness[, Dr. Neil Rosenblum,] recommending PCIT therapy
for two of the Children, and] stating that he could not
recommend termination of [Mother’s] rights to B.L.S. and
J.L.S.[?]
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Id.; Agency’s Brief at ii.2
Mother argues the Agency failed to establish clear and convincing
evidence to support termination. Mother’s Brief at 25. She maintains the
evidence was not clear and convincing because: “All parties, service providers,
evaluation providers, and the [orphans’ c]ourt agree that Mother performed
virtually all the services and evaluations that were asked of her or ordered by
the [c]ourt.” Id.
Conversely, the Agency argues:
Although [Mother] was found to have moderate and later
substantial compliance with the permanency plan at each
Permanency Review Hearing, she was found to have made
minimal progress in alleviating the circumstances which
necessitated the original placement[,] as she displayed numerous
parenting deficits in nutrition, supervision, and safety.
Agency’s Brief at 3.
We review the termination of parental rights for an abuse of discretion.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012).
[O]ur standard of review requires [us to] accept the findings of
fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported,
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2 Children’s guardian ad litem, Emily K. Trisoline, Esquire, has advised of her
“joinder in the Brief of the [Agency].” Letter, 5/3/23. Attorney Trisoline
stated she would “not be submitting an independent brief for consideration.”
Id.Andrew F. Skala, Esquire, the attorney representing the legal interests of two
of the Children, advised he would “not be filing an Answer to [Counsel’s] Brief
for Appellant.” Letter, 5/5/23. Attorney Skala stated that his decision “should
not be construed as a concurrence or concession to [Mother’s] position.” Id.-7-
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appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an
abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
court might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
As [the Supreme Court] discussed in In re: R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179,
1190 (Pa. 2010)], there are clear reasons for applying an abuse
of discretion standard of review …. [U]nlike trial courts, appellate
courts are not equipped to make fact-specific determinations on a
cold record, where trial judges are observing the parties during
the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.
Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result,
as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an
appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court
and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment;
instead, we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual
findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal
conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of
discretion.
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27 (some citations omitted). The petitioner
has the burden to provide clear and convincing evidence that its asserted
grounds for termination are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.
Super. 2009).
I. Section 2511(a) – Grounds for Termination
Mother argues the orphans’ court erred in terminating her parental
rights under Subsections 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8). We need only agree with
the orphans’ court as to any one Subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as
Subsection (b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
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banc). Instantly, we examine Mother’s challenge under Subsection
2511(a)(2). Subsection 2511(a)(2) provides for termination when:
The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental
care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).
To satisfy these requirements, the petitioner must prove “(1) repeated
and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental
care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In re A.H., 247 A.3d 439,
443 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). Grounds for termination “are not
limited to affirmative misconduct, but concern parental incapacity that
cannot be remedied.” Id. (emphasis added).
In addressing Subsection 2511(a)(2), Mother assails the credibility of
Alicia Gilbert, a service provider with the Children’s Institute, who “testified
that she continues to have safety concerns for the children.” Mother’s Brief
at 35. Mother states:
Ms. Gilbert relied on alleged safety incidents which happened
months prior to the filing of the termination petitions[, and]
testified that she does not have current safety concerns, but then
clarified that it is only because the visits are supervised and
interventions can quickly be made by service providers.
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Mother references the testimony of Nacia Gibbs, a service provider with
the Bair Foundation, who supervised Mother’s visits between October and
December 2022. Mother claims Ms. Gibbs “has been noting progress on
Mother’s part, [which] calls into question Ms. Gilbert’s testimony.” Id. at 36.
She adds that “Ms. Gilbert’s credibility is further compromised by some of her
nit-picking comments and testimony.” Id.
Mother emphasizes that “Ms. Gibbs did not note any safety concerns for
[C]hildren or any issues with [Mother’s] manner of parenting” during the four
visits she supervised. Id. at 37. According to Mother, Ms. Gilbert’s successor,
Ms. Sluka, “agreed the visits were fine and there were no safety issues.” Id.
at 37-38. Mother states, “even if this Honorable Court would conclude that
the [orphans’ c]ourt was correct in its assessment that safety or supervisory
concerns are ongoing, the testimony of Ms. Gibbs clearly establishes that
Mother is very close to remedying any deficiency.” Id. at 39.
The Agency responds that although Mother complied with her
permanency plans, “she was found to have made minimal progress in
alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original
placement[,] as she displayed numerous parenting deficits in
nutrition, supervision, and safety.” Agency’s Brief at 3 (emphasis added).
The orphans’ court, referencing the expert testimony of psychologist
Neil Rosenblum, observed:
Dr. Rosenblum diagnosed Mother with depression, anxiety,
and cannabis use disorder, among other diagnoses. She exhibited
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borderline personality traits and struggles developing a personal
identity. Dr. Rosenblum does not believe Mother has made
significant progress with her mental health and she is struggling
to cope with her current situation.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 10.
The orphans’ court further explained:
Children were removed from the care of [Mother] in August of
2020, when an Agency caseworker came to the home and the
Children were running water in the bathtub while Mother was
asleep. …
Throughout the Children’s placement, safety issues have
continued to be noted almost regularly. [Mother] progressed to
monitored visits for a short period of time on two occasions but
reverted back to supervised visits because of the safety concerns.
Even after service providers assisted [Mother] with child-proofing
the[] home, safety concerns continued.
Providers repeatedly saw the Children run away from
[Mother] and run near the steps inside or outside of the home.
The Children would pick things up off the ground and put them in
their mouths. The Children suffered minor injuries during visits,
such as [E.J.S.] getting a small burn from the oven. Providers
witnessed [J.L.S.] push [E.J.S.] off the top bunk bed and [D.L.S.]
fall from his highchair. There were several near falling, burning,
or choking incidents. On one occasion, the television almost fell
on [D.L.S.] and had to be stopped by a service provider. A visit
which occurred on April 18, 2022, ended early after providers
found a marijuana roach on the couch. During a monitored visit,
the Children were permitted to urinate outside and run around
naked.
… While visits have improved in the past few months, the
improvement could be attributable to the visits occurring at the
Children’s Institute as opposed to Mother’s residence. Visits also
appear to be less chaotic when the Children’s visits are split up
and all five children are not together. … [Mother has]
demonstrated inappropriate parenting skills even when there are
fewer Children present.
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Additionally, nutrition has been an ongoing issue. There
were numerous visits at which [E.J.S.] was given candy or food
that she cannot have due to her dental work. …
***
Mother [has] demonstrated a repeated and continued
incapacity which has caused the Children to be without essential
parental care and control necessary for their well-being. Service
providers have discussed supervision and safety with [Mother] on
numerous occasions, yet visits have continued to be chaotic since
the Children were removed. Even recently in October [2022],
Nacia Gibbs had to intervene and redirect [Mother].
Mother has not demonstrated the ability to routinely and
adequately supervise all four Children. Despite the lengthy
testimony regarding the safety concerns witnessed by providers,
Mother testified that she does not believe there are major
concerns during visits …. Mother clearly does not understand the
severity of the safety issues witnessed during visits. … Thus, it
is unlikely that this incapacity will be remedied by Mother[.]
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 35-37.
The record supports the orphans’ court’s determination that Mother’s
repeated and continued incapacity to parent has caused Children to be without
essential parental care that cannot or will not be remedied, as provided in
Subsection 2511(a)(2). We must “accept the [orphans’ court’s] findings of
fact and credibility determinations … so long as the factual findings are
supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of
an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d
at 826-27. Accordingly, Mother’s argument regarding grounds for terminating
her parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) does not merit relief.
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II. Section 2511(b) – Needs and Welfare
If the court determines termination is warranted under Subsection
2511(a), it must then consider Children’s needs and welfare:
The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs
and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical
care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. …
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
This Court has stated repeatedly that “[i]ntangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and
welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(citation omitted). The orphans’ court “must also discern the nature and
status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child
of permanently severing that bond.” Id. (citation omitted). The court “should
consider the importance of continuity of relationships and whether any
existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the
child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011). Nonetheless,
in cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a
parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.
Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis
necessarily depends on the circumstances of the
particular case.
Importantly, the question is not merely whether a bond
exists, but whether termination would destroy this
existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.
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In re A.H., 247 A.3d at 444–45 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
Mother argues the Agency “did not present sufficient evidence and the
[orphans’ c]ourt did not make specific findings of the impact on [C]hildren of
the severing of these important and beneficial bonds.” Mother’s Brief at 25.
Mother states there “is obviously a bond between [Mother] and [C]hildren.”
Id. at 47. According to Mother, Dr. Rosenblum “noted many of the same bond
type behaviors between [Mother] and [C]hildren when he performed his two
interactional evaluations ….” Id. She states, “all the visitation supervisors
who testified concede that [C]hildren interact with [Mother] at visits, are
excited to see [Mother], and give hugs and kisses to [her].” Id. Mother
emphasizes that E.J.S., B.L.S. and J.L.S. expressed their desire “to return
home to” Mother. Id. at 46. Finally, Mother claims the orphans’ court “should
have addressed … the severing of the bond between the four [C]hildren and
their brother D.[a.].” Id. at 48.
The Agency argues otherwise. Agency’s Brief at 21-26; id. at 22 (citing
In re Adoption of G.R.L., 26 A.3d 1124, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating
“although the preservation of the family is the desired outcome … the goal of
preserving the family unit cannot be elevated above all other factors when
considering the best interests of the child[ren], but must be weighed in
conjunction with other factors.”)). The Agency cites Dr. Rosenblum’s
testimony in asserting: “While there may be a bond between [Mother] and the
Children, the need for stability, safety and permanency is more important than
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any bond between a parent and a child.” Agency’s Brief at 26; id. at 22-26
(discussing Dr. Rosenblum’s testimony about his assessment of the Children’s
emotional, developmental and educational needs, and their attachment to
Mother and their foster parents).
The parties agree that Children have been dependent and in the custody
of the Agency for approximately three years. See Mother’s Brief at 7 (stating
the “4 children were placed into Agency custody on or about August 3,
2020.”); Agency’s Brief at 3 (stating Children “were adjudicated dependent on
August 28, 2020”). In considering Children’s needs and welfare, the orphans’
court opined:
Terminating parental rights is in the Children’s best interests
and supports the developmental, physical and emotional needs
and welfare of the Children. The Children are in need of
permanency and the possibility of reunification in the near future
is minimal. While [B.L.S.] and [J.L.S.] have been placed in
multiple foster homes, their developmental, physical and
emotional needs cannot be met by [Mother]. [E.J.S.] and [D.J.S.]
are bonded with their foster family and removing them from this
family would not be in their best interests.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 44.3
The orphans’ court noted the “limited testimony” of the two older
children, B.L.S. and E.J.S., who were ages 6 and 5 at the time of the hearing.4
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3 The Agency points out that B.L.S. and J.L.S. were placed in a pre-adoptive
foster home on November 6, 2022. See Agency’s Brief at 26 (record citation
omitted) (stating, “To date, [] B.L.S. and J.L.S. remain in that pre-adoptive
foster home and they are thriving as well.”).
4 J.L.S., age 4, and D.L.S., age 2, did not testify.
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Id. at 24. The court relayed that B.L.S. enjoyed visits with Mother and “felt
sad when visits are over”; the court stated that E.J.S. “feels sad when leaving
visits but is happy to go back to her foster mother.” Id.
Pertinently, the orphans’ court explained:
[Mother has] remained unable to adequately provide for the
developmental needs of the Children. While none of the Children
are currently school-aged, various service providers were
concerned that the Children were developmentally delayed when
they came into placement. While Mother … took [E.J.S.] to her
hematology appointments and facilitated her blood transfusion
prior to placement, providers have concerns that [Mother does]
not fully understand the extent of [E.J.S.’s] medical issues.
During the evaluation with Dr. Rosenblum, [Mother] said [E.J.S.]
had no developmental delays, which was inaccurate. …
[E.J.S.] and [D.L.S.] were both developmentally delayed
when they came into the care of the[ir pre-adoptive foster
parents,] and [the foster mother] taught [E.J.S.] sign language to
assist with her communication. The [foster parents] had [D.L.S.]
in physical therapy and occupational therapy to help his fine motor
coordination. [Foster mother] uses educational games and
activities to promote the Children’s learning. Throughout their
placement with [foster parents], [E.J.S.’s] speech has greatly
improved and [D.L.S.] has made developmental progress. …
[E.J.S.] has medical appointments regularly and sees an
audiologist multiple times a year for her hearing aids. The [foster
parents] have texted Mother and let her know about appointments
but Mother has only attended one of these appointments. The
[foster parents] have consistently worked with [E.J.S.] in a way
that is appropriate for her development and they regularly take
her to all appointments. Mother has failed to fully understand
[E.J.S.’s] developmental needs and has not attended medical
appointments that would shed light on [E.J.S.’s] development.
[E.J.S.] and [D.L.S.] have a strong bond to the [foster]
family and it would be detrimental to their wellbeing if they were
removed from their foster home. Various service providers have
reported that [E.J.S.] is extremely attached to foster mother, and
literally clings to her around others. [E.J.S.] and [D.L.S.] call the
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[foster parents] “mommy” and “daddy.” They often seek [the
foster parents] for comfort and affection. [D.L.S.] was placed with
[foster parents] when he was only a few months old. Dr.
Rosenblum’s opinion was that [D.L.S.] would not remember living
with [Mother].
[B.L.S.] and [J.L.S.] have been placed in multiple foster
homes since they were removed from [Mother]. When the boys
were evaluated by Dr. Rosenblum, he concluded that their
behavioral problems were due to a lack of permanency since the
boys, particularly [B.L.S.], were having trouble understanding
their identity within a foster home that was not pre-adoptive. The
boys have continued to exhibit behavioral issues … [J.L.S.] and
[B.L.S.] need a permanent home, as they are at risk for having
adjustment disorder and it is unlikely that reunification will occur
in the near future since [Mother has] not made meaningful
progress and ha[s] not progressed past monitored visits.
Additionally, [J.L.S.] has had to undergo some medical
testing in the past year to determine his development. While the
foster parents let Mother know when these medical appointments
are scheduled for, [she has not] attended medical appointments
for [J.L.S.] or [B.L.S.] since their removal.
[Mother] clearly love[s] Children. There is affection
witnessed by providers at every visit and [Mother] regularly tell[s]
Children that [she] love[s] them. The Children seem to enjoy
visits and spending time with [Mother]. There are also times when
the Children want visits to end early or ask to be returned to their
foster parents. When the Children were first removed from
[Mother’s] care, [E.J.S.] asked on at least two occasions if she
could go back home [to Mother]. However, various service
providers, including Dr. Rosenblum, believe [E.J.S.] and [D.L.S.]
are now strongly attached to their foster parents. [E.J.S.] often
asks [foster mother] if she [has] to go to visits [with Mother] and
has behavioral issues before and after visits.
The Supreme Court has previously observed that “[c]hildren
are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation
to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail ...
the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.”
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 269 (Pa. 2013). While there may
be some bond between [Mother] and [the] Children, the
need for stability, safety, and permanency lead this [c]ourt
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to terminate parental rights [under Subsection 2511(b)].
Id. at 42-44 (emphasis added).
The record supports the orphans’ court’s analysis and refutes Mother’s
claim that the court did not consider the bond between Mother and the
Children. Although the court did not address Mother’s older son, Da.,
specifically, the record reflects the court’s proper consideration of the evidence
and law in finding that termination was warranted under Section 2511(b).
III. Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights to B.L.S. and J.L.S.
Mother argues the orphans’ court improperly terminated her parental
rights to B.L.S. and J.L.S. because “the lone expert witness[, Dr. Rosenblum,]
who offered an opinion on termination[,] opined that [Mother’s] rights to
B.L.S. and J.L.S. should not be terminated ….” Mother’s Brief at 51. Mother
states:
Dr. Rosenblum was called by the Agency as its witness and his
testimony was presented during the case-in-chief of the Agency.
By presenting in its case-in-chief evidence which is contrary to its
ultimate position on its petitions for termination, the Agency is
bound by Dr. Rosenblum’s admission, and termination with regard
to B.L.S. and D.L.S. [sic] must be denied.
Id. at 50.
Mother acknowledges that when Dr. Rosenblum testified, he could not
“make a recommendation that [Mother’s] rights be terminated … to B.L.S. and
J.L.S. … because at the time of his evaluation[s], these 2 children were
not in a secure pre-adoptive foster home.” Mother’s Brief at 11 (citing
N.T., 10/6/22, at 66-67, 107, 108) (emphasis added). Mother ignores Dr.
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Rosenblum’s testimony that Mother “was very compromised in [her] mental
functioning,” and “not any closer to being successfully reunited” with Children.
N.T., 10/6/22, at 84. Dr. Rosenblum concluded that the “major obstacle to
reunification is [Mother’s] lack of significant progress with mental health and
substance abuse concerns,” as well as deficient parenting skills. Id. at 80.
Dr. Rosenblum added that “parenting skills alone are not what is preventing
reunification. It’s [M]other continuing to display concerning problems in [her]
personal adjustment, mental health functioning, and dependence on drugs.”
Id.
Dr. Rosenblum recognized “it’s the [c]ourt’s decision on how the [c]ourt
chooses to rule ….” N.T., 10/6/22, at 66. He then opined, “with a full degree
of psychological certainty, that the needs and welfare of [E.J.S.] and [D.L.S.]
would be best met by the [c]ourt considering termination of parental rights
and the ensuing adoption of the children by their foster parents.” Id. As to
B.L.S. and J.L.S., Dr. Rosenblum could not recommend termination because
at the time of his evaluations, “they were not in a secure foster home that
was committed to meeting their needs on a permanent basis.” Id. Dr.
Rosenblum added that he had “no idea where two of the children were placed
[after April 2022], namely B.L.S. and J.L.S.” Id. at 79. Dr. Rosenblum had
recommended B.L.S. “be placed in a pre-adoptive foster home.” Id. at 116.
He explained:
The law may not require it, but in terms of a psychological
assessment, which I am being asked to offer the [c]ourt, in my
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clinical opinion, I would very rarely offer a recommendation for
termination of parental rights, unless I was confident that an
alternative placement was proven to be working for the child.
Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
As the orphans’ court stated:
Following the evaluations in 2022, Dr. Rosenblum
recommended … [B.L.S.] and [J.L.S.] be moved to a pre-adoptive
home and [B.L.S.] participate in PCIT with [Mother]. Dr.
Rosenblum did not believe reunification could occur for [J.L.S.]
and [B.L.S.] in the near future. While reunification was still
possible[,] … Dr. Rosenblum believed [Mother] would have to
demonstrate great improvement in several areas before
reunification could be a realistic possibility. PCIT was
recommended since [Mother was] not making progress and
needed a greater understanding of [B.L.S.’s] behavioral problems.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 12-13.
Mother claims the orphans’ court erred in terminating her rights to
B.L.S., “given the Agency’s failure to provide Court-Ordered PCIT therapy.”
Mother’s Brief at 5. This claim is belied by Dr. Rosenblum’s testimony that he
recommended PCIT for Mother and B.L.S., “but as I’ve said multiple times
now, that’s not the intervention that’s critical in terms of leading toward
reunification.” N.T., 10/6/22, at 109. Dr. Rosenblum repeated, “as I’ve said
now many times, critical intervention has to be mental health functioning of
[Mother].” Id. at 110.
We are also unpersuaded by Mother’s claim that the court failed to
properly consider the wishes of B.L.S. and J.L.S., who “clearly expressed …
that they wished to return home and be reunited with” Mother. Mother’s Brief
at 50. Mother concedes B.L.S. and J.L.S. were “ages 6 and 4 respectively,
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and typically their testimony may not be given a lot of weight by the courts.”
Id. Nonetheless, she states “it is important for the [orphans’ c]ourt to
consider that these 2 children have consistently held this position.” Id. at 50-
51. As indicated above, D.L.S. did not testify at the hearing, and the orphans’
court considered the “limited testimony” of B.L.S. See Orphans’ Court
Opinion, 1/11/23, at 24. The court also considered other witness testimony
regarding the Children’s communications, behavior, and interactions with
Mother. See id. at 43-44. Our review reveals no error.
For the reasons discussed above, we discern no error or abuse of
discretion by the orphans’ court. We therefore affirm the order terminating
Mother’s parental rights to Children D.L.S., J.L.S., E.J.S., and B.L.S.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/1/2023
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