Com. v. Ford, H. ( 2019 )


Menu:
  • J-A13043-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee               :
    v.                             :
    :
    HAROLD FRANKLIN FORD,                    :
    :
    Appellant              :   No. 110 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 5, 2018
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0003457-2002
    BEFORE:        SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:                         FILED JULY 1, 2019
    Harold Franklin Ford (Appellant) appeals pro se from the December 5,
    2018 order dismissing his petition to strike judgment as an untimely-filed
    petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-
    9546. We affirm.
    On December 18, 2002, a jury convicted [Appellant] of
    robbery and conspiracy based upon his participation in a June
    2002 robbery at a hotel in Chester County. On June 30, 2003,
    the trial court sentenced [Appellant] to a mandatory minimum
    term of 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment, pursuant to
    [subsection] 9714(a)(2), for his robbery conviction, concluding
    the conviction was [Appellant’s] “third strike” under the law.
    [Appellant’s] judgment of sentence was affirmed by this Court
    on direct appeal, and the Supreme Court subsequently denied
    his petition for review on April 19, 2005. See Commonwealth
    v. Ford, 
    859 A.2d 829
    [] (Pa. Super. 2004) (unpublished
    memorandum), appeal denied, 
    872 A.2d 1198
    (Pa. 2005). On
    May 2, 2005, Ford filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition. Counsel
    was appointed and filed an amended petition, which the PCRA
    court ultimately dismissed on May 29, 2007. This Court affirmed
    the PCRA court’s order on appeal, and, once again, the Supreme
    Court     denied   [Appellant’s]   petition for  review.    See
    *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A13043-19
    Commonwealth v. Ford, 
    947 A.2d 1251
    (Pa. Super. 2008),
    appeal denied, 
    959 A.2d 319
    (Pa. 2008).
    Thereafter, [Appellant] filed multiple pro se petitions
    seeking PCRA relief, none of which [was] successful.
    Commonwealth v. Ford, 
    192 A.3d 248
    (Pa. Super. 2018) (unpublished
    memorandum at *1).
    Most recently, Appellant filed the petition at issue herein on October
    25, 2018. Although styled as a petition to strike judgment, the PCRA court
    treated the October 25, 2018 filing as Appellant’s sixth PCRA petition.1 On
    November 7, 2018, the PCRA court filed a notice of intent to dismiss the
    petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant did not
    respond, and the petition was dismissed on December 5, 2018.
    On December 17, 2018, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.2,3 On
    appeal, Appellant challenges the legality of his sentence. Appellant’s Brief at
    1 Because Appellant’s claims implicate the legality of his sentence, his issues
    were cognizable under the PCRA and therefore, the PCRA court properly
    considered Appellant’s filing as a PCRA petition.    See Commonwealth v.
    Beck, 
    848 A.2d 987
    , 989 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“Issues concerning the legality
    of sentence are cognizable under the PCRA.”).
    2
    Appellant’s notice of appeal lists the “November 7, 2018 order of
    dismissal[,]” as the order from which he appeals. See Pro Se Notice of
    Appeal, 12/17/2018 (emphasis and unnecessary capitalization omitted).
    However, as 
    noted supra
    , the November order was merely a notice of the
    PCRA court’s intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition, and thus was a non-
    final, non-appealable order.  On this basis, the PCRA court urges this Court
    to quash Appellant’s appeal. See PCRA Court Opinion, 1/10/2019, at 1 n.1
    (“I respectfully suggest that this appeal is taken from a non-final, non-
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -2-
    J-A13043-19
    5 (unnumbered). Specifically, Appellant avers he is entitled to relief because
    the trial court improperly sentenced Appellant as a “third-strike” offender
    when (1) he was never sentenced as a second-strike offender, and (2) his
    prior convictions did not meet the statutory requirements to qualify as first
    or second strikes. 
    Id. We begin
    our review mindful of the following.
    Under the PCRA, all petitions must be filed within one year of the date
    that the petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final, unless one of three
    statutory exceptions under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) applies. 42 Pa.C.S.
    § 9545(b)4; Commonwealth v. Chester, 
    895 A.2d 520
    , 522 (Pa. 2006).
    “The PCRA’s time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature.”     
    Chester, 895 A.2d at 522
    . “Thus, ‘[i]f a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court nor
    (Footnote Continued)   _______________________
    appealable order.”). Notably, Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed after the
    actual order of dismissal was filed.
    Considering Appellant’s reference to the November 7th order as the
    “order of dismissal,” it appears Appellant mistakenly listed the November
    order instead of the PCRA court’s December 5, 2018 order which did dismiss
    Appellant’s petition. Regardless, this apparent error is of no consequence,
    as Appellant’s timely-filed notice of appeal invoked this Court’s jurisdiction.
    See Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    106 A.3d 583
    (Pa. 2014) (holding that a
    timely notice of appeal, irrespective if it is otherwise defective, triggers the
    jurisdiction of the appellate court).
    3
    Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    4
    There are also time restrictions on when a petitioner must file a petition
    after a time-bar-exception claim has arisen. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
    On October 24, 2018, the General Assembly amended subsection 9545(b)(2)
    in order to extend the time for filing a petition from 60 days to one year
    from the date the claim could have been presented. See 2018
    Pa.Legis.Serv.Act 2018-146 (S.B. 915), effective December 24, 2018.
    -3-
    J-A13043-19
    the trial court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we
    simply do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims.’”
    
    Id. (quoting Commonwealth
    v. Lambert, 
    884 A.2d 848
    , 851 (Pa. 2005)).
    Moreover, “[t]hough not technically waivable, a legality [of sentence] claim
    may nevertheless be lost should it be raised ... in an untimely PCRA petition
    for which no time-bar exception applies, thus depriving the court of
    jurisdiction over the claim.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 
    102 A.3d 988
    , 995-
    96 (Pa. Super. 2014).
    “For purposes of [the PCRA], a judgment [of sentence] becomes final
    at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
    Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
    or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.”              42 Pa.C.S.
    § 9545(b)(3). In this case, our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition
    for allowance of appeal on April 19, 2005.      Thus, Appellant’s October 25,
    2018 petition is facially untimely.
    Nevertheless, we may consider an untimely-filed PCRA petition if
    Appellant pleaded and proved one of the three exceptions set forth in 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).   In his brief on appeal, Appellant asserts the
    governmental-interference and newly-discovered evidence exceptions found
    at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i) (providing an exception where “the failure to
    raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government
    officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or
    -4-
    J-A13043-19
    laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States”
    and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (providing an exception where “the facts
    upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could
    not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence”).           Appellant’s
    Brief   at   8.    In   support   of   the   latter   exception,   Appellant   cites
    Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 
    74 A.3d 228
    (Pa. Super. 2014) and
    Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 
    107 A.3d 735
    (Pa. 2014). Appellant’s Brief
    at 8.
    Initially, we note that “although this Court is willing to construe
    liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers
    no special benefit upon an appellant.” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 
    833 A.2d 245
    , 251-52 (Pa. Super. 2003). “This Court will not act as counsel and will
    not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.”            Commonwealth v.
    Tchirkow, 
    160 A.3d 798
    , 804 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
    “It is Appellant’s obligation to sufficiently develop arguments in
    his brief by applying the relevant law to the facts of the case,
    persuade this Court that there were errors below, and convince
    us relief is due because of those errors. If an appellant does not
    do so, we may find the argument waived.”
    Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 
    981 A.2d 274
    , 284 (Pa. Super. 2009). Here, the
    argument section of Appellant’s brief is underdeveloped and incoherent at
    times. Likewise, this section is difficult to follow due to Appellant’s failure to
    divide his argument section “into as many parts as there are questions to be
    -5-
    J-A13043-19
    argued.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119. In light of the foregoing, we find Appellant’s issues
    waived.
    Regardless, even if Appellant did not waive his issues on appeal, he
    would still not be entitled to relief.   Notably, this Court has previously
    determined that Appellant’s reliance on Armstrong did not constitute a
    newly discovered fact. 
    Ford, 947 A.2d at 1255
    .
    Although [Appellant] does not explicitly invoke any of the
    time for filing exceptions, he does imply that he is entitled to
    relief based upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in
    
    [Armstrong, 107 A.3d at 735
    ]. In that case, the Supreme
    Court affirmed, without further opinion, the decision of this
    Court, which held that a defendant cannot be sentenced under
    the third strike provision of Section 9714, when his second strike
    offense was committed before he was convicted and sentenced
    as a first strike offender, and, therefore, the defendant had no
    opportunity to reform. See [Armstrong, 74 A.3d[ at 241–242]
    We conclude the Armstrong decision does not provide
    [Appellant] with relief. First, it is well-settled that judicial
    decisions do not equate to “newly discovered facts” pursuant to
    the exception set forth in [subs]ection 9545(b)(1)(ii). … [E]ven if
    Armstrong did provide [Appellant] with a basis for relief, his
    present petition was not filed within 60 days of the Supreme
    Court’s decision as required by [subs]ection 9545(b)(2). See 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2) (“Any petition invoking an exception
    provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the
    date the claim could have been presented.”). Therefore,
    [Appellant] has failed to invoke a timing exception based on
    Armstrong.
    Ford, 
    192 A.3d 248
    (unpublished memorandum at *2).
    Additionally, with respect to Appellant’s government interference
    claim, related to his previous counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness, it is well
    settled that claims related to      defense counsel “do      not qualify    [as
    -6-
    J-A13043-19
    governmental interference] due to the specific provision in 42 Pa.C.S.
    § 9545(b)(4) that the term ‘government officials’ does not include defense
    counsel.” Commonwealth v. Pursell, 
    749 A.2d 911
    , 916 (Pa. 2000). See
    also   42   Pa.C.S.     § 9545(b)(4)     (“For   purposes    of     this   subchapter,
    ‘government officials’ shall not include defense counsel, whether appointed
    or retained.”).     Thus, Appellant has failed to plead and prove that either
    exception applies.
    Moreover, this Court previously           concluded   that,    irrespective   of
    Appellant’s failure to meet a timeliness exception, Appellant’s legality claims
    are meritless. See 
    Ford, 947 A.2d at 1255
    ; Ford, 192 A.3d at *3.
    [Appellant] raised a virtually identical claim in the appeal
    from the denial of his first PCRA petition. Specifically, he argued
    “because he was never sentenced as a second strike offender
    pursuant to section 9714, he cannot be sentenced as a third
    strike offender.” 
    Ford, supra
    , 947 A.2d at 1254. A panel of this
    Court rejected this claim as follows:
    [T]he Commonwealth’s Sentencing Memorandum
    filed on June 17, 2003, in support of its Notice of
    Intent to Invoke Mandatory Minimum Sentencing
    Provisions, provides clear proof that [Appellant’s]
    prior convictions satisfy the mandates of both
    [Commonwealth v.] Shiffler[, 
    879 A.2d 185
    (Pa.
    2005),] and section 9714. Specifically, our review of
    the Commonwealth’s sentencing memorandum
    reveals the following:
    1. On September 20, 1974, in case nos.
    148–73 and 186–73, [Appellant] pled
    guilty to, inter alia, the charge of robbery
    while armed and robbery, respectively,
    and was sentenced to two concurrent
    terms     of     four    to   eight    years
    imprisonment.
    -7-
    J-A13043-19
    2. On September 11, 1979, in case no.
    1199–78, [Appellant] was sentenced to
    24 months to 59 months imprisonment
    following his conviction of, inter alia,
    robbery.
    3. On December 20, 1991, in case no.
    2883–88, [Appellant] was sentenced to
    four to ten years imprisonment following
    his conviction of robbery.
    Commonwealth’s        Sentencing        Memorandum,
    06/17/03, Exhibits A, B, C, D.
    Clearly, the record contradicts [Appellant’s] assertion
    that the requirements for a third strike offender were
    not established. Specifically, the record reflects that
    [Appellant] was sentenced for crimes of violence on
    three occasions prior to the instant offense, and
    given intervening opportunities to reform, of which
    he clearly failed to take advantage. As noted by the
    learned trial judge, [Appellant’s] current robbery
    conviction actually represents his fourth strike.
    Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s
    imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence
    pursuant to [sub]section 9714(a)(2).
    
    Ford, supra
    , 947 A.2d at 1255.
    Ford, 
    192 A.3d 248
    (unpublished memorandum at *3). (some citations and
    unnecessary capitalization omitted). Thus, this Court has already reviewed
    and addressed Appellant’s issues concerning his status as a third-strike
    offender, as well as Appellant’s prior convictions to support the imposition of
    a mandatory minimum sentence and determined that these claims were
    without merit.     It is well-settled that previously litigated claims are not
    -8-
    J-A13043-19
    cognizable under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 
    18 A.3d 244
    ,
    260 (Pa. 2011).
    Based upon the foregoing, we conclude Appellant’s petition was
    untimely   filed,   he   did   not   satisfy   an   exception   to   the   timeliness
    requirements, and his legality claims were previously litigated.           Thus, the
    PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review his petition, and he is not entitled to
    relief.5
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/1/19
    5
    Lastly, we note that Appellant attempts to raise ineffective-assistance-of-
    counsel claims for the first time on appeal. Appellant’s Brief at 7-8. Without
    addressing whether these claims meet a timeliness exception, because these
    issues were not raised in Appellant’s pro se petition before the PCRA court,
    they are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower
    court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
    -9-