Com. v. Johnson, W. ( 2019 )


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  • J-A02044-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    WILLIAM A. JOHNSON                         :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 693 MDA 2018
    Appeal from the PCRA Order March 19, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-50-CR-0000074-2005,
    CP-50-CR-0000102-2005
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                     FILED: JANUARY 2, 2019
    William A. Johnson appeals from the trial court’s March 19, 2018, order
    finding his Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 objections meritless and dismissing his petition
    filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-
    9546. After review, we remand with instructions.
    In March 2006, a jury convicted Johnson1 of four counts each of
    attempted rape of a child, aggravated indecent assault, and indecent assault,
    and two counts each of corruption of minors and indecent exposure. On July
    31, 2006, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of ten years and nine
    months to forty-two years’ incarceration.          Johnson was deemed to be a
    ____________________________________________
    1 Two victims were involved. Originally the charges were filed under two
    separate docket numbers, CP-50-CR-0000074-2005 and CP-50-CR-0000102-
    2005. However, upon motion by the Commonwealth, they were consolidated
    for trial.
    J-A02044-19
    sexually violent predator (SVP), pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.4. He filed a
    direct appeal challenging his designation as an SVP; however, our Court
    dismissed the appeal due to appellate counsel’s failure to file a brief. Johnson
    filed a pro se PCRA petition in October 2007, seeking reinstatement of his
    appellate rights nunc pro tunc and the appointment of counsel. Johnson’s
    rights were reinstated; however, he did not file a direct appeal.      Instead,
    counsel filed a timely PCRA petition requesting the court vacate the order
    reinstating his appellate rights and permit him to amend his petition. The
    court granted the relief and permitted counsel to file an amended PCRA
    petition. After holding hearings, the court denied Johnson’s PCRA petition on
    October 5, 2011. Johnson filed a collateral appeal and our Court affirmed the
    denial of PCRA relief. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 1937 MDA 2011
    (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 18, 2012) (unpublished memorandum). On October
    29, 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Johnson’s petition for
    allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    78 A.3d 1090
    (Pa. 2013)
    (Table).
    Johnson filed another pro se PCRA petition on November 18, 2013.
    Counsel was appointed and, after being granted five extensions within which
    to file an amended petition, sought leave to withdraw pursuant to
    Turner/Finley.2       Johnson simultaneously sought a change in appointed
    ____________________________________________
    2Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
    (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
    Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
    (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
    -2-
    J-A02044-19
    counsel. The court granted counsel’s request to withdraw on May 24, 2017.3
    On May 31, 2017, the court appointed new counsel for Johnson. New counsel
    sought to withdraw on November 15, 2017, pursuant to Turner/Finley. On
    November 20, 2017, the court granted counsel’s petition to withdraw and gave
    Johnson Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss his petition and
    advised him of his right to respond to the proposed order within 20 days. On
    December 4, 2017, Johnson filed an objection to the notice to dismiss his
    petition.
    On March 19, 2018, the court ruled upon Johnson’s objection, noting
    that the record supported counsel’s conclusion that the claims in Johnson’s
    PCRA petition are meritless and that the court had also independently
    reviewed each PCRA claim and came to the same conclusion. Additionally,
    the court acknowledged that Johnson had filed another PCRA brief to support
    his petition that “raises new issues not raised in any of his PCRA petitions,
    ____________________________________________
    3 On May 15, 2017, Johnson filed a pro se addendum to his PCRA petition
    claiming that a Commonwealth witness had a disease that “attack[ed] the
    memory part of [her] brain” and that at the time of his trial this witness was
    on a medication and “drinking all the time[,]” which decreased the
    effectiveness of the medication and increased its adverse side-effects. See
    Addendum to PCRA Petition, 5/15/17. However, because Johnson was still
    represented by counsel at that time, his filing was not docketed and
    independently ruled upon by the court. See Commonwealth v. Jette, 
    23 A.3d 1032
    (Pa. 2011) (proper response to any pro se pleading by represented
    defendant is to refer pleading to counsel, and take no further action on pro se
    pleading unless counsel forwards motion to withdraw; once brief filed, any
    right to insist upon self-representation has expired).
    -3-
    J-A02044-19
    including arguing that his lifetime registration under SORNA is unconstitutional
    and that his being found a Sexually Violent Predator is unconstitutional.”
    Opinion and Order, 3/19/18, at 3-4.            However, because Johnson had not
    sought leave to amend his petition when counsel had filed a petition to
    withdraw under Turner/Finley, the PCRA court was under no obligation to
    address new issues.4
    On April 23, 2018, Johnson filed his notice of appeal from the trial court’s
    March 19, 2018 order denying his PCRA petition. On appeal, he raises the
    following issues for our consideration:
    (1)    Constitutionally ineffective[] counsel for failing to bring
    PCRA [c]laims that were unaddressed and asked to do.
    (2)    Sufficiency of the evidence.
    (3)    Whether [the t]rial court erred in finding [Johnson] to be a
    sexually violent predator even though the Sex Offender
    Assessment Board did not so find.
    (4)    SORNA [r]egistration [requirements] and Megan’s Law are
    unconstitutional.
    (5)    Did the [t]rial judge abuse his discretion by going against
    the SOAB at sentencing?
    Appellant’s Brief, at 7.
    Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we must determine whether
    Johnson timely filed his notice of appeal, as it implicates the jurisdiction of our
    ____________________________________________
    4 See Commonwealth v. Rigg, 
    84 A.3d 1080
    (Pa. Super. 2014); see also
    Commonwealth v. Rykard, 
    55 A.3d 1177
    (Pa. Super. 2012) (response to
    Rule 907 notice of dismissal not treated as either amended PCRA petition or
    serial petition).
    -4-
    J-A02044-19
    appellate court. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    106 A.3d 583
    , 587 (Pa.
    2014) (“A timely notice of appeal triggers the jurisdiction of the appellate
    court, notwithstanding whether the notice of appeal is otherwise defective.”).
    Instantly, the order from which Johnson appeals was filed on March 19, 2018.
    However, Johnson’s notice of appeal was not docketed in the trial court until
    April 23, 2018.
    In Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    700 A.2d 423
    (Pa. 1997), our Supreme
    Court held that the “prisoner mailbox rule” (the “Rule”) applies to appeals
    from court orders under Pa.R.A.P. 903. In Jones, the Court stated, “we are
    inclined to accept any reasonably verifiable evidence of the date that the
    prisoner deposits the appeal with the prison authorities” to satisfy the burden
    of proof under the prisoner mailbox rule.      
    Id. at 426.
      Some examples of
    evidence our courts have accepted to prove the date of deposit under the Rule
    include: a cash slip given by prison officials to the defendant that noted both
    the deduction from the prisoner’s account for the mailing and the date of
    mailing; an affidavit attesting to date of deposit with prison officials; internal
    operating procedures regarding mail delivery in both the prison and the
    Commonwealth Court and the delivery route of the mail; and a form of
    certified mail indicating the date of mailing accompanied by an envelope
    bearing a US Postal date stamp.       See Smith v. Pennsylvania Board of
    Probation and Parole, 
    683 A.2d 278
    (Pa. 1996); Miller v. Unemployment
    Compensation Board of Review, 
    476 A.2d 364
    (Pa. 1984).
    -5-
    J-A02044-19
    In his second response to our Court’s rule to show cause, Johnson stated
    that “the D.O.C. Mailroom has been sending mail late and the notice of appeal
    was sent out on the 18h day of April [and] the D.O.C. had control of the
    [n]otice of [a]ppeal. The three-day [m]ailbox [r]ule provided by Pa.R.A.P.
    121(e).” Second Response to Rule to Show Cause, 10/2/18, at ¶ 1. In his
    response to our Court’s rule to show cause, Johnson also attached a copy of
    a DC-138A cash slip, dated April 18, 2018, signed and approved by a DOC
    employee. The mailing is addressed to Brenda J. Albright, the Clerk of Courts
    of Perry County. The cash slip, however, does not contain a postmark, fails
    to indicate what Johnson deposited with prison authorities requiring postage
    and a deduction from his account, and does not show the docket number of
    the governmental unit. 
    Smith, supra
    . Moreover, there is no original of the
    cash slip or post-marked envelope in the certified record to verify when he
    deposited the notice of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Chambers, 
    35 A.3d 34
    (Pa. Super. 2011) (where defendant did not provide PCRA court with cash
    slip, but presented it for first time as exhibit to appellate brief, our Court
    remanded matter to provide defendant with opportunity to present evidence
    to PCRA court for determination as to timeliness of filing).
    Accordingly, we are unable to conclude that the cash slip attached to
    Johnson’s response to the rule to show cause is verifiable evidence of the date
    that he deposited his notice of appeal with prison authorities or in the prison
    mailbox to invoke the prisoner mailbox rule.      Thus, we must remand the
    matter for a proper determination on the issue.
    -6-
    J-A02044-19
    Because there is an issue with regard to whether Johnson did indeed file
    his notice of appeal in a timely fashion, we decline to address the merits of
    this appeal. 
    Smith, supra
    . The matter is remanded to the trial court, for 60
    days from this filing, to determine the timeliness of Johnson’s notice of appeal.
    Johnson shall be given the opportunity to present evidence, including the
    original cash slip that he appended to his rule to show cause, a post-marked
    envelope, and/or an affidavit as to the date that he deposited his notice of
    appeal with prison authorities, to the PCRA court and for the PCRA court to
    make a determination as to the timeliness of the filing of his notice of appeal.
    Case remanded. Panel jurisdiction retained.
    -7-