Lyon v. Whisman , 45 F.3d 758 ( 1995 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    1995 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    1-19-1995
    Lyon v Whisman
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 94-7190
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    Recommended Citation
    "Lyon v Whisman" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 14.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/14
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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    Nos. 94-7190 and 94-7283
    PATRICIA A. LYON
    v.
    JAMES A. WHISMAN; Whisman & Associates, P.A.,
    Appellants
    PATRICIA A. LYON
    v.
    JAMES A. WHISMAN;
    WHISMAN & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
    James A. Whisman, Jr.
    Whisman & Associates, P.A.,
    Appellants
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Delaware
    (Civil Action No. 91-289)
    Argued November 1, 1994
    BEFORE:    GREENBERG and McKEE, Circuit Judges,
    and POLLAK, District Judge*
    (Filed: January 19, 1995)
    ______________
    Barry M. Willoughby (argued)
    Bhavana Sontakay
    Young, Conaway, Stargatt
    & Taylor
    Rodney Square North, 11th Floor
    * Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior United States District Judge
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
    designation.
    P. O. Box 391
    Wilmington, DE 19899-0391
    Attorneys for Appellants
    Fredric J. Gross (argued)
    7 East Kings Highway
    Mount Ephraim, NJ 08059
    Attorney for Appellee
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
    I. Introduction
    Patricia A. Lyon sued her employer, Whisman &
    Associates, an accounting firm which is a Delaware corporation,
    and its president James A. Whisman, in the United States District
    Court for the District of Delaware, charging that they failed to
    pay her overtime wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards
    Act ("FLSA"), 
    29 U.S.C. § 207
    (a).   As a matter of convenience we
    will refer to both defendants as Whisman.    Lyon's complaint also
    included Delaware contract and tort claims charging that Whisman
    failed to pay her a promised bonus on time or in full.    At trial
    Lyon prevailed on all three grounds.   Whisman then appealed,
    challenging only the judgment on the tort claim.   We must vacate
    the judgments on both of the state law claims, however, because
    the claims did not share a "common nucleus of operative fact"
    with the FLSA claim, and thus the district court lacked subject
    matter jurisdiction over them supplemental to its federal
    question jurisdiction over the FLSA claim.1
    We set forth the facts and the aspects of the
    procedural history necessary for resolution of the jurisdictional
    issue.2   Lyon began working as a bookkeeper for Whisman in
    January 1988 on an at-will basis for hourly wages.   Lyon and
    Whisman soon became embroiled in a dispute over a bonus that
    Whisman promised to pay Lyon at the end of 1988; by 1989 Lyon
    planned to find a new job.   Whisman, however, threatened to
    rescind the bonus if Lyon left its employment.    Although Whisman
    eventually did pay Lyon a bonus, she charges that the payment was
    late and was for less than the promised amount.
    After Lyon left Whisman's employment she filed a three-
    count complaint alleging that it had
    (1) violated the FLSA, 
    29 U.S.C. § 207
    (a),
    by failing to pay overtime wages;
    (2) violated Delaware contract law by paying
    a bonus smaller than promised; and
    (3) violated Delaware tort law by
    threatening to withhold a vested bonus
    if she left its employ.
    1
    . Since "the initial notice of appeal invokes [appellate]
    jurisdiction over the whole case," we properly may consider the
    propriety of the state contract judgment despite the fact that
    Whisman appealed only from the tort judgment. United States v.
    Tabor Court Realty Corp., 
    943 F.2d 335
    , 344 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
    denied, 
    112 S.Ct. 1167
     (1992).
    2
    . Because of procedural concerns which we need not recount,
    Whisman filed a notice of appeal and amended notices of appeal in
    a successful effort to ensure that we would have appellate
    jurisdiction. We have consolidated the appeals.
    The district court had federal question jurisdiction over Lyon's
    FLSA claim under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    , and Lyon asserted that it had
    "pendent" federal jurisdiction over the state law claims in
    counts two and three.   Neither the district court nor Whisman
    questioned this assertion of pendent jurisdiction which, in
    accordance with 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    , we usually will call
    supplemental jurisdiction.   Since the district court did not have
    diversity jurisdiction, it could entertain the state-law claims
    only by exercising supplemental jurisdiction.
    At trial Lyon won on all three counts.   She recovered
    $731.20 on the contract claim and $5,000 in compensatory damages
    and $20,000 in punitive damages on the tort claim.3   We cannot
    ascertain what she recovered on the FLSA claim as the docket
    sheets do not reflect the amount and the parties make no
    reference to it in their briefs.   Whisman appealed only from the
    judgment on count three, the Delaware law tort claim.    We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    II. Discussion
    Although neither the parties nor the district court
    questioned the court's supplemental jurisdiction over Lyon's
    state law contract and tort claims, we inquire into that
    jurisdiction on our own initiative.   See Bender v. Williamsport
    Area Sch. Dist., 
    475 U.S. 534
    , 541, 
    106 S.Ct. 1326
    , 1331 (1986).
    3
    . The punitive damages verdict was for $75,000 but Lyon
    accepted a remittitur reducing the damages to $20,000.
    Consequently following oral argument we directed the parties to
    file briefs on this point and they have done so.
    A. The Constitutional Test
    Congress has authorized district courts to exercise
    jurisdiction supplemental to their federal question jurisdiction
    in 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    , which states:
    in any civil action of which the district
    courts have original jurisdiction, the
    district courts shall have supplemental
    jurisdiction over all other claims that are
    so related to claims in the action within
    such original jurisdiction that they form
    part of the same case or controversy under
    Article III of the United States
    Constitution.
    In Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 
    935 F.2d 599
    , 603 (3d
    Cir. 1991), we treated section 1367 as codifying the
    jurisdictional standard established in United Mine Workers v.
    Gibbs, 
    383 U.S. 715
    , 
    86 S.Ct. 1130
     (1966).   A leading treatise
    concurs:   "[Section 1367] incorporates the constitutional
    analysis of the Gibbs case."   13B Charles A. Wright et al.,
    Federal Practice & Procedure § 3567.1 (supp. 1994), citing, inter
    alia, Soniform.4   Gibbs laid down three requirements for
    4
    . Section 1367(c) may have modified the discretionary arm of
    the Gibbs decision, under which a district court may dismiss a
    supplemental claim notwithstanding that it has the constitutional
    power to entertain the claim. See LaSorella v. Penrose St.
    Francis Healthcare Sys., 
    818 F. Supp. 1413
     (D. Colo. 1993).
    Here, however, we are concerned with the district court's power
    to hear the state law claims under § 1367(a), and all authority
    indicates that Gibbs continues to control the constitutional
    dimension of this jurisdictional determination.
    supplemental jurisdiction.   First, "[t]he federal claim must have
    substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
    court."   Gibbs, 
    383 U.S. at 725
    , 
    86 S.Ct. at 1138
    .   Lyon's FLSA
    claim satisfies this standard.
    The other two requirements before federal courts may
    exercise supplemental jurisdiction to hear state law claims are:
    [1] The state and federal claims must derive
    from a common nucleus of operative facts.
    [2] But if, considered without regard to
    their federal or state character, a
    plaintiff's claims are such that he would
    ordinarily be expected to try them all in one
    judicial proceeding, then, assuming
    substantiality of the federal issues, there
    is power in federal courts to hear the whole.
    
    Id.
       Despite the ambiguity of the language connecting [1] the
    "nexus" requirement with [2] the "one proceeding" standard, all
    judicial authority finds that they are cumulative: state claims
    must satisfy both before a district court may exercise
    supplemental jurisdiction.   13B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal
    Practice & Procedure § 3567.1 (1984 & supp. 1994), citing
    Almenares v. Wyman, 
    453 F.2d 1075
    , 1083 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
    denied, 
    405 U.S. 944
    , 
    92 S.Ct. 962
     (1972); Beverly Hills Nat.
    Bank & Trust Co. v. Compania De Navegacione Almirante S.A., 437
    (..continued)
    We do observe, however, that it is possible that even
    if the district court had the power to hear the supplemental
    claims, it abused its discretion in doing so. Section 1367(c),
    inter alia, counsels against the exercise of jurisdiction when
    "the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law," and
    when "the [state] claim substantially predominates over the
    [federal] claims . . . ." The tort claim in this suit is both
    novel and complex, and it seems to have predominated at the
    trial.
    F.2d 301, 306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    402 U.S. 996
    , 
    91 S.Ct. 2173
     (1971).   Because we find that there was an insufficient
    factual nexus between the federal and state claims to establish a
    common nucleus of operative facts, we will not consider the "one
    proceeding" arm of Gibbs.
    B. The Case-Specific Nature of the Inquiry
    The test for a "common nucleus of operative facts" is
    not self-evident.   Indeed, "[i]n trying to set out standards for
    supplemental jurisdiction and to apply them consistently, we
    observe that, like unhappy families, no two cases of supplemental
    jurisdiction are exactly alike."   Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin
    Memorial Hosp., 
    857 F.2d 96
    , 105 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
    
    489 U.S. 1078
    , 
    109 S.Ct. 1528
     (1989).
    We can illustrate the fact-sensitive nature of
    supplemental jurisdiction determinations by contrasting our
    treatment of state defamation claims in Nanavati with our
    treatment of similar claims in PAAC v. Rizzo, 
    502 F.2d 306
     (3d
    Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 
    419 U.S. 1108
    , 
    95 S.Ct. 780
     (1975).      In
    Nanavati, we found that the district court had the power to
    adjudicate a slander claim asserted by an antitrust defendant,
    noting that "a critical background fact (the enmity between the
    two physicians) is common to all claims."   Nanavati, 
    857 F.2d at 105
    .   We concluded that the alleged slanders naturally would
    become part of the antitrust trial since the slander victim might
    use the slanderer's allegedly wrongful behavior to justify the
    victim's conduct which the other party contended was actionable
    under the antitrust laws.   
    Id. at 105-06
    .    In PAAC, however, we
    ruled that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a state
    defamation claim in a suit brought under the Economic Opportunity
    Act charging the defendant with unlawfully interfering with the
    agency established under that law.     In PAAC we recited the
    operative language of Gibbs and found that the state claims were
    not related sufficiently to the federal claim to permit the
    exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
    The line that separates Nanavati and PAAC is Article
    III of the Constitution.    Both cases fall near the line; one is
    on one side, the other is on the other side.    In most instances
    the question whether Article III is satisfied is not that close.
    For example, when the same acts violate parallel federal and
    state laws, the common nucleus of operative facts is obvious and
    federal courts routinely exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
    the state law claims.   See, e.g., Pueblo Int'l, Inc. v. De
    Cardona, 
    725 F.2d 823
    , 826 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding jurisdiction
    over claims under Puerto Rico constitution, civil rights laws,
    and antitrust laws where federal jurisdiction was established
    under parallel laws, observing that "[t]he facts necessary to
    prove a violation of one are practically the same as those needed
    to prove a violation of the other").
    Thus, district courts will exercise supplemental
    jurisdiction if the federal and state claims "are merely
    alternative theories of recovery based on the same acts," Lentino
    v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 
    611 F.2d 474
    , 479 (3d Cir. 1979).
    In Lentino, for instance, we recognized that there was federal
    jurisdiction over a state legal malpractice claim joined with an
    ERISA claim because the alleged malpractice involved precisely
    the same acts that the plaintiffs charged constituted a breach of
    fiduciary duties under ERISA.   In White v. County of Newberry,
    
    985 F.2d 168
     (4th Cir. 1993), landowners sued the county for
    "response costs" under CERCLA and for inverse condemnation,
    claiming that the county's discharge of toxic waste into
    groundwater and wells effectively took their property.   In
    sustaining the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the
    state law inverse condemnation claim, the court said that "[b]oth
    claims share the common element of showing that the County
    engaged in an act  a release [CERCLA language] or an
    affirmative, positive, aggressive act [South Carolina inverse
    condemnation language]  that in this case would be the dumping
    or disposal of [a toxin] in a manner that caused contamination
    . . . ."   
    Id. at 172
    .   Two areas in which the federal courts
    quite commonly exercise supplemental jurisdiction based on
    "alternative theories of recovery based on the same acts" are
    state fraud claims in securities cases5 and state assault claims
    in civil rights suits charging police abuses.6
    5
    . See Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 
    528 F.2d 225
     (9th Cir. 1975);
    Vanderboom v. Sexton, 
    422 F.2d 1233
     (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 
    400 U.S. 852
    , 91 S.Ct. (1970); First Interregional Equity Corp. v.
    Haughton, 
    805 F. Supp. 196
     (S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Storage
    Technology Corp. Sec. Litig., 
    804 F. Supp. 1368
     (D. Colo. 1992);
    Bowman v. Hartig, 
    334 F. Supp. 1323
     (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
    6
    . See Chudzik v. City of Wilmington, 
    809 F. Supp. 1142
     (D. Del.
    1992); Stewart v. Roe, 
    776 F. Supp. 1304
     (N.D. Ill. 1991).
    On the other hand, we have refused to exercise
    supplemental jurisdiction over state claims totally unrelated to
    a cause of action under federal law.    For instance, in Local No.
    1 (ACA) v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 
    614 F.2d 846
     (3d Cir.
    1980), we found the district court powerless to try a state-law
    salary dispute when federal jurisdiction arose from a union
    merger dispute actionable under the Labor Management Relations
    Act ("LMRA").   We reasoned that "the merger and salary claims are
    factually distinct and do not meet the test enunciated in United
    Mine Workers v. Gibbs . . . . [The two are] not derived 'from a
    common nucleus of operative facts.'"     
    Id. at 851-52
    .
    As might be expected there are closer cases than those
    we have described.    Furthermore, the courts have not been
    consistent in defining the nexus between the federal and state
    claims necessary to support supplemental jurisdiction in these
    closer cases.   Thus, some courts have stated that even a "loose"
    nexus is enough.     Frye v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, Inc., 
    555 F. Supp. 730
    , 732 (D.S.C. 1983); Ritter v. Colorado Interstate Gas
    Co., 
    593 F. Supp. 1279
    , 1281 (D. Colo. 1984).     But at least one
    court strongly and explicitly has rejected this loose nexus test,
    finding that it expands judicial power beyond the limits set by
    Article III of the Constitution.     Mason v. Richmond Motor Co.,
    
    625 F. Supp. 883
    , 886 (D. Va. 1986), aff'd, 
    825 F.2d 407
     (4th
    Cir. 1987) (table).    Numerous other decisions implicitly reject
    the loose nexus test.7    Here we see no need to define how close
    7
    . Sanders v. Duke Univ., 
    538 F. Supp. 1143
    , 1147-48 (M.D.N.C.
    1982); Klupt v. Blue Island Fire Dep't, 
    489 F. Supp. 195
    , 197-98
    the nexus between the federal and state claims must be to support
    the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction for, as we will
    demonstrate, under any standard the nexus between the federal and
    state claims in this case is inadequate for that purpose.
    C. Implications of the Employer/Employee Nexus
    Congress has the power to limit the jurisdiction of the
    inferior federal courts.   See Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 
    303 U.S. 323
    , 330, 
    58 S.Ct. 578
    , 582 (1938).   Thus, we do not doubt
    but that Congress could have provided expressly that district
    courts could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction in FLSA
    cases.   The statute, however, does not mention the scope of
    supplemental jurisdiction which a court should exercise.     Thus,
    we assume in this section that Congress wished a court in an FLSA
    action to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to the limit
    permitted by Article III of the Constitution.8   Even under such
    an assumption, we find that there is an insufficient nexus
    (..continued)
    (N.D. Ill. 1980); Madery v. International Sound Technicians,
    Local 695, 
    79 F.R.D. 154
    , 156-57 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
    8
    . Under one construction of section 1367, it is possible to
    argue that Congress mandated such an assumption. By using the
    word "shall" in section 1367(a), the argument goes, Congress
    created a default rule that, absent specific language to the
    contrary, federal district courts should exercise supplemental
    jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted under Article III
    (subject to the district court's discretion, delineated in
    section 1367(c)). Gibbs contained no such presumption, so this
    argument would bring into question our assumption in Sinclair v.
    Soniform, 
    supra,
     that section 1367 merely codified the
    constitutional arm of the Gibbs decision.
    between Lyon's federal FLSA claim and her Delaware claims to
    justify supplemental jurisdiction over the latter.
    The only link between Lyon's FLSA and state law claims
    is the general employer-employee relationship between the
    parties.   In Prakash v. American Univ., 
    727 F.2d 1174
     (D.C. Cir.
    1984), the court seemingly found such a relationship sufficient
    to confer supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.     In
    Prakash a terminated professor sued his former employer,
    asserting FLSA claims as well as state law claims for breach of
    contract, interference with contractual relations, conversion,
    deceit, and defamation.   In finding that the district court had
    jurisdiction over the state law claims, the court of appeals said
    that "[t]he federal and nonfederal claims [plaintiff] advances
    'derive from a common nucleus of operative facts'  [the
    plaintiff's] contract dispute with the university . . . ."      
    Id. at 1183
    .
    Arguably Prakash is factually distinguishable from this
    case.   Fairly read, however, we believe that Prakash stands for
    the proposition that FLSA plaintiffs can try all state law
    contract claims against their employers in a federal proceeding,
    as the employment relationship alone provides a factual nexus
    sufficient to confer supplemental jurisdiction.
    Yet there is virtually no support for this broad
    reading of the reach of Article III and of Gibbs.9   In Hales v.
    9
    . We note that even under the opinion of the Prakash court it
    might be found that the district court lacked jurisdiction over
    Lyon's state tort claim, inasmuch as the Prakash court predicated
    its finding that there was federal jurisdiction on the nexus
    Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 
    500 F.2d 836
     (4th Cir. 1974), the court
    ruled that it could not entertain a state-law claim for failure
    to make payments from a profit-sharing plan despite the factual
    link to a federal claim under the Welfare and Pension Plans
    Disclosure Act, 
    29 U.S.C. § 301
     et seq. (repealed), charging that
    a plan administrator failed to provide statutorily required
    information.   The factual nexus in Winn-Dixie, where both claims
    revolved around a specific area of employer-employee relations,
    presents stronger grounds for jurisdiction than cases based
    solely on the general employment relationship.   Nonetheless, the
    court found that:
    [t]he record establishes beyond doubt that
    the [two counts] do not grow out of a 'common
    nucleus of operative facts' [citing Gibbs]
    . . . . While plaintiffs may have sought
    [the federally mandated] information in order
    to consider and/or assert their [state law]
    claims, their causes of action under both
    Counts I and II are separately maintainable
    and determinable without any reference to the
    facts alleged or contentions stated in or
    with regard to the other count. 
    Id.
     at 847-
    48.
    District courts have resisted expanding supplemental
    jurisdiction based merely on an employment contract in a variety
    of federal statutory settings.   Thus, in both Nicol v.
    Imagematrix, Inc., 
    767 F. Supp. 744
     (E.D. Va. 1991), and Benton
    (..continued)
    between the federal and state claims created by the employment
    relationship. Nevertheless, because we find the Prakash decision
    unconvincing, we do not analyze the difference between
    supplemental jurisdiction based on the nature of the claim, be it
    tort or contract. In both cases, we question the existence of a
    sufficient factual nexus to confer jurisdiction.
    v. Kroger Co., 
    635 F. Supp. 56
     (S.D. Tex. 1986), the courts
    refused to permit plaintiffs to use Title VII discrimination
    suits, combined with their status as employees, to bootstrap
    state claims into federal court.    In declining to entertain state
    contract and fraud claims in a sexual discrimination suit, Nicol
    pointedly noted that the sole common fact between the state and
    federal claims was the employment relationship.      Nicol, 
    767 F. Supp. at 747
    .    In Benton, the plaintiff contended that her
    employer fired her either as an act of sexual discrimination or
    in retaliation for her having filed a worker's compensation
    claim.    The court refused to consider the state law retaliation
    claim, finding that "[a]lleged incidents of sexual harassment or
    gender bias were entirely separate from the circumstances
    surrounding plaintiff's back injury.     These separate events can
    hardly be grouped as the 'common nucleus of operative facts .
    . . .'"    Benton, 
    635 F. Supp. at 59
    .
    District courts similarly have found that they did not
    have supplemental jurisdiction to entertain a variety of state
    claims in age discrimination cases.      In Mason v. Richmond Motor
    Co. the court concluded it could not exercise supplemental
    jurisdiction over a state law breach of contract claim (based on
    an oral promise that the defendant would never fire the
    plaintiff) in an ADEA wrongful discharge suit.     The court,
    applying Gibbs, found that "[o]nly one fact is common to both the
    federal and state claims; and that is that plaintiff was fired by
    his employer."    625 F. Supp. at 888.   In Robinson v. Sizes
    Unlimited, Inc., 
    685 F. Supp. 442
     (D.N.J. 1988), another ADEA
    case, the court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over state
    age discrimination claims, but concluded that it could not
    entertain a state claim predicated on discrimination against a
    plaintiff because of a handicap.
    We find these precedents compelling.    Lyon's FLSA claim
    involved very narrow, well-defined factual issues about hours
    worked during particular weeks.    The facts relevant to her state
    law contract and tort claims, which involved Whisman's alleged
    underpayment of a bonus and its refusal to pay the bonus if Lyon
    started looking for another job, were quite distinct.   In these
    circumstances it is clear that there is so little overlap between
    the evidence relevant to the FLSA and state claims, that there is
    no "common nucleus of operative fact" justifying supplemental
    jurisdiction over the state law claims.    In fact, it would be
    charitable to characterize the relationship of the federal and
    state claims as involving even a "loose" nexus.    Thus, Article
    III bars federal jurisdiction.
    D. Congressional Intent Under the FLSA
    We have assumed up to this point that Congress intended
    district courts in FLSA actions to exercise supplemental
    jurisdiction subject only to the limits of Article III; even so,
    we have concluded that the district court did not have the power
    to hear Lyon's contract and tort claims.   In addition, we
    question whether Congress intended courts in FLSA actions have
    such broad jurisdiction.   In its "declaration of policy" for the
    FLSA, Congress found that existence of "labor conditions
    detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living
    necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of
    workers" caused harm to interstate commerce.   
    29 U.S.C. § 202
    .
    Accordingly, its "declared policy" under the FLSA was "to correct
    and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate [these] conditions."
    
    Id.
    The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he central aim of
    the [FLSA] was to achieve . . . certain minimum labor standards."
    Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 
    361 U.S. 288
    , 292, 
    80 S.Ct. 332
    , 335 (1960).   The substantive sections of the FLSA,
    narrowly focusing on minimum wage rates and maximum working
    hours, bear out its limited purposes.   Accordingly, we find no
    indication that Congress passed the FLSA with the expectation
    that it was authorizing federal courts to exercise far-reaching
    jurisdiction over state-law disputes arising from employment
    relationships.   This restrained view of the scope of federal
    jurisdiction is consistent with the Supreme Court's statement
    that "[i]n the Fair Labor Standards Act, Congress did not intend
    that the regulation of hours and wages should extend to the
    furthest reaches of federal authority."   McLeod v. Threlkeld, 
    319 U.S. 491
    , 493, 
    63 S.Ct. 1248
    , 1249 (1943).
    We do not mean to imply that a district court never may
    exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims in an FLSA
    action.   For example, an employee seeking to enforce an
    employment contract granting hourly wages in excess of the
    (statutorily required) time and a half probably could assert her
    state law contract claim on a supplemental jurisdictional basis
    along with her FLSA claim in a district court, since the
    "operative facts" in the two claims would be identical.    But
    still, when a court exercises federal jurisdiction pursuant to a
    rather narrow and specialized federal statute it should be
    circumspect when determining the scope of its supplemental
    jurisdiction.   Accordingly, Congressional intent may provide a
    second, non-constitutional ground for finding that the district
    court did not have jurisdiction over Lyon's state law claims.10
    III. Conclusion
    Because we find that the district court lacked subject
    matter jurisdiction over Lyon's state law contract and tort
    claims, we will vacate its judgments on those two counts and
    remand the matter with instructions to dismiss those claims
    without prejudice.   Of course, the district court did have
    jurisdiction over Lyon's FLSA claim, and our decision does not
    disturb the judgment on that count.    The parties will bear their
    own costs on this appeal.
    10
    . While our result may seem harsh as this case was tried
    without jurisdictional objection in the district court, we point
    out that in all likelihood Lyon will be able to file her state
    law claims in the Delaware state courts without being barred by
    the statute of limitations. See Frombach v. Gilbert Assocs.,
    Inc., 
    236 A.2d 363
     (Del. 1967); Houmet Corp. v. City of
    Wilmington, 
    285 A.2d 423
     (Del. Super. Ct. 1971). However, our
    conclusion is not dependent on that belief.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 94-7190

Citation Numbers: 45 F.3d 758

Filed Date: 1/19/1995

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (31)

Pueblo International, Inc. v. Hector Reichard De Cardona , 725 F.2d 823 ( 1984 )

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paac-as-a-commission-and-individually-v-frank-l-rizzo-mayor-of-the-city , 502 F.2d 306 ( 1974 )

terry-lee-sinclair-v-soniform-inc-harsco-corporation-sherwood-company , 935 F.2d 599 ( 1991 )

frank-lentino-and-perry-flame-trustees-of-the-teamsters-local-158 , 611 F.2d 474 ( 1979 )

suketu-h-nanavati-md-in-86-5778-v-burdette-tomlin-memorial-hospital , 857 F.2d 96 ( 1988 )

william-white-frances-white-bill-white-enterprises-inc-v-county-of , 985 F.2d 168 ( 1993 )

Joseph W. Hales v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. , 500 F.2d 836 ( 1974 )

Anand Prakash v. American University , 727 F.2d 1174 ( 1984 )

fed-sec-l-rep-p-95404-1-employee-benefits-ca-1143-frank-a-klaus-v , 528 F.2d 225 ( 1975 )

united-states-v-tabor-court-realty-corp-raymond-colliery-co-inc , 943 F.2d 335 ( 1991 )

Ritter v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. , 593 F. Supp. 1279 ( 1984 )

LaSorella v. Penrose St. Francis Healthcare System , 818 F. Supp. 1413 ( 1993 )

In Re Storage Technology Corporation Securities Litigation , 804 F. Supp. 1368 ( 1992 )

Howmet Corporation v. City of Wilmington , 285 A.2d 423 ( 1971 )

Frombach v. Gilbert Associates, Inc. , 236 A.2d 363 ( 1967 )

Chudzik v. City of Wilmington , 809 F. Supp. 1142 ( 1992 )

Robinson v. Sizes Unlimited, Inc. , 685 F. Supp. 442 ( 1988 )

Sanders v. Duke University , 538 F. Supp. 1143 ( 1982 )

Stewart v. Roe , 776 F. Supp. 1304 ( 1991 )

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