angie-brooks-v-kimberly-quam-davis-and-gayle-schaal-and-erica-brooks-a ( 1996 )


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  • ANGIE BROOKS,                     )
    Plaintiff/Appellant,         )
    )
    VS.                               )    Montgomery Circuit
    )    No. C8-412
    KIMBERLY J. QUAM DAVIS and,       )    and
    GAYLE SCHAAL,                     )    Montgomery Circuit
    Defendants/Appellees,        )    No. C8-557
    )    Consolidated in Trial Court.
    AND                               )    Appeal No.
    )    01-A-01-9509-CV-00402.
    ERICA BROOKS, a minor b/n/f       )
    ANGIE BROOKS,mother and natural   )
    guardian,
    Plaintiffs/Appellants,
    )
    )          FILED
    )
    VS.                               )             March 8, 1996
    )
    KIMBERLY J. QUAM DAVIS and        )         Cecil W. Crowson
    AMY SCHAAL,                       )        Appellate Court Clerk
    Defendants/Appellees.        )
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY
    AT CLARKSVILLE, TENNESSEE
    HONORABLE ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE
    PAUL WELKER
    101 South Third Street
    Clarksville, Tennessee 37040
    ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS
    Alan M. Sowell
    GRACEY, RUTH, HOWARD, TATE & SOWELL
    150 Second Avenue, North
    Suite 201
    Nashville, Tennessee 37201
    ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
    ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
    William R. Pigue
    William G. McCaskill, Jr.
    TAYLOR, PHILBIN, PIGUE,
    MARCHETTI & BENNETT
    One Union Street
    P.O. Box 198169
    Nashville, Tennessee 37219-8169
    ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
    KIMBERLY J. QUAM DAVIS
    MODIFIED, AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
    HENRY F. TODD
    PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION
    BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE, CONCURS AND
    WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE, CONCURS IN SEPARATE OPINION.
    ANGIE BROOKS,                                )
    Plaintiff/Appellant,                    )
    )
    VS.                                          )       Montgomery Circuit
    )       No. C8-412
    KIMBERLY J. QUAM DAVIS and,                  )       and
    GAYLE SCHAAL,                                )       Montgomery Circuit
    Defendants/Appellees,                   )       No. C8-557
    )       Consolidated in Trial Court.
    AND                                          )       Appeal No.
    )       01-A-01-9509-CV-00402.
    ERICA BROOKS, a minor b/n/f                  )
    ANGIE BROOKS,mother and natural              )
    guardian,                                    )
    Plaintiffs/Appellants,                )
    )
    VS.                                          )
    )
    KIMBERLY J. QUAM DAVIS and                   )
    AMY SCHAAL,                                  )
    Defendants/Appellees.                   )
    O P I N I O N
    This appeal is from the dismissal of the separate, but consolidated, suits of a mother
    and daughter for their personal injuries sustained while guest-passengers in a vehicle owned
    by Gayle (Amy) Schall and operated by Kimberly J. Quam Davis (hereafter "Ms. Davis").
    Allstate Insurance Company (hereafter "Allstate") was served with process as an uninsured
    motorist insurer.
    Gayle (Amy) Schall was dismissed by summary judgment upon her uncontradicted
    affidavit that Ms. Davis was not operating the subject vehicle as agent of Gayle (Amy)
    Schall. This is not questioned on appeal.
    On May 28, 1992, Allstate answered admitting $25,000 uninsured motorist coverage
    of plaintiffs, but denying that either of the named defendants were uninsured.
    On September 30, 1992, Ms. Davis answered stating:
    . . . Defendant admits that she was driving the aforesaid
    vehicle when she suddenly lost control of the vehicle, went off
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    the road and struck an embankment. Defendant denies she was
    negligent in any way including that she failed to maintain a due
    and proper look out ahead, that she was operating her vehicle at
    a speed which was excessive under the conditions, that she
    drove her vehicle in a willful and wanton disregard for the
    safety of persons or property, and denies that as a direct and
    proximate result of defendant's alleged negligence, the plaintiff
    Angie Brooks received serious painful, disabling and
    permanent bodily injuries.
    On October 24, 1994, the Trial Court entered judgment stating:
    This cause came on to be heard on the 18th day of October,
    1994, before the Court and jury, to wit: Gloria Rye, Carmella
    Draa, Jody Burkhart, Steve Lannom, Holli Daniel, Louis
    Parham, Sandra Turner, Sherri Balthrop, Jannie James, Harriet
    Albright, James Hancock and David Trotter, upon the
    complaints, answers of defendant Kimberly J. Quam Davis,
    and answers of defendant Allstate Insurance Company,
    pursuant to T.C.A. §56-7-1206, the amended answer of
    defendant Kimberly J. Quam Davis allowed by the Court on
    defendant's motion to amend its answer to include the ". . .
    negligence of an unknown defendant whose vehicle came over
    the center line and forced her off of the road...", the testimony
    of witnesses heard in open court, a video deposition, and the
    entire record and from all of the proof the jury having found the
    issues in favor of the plaintiffs, Angie Brooks and Erica Brooks
    b/n/f Angie Brooks, against the unknown defendant and
    Allstate Insurance Company, assessed plaintiff's, Angie
    Brooks', damages at $25,000.00 for bodily injury, medical
    expenses and found the unknown defendant and Allstate
    Insurance Company 100 percent negligent and the defendant
    Kimberly J. Quam Davis zero percent negligent, and assessed
    plaintiff's, Erica Brooks' b/n/f Angie Brooks, damages at
    $10,000.00 for bodily injury, medical expenses and found the
    unknown defendant and Allstate Insurance Company 100
    percent negligent and defendant Kimberly J. Quam Davis zero
    percent negligent.
    It is therefore, ordered adjudged and decreed that the
    plaintiff, Angie Brooks, have and recover of the unknown
    defendant and Allstate Insurance Company, the sum of
    $25,000.00 for bodily injury, medical expenses and loss of
    earning capacity for which execution may issue if necessary,
    and plaintiff, Erica Brooks b/n/f Angie Brooks, have and
    recover of the unknown defendant and Allstate Insurance
    Company, the sum of $10,000.00 for bodily injury, medical
    expenses and loss of earning capacity for which execution may
    issue if necessary and that both causes of action are hereby
    dismissed against defendant Kimberly J. Quam Davis.
    On October 25, 1994, Allstate Insurance Company moved the Trial Court to remove
    its name from the judgment on the grounds that the complaints fail to mention an unknown
    -3-
    motorist and no process was issued against an unknown motorist as required by TCA §56-7-
    1206(b).
    On October 27, 1994, plaintiffs moved for a new trial on grounds that the Trial Court
    erroneously allowed Ms. Davis to amend her answer at the close of plaintiffs' proof to assert
    the fault of an unknown driver and erroneously admitted evidence of the unknown driver.
    On November 7, 1994, Allstate moved to alter or amend the judgment to delete the
    name of Allstate from the judgment for the reasons already stated.
    On February 24, 1995, Allstate filed an amended motion to alter or amend on the
    ground that no physical contact between the unknown vehicle and that of Ms. Davis and that
    the existence of the unknown motorist was not proven by clear and convincing evidence
    other than that furnished by the occupants of the Davis vehicle as required by T.C.A. Section
    56-7-1201(e)(1)(B).
    On May 11, 1995, the Trial Court overruled the motion for new trial of plaintiffs and
    struck the name of Allstate from the judgment.
    On May 18, 1995, the Trial Court entered an amended judgment order stating:
    . . . [T]he jury having found the issues in favor of the
    plaintiffs, Angie Brooks and Erica Brooks b/n/f Angie Brooks,
    against the unknown defendant assessed plaintiffs, Angie
    Brooks', damages at $25,000.00 for bodily injury, medical
    expenses and found the unknown defendant 100 percent
    negligent and the defendant Kimberly J. Quam Davis zero
    percent negligent, and assessed plaintiffs, Erica Brooks' b/n/f
    Angie Brooks, damages at $10,000.00 for bodily injury,
    medical expenses and found the unknown defendant 100
    percent negligent and defendant Kimberly J. Quam Davis zero
    percent negligent.
    It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the plaintiff,
    Angie Brooks, have and recover of the unknown defendant the
    sum of $25,000.00 for bodily injury, medical expenses and loss
    of earning capacity for which execution may issue if necessary,
    -4-
    and plaintiff, Erica Brooks b/n/f Angie Brooks, have and
    recover of the unknown defendant the sum of $10,000.00 for
    bodily injury, medical expenses and loss of earning capacity for
    which execution may issue if necessary and that both causes of
    action are hereby dismissed against defendant Kimberly J.
    Quam Davis.
    The amended judgment omits the name of Allstate as requested in Allstate's motion.
    From this judgment plaintiffs have perfected their appeal. Plaintiffs' brief presents no
    issues as required by T.R.A.P. Rule 27(a)(4). However, plaintiffs' brief argues that:
    I.      An affirmative defense must be set forth in a
    defendant's answer or it is waived.
    II.    The Trial Court erred in allowing the defendant
    to amend her answer to conform to the evidence.
    Plaintiffs first cite T.R.C.P. Rule 8.03 which requires a party defendant to state facts
    relied upon to constitute comparative fault or an avoidance or affirmative defense. Plaintiffs
    argue that an unpled affirmative defense is waived. At the time the answers of Ms. Davis and
    Allstate were filed , Rule 8.03 did not include a requirement to affirmatively plead
    comparative negligence of another person. This requirement was added on July 1, 1993.
    The record does not contain the "amended answer of Kimberly J. Quam Davis"
    mentioned in the judgment of the Trial Court which recites that the answer included "the
    negligence of an unknown defendant whose vehicle came over the center line and forced her
    off the road."
    The transcript records that, on October 19, 1994, before defendants presented their
    evidence, plaintiffs moved to exclude any evidence of an unknown motorist because not pled;
    that, the Trial Judge orally stated:
    The rule on amending pleadings to conform to the proof is to
    be liberally construed. In the deposition of Kimberly J. Davis,
    which has been filed with the court on October 14th, filed with
    the clerk and made a part of File No. C8-557, Ms. Davis'
    -5-
    deposition was taken December 17, 1992. Mr. Welker, counsel
    for the plaintiff, was present, along with two other attorneys,
    Mr. Batson and Mr. McCoy.
    On page 18, I believe this is Mr. Welker asking the questions.
    It appears to be. Question -- pardon me. It starts on the bottom
    of page 17 line 25.
    Q. "All right. Okay. All right. Now, just in your own words,
    tell me what happened, how this accident happened."
    A. "We were going down Tiny Town Road. There was
    another car over in my lane, and I went over to move -- you
    know, to miss it. And we went off in the ditch."
    ....
    Now, this deposition indicates to me that the issue of another
    car being involved is certainly not -- this is not the first time
    that the plaintiff has been aware of this. . . .
    But since it's not a surprise, and the plaintiff has had ample
    time to deal with the issue one way or the other, then I'm going
    -- assuming that she testifies similarly to how she did in her
    deposition, then I'm going to allow the defendant to amend -- to
    amend the answer to conform to the proof in the case.
    There were no special requests for instructions, but the Trial Court did instruct the
    jury as follows:
    In this case it is claimed that an unknown driver of another
    vehicle was at fault in the occurrence in question. Even though
    that person has not appeared or offered evidence, it is necessary
    for you to determine whether that person was at fault in the
    collision or the occurrence and determine the percentage of
    fault, if any, chargeable to that person.
    T.R.C.P. Rule 15.01 and 15.02 provide in pertinent part as follows:
    15.01 Amendments. - A party may amend his pleadings once
    as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading
    is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive
    pleadings is permitted and the action has not been set for trial,
    he may so amend it at any time within fifteen (15) days after it
    is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleadings only by
    written consent of the adverse party or by leave of court; and
    leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. . . .
    15.02 Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. - When
    issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
    implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
    respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
    amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them
    -6-
    to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be
    made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
    judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of
    the trial of these issues. . . .
    Wide discretion is vested in the Trial Judge in granting or refusing amendment at any
    stage of the proceedings before final submission to the jury, and such discretion will not be
    disturbed unless abused. Womble v. Walker, 
    216 Tenn. 27
    , 
    390 S.W.2d 208
    (1965); Daniels
    v. Talent, 
    212 Tenn. 447
    , 
    370 S.W.2d 515
    (1963); Diversified Equities Inc. v. Warren, Tenn.
    App. 1976, 
    567 S.W.2d 171
    .
    Although it would have been better procedure to require the defendants to submit
    their amended answers in writing, the failure to do so does not alter the fact that the Trial
    Judge acted within the bounds of his discretion and committed no reversible error under the
    circumstances.
    Allstate presents the additional argument that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover on
    the uninsured motorist coverage because of failure to issue process against the unknown
    motorist or to prove the existence of the unknown motorist as required by the statute. Since
    Allstate's removal from the judgment has not been challenged on appeal, this argument
    appears to be moot, except that it calls attention to the fact that the Trial Court has rendered
    judgment against John Doe without issuance or service of any process to impose personal
    jurisdiction and judgment upon John Doe.
    The statute, Section 56-7-1206, establishes a fictional unknown party for purposes of
    imposing liability upon the uninsured motorist insurer. The statute does not, and could not
    constitutionally, provide for the entry of a judgment which would be enforceable against an
    unknown party who had no actual or constructive knowledge of the proceeding. Although, as
    a practical matter, the judgment against John Doe is worthless, the preservation of the
    -7-
    integrity of the judicial process requires that this Court remedy the situation by vacating the
    judgment against John Doe.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the Trial Court is modified by vacating and deleting the
    judgment against John Doe and by taxing all Trial Court costs again the plaintiffs. As
    modified, the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are taxed against
    plaintiffs and their surety. The cause is remanded for further proceedings in conformity with
    this opinion.
    Modified, Affirmed and Remanded.
    _____________________________________
    HENRY F. TODD
    PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION
    ________________________________________
    BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE, CONCURS
    WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE, CONCURS
    IN SEPARATE OPINION.
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01A01-9509-CV-00402.

Judges: Judge Henry F. Todd

Filed Date: 12/8/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/1/2016