Terry Ann Smith v. Andrew Smith ( 2021 )


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  • June 16, 2021
    Supreme Court
    No. 2020-3-Appeal.
    No. 2020-65-Appeal.
    (P 14-2875)
    Terry Ann Smith            :
    v.                   :
    Andrew Smith.              :
    ORDER
    These consolidated appeals came before the Supreme Court on May 12, 2021,
    pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues
    raised should not be summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and
    oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been
    shown and that these appeals may be decided without further briefing or argument.
    For the reasons set forth in this order, we affirm the orders of the Family Court.
    This case stems from a prolonged and contentious divorce dispute between
    the defendant, Andrew Smith (defendant or Mr. Smith), and his former spouse, the
    plaintiff, Terry Ann Smith (plaintiff or Ms. Smith). Mr. Smith, a self-represented
    litigant, appeals from orders of the Family Court (1) establishing reasonable
    attorneys’ fees as sanctions for his prior violations of Rule 11 of the Family Court
    -1-
    Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure, the imposition of which this Court affirmed
    in Smith v. Smith, 
    207 A.3d 447
     (R.I. 2019); (2) setting aside the transfer of marital
    property that Mr. Smith had conveyed to a third party for one cent; and (3)
    appointing a commissioner to sell that marital property.
    In Smith, we discussed the disturbing facts and procedural history of this case;
    we therefore recite only those facts that relate directly to the present appeals. In
    Smith, this Court upheld the Family Court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions upon
    Mr. Smith because he had “deliberately sought to deceive the court, refused to
    comply with discovery requests, and engaged in vexatious litigation practices by
    filing a multitude of frivolous motions and appealing nearly every decision by the
    general magistrate.” Smith, 207 A.3d at 448, 451. Thus, Mr. Smith was ordered to
    pay plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees. Id. at 449. The Court also affirmed the Family Court’s
    distribution of marital assets, which included a distribution to Ms. Smith of 50
    percent of the value of marital real property located at 1703 Pontiac Avenue,
    Cranston (the property) that Mr. Smith had conveyed to his friend, Marcia McCabe,
    for the consideration of one cent on September 1, 2016. See id. at 448-50.
    On June 4, 2019, after remand of the case to the Family Court, Ms. Smith
    sought entry of a final judgment of divorce; determination of reasonable attorneys’
    fees due as sanctions for Mr. Smith’s violations of Rule 11; an order setting aside
    and deeming void the conveyance of the property to Ms. McCabe; and the
    -2-
    appointment of a commissioner to sell the property. A justice of the Family Court
    entered a final judgment of divorce on July 19, 2019. The trial justice further added
    Ms. McCabe as a third-party defendant and scheduled the remaining issues for a
    later hearing.
    On November 18, 2019, Ms. Smith testified and presented documentary
    evidence of the fees she incurred in responding to defendant’s Rule 11 violations.
    She also presented expert testimony concerning attorneys’ fees and solicited
    testimony from Ms. McCabe regarding the nature of her relationship with Mr. Smith
    and the circumstances surrounding the transfer of the property. The trial justice
    awarded attorneys’ fees to Ms. Smith in the amount of $30,308.75, finding that the
    time spent and rate charged by plaintiff’s counsel were reasonable. The trial justice
    also set aside the transfer of the property, finding that Ms. McCabe was not credible
    and that the conveyance of the property was fraudulent. The trial justice entered an
    order on December 4, 2019, and Mr. Smith filed a timely appeal (No. 2020-3-A.).
    Ms. Smith thereafter renewed her motion for the appointment of a
    commissioner to sell the property.      At a hearing on the motion, Mr. Smith
    vehemently objected, asserting that “if anybody enters on that property * * * they’re
    going to be committing a crime” and “Rhode Island State Police is going to be
    notified.” The trial justice found that the appointment of a commissioner was
    necessary “based upon the history of the case and further, based upon statements of
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    the Defendant in [c]ourt[.]” An order entered on December 20, 2019, from which
    Mr. Smith timely appealed (No. 2020-65-A.).
    Mr. Smith claims myriad errors on appeal, many of which relate to earlier
    decisions of the trial justice regarding the equitable distribution of the parties’
    marital assets and the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Mr. Smith has already
    appealed from those decisions, which this Court affirmed in Smith. It is futile to
    relitigate issues that have already been decided. See BI Boat Basin Associates, LLC
    v. Sky Blue Pink, LLC, 
    242 A.3d 462
    , 466 (R.I. 2020) (“Res judicata, or claim
    preclusion, bars the relitigation of all issues that were tried or might have been tried
    in an earlier action.”) (quoting JHRW, LLC v. Seaport Studios, Inc., 
    212 A.3d 168
    ,
    177 (R.I. 2019)).
    Several of Mr. Smith’s remaining claims of error are demonstrably false or
    unsupported by factual or legal analysis. See Drew v. State, 
    198 A.3d 528
    , 530 (R.I.
    2019) (“[S]imply stating an issue for appellate review, without a meaningful
    discussion thereof or legal briefing of the issues, does not assist the Court in focusing
    on the legal questions raised, and therefore constitutes a waiver on that issue.”)
    (quoting Dunn’s Corners Fire District v. Westerly Ambulance Corps, 
    184 A.3d 230
    ,
    235 (R.I. 2018)); Terzian v. Lombardi, 
    180 A.3d 555
    , 558 (R.I. 2018) (“[W]e will
    not ‘scour the record to identify facts in support of the plaintiff’s broad claims, and
    we will not give life to arguments that the plaintiff has failed to develop on his
    -4-
    own.’”) (quoting McMahon v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 
    131 A.3d 175
    ,
    176 (R.I. 2016) (mem.)). Mr. Smith’s complaints about the ethics and behavior of
    the trial justice are wholly without merit; the trial justice exhibited a great deal of
    patience towards a self-represented litigant who was disruptive and disrespectful
    throughout the proceedings. Accordingly, we address only two discrete claims: (1)
    whether the amount of attorneys’ fees imposed as Rule 11 sanctions is unreasonable,
    and (2) whether the trial justice lacked authority to set aside the conveyance of the
    property and order its sale.
    This Court “will not disturb findings of fact made by a trial justice or
    magistrate in a divorce action unless he or she has misconceived the relevant
    evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong.” Vieira v. Hussein-Vieira, 
    150 A.3d 611
    ,
    615 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Palin v. Palin, 
    41 A.3d 248
    , 253 (R.I. 2012)).
    “Consequently, unless it is shown that the trial justice either improperly exercised
    his or her discretion or that there was an abuse thereof, this Court will not disturb
    the trial justice’s findings.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Palin, 
    41 A.3d at 253
    ). “Questions of law
    in an appeal from the Family Court, however, are reviewed de novo.” Id. at 615-16
    (quoting Palin, 
    41 A.3d at 253
    ).
    With respect to the award of $30,308.75 in attorneys’ fees to Ms. Smith, the
    record reveals evidentiary support for this amount. After considering invoices
    submitted into evidence, as well as testimony from Ms. Smith’s expert witness, the
    -5-
    trial justice found the number of hours worked and hourly rate charged to be
    reasonable. The award reflects the cost of protracted litigation fueled by Mr. Smith’s
    “numerous frivolous motions that forced the plaintiff to incur additional legal
    fees[.]” Smith, 207 A.3d at 451. Moreover, it is clear from the transcript of the
    hearing that Mr. Smith neither produced his own expert nor elicited testimony on
    cross-examination to suggest the unreasonableness of the number of hours worked
    or rate charged.1 Thus, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial justice’s
    findings were “clearly wrong.” Vieira, 150 A.3d at 615 (quoting Palin, 
    41 A.3d at 253
    ).
    We next address Mr. Smith’s claim that the trial justice lacked authority to set
    aside the conveyance and order the sale of the property. The defendant cites to Britt
    v. Britt, 
    119 R.I. 791
    , 
    383 A.2d 592
     (1978), in support of his own argument that
    “absent specific statutory authority, [the Family Court] has no power to vest in one
    party the title to property of the other[.]” Britt, 119 R.I. at 795, 
    383 A.2d at 594
    .
    However, Mr. Smith’s reliance on Britt is misplaced; as this Court recognized in
    1
    These consolidated appeals are Mr. Smith’s seventh and eighth appeals from the
    Family Court in this matter. The record of proceedings at issue demonstrates that
    defendant’s behavior on remand after the issuance of our opinion in Smith v. Smith,
    
    207 A.3d 447
     (R.I. 2019), echoed the behavior that resulted in sanctions—“act[ing]
    in bad faith with the purpose and intent to harass the plaintiff[.]” Smith, 207 A.3d at
    451. We admonish Mr. Smith that continued meritless motions and appeals will
    further protract litigation, resulting in the accrual of additional attorneys’ fees and,
    potentially, further sanctions.
    -6-
    Brierly v. Brierly, 
    431 A.2d 410
     (R.I. 1981), subsequent legislative enactments have
    “specifically grant[ed] the Family Court the authority to make assignments of
    property in divorce proceedings.” Brierly, 
    431 A.2d at
    415-16 (citing G.L. 1956 §§
    15-5-16.1 through 15-5-16.4, as enacted by P.L. 1979, ch. 279, § 2). In the instant
    case, the trial justice found that the property at issue is a marital asset. See Smith,
    207 A.3d at 449. She further found that Mr. Smith’s conveyance of the property to
    Ms. McCabe was fraudulent. The trial justice clearly had the authority to set aside
    the fraudulent conveyance and to order the sale of the property pursuant to
    § 15-5-16.1.
    For the reasons set forth in this order, we affirm the orders of the Family
    Court. We remand the record to the Family Court.
    Entered as an Order of this Court this 16 day of June, 2021.
    By Order,
    /s/ Debra A. Saunders, Clerk
    _____________________________
    Clerk
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    STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
    SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
    Licht Judicial Complex
    250 Benefit Street
    Providence, RI 02903
    ORDER COVER SHEET
    Title of Case                       Terry Ann Smith v. Andrew Smith.
    No. 2020-3-Appeal.
    Case Number                         No. 2020-65-Appeal.
    (P 14-2875)
    Date Order Filed                    June 16, 2021
    Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
    Justices
    Long, JJ.
    Source of Appeal                    Providence County Family Court
    Judicial Officer from Lower Court   Associate Justice Patricia K. Asquith
    For Plaintiff:
    Jesse Nason, Esq.
    Attorney(s) on Appeal
    For Defendant:
    Andrew Smith, Pro Se
    SU-CMS-02B (revised June 2020)
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-3, 20-65

Filed Date: 6/16/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/17/2021