State v. Jose Lopez , 149 A.3d 459 ( 2016 )

Supreme Court
No. 2015-245-C.A.
(P1/14-1482AG)
State :
v. :
Jose Lopez. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island,
250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone
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corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2015-245-C.A.
(P1/14-1482AG)
State :
v. :
Jose Lopez. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on
October 26, 2016, on appeal by the defendant, Jose Lopez (defendant or Lopez), from judgments
of conviction entered in the Superior Court, following a jury trial. Lopez was convicted of
murder in the first degree, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, and conspiracy to
commit murder. Lopez, who was a juvenile at the time of the murder, was acquitted of one
count of carrying a firearm without a license.1
Before this Court, Lopez contends that the trial justice erred by denying his motion for a
new trial. Specifically, he argues that the trial justice overlooked and misconstrued material
evidence and that the weight of the evidence did not support the verdicts in this case in light of
the bias and interests of the state’s witnesses. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the
judgments of conviction.
1
Lopez turned seventeen years old four days after the murder and was waived out of Family
Court following a hearing.
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Facts and Travel
On Christmas Eve 2013, twenty-one-year-old Ryan Almeida (Almeida) was murdered
outside his mother’s home at The Galego Court housing project (the Manor) in Pawtucket,
Rhode Island. The facts and circumstances leading up to this homicide portray a vengeful and
violent gang feud between the “Chad Brown” and the “East Side” street gangs. Jason “Heavy”
Gonzalez (Gonzalez), Daquan Watts (Watts), and Lopez are members of the Chad Brown gang,
and the decedent was an alleged member of the rival East Side gang. Although the intense
antagonism between the two gangs is deeply rooted, the animosity escalated in June 2013 when
Lopez’s cousin, Jose “Hova” Sanchez, was murdered, allegedly by members of the East Side
gang.
The facts of this case are chilling. In the early morning hours of December 24, 2013,
Gonzalez, Watts, and Lopez “went for a ride” to the East Side of Providence “[t]o see if [they
could] see anybody from that side of town.” They drove up Pleasant Street, down Camp Street,
and down Doyle Avenue, looking for enemies to shoot, to no avail, when Watts suggested that
they go to the Manor and look for Almeida. After driving past the guard shack at the Manor,
Watts directed them to the back of the Manor, where he knew Almeida lived with his mother.
Gonzalez and Watts noticed a black car with its engine running and its lights on. Although the
vehicle appeared to be unoccupied, there were two occupants in the car—Janelle Lewis (Lewis)
and her boyfriend. Lewis, an eyewitness to the murder, testified at trial. Her testimony
corroborated the testimony of Gonzalez and Watts and supported their accounts that Lopez was
the shooter. After noticing Lewis’s vehicle, the Chad Brown gang proceeded out of the Manor
and parked on a side street across from the complex.
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According to both Gonzalez and Watts, Gonzalez got out of the car and asked for the gun
but Lopez objected, declaring that he “wanted to do it.” Watts and Gonzalez watched as Lopez
pulled a gun out of his shoe and put it in the pocket of his gray hooded sweatshirt. Lopez asked
Watts to accompany him because Watts knew his way around the Manor; Gonzalez remained in
the car. Watts and Lopez tightened the hoods of their sweatshirts and proceeded into the Manor
toward Almeida’s apartment. According to Watts, Almeida was coming out of his home when
Lopez pulled out the gun, aimed, and fired. Watts heard a total of five gunshots. As Almeida
fell to the ground, Lopez and Watts ran back to the car where Watts told Gonzalez that it was
Almeida who was coming out of the house, and that “[Lopez] had got him.” Watts added, “I
heard [Almeida] scream. I think he got hit five times.” Lopez agreed, stating, “I think I hit
him.” The gunshots awakened Almeida’s mother, who ran to the door and saw her son lying on
the ground outside, bleeding from his abdomen. In his final moments, Almeida worried for his
mother, stating, “Ma, don’t run out here. I think they’re still out here.” Almeida died of a
gunshot wound to the torso; the manner of death was homicide. It was Christmas Eve morning.
The defendant testified at trial and contested this version of events. According to Lopez,
it was he who was driving the car that evening, a white Toyota Solara that he had borrowed from
his friend, Nathaniel Robinson (Robinson). After Lopez picked up Watts, Gonzalez, and Tyron
Wilcox (Wilcox), Watts suggested that they drive to the East Side to look for rival gang
members. Lopez agreed because it was the East Side gang that had killed his cousin, but he
stated: “I’m not shooting nobody or nothing.” Lopez testified that he did not want to “put
[Robinson’s] car in a situation.” As they were driving to the East Side, Wilcox asked to be taken
home to his house in the Manor to “get something.” When they reached the Manor, Lopez drove
past the guard shack, circled around, and exited the complex. He parked across the street, as
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instructed by Watts. Notably, Lopez claimed that he did not notice a black car with its lights on
parked in the back of the Manor because he “wasn’t paying attention.”
Lopez testified that Watts and Wilcox got out of the Solara, donned their hoodies, and
walked toward the Manor without speaking a word. Lopez testified that he did not see a gun,
and did not know where Watts and Wilcox were going because he “wasn’t paying attention.”
When the men returned to the vehicle, about five minutes later, Lopez asked, “What the hell.
What’s going on?” Lopez claimed that neither man responded, but that he saw Watts hand
something to Gonzalez. He could not identify the item because he “wasn’t paying attention.”
Also, he did not learn of the shooting until the next day, when he watched the news. Lopez
averred that he later spoke with Watts, who confirmed that he was the shooter.
Although the events leading up to the shooting were disputed by the witnesses at trial, it
was uncontested that Lopez was the first member of the group to speak with the police in the
aftermath of the shooting. However, defendant’s version of the events did not support the facts
uncovered by the detectives during their investigation, including the facts disclosed by Lewis,
whose physical description of the shooter matched that of Lopez. Lopez was arrested on April 4,
2014, after the detectives secured an arrest warrant based on surveillance images captured by a
camera on the guard shack of the Manor. The images depict the Toyota Solara entering into the
complex in the early morning hours of December 24, 2013; based on the images, the police
traced the vehicle to Lopez. After an initial denial, Lopez eventually admitted that he had been
the driver of the Solara, but that Watts was the shooter. Subsequently, the detectives secured
warrants for Watts and Wilcox, and then arrested Gonzalez.
When Watts and Gonzalez learned that Lopez “gave up everybody” and “point[ed] the
finger at [them],” the tables turned. Watts and Gonzalez agreed to cooperate with the state and
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testify against Lopez.2 At trial, both Watts and Gonzalez declared that Lopez was the shooter.
Their testimony and that of the other witnesses for the state convinced the jury of Lopez’s guilt.
He was convicted of murder, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, and conspiracy to
commit murder.
After the trial justice denied Lopez’s motion for a new trial, he was sentenced to two
mandatory consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for first-degree murder and for
discharging a firearm resulting in death. He also was sentenced to a consecutive ten-year term of
suspension and probation for conspiracy to commit murder. Lopez filed a timely notice of
appeal to this Court; he was eighteen years old at the time.
Standard of Review
When passing on a motion for a new trial in a criminal case, “the trial justice must
determine ‘whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient for the jury to conclude guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Staffier, 21 A.3d 287, 290 (R.I. 2011) (quoting State v.
Peoples, 996 A.2d 660, 664 (R.I. 2010)). “When making this determination, ‘the trial justice acts
as a thirteenth juror, exercising independent judgment on the credibility of witnesses and on the
weight of the evidence.’” Id. (quoting State v. Heredia, 10 A.3d 443, 446 (R.I. 2010)).
“Specifically, ‘the trial justice must (1) consider the evidence in light of the jury charge,
(2) independently assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and then
(3) determine whether he or she would have reached a result different from that reached by the
jury.’” Id. (quoting Heredia, 10 A.3d at 446). “If the trial justice agrees with the jury’s verdict,
2
Watts pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, conspiracy, and carrying a firearm without a
license; he was sentenced to serve a single life sentence for first-degree murder and ten years
concurrently for conspiracy and carrying a firearm without a license. Gonzalez pleaded guilty to
conspiracy and carrying a firearm without a license; he was sentenced to two concurrent terms of
ten years, three years to serve with seven years suspended and probation.
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the inquiry is complete and the motion for a new trial should be denied.”3 Id. (citing State v.
Morales, 895 A.2d 114, 121 (R.I. 2006)).
Furthermore, “[i]n cases in which the trial justice has articulated a sufficient rationale for
denying a motion for a new trial, the decision will be given great weight. Such a judgment will
be disturbed only if the trial justice has overlooked or misconceived material evidence relating to
a critical issue or if the justice was otherwise clearly wrong.” State v. Banach, 648 A.2d 1363,
1367 (R.I. 1994) (citing State v. Robbio, 526 A.2d 509, 513 (R.I. 1987)). “This Court employs a
‘deferential standard of review because a trial justice, being present during all phases of the trial,
is in an especially good position to evaluate the facts and to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.’” State v. Baptista, 79 A.3d 24, 29-30 (R.I. 2013) (quoting State v. Paola, 59 A.3d 99,
104 (R.I. 2013)).
Analysis
The sole issue before this Court is whether the trial justice erred in denying defendant’s
motion for a new trial. Specifically, we are tasked with considering whether the trial justice
overlooked or misconceived material evidence and clearly erred when he credited the testimony
of two biased cohorts—Watts and Gonzalez. We perceive no error.
After carefully reviewing the record before us, we are satisfied that the trial justice
properly weighed the evidence presented at trial and independently assessed the credibility of the
witnesses when he concluded that he agreed with the jury’s verdict. See Banach, 648 A.2d at
1367 (holding that the trial justice did not err in denying a motion for a new trial where he
3
See State v. Staffier, 21 A.3d 287, 290-91 (R.I. 2011) (“If, however, the trial justice does not
agree with the jury verdict, he or she is required to proceed to a fourth step in the new trial
analysis to ‘determine whether the verdict is against the fair preponderance of the evidence and
fails to do substantial justice. If the verdict meets this standard, then a new trial may be
granted.’” (quoting State v. Guerra, 12 A.3d 759, 765-66 (R.I. 2011))).
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reviewed the physical evidence presented at trial, independently assessed the credibility of the
witnesses, and articulated his reasons for the denial). The trial justice prefaced his reasoning for
denying the motion by quoting from this Court’s decision in State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098(R.I. 1992), stating:
“[W]hen a defendant elects to testify, he runs the very real risk that
if disbelieved, the trier of fact may conclude that the opposite of
his testimony is the truth. * * * As long as there exists some other
evidence of the defendant’s guilt, disbelief of a defendant’s sworn
testimony is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt. * * * ‘A trier of
fact is not compelled to accept and believe the self-serving stories
of vitally interested defendants. Their evidence may not only be
disbelieved, but from the totality of the circumstances, including
the manner in which they testify, a contrary conclusion may be
properly drawn.’” Id. at 1109 (quoting United States v. Cisneros,
448 F.2d 298, 305 (9th Cir. 1971)).
We consider this passage befitting for the issue at hand. This case was a straightforward
credibility contest between defendant and his co-conspirators, Watts and Gonzalez. The
defendant elected to testify, and the jury rejected his testimony, a repudiation that the trial justice
found to be “not at all surprising.”
The trial justice assessed defendant’s credibility by recounting portions of his testimony,
honing in on the myriad of untruths that he offered to the jury. The inconsistencies began with
defendant’s claim “that he was not a member of the Chad Brown gang” despite his appearance in
Facebook photographs flaunting the iconic Chad Brown “C” hand sign and his repeated
Facebook references to his friends as “fellow gang members.” The defendant testified that he
“didn’t know there was a gun in the car” even though the nearly identical testimony of Watts and
Gonzalez named him as the gunman. The trial justice found that, in further conflict with
defendant’s apparent ignorance of the gun, is the sad reality of gang life—that “one never
enter[s] into enemy territory without a gun”—and that there is “no reason to go into enemy
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territory unless [intending] to shoot somebody.” The trial justice concluded that defendant’s
testimony, in addition to his disclaimer that he would drive to the East Side but not shoot at
anyone, was “simply not credible. At the very least, [defendant] knew full well that this car ride
was bent on violence and, as well, revenge and retaliation for [his cousin’s] death.” The
defendant’s version of the moments after the shooting, when he stated that Watts and Gonzalez
returned to the car and neglected to mention the shooting, also was categorized by the trial
justice as “simply ridiculous.”
In contrast to defendant’s testimony, the trial justice credited that of Watts and Gonzalez
and found “[a]t the very least, the evidence demonstrated that all three of them were involved in
a conspiracy to commit murder. * * * Gonzalez last saw the gun in Lopez[’s] hands, and Watts
said he saw Lopez actually shoot Almeida.” The trial justice concluded, based on the evidence
adduced at trial, that the jury was warranted in accepting that testimony. We are inclined to
agree. When a defendant in a criminal case elects to testify on his own behalf, he can expect
rigorous cross-examination from the prosecution that may well serve as the final persuasive
factor convincing the jury of his guilt.
In the context of a motion for a new trial, this Court has articulated that, even if “the
evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are so nearly balanced that
reasonable individuals could arrive at different results * * * the new trial motion must be
denied.” Connors v. Gasbarro, 448 A.2d 756, 759 (R.I. 1982). Here, however, the approximately
one hundred and fifty pages of the record devoted to defendant’s testimony yields little room for
a near balance of the evidence or the potential for reasonable minds to arrive at different results.
Rather, after a fair reading of defendant’s testimony, any doubt that existed in the minds of the
jurors after the testimony of Watts and Gonzalez evaporated. See State v. Cacchiotti, 568 A.2d
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1026, 1029 (R.I. 1990) (affirming the denial of a motion for a new trial where the defendant’s
own testimony, when viewed in the context of other highly credible testimony, in all likelihood
caused the jury to convict the defendant of involuntary manslaughter).
Thus, when the credible testimony of Watts and Gonzalez is considered in light of
defendant’s inconsistent, self-serving offering, a rational factfinder could fairly find defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Mattatall, 603 A.2d at 1109 (considering the independent
evidence adduced at trial in light of the defendant’s “patently incredible testimony—testimony
full of inconsistencies and contradictions” to conclude that “neither the trial justice nor any
rational juror could have entertained any reasonable doubt about [the defendant’s] guilt”).
Consequently, we are satisfied that the trial justice neither overlooked nor misconceived material
evidence nor was the trial justice otherwise clearly wrong in reaching the same result as the jury.
We note that the main thrust of defendant’s appeal—that the trial justice should have
believed defendant’s testimony and not that of the state’s witnesses, who he alleges were biased
and were driven by motives to lie—is but an attempt to have this Court reassess the credibility of
the witnesses, an exercise in which we decline to engage. See Banach, 648 A.2d at 1368 (noting
that, credibility determinations belong in a trial court but not in this Court).
At the motion for a new trial stage in a criminal prosecution, credibility assessments are
exclusively within the province of the trial justice who “is under no obligation to sift through a
witness’s testimony and discard only those portions that are patently unbelievable.” Banach, 648
A.2d at 1368. Rather, the trial justice may “believe[] one set of facts and disbelieve[] the other.”
Id. (quoting Fontaine v. State, 602 A.2d 521, 526 (R.I. 1992)); see also Mattatall, 603 A.2d at
1108 (“[The trial justice] may accept or reject conflicting testimony and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom.”). In the case before us, the jury and the trial justice were presented with
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the possibility that defendant may have been framed by his cohorts; yet, it was their version of
the events that was accepted as true and the testimony of defendant was rejected.
The defendant points us to discrepancies between Watts’s testimony and Gonzalez’s
testimony in arguing that the two gang members colluded against him. However, “the presence
of some inconsistencies between or among [the statements] of a witness or witnesses at different
points in time does not ipso facto render the testimony unworthy of belief.” State v. Jensen, 40
A.3d 771, 781 (R.I. 2012). Of course, crediting the testimony of Watts and Gonzalez, and
rejecting that of defendant, was within the discretion of the trial justice in passing on a motion
for a new trial. We defer to that discretion. See Fontaine, 602 A.2d at 526 (“This court will not
act as the arbiter of credibility * * * because that remains a determination that is expressly
entrusted to the trial justice.”); see also Paola, 59 A.3d at 106 (“[W]e ‘defer to trial justices who
experience firsthand the delivery and demeanor of a witness’s testimony.’” (quoting State v.
Ferreira, 21 A.3d 355, 366 (R.I. 2011))).
The trial justice determined that, based on the evidence at trial, the jury was warranted in
finding defendant guilty. The weight of the evidence, namely the independent eyewitness
testimony of Lewis, coupled with that of Watts and Gonzalez, clearly established that defendant
was the shooter rather than an unsuspecting getaway driver who “wasn’t paying attention.” See
State v. Vanasse, 593 A.2d 58, 67 (R.I. 1991) (“If in [the trial justice’s] independent assessment
the trial justice determines that the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient for the jury, as
factfinders, to conclude that it proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the motion for a new trial
must be denied.” (citing State v. McGranahan, 415 A.2d 1298, 1302 (R.I. 1980))).
Accordingly, we are satisfied that the trial justice fulfilled his role as the thirteenth juror
by independently weighing the evidence in light of his charge to the jury and assessing the
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credibility of the witnesses. His conclusion that he agreed with the verdict thus ended his role in
the new trial analysis. We decline to disturb that decision.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgments of conviction. The papers
in this case shall be remanded to the Superior Court.
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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S
OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE: State v. Jose Lopez.
CASE NO: No. 2015-245-M.P.
(P1/14-1482AG)
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED: December 6, 2016
JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg
SOURCE OF APPEAL: Providence County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice Robert D. Krause
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For State: Virginia M. McGinn
Department of Attorney General
For Defendant: Kara J. Maguire
Office of the Public Defender