Gray v. Pagano , 287 F. App'x 155 ( 2008 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2008 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    7-23-2008
    Gray v. Pagano
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 07-3433
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
    Recommended Citation
    "Gray v. Pagano" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 810.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/810
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 07-3433
    ___________
    PATRICIA R. GRAY;
    PATRICK M.K. GRAY,
    Appellants
    v.
    GEORGE A. PAGANO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS JUDGE, COURT OF
    COMMON PLEAS, DELAWARE COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA; JOSEPH F. MCGINN,
    IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SHERIFF OF DELAWARE COUNTY,
    PENNSYLVANIA
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-2810)
    District Judge: Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    May 2, 2008
    Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
    (filed: July 23, 2008 )
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Patricia and Patrick Gray appeal from an order of the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
    their complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
    For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint.
    According to Plaintiffs’ complaint, Thelma L. Gray, the mother-in-law of Plaintiff
    Patricia R. Gray and the grandmother of Patrick Gray, executed a note on September 25,
    1998, in the amount of $100,800, secured by a mortgage of $15,000 in favor of First
    Union National Bank. On June 20, 2000, Thelma Gray conveyed the real property subject
    to the mortgage to “Thelma Lee Gray, T. Barry Gray and Patricia R. Gray, Husband and
    Wife.” On February 26, 2001, an action in mortgage foreclosure was commenced in the
    Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County against the mortgage and a default judgment
    was entered against them. Subsequent efforts to open the judgment and to transfer title to
    the property to permit refinancing were unsuccessful.
    On November 17, 2006, Court of Common Pleas Judge George A. Pagano entered
    an order to remove Patrick and Patricia Gray from ownership of the property and a
    sheriff’s sale was scheduled for July 20, 2007. Thereafter, the Grays filed a complaint in
    the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania requesting a declaration that
    Judge Pagano was not authorized to nullify transfer of title to them, together with an order
    enjoining Sheriff McGinn from conducting the sheriff’s sale. The District Court
    concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman
    doctrine, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 
    263 U.S. 413
    (1923); District of Columbia Court
    2
    of Appeals v. Feldman, 
    460 U.S. 462
    (1983), and dismissed the case against Judge
    Pagano. The Court also dismissed the allegations against Sheriff McGinn, concluding
    that they were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We will affirm on
    alternative grounds.
    Under the doctrine of Younger abstention, federal courts are prevented from
    enjoining pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.1 Middlesex
    County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 
    457 U.S. 423
    , 437 (1982). There are
    three requirements which must be met before a federal court may properly invoke
    Younger abstention: (1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2)
    the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings
    afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims. Schall v. Joyce, 
    885 F.2d 101
    , 106
    (3d Cir. 1989). These requirements are met. First, the Grays have filed an appeal in the
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania and, therefore, the case is ongoing. Cf. Taliaferro v.
    Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 
    458 F.3d 181
    , 192 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding Younger abstention
    did not apply because the state courts had reviewed the zoning board’s ruling “extensively
    and with finality.”) The third prong is met as Pennsylvania’s appellate courts are an
    adequate forum for review of Plaintiffs’ federal due process claims.
    1
    Although not raised in the district court, abstention may be raised by this court sua
    sponte. O’Neill v. City of Phila., 
    32 F.3d 785
    , 786 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Even though the
    question of Younger abstention was not raised by the parties on appeal, we may consider
    it sua sponte.”).
    3
    The second prong is also satisfied. In Schall, upon consideration of the second
    prong of Younger, we held that, where the other elements of the test are met, neither
    injunctive nor declaratory relief will be available “in cases in which the federal relief
    would render the state court’s orders or judgments 
    nugatory.” 885 F.2d at 108
    .
    Plaintiffs’ complaint requests a declaration that would nullify Judge Pagano’s ruling that
    transfer of title was improper. Any relief that could be granted by the district court would
    directly impact Pennsylvania’s interest in protecting the authority of its judicial system, as
    the relief would necessarily be predicated on a determination that Judge Pagano’s ruling
    was wrongly decided. Were the district court to make this determination, it would in
    essence be “substitut[ing] itself for the State’s appellate courts.” Huffman v. Pursue,
    Ltd., 
    420 U.S. 592
    , 609 (1975).
    [I]nterference with a state judicial proceeding prevents the state not only from
    effectuating its substantive policies, but also from continuing to perform the
    separate function of providing a forum competent to vindicate any constitutional
    objections interposed against those policies. Such interference also results in
    duplicative legal proceedings, and can readily be interpreted ‘as reflecting
    negatively upon the state courts’ ability to enforce constitutional principles.’
    
    Id. at 604
    (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 
    415 U.S. 452
    , 462 (1974)). Thus, the state
    proceeding implicates the important interest of preserving the authority of the state’s
    judicial system.
    Pursuant to Younger, the only basis for federal court interference is where one of
    four exceptions are met: (1) irreparable injury is both great and immediate; (2) the state
    law is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions; (3) there is a
    4
    showing of bad faith or harassment; or (4) other unusual circumstances call for equitable
    relief. Mitchum v. Foster, 
    407 U.S. 225
    , 230 (citing Younger v. Harris, 
    401 U.S. 37
    ,
    46-54 (1971)). None of these exceptions are present and, therefore, Younger abstention
    principles require the dismissal of the Grays’ due process challenge to the default
    judgment entered against them.
    To the extent that Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Judge Pagano violated the
    Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“PUFTA”), this alleged violation is one
    of state law, not federal law.2 Although Plaintiffs generally allege due process violations,
    we do not construe the alleged misapplication of state law as violative of substantive
    federal due process. The Constitution does not guarantee that the decision of state courts
    shall be free from error, or require that pronouncements shall be consistent. Worcester
    County Trust Co. v. Riley, 
    302 U.S. 292
    (1937). As explained by the Supreme Court in
    Engle v. Isaac, 
    456 U.S. 107
    , 121 n.21 (1982), “[w]e have long recognized that a ‘mere
    error of state law’ is not a denial of due process . . . . If the contrary were true, then
    ‘every erroneous decision by a state court on state law would come [to the federal courts]
    as a federal constitutional question.’” (quoting Gryger v. Burke, 
    334 U.S. 728
    , 731
    (1948)).
    Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin Sheriff McGinn and/or the sheriff’s department from
    2
    Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks “a declaratory ruling on whether the State Court order by
    defendant Pagano violated the PUFTA in removing them from ownership of the real
    property at 141 7th Ave., Folsom, PA 19033.” (Compl. ¶ 43.)
    5
    conducting a Sheriff Sale of 141 7th Avenue, Folsom, PA 19033, which was scheduled
    for July 20, 2007. This claim is moot, as we are now eight months past the scheduled sale
    of the property. Plaintiffs request no other form of relief against Sheriff McGinn and,
    therefore, no case or controversy exists as the basis for invoking subject matter
    jurisdiction under Article III of the Federal Constitution. See Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 
    484 F.3d 236
    , 240-41 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The requirement that a case or controversy be actual
    and ongoing extends throughout all stages of federal judicial proceedings, including
    appellate review”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Even if the claim were not
    moot, it also appears that Sheriff McGinn’s action of putting the Grays’ property up for
    sale is protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity. See Carswell v. Borough of
    Homestead, 
    381 F.3d 235
    , 242 (3d Cir. 2004) (A defendant may be shielded from liability
    for civil damages if his actions did not violate clearly established statutory or
    constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known) (citing Hope v.
    Pelzer, 
    536 U.S. 730
    (2002)).
    Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by failing to sua sponte grant
    leave to amend the complaint. Leave to amend should be granted unless amendment is
    futile or inequitable. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 
    293 F.3d 103
    , 106 (3d Cir.
    2002). Amendment is futile if the amended complaint cannot withstand a renewed
    motion to dismiss. See Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 
    863 F.2d 289
    , 292 (3d
    Cir. 1988). As previously explained, the claim against Sheriff McGinn is now moot and
    6
    protected by qualified immunity. The Grays’ remaining claims cannot be cured as they
    are precluded from review by the Younger abstention doctrine.
    For the stated reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the
    complaint.
    7