2023-03

Ralph Mangiarelli, Jr. v. Town of Johnston ( 2023 )

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March 1, 2023
Supreme Court
No. 2022-28-Appeal.
(PC 16-5893)
Ralph Mangiarelli, Jr. :
v. :
Town of Johnston et al. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any
typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2022-28-Appeal.
(PC 16-5893)
Ralph Mangiarelli, Jr. :
v. :
Town of Johnston et al. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court
on December 1, 2022, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show
cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. The
plaintiff, Ralph Mangiarelli, Jr., appeals from an order of the Superior Court denying
his motion for a new trial following a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, the
Town of Johnston (town); Joseph Chiodo, in his capacity as Treasurer for the town;
Arnold Vecchione, in his capacity as Public Works Director for the town; and John
Joe, alias.1 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial justice erred in denying his
1
Although a party named John Joe is referred to as John Doe at times, this individual
was never identified at trial. Our references to defendants do not include John Joe.
-1-
motion for a new trial.2 For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of
the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
This is a slip-and-fall case. On July 28, 2016, plaintiff went to the Johnston
Town Hall to pay his tax bill. He parked in the visitors parking lot in the rear of the
town hall and made his way towards the building’s rear entrance. According to
plaintiff, he walked through the parking lot towards the building; and, as he was
stepping up onto the curb, tripped and fell onto a staircase that leads up to the
entrance of the building. The plaintiff testified that:
“[T]here’s a crosswalk to go into the new patio * * * and
as I was walking up, it’s on an angle. And the crosswalk
meets the angle, but it’s not straight. And as I took one
step up on the patio, my second foot still was on the
asphalt. When I took another step with my right foot, not
realizing my foot caught the top of the curbstone, I shot
towards the stairway going * * * up the stairway of the
back of [t]own [h]all.”
As a result of his fall, plaintiff suffered a fractured wrist, injuries to his ribs, and
scrapes to an arm and leg. A town hall employee called 911; rescue personnel from
2
The procedural posture of this case is anything but smooth. Although plaintiff
argues that the trial justice erred by denying his motion for a new trial and by
granting defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, we note that judgment
entered on the jury’s verdict only, not by way of judgment as a matter of law.
Furthermore, plaintiff appeals only from the denial of his motion for a new trial and
not from the decision granting defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Therefore, we confine our analysis to the appropriateness of the trial justice’s denial
of plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
-2-
the Johnston Fire Department transported plaintiff to Our Lady of Fatima Hospital
in North Providence, where he received treatment for his injuries.3
Prior to plaintiff’s fall, in 2015, the rear entrance to the town hall had been
reconstructed. The project included the demolition of the preexisting sidewalk and
stairs, as well as the installation of a new ramp, stairs, handrail, sidewalk, and curb.
The plaintiff testified that his fall occurred during his first visit to the town hall after
the reconstruction had been completed. At the time, there was no yellow striping or
signage in place on or near the curb. However, the record discloses that the
construction was completed in accordance with all applicable codes.4 After the
incident, the town painted the edge of the curb yellow, and placed cones with signs
reading “step up” on the curb.
The plaintiff filed this action on December 22, 2016, alleging one count of
negligence. He claimed that defendants were “negligent in maintaining the
premises” of the town hall in a “clean, good and safe condition,” by failing to warn
invitees such as him of a “dangerous condition”—namely, an “uneven and unmarked
curbing” that lacked “any yellow highlighting or warning.” The plaintiff alleged
that, as a result of defendants’ breach, he sustained personal injuries and damages.
3
Before plaintiff left the town hall on a stretcher, a town employee was given his
tax payment and plaintiff was mailed a receipt a few days later.
4
These codes include the Rhode Island State Building Code, the Rhode Island Fire
Safety Code, and the ADA Standards for Accessible Design.
-3-
A jury trial on plaintiff’s negligence claim took place over the course of two
days on October 24 and October 25, 2019. During trial, plaintiff’s theory of the case
was that the town was negligent because the curb presented a dangerous condition
of which defendants failed to warn. At the conclusion of plaintiff’s case, defendants
moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that plaintiff had presented no evidence as to the
applicable standard of care or whether the existence of an angled curb constituted a
breach of the standard of care. According to defendants, expert testimony was
required to prove that the curb constituted a dangerous condition. The plaintiff
objected and proffered his own motion for judgment as a matter of law. He argued
that whether the angle of the curb constituted a dangerous condition was within the
ken of the average juror and therefore, expert testimony was not required. The trial
justice reserved her decision on the motions.
The defendants rested without presenting any evidence and renewed their
motion for judgment as a matter of law. The trial justice again reserved decision on
the motion. The trial justice then charged the jury, in relevant part:
“This is a negligence case, so let me say, generally,
negligence is defined as the failure of one person, acting
in a given set of circumstances, to exercise that degree of
care for the safety, interest or property of another person
that a reasonably prudent person would ordinarily exercise
in the same or similar circumstances.
-4-
“Breaking that down, in order to establish
negligence, a plaintiff must prove the following: One, that
the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; two, that
the defendant breached that duty; and, three, that the
plaintiff suffered damages as a proximate result of
defendant’s breach.
“* * *
“In considering whether defendant owes a duty of
care to plaintiff, you may consider the facts and
circumstances of a particular case including the nature of
the relationship and the nature of the transaction.
“* * *
“In this particular case -- we’re talking about these
ideas of negligence -- it is the plaintiff’s claim that the
Town of Johnston had a duty to maintain its premises[,]
specifically the area immediately adjacent to Town Hall,
in a clean, safe condition for the general public and
anticipated invitees.”
The trial justice also read aloud to the jury the questions on the verdict form. The
verdict form included three questions:
“1. Do you find that [p]laintiff proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that [d]efendant breached its duty to
maintain the premises at or around Johnston Town Hall in
a safe condition free from any dangerous or defective
conditions on July 28, 2016?
“* * *
“2. Do you find that [p]laintiff proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that [d]efendant’s breach of its duty of care
was the proximate cause of the [p]laintiff’s injuries?
“* * *
-5-
“3. If you answered ‘Yes’ to Question 2, what amount of
damages do you award to [p]laintiff, Ralph Mangiarelli,
Jr.?”
Upon conclusion of the charge, plaintiff objected at sidebar, arguing that the charge
as given improperly assigned to the jury the responsibility of determining whether
defendants owed plaintiff a duty of care. Notably, however, there was no objection
to the verdict form.
The jury returned a verdict for defendants. The trial justice then granted
defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, reasoning that plaintiff failed to
present any evidence that the angle of the curb constituted a dangerous condition.
Although the trial justice granted defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of
law, she entered judgment in favor of defendants not as a matter of law, but on the
jury’s verdict.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the
Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.5 A hearing was held during which plaintiff
argued that a new trial was warranted based upon three claims of error. First,
plaintiff asserted that the trial justice improperly tasked the jury with determining
whether defendants owed a duty of care to plaintiff. Second, plaintiff contended that
the verdict form improperly set forth plaintiff’s burden of proof as a “preponderance
5
The plaintiff also filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule
50 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, which the trial justice denied.
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of the evidence” rather than a “fair preponderance of the evidence.” Lastly, plaintiff
argued that the trial justice erred by determining that expert testimony was required
to support plaintiff’s claim that the angle of the curb created a dangerous condition.
The defendants, on the other hand, argued that no evidence was presented at trial
that the angle of the curb made it defective or dangerous.
The trial justice denied plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. The trial justice
explained that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to prove that the curb
was defective. Although the trial justice acknowledged that the language she used
to instruct the jury was “inartful,” she concluded that the claimed errors with the jury
instructions did not warrant a new trial. First, the trial justice rejected plaintiff’s
argument that the jury instructions improperly charged the jury with determining
whether defendants owed a duty of care to plaintiff because the verdict form, which
plaintiff had an opportunity to review beforehand, presumed that defendants owed
plaintiff a duty and tasked the jury with deciding whether defendants breached that
duty to plaintiff. Second, the trial justice explained that, although the verdict form
set forth the burden as a preponderance of the evidence and omitted the word “fair,”
plaintiff failed to raise an objection based upon this omission on the verdict form.
In accordance with this bench decision, an order entered denying plaintiff’s motion
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for a new trial. Final judgment entered for defendants in accordance with the jury
verdict.6 The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.
Before this Court, plaintiff claims that the trial justice erred by (1) instructing
the jury to determine whether the town owed plaintiff a duty of care; (2) omitting
the word “fair” from the term “fair preponderance of the evidence” on the verdict
form; and (3) determining that expert testimony was required to establish that the
angle of the curb constituted a dangerous condition.
Standard of Review
“It is well-settled that ‘[a] trial justice’s role in considering a motion for a new
trial is that of a superjuror, who must weigh the evidence and assess the credibility
of the witnesses.’” Yi Gu v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority,

Ralph Mangiarelli, Jr. v. Town of Johnston ( 2023 )

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