Cummings v. Evans ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
NOV 12 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
DAVID LEON CUMMINGS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 96-6382
EDWARD EVANS, Warden;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Respondents - Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D. Ct. No. CIV-94-1492-A)
Submitted on the briefs: *
David Leon Cummings, Petitioner-Appellant, appeared pro se on the opening
brief.
Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, and Jenine Jensen, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, were appointed to represent him on the
supplemental brief.
W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Steven E. Lohr,
*
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, for Respondents-Appellees.
Before ANDERSON , TACHA , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
TACHA , Circuit Judge.
Petitioner David Leon Cummings, an Oklahoma state prisoner, appeals an
order of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because petitioner is proceeding pro se, we
liberally construe his brief and find that he raises all issues brought before the
district court. See Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). On
appeal, Mr. Cummings alleges: (1) a violation of his right not to be placed in
double jeopardy because both crimes arose from the same course of criminal
conduct; (2) denial of a fair trial because the court admitted his co-defendants’
prior out-of-court statements in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses; (3) state court error in failing to rule on his motion to
suppress his co-defendant’s statements; (4) unlawful enhancement of his
sentence; (5) error in allowing the prosecution to tell the jury how much time he
served for a prior conviction; and (6) that the trial court’s treatment of his motion
to sever and his peremptory challenges violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2253 and affirm.
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I.
On the afternoon of April 18, 1988, petitioner entered a bar in Savanna,
Oklahoma. He ordered a beer from the lone waitress, left the bar for a few
minutes and returned. Soon after, two other men entered the bar. One went
immediately behind the bar, stabbed the waitress, and struck her in the mouth
when she screamed. The waitress fell down, and the assailant then took money
from the cash register and the waitress’ purse. Meanwhile, petitioner came
around the bar and put a knife to the waitress’ throat, instructing the third man to
tie and gag her. After binding the waitress, the men fled. Police apprehended
them later that day.
A jury convicted Mr. Cummings of Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon
After Former Conviction of a Felony (“AFCF”) and Assault and Battery with a
Deadly Weapon AFCF. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of twenty-
five years for the robbery charge and one hundred years for the assault and battery
charge. Defendant filed a direct appeal, raising numerous constitutional and
procedural errors. On February 23, 1993, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed Mr. Cummings’ convictions in a summary opinion. Mr.
Cummings then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the United States
District Court for the District of Western Oklahoma. The matter was referred to a
magistrate judge, who recommended denial of the petition on all counts except
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petitioner’s double jeopardy claim. The district court, in a written order on
October 24, 1996, refused to follow the magistrate’s recommendation as to the
double jeopardy claim, adopted the magistrate’s other recommendations, and
denied the habeas petition. We granted Mr. Cummings’ motion for a certificate
of probable cause to proceed on appeal and ordered briefing on his double
jeopardy claim. Respondent concedes that petitioner has exhausted his state
remedies for the purposes of federal habeas corpus review.
II.
On appeal from the district court’s determination of a § 2254 petition, we
review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo, but we presume the state
court’s factual findings are correct unless they are not fairly supported by the
record. See Hatch v. Oklahoma , 58 F.3d 1447, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995). We review
mixed questions of law and fact de novo. See id.A. Double Jeopardy
Mr. Cummings asserts that his conviction for both Robbery with a
Dangerous Weapon and Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Double Jeopardy Clause consists of three
separate constitutional protections. “It protects against a second prosecution for
the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the
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same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for
the same offense.” North Carolina v. Pearce , 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled
on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith , 490 U.S. 794 (1989). Here, the third
protection is at issue. This protection, however, is limited to “ensur[ing] that the
sentencing discretion of courts is confined to the limits established by the
legislature,” for it is the legislature that is vested with “the substantive power to
prescribe crimes and determine punishments.” Ohio v. Johnson , 467 U.S. 493,
499 (1984); see also Missouri v. Hunter , 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983). Thus, when a
course of criminal conduct constitutes a violation of two statutory provisions, the
test to determine whether the punishments are “multiple,” in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, is “essentially one of legislative intent.” Johnson , 467
U.S. at 499. In the absence of clear legislative intent, courts must apply the
Blockburger test, which states “‘that where the same act or transaction constitutes
a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires
proof of a fact that the other does not.’” Hunter , 459 U.S. at 366-67 (quoting
Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
Respondent argues that the applicable standard in this case is Blockburger .
Under that standard, Mr. Cummings’ double jeopardy argument certainly fails
because, under Oklahoma law, the elements for robbery differ from those for
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assault and battery. 1
However, this argument overlooks Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 11,
which provides:
an act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by
different provisions of this code may be punished under either of
such provisions, . . . but in no case can [it] be punished under more
than one; and an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either
one, bars the prosecution for the same act or omission under any
other.
This statutory double jeopardy provision, which is separate from the double
jeopardy provision of the Oklahoma state constitution, see Hale v. State , 888 P.2d
1027, 1029 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995), is indicative of legislative intent. Thus, we
must consider it in determining the federal constitutional double jeopardy
question.
“In assessing whether a state legislature intended to prescribe cumulative
punishments for a single criminal incident, we are bound by a state court’s
determination of the legislature’s intent.” Birr v. Shillinger , 894 F.2d 1160, 1161
(10th Cir. 1990); see also, e.g , Lucero v. Kerby , 133 F.3d 1299, 1316 (10th Cir.
1998) (asserting that federal court in habeas corpus proceeding should defer to
1
The elements of Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon are: 1) an
assault and battery; 2) upon another person; 3) with a deadly weapon or by such
other means as is likely to produce death. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 652. By
way of comparison, the elements of Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon are: 1)
wrongful; 2) taking; 3) of the personal property; 4) of another; 5) from another; 6)
by force or fear; 7) through the use of a dangerous weapon. See Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 21, §§ 791, 801.
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state court’s determination of separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes),
cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1684 (1998); Thomas v. Kerby , 44 F.3d 884, 887 (10th
Cir. 1995) (same). In other words, if the highest state court determines that the
legislature intended to punish separate offenses cumulatively, a federal habeas
court must defer to that conclusion. See Birr , 894 F.2d at 1161. Here, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the highest court on criminal matters in
Oklahoma, see Brecheen v. Reynolds , 41 F.3d 1343, 1348 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994),
rejected Mr. Cummings’ double jeopardy argument. Because we defer to the
highest state court’s ruling, this might be the end of the issue.
However, Mr. Cummings asserts that we may not rely on the Court of
Criminal Appeals’ decision because it was a summary disposition. Recognizing
that this court has, in the past, deferred to summary decisions of the Court of
Criminal Appeals, see Larsen v. Frazier , 835 F.2d 258, 259 (10th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam), Cummings argues that Ylst v. Nunnemaker , 501 U.S. 797 (1991) now
requires that we accord a state court’s summary opinion no weight. Instead,
Cummings claims we must look to other state court opinions in order to determine
if there were valid grounds for the Court of Criminal Appeals decision. Ylst
involved the question of whether procedural default applied to a habeas corpus
petition. The Supreme Court held that a federal habeas corpus court would have
to “look through” a state appellate court’s summary denial of post-conviction
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relief to the last reasoned opinion in that case in order to determine whether
procedural default applied. Ylst , 501 U.S. at 802-04. Petitioner recognizes that,
since he appealed his conviction directly to the Court of Criminal Appeals, there
is no written opinion in his case. Therefore, he argues we must expand the Ylst
principle and look to other applicable reasoned decisions by the Court of Criminal
Appeals.
Ylst dealt specifically with procedural default. This court has not
addressed whether a “look through” principle applies to summary dispositions in
the double jeopardy context. Regardless of whether we rely on the summary
disposition or look through to other decisions of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals, the summary disposition in this case is consistent with numerous other
reasoned decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals that support the
determination that Mr. Cummings’ convictions do not violate Okla. Stat. tit. 21,
§ 11.
Section 11 applies when “a single criminal act gives rise to offenses which
are not separate and distinct, are a means to another ultimate objective, are lesser
included offenses, or are incidents or facets of some other offense.” Hale v.
State , 888 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). The test is “whether, taken
as a whole, a defendant has been punished twice for one criminal course of
conduct where his offenses were incident to one objective.” Id. When the
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“criminal course of conduct” consists of a singular act that violates two criminal
laws, § 11 clearly applies. See id. at 1030 (“In promulgating § 11 our legislature
expressed its clear intention that, where an act or omission is punishable under
different statutes, a defendant may only be punished once for the single act.”).
For example, in Hale , the court held that a defendant who committed forcible rape
against his sister could not be convicted of both rape and incest, since both
offenses were incident to the single objective of sexual intercourse. See id. at
1030; see also, e.g. , Mathues v. State , 925 P.2d 64, 65 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996)
(holding defendant who illegally sold cocaine cannot be punished for both
delivery of narcotics and receipt of proceeds derived from illegal drug activities);
Hammon v. State , 898 P.2d 1287, 1303 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (holding
defendant who used a firearm during a robbery cannot be punished for both felony
murder and use of a firearm in commission of felony because both crimes punish
the use of the firearm); Jones v. State , 635, 653-54 (Okla Crim. App. 1995)
(holding that defendant’s conviction of both stealing a vehicle and possession of a
stolen vehicle violated § 11 because defendant “had to necessarily possess the
vehicle to be convicted of stealing it”). The question becomes more problematic
when, as in this case, the “criminal course of conduct” consists of more than one
criminal act. Thus, the key to understanding whether petitioner’s convictions
violated § 11 is within the phrase “are means to another ultimate objective.”
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Unfortunately, the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals has not precisely defined
the scope of this phrase.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ cases do, however, demonstrate
that the completion of one separate and distinct offense does not prevent the
defendant from being punished for a later offense committed within the same
criminal episode if the two offenses did not assist each other, i.e., neither is a
means to the other. In this scenario, § 11 does not apply because the criminal
defendant has manifested two separate criminal objectives. For example, the
Court of Criminal Appeals found that a defendant who robbed and then shot his
victim could be sentenced for both Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon and
Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon. See Ashinsky v. State , 780 P.2d 201,
208 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989). The court reasoned that because the robbery was
complete at the time the victim was shot, defendant’s argument that he committed
the subsequent shooting to consummate the robbery was without merit. See id.Essentially, neither offense assisted the defendant in committing the other. The
court found that having finished his first crime, robbery, the defendant changed
his focus and criminal objective and accomplished a second crime, assault and
battery. See id.In this case, petitioner’s argument is stronger because the stabbing
undoubtedly made it easier to complete the robbery. Nevertheless, the Court of
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Criminal Appeals has stated, when elaborating on the phrase “means to some
other ultimate objective,” that a continuing offense is “‘a transaction or series of
acts set on foot by a single impulse , and operated by an unintermittent force , no
matter how long it may occupy.’” See Gregg v. State , 844 P.2d 867, 878 (Okla.
Crim . App. 1993) (emphasis added). Moreover, it is clear that the Oklahoma
legislature, in promulgating § 11, did “not intend[ it] as a method of carte blanche
extending to the accused the prerogative of committing as many offenses as he
desire[s] within the same transaction with the protective shield of permitting only
one prosecution to arise . . . from that transaction.” Id. (quoting Hoffman v. State ,
611 P.2d 267, 269 (Okla. Crim. Ct. 1980)). Based on these considerations and
our understanding of the relevant Oklahoma case law, we conclude that § 11 does
not apply when a person commits non-essential and gratuitous criminal acts in the
course of accomplishing another crime, even if the intervening crimes assist the
person in consummating the final criminal act. By acting outside the scope of
what is needed to complete the ultimate crime, the defendant manifests a separate
criminal objective -- an impulse distinct from the course of conduct leading up to
the original criminal objective. Here, in deciding to stab the waitress, the
assailant engaged in an act of gratuitous violence separate from the robbery. 2
The record indicates that the defendant did not need to stab the waitress to
2
complete the offense. To the contrary, the assailant entered the bar and
immediately went behind the counter to stab the victim.
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Petitioner argues that the cases of Bray v. Page , 494 P.2d 339 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1972) and Smith v. State , 486 P.2d 770 (Okla. Crim. 1971) compel a
different result. We disagree. Bray and Smith each involved a defendant who
was charged with two criminal acts arising out of a single criminal episode. See
Bray , 494 P.2d at 339 (defendant charged with Shooting with the Intent to Kill
and Attempted Robbery with Firearms); Smith , 486 P.2d at 770-71 (defendant
charged with Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon and Robbery with a
Dangerous Weapon). In both cases, the defendant was charged and convicted of
one offense and subsequently charged and convicted of a second offense. See
Bray , 494 P.2d at 339; Smith , 486 P.2d at 771. The Court of Criminal Appeals
struck the second convictions as violating § 11 because both convictions arose
from the same criminal action. See Bray , 494 P.2d at 340; Smith , 486 P.2d at
771-72.
These cases do not govern the issue presented here. The Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals has drawn a distinction between multiple trials arising out of
the same transaction and a single trial with multiple charges. See Ashinsky v.
State , 780 P.2d 201, 208 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989). In instances involving more
than one trial, the Oklahoma courts apply a “same transaction” test that is more
protective than the test for multiple charges at a single proceeding. See id. Thus,
in Ashinsky , which, like this case, involved convictions for Assault and Battery
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with a Deadly Weapon and Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon at a single trial,
the court ruled it was not bound by Bray or Smith . See id. This distinction is
significant in Oklahoma law, and we defer to that determination. See Johnson v.
Fankell , __U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 1800, 1804 (1997) (federal courts do not have
“authority to place a construction on a state statute different from the one
rendered by the highest court of the state”). Moreover, it is a distinction that has
a rational basis, not an arbitrary one, and consequently it does not violate
petitioner’s rights to equal protection or due process of law. Cf. Weatherly v.
State , 733 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (noting that double jeopardy
prohibitions against multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments are “based
on separate policies and are designed to accomplish different objectives”).
Compare Ohio v. Johnson , 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984) (noting that the Double
Jeopardy Clause’s protection against multiple punishment is to constrain the
discretion of the courts to impose punishments greater than those prescribed by
the legislature) with Ashe v. Swenson , 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (asserting that the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against
subsequent prosecutions for charges arising from the same transaction is to
prevent the State from making “repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity” (quoting
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Green v. United States , 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957))). Therefore, we find
petitioner’s reliance on Bray and Smith misplaced. His double jeopardy claim
fails.
B. Admission of Out-of-Court Statements
Mr. Cummings’ five additional challenges are also without merit. First,
petitioner asserts that the admission of statements by non-testifying witnesses
violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, as construed in Bruton v.
United States , 391 U.S. 123 (1968). We find no constitutional error in the trial
court’s treatment of the co-defendants’ out-of-court statements. Although Bruton
prohibits jury consideration of non-testifying co-defendant statements that
incriminate the defendant, see id. at 136-37; Nelson v. O’Neil , 402 U.S. 622, 626-
28 (1971), here, both co-defendants took the stand and were subject to cross-
examination. Moreover, the statements referenced by Mr. Cummings were never
introduced into evidence. One co-defendant denied making the statement the
prosecution sought to admit, and the other testified he could not remember
making the statement. This ended any questioning into these statements.
Additionally, Mr. Cummings’ name was not mentioned at any time during this
testimony. Thus, there was no Bruton error at trial. See Nelson , 402 U.S. at 629-
30 (finding no constitutional error when co-defendant testified and denied an out-
of-court statement implicating defendant); Richardson v. Marsh , 481 U.S. 200,
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211 (1987) (holding that Bruton does not apply where defendant is not
incriminated).
Mr. Cummings also appears to raise a due process claim based on the
alleged admission of these same statements. This claim fails for the same reasons
cited above. Furthermore, we have no authority to consider any error of state law
on habeas review unless it violates federal law. See Estelle v. McGuire , 502 U.S.
62, 68 (1991) (“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding
whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.”). We find no such violation on this issue.
C. Illegal Sentence
Mr. Cummings claims that his convictions were unlawfully enhanced
because the State did not indicate at the preliminary hearing that it would be
charging him AFCF and because the State failed to prove his prior conviction. To
the contrary, the record reveals that the trial court admitted evidence of Mr.
Cummings’ prior conviction at the preliminary hearing and sentencing phase. We
will not grant habeas relief on state court evidentiary rulings unless they rendered
the “‘trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal
constitutional rights.’” Duvall v. Reynolds , 139 F.3d 768, 789 (10th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Hopkinson v. Shillinger , 866 F.2d 1185, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989)), cert.
denied , -- U.S. --, 1998 WL 46480 (Oct. 13, 1998). We find that petitioner was
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not deprived of any federal constitutional rights in the proof and admission of
evidence regarding his prior conviction. Thus, petitioner’s illegal sentence claim
has no merit.
D. Prosecutorial Misconduct
At one point during the trial, the prosecutor told the jury that petitioner had
served only three months of his prior three-year sentence. Mr. Cummings claims
this statement constituted prosecutorial misconduct that was so prejudicial that it
deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree. Habeas relief is available for
prosecutorial misconduct only when the misconduct is so egregious that it renders
the entire trial fundamentally unfair. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo , 416 U.S.
637, 642-48 (1974); Jackson v. Shanks , 143 F.3d 1313, 1322 (10th Cir. 1998). In
making this determination, we consider “the totality of the circumstances,
evaluating the prosecutor’s conduct in the context of the whole trial.” Jackson ,
143 F.3d at 1322. This court has previously elaborated on what this inquiry
entails:
To view the prosecutor’s statements in context, we look first at the
strength of the evidence against the defendant and decide whether the
prosecutor’s statements plausibly could have tipped the scales in
favor of the prosecution. We also ascertain whether curative
instructions by the trial judge, if given, might have mitigated the
effect on the jury of the improper statements. When a prosecutor
responds to an attack made by defense counsel, we evaluate that
response in light of the defense argument. Ultimately, we must
consider the probable effect the prosecutor’s [statements] would have
on the jury’s ability to judge the evidence fairly.
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Hopkinson v. Shillinger , 866 F.2d 1185, 1210 (10th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); accord Fero v. Kerby , 39 F.3d 1462, 1474 (10th Cir.
1994). After reviewing the record, we find that the strong evidence of guilt, the
fact that the remarks occurred at the sentencing phase of the trial, the fact that the
comments were made in response to statements by defense counsel, and the fact
that the trial judge gave careful curative instructions to the jury combine to show
that no fundamental unfairness resulted from the prosecutor’s comments. Cf.
Darden v. Wainwright , 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (finding no unfair trial when
record showed strong evidence of guilt, curative instructions, and fact that
statements were made in response to defense counsel); Jackson , 143 F.3d at 1322(finding that prosecutorial misconduct did not “fundamentally impair” the jury’s
ability to judge the evidence fairly when the record contained “considerable
evidence” of guilt).
E. Denial of Motion to Sever and Treatment of Peremptory Challenges
Finally, Mr. Cummings asserts that the trial court’s treatment of his motion
to sever and his peremptory challenges violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights. Whether the trial court erred in denying severance is generally a question
of state law that is not cognizable on federal habeas appeal, see Bond v.
Oklahoma , 546 F.2d 1369, 1377 (10th Cir. 1976), for a criminal defendant has no
constitutional right to severance unless there is a strong showing of prejudice
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caused by the joint trial, see United States v. Youngpeter , 986 F.2d 349, 353 (10th
Cir. 1993). To make such a showing, the defendant must necessarily disclose
sufficient information to enable the court to make a finding of prejudice. It is this
disclosure that forms the basis of petitioner’s assignment of error. In particular,
petitioner objects to the fact that the trial court, in ruling on his severance motion
and request for peremptory challenges, required him to reveal his theory of
defense in violation of his right to remain silent and his right to a fair trial.
The disclosure of his defense theory prior to trial did not violate
petitioner’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. It is well-
settled that defendants may be required to disclose to the court and to the state
their defenses prior to trial. As the Supreme Court stated in Williams v. Florida :
[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is not violated by a
requirement that the defendant give notice of an alibi defense . . . .
. . . That the defendant faces such a dilemma demanding a
choice between complete silence and presenting a defense has never
been thought an invasion of the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination.
399 U.S. 78, 83-84 (1970). The court did not unconstitutionally compel petitioner
to disclose his defense, and “[n]othing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles
the defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the State’s
case before announcing the nature of his defense.” Id. at 85.
Petitioner also seems to argue that the disclosure of his defense theory to
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the prosecution violated either his Fifth Amendment right to due process of law or
his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. Simply put, petitioner has not provided,
and we have not found, any authority supporting his argument that the disclosure
outside the presence of the jury of information necessary to make a showing of
prejudice to support a severance motion violates the Fifth or Sixth Amendments.
In any event, after reviewing the record in this case, we find that plaintiff
suffered no prejudice from the trial court’s handling of his motion for severance.
Petitioner’s final claim is that he was unfairly limited in his number of
peremptory challenges. The number of peremptory challenges is a matter of state
law that raises no constitutional questions. See Ross v. Oklahoma , 487 U.S. 81,
88 (1988). We may not review this claim.
III.
Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, we deny Mr. Cummings’ habeas
corpus petition. The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
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