Christina Hood v. Suffolk City School Board , 469 F. App'x 154 ( 2012 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-1044
    CHRISTINA G. HOOD,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    SUFFOLK CITY SCHOOL BOARD; DERAN R.           WHITNEY,   Interim
    Superintendent, Suffolk Public Schools,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District
    Judge. (2:10-cv-00500-RAJ-TEM)
    Submitted:   December 21, 2011            Decided:   March 13, 2012
    Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    David S. Bailey, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW GROUP, PLLC, Richmond,
    Virginia, for Appellant.   Wendell Myron Waller, SUFFOLK PUBLIC
    SCHOOLS, Suffolk, Virginia, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Christina Hood, an elementary school teacher employed by
    the School Board of the City of Suffolk, Virginia (the Board),
    brought this action against the Board and Deran R. Whitney, an
    administrator of the Suffolk public school system (collectively,
    the defendants).            In an action brought under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    ,
    Hood    alleged      that    the   defendants      violated    her    constitutional
    right    to    bodily   integrity      by   deliberately       exposing      her    to   a
    harmful workplace environment, which resulted from the presence
    of excessive mold and bacteria in her classroom.                       The district
    court    dismissed      Hood’s     complaint,      holding     that    she    had    not
    stated a cognizable violation of a constitutional right.                            Upon
    our review, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
    I.
    During the 2007-2008 school year, Hood was employed by the
    Board    as    a     fourth    grade   teacher       at     Booker    T.   Washington
    Elementary School (the School).                 When Hood began the school year
    in August 2007, she immediately noticed an elevated level of
    humidity inside the School.             She observed that books and papers
    that had been left in her classroom were “soggy” and warped as a
    result    of       accumulated     moisture.         Hood     also    observed      that
    dehumidifiers were placed throughout the School.
    2
    Several     days          later,       Hood’s        eyes     became       “itchy”      and
    irritated.       By       her    second      week     of    teaching,        Hood    began     to
    experience      serious          reactions          similar       to     those      caused    by
    allergies.      By early September 2007, Hood also thought that she
    may   have    contracted          a    cold     or     a    sinus        infection.          Hood
    additionally      observed            that    several         students       suffered        from
    similar symptoms.
    Based     on        these        considerations,              Hood        requested      a
    dehumidifier from the assistant principal, Christopher Phillips.
    Although Phillips stated that none immediately was available,
    Hood was able to obtain one for use in her classroom.                                 She used
    the   dehumidifier         each       day,    and     found       that    the    dehumidifier
    regularly collected a sufficient amount of water overnight to
    activate the automatic “shut-off” feature of the machine.
    By September 19, 2007, Hood’s symptoms had worsened, and
    she   developed       a    severe        rash   around        her      mouth     that   caused
    swelling.     Hood informed Phillips that she was ill, that she was
    uncertain about the cause, and that she would need to leave work
    to consult a physician.                   During their conversation, Phillips
    stated, “[W]e know there is a mold problem and it comes up
    through the ground in the summertime.”
    Hood    visited       her       primary       care     physician       that     day    and
    received a diagnosis of sinusitis, bronchitis, lip inflammation
    3
    and infection, and mold exposure.                   At that time, Hood received a
    prescription for antibiotics.
    The next day, Hood submitted to the School’s principal,
    Patricia Montgomery, a note from her physician reflecting his
    diagnosis of her condition.                  Before Hood gave Montgomery this
    note,   she   had      been     informed      by    other       teachers         that     school
    administrators         would       order     mold     testing         if    provided       with
    documentation         that    mold    in     the    School      was       causing      illness.
    However,    although         Montgomery      made    a    copy       of    the   physician’s
    note, she took no other immediate action.
    On     September        26,     2007,     a    school       administrator,            Terry
    Napier, visited Hood’s classroom to inquire about her medical
    history    and    symptoms,         and    whether       any    of    the       students    had
    experienced similar problems.                 Hood explained her symptoms, and
    related    that       some    students       also    were      sick       and    had    allergy
    problems.        Additionally, Hood informed Napier that there was
    excessive humidity in the classroom.
    Napier obtained air samples from Hood’s classroom, although
    he was not properly trained in mold sampling.                                At that time,
    Hood was left with the impression that Napier thought that her
    concerns about mold were unfounded.
    When the rash on Hood’s face spread and caused her greater
    discomfort       in    early    October       2007,      Hood     scheduled         two    more
    appointments with her primary care physician.                              Hood’s physician
    4
    concluded that a fungus was the cause of Hood’s rash, and he
    proscribed a strong antifungal cream.
    After    Hood     made    several    inquiries      about   the     mold   test
    results, Montgomery and Napier held a meeting on October 16,
    2007, in which they shared the results with her.                        Referring to
    the results, Napier told Hood that the classroom did not have a
    mold problem, because the mold spore count was higher outside
    than    inside    the       classroom.      Hood   eventually      obtained       these
    results, which revealed instead that levels of certain species
    of mold actually were higher inside the classroom.
    Starting on October 10, 2007, the maintenance staff began
    cleaning Hood’s classroom on a daily basis, rather than on the
    customary weekly schedule.               After their meeting on October 16,
    2007,       Montgomery      informed   Hood     that    her    classroom    would   be
    thoroughly cleaned every night for two weeks, to see if Hood’s
    condition would improve.
    By this point, Hood’s eyes were swollen and the rash on her
    face had worsened.              Her primary care physician instructed her
    not    to    return    to    work   until     October    19,    2007.      When   Hood
    informed Phillips about her physician’s instructions, Phillips
    5
    directed Hood to file a worker’s compensation claim, because she
    would not be compensated for this sick leave. *
    After October 19, 2007, Hood was able to return to work
    briefly.     However, by November 2, 2007, Hood’s condition had
    deteriorated again, and her primary care physician rendered a
    diagnosis of facial fungal dermatitis.                 Hood’s physician also
    instructed    her    that   she    should   no    longer    work     in     the   same
    environment.     When Hood gave Montgomery the physician’s note to
    this effect, Montgomery responded: “What am I supposed to do
    with this? . . . Where else are you going to work, you are a
    teacher?”
    In early November 2007, a mold inspection company, Marine
    Chemist, took mold samples from Hood’s classroom as part of a
    “limited    indoor   evaluation.”       Hood      contends     that      Napier    and
    other administrators at the School deliberately failed to inform
    Marine Chemist about the recent “aggressive cleaning history” of
    Hood’s classroom, which she alleged was a practice employed to
    conceal    the   presence    and    severity      of   mold    at     the    School.
    According to Hood’s complaint, Napier also failed to provide
    Marine    Chemist    with   the    relevant      findings     of    an    inspection
    *
    In November 2007, Hood began communicating with the
    defendants’ workers’ compensation insurance company, attempting
    to qualify for workers’ compensation benefits.      In February
    2008, the insurer denied her claim, and Hood filed a claim with
    the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission, which Hood states
    has not yet been resolved.
    6
    conducted in July 2003, which had found excessive levels of mold
    in the School and concluded that its heating, ventilation, and
    air   conditioning        system    was    unable    to    dehumidify         the    School
    properly.       Hood later obtained a copy of Marine Chemist’s report
    regarding       her    classroom,     which       confirmed       the    presence        of
    multiple species of mold.             Further, this report recommended to
    Napier that a more thorough investigation be conducted in the
    event that Napier received additional complaints.
    At   all    times,    the    Board    was    aware    of   Hood’s       increasing
    health problems.           Hood consulted an additional physician, and
    she began taking steroids to control her symptoms.                                  By late
    November 2007, that physician informed Hood that her allergy
    test results showed that she was very allergic to mold.                                 The
    physician       further    informed       Hood    that,    if    she    did    not     stop
    working    in    the    School,     she    would    continue       to    require       many
    medications and shots.             According to allergy test results, Hood
    had exhibited allergic responses to several species of mold that
    had been identified in her classroom.
    In December 2007, Hood requested that she be transferred to
    another school.           However, there were no vacant positions for
    which Hood was qualified.             The Board did not take any action at
    that time to move Hood to another classroom.
    For the remainder of the school year, the floors of Hood’s
    classroom       were   washed      more    frequently       than       they    had     been
    7
    previously.          Hood alleged that, although these repeated washings
    initially       may    have     removed       some    mold,     the     repeated     washing
    process ultimately caused increased indoor mold growth.
    In June 2008, Hood obtained another mold inspection of her
    classroom.            Even    though     Hood’s       classroom        had   been    cleaned
    repeatedly, the inspection revealed that mold growth was still
    present, as well as excessive moisture.
    Hood      now    takes    several        allergy      medications,       and    expects
    that she will have to take these allergy medications for an
    unknown, extended period of time.
    According        to    Hood,     the     presence       of   excessive        mold    and
    moisture      in      her     classroom        was    not     an     isolated       incident.
    Instead, she alleges that the School had a long history of water
    leaks     and        inadequate       attention         to     maintenance          problems.
    Further,     Hood      stated     that    the       defendants     were      aware    of    the
    condition       of    the    School,     and    of    the     health    risks      that    mold
    exposure posed to its occupants.
    Hood filed a complaint against the defendants in a Virginia
    state court, which the defendants removed to the district court.
    In   an   amended       complaint,       Hood        contended     that      she    had    been
    exposed      to      excessive       levels     of     mold    and     bacteria      in     her
    classroom at the School, which caused her severe and permanent
    allergic     reactions         and    respiratory        difficulties.             Hood    also
    alleged that the defendants engaged in deceitful practices to
    8
    conceal evidence of mold growth at the School, and deliberately
    caused Hood to be exposed to a harmful workplace while fully
    cognizant of the risk to her safety from mold exposure.
    In her amended complaint, Hood brought two causes of action
    pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , which alleged that the defendants
    violated her liberty interest in bodily integrity and deprived
    her of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
    States Constitution.         In her first cause of action, Hood claimed
    that the Board failed to train its employees properly regarding
    mold inspection procedures and remediation, and had a practice
    of    concealing     the   harmful    effects    of    excessive   moisture   and
    mold.        In her second cause of action, Hood claimed that the
    defendants engaged in deliberate acts that created a dangerous
    work environment, which violated her right to bodily integrity.
    The     defendants     filed   a     motion     to    dismiss   Hood’s   amended
    complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
    II.
    The     district     court     characterized       Hood’s    claims    as
    substantive due process claims “based on her right not to be
    harmed by the conditions of the School in which she works.”
    Hood v. Suffolk City Sch. Bd., 
    760 F. Supp. 2d 599
    , 601 (E.D.
    Va. 2010).       Because Hood sought relief under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    ,
    the district correctly observed that Hood was required to allege
    9
    a violation of a cognizable constitutional right.                     
    Id.
         The
    district   court     concluded    that        Hood   failed    to    meet    this
    requirement.     
    Id. at 602
    .
    In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on
    the   Supreme    Court’s    decision     in    Collins   v.   City   of     Harker
    Heights, 
    503 U.S. 115
     (1992), a case in which a § 1983 claim was
    brought on behalf of a city sanitation employee who had died
    from asphyxia while trying to repair a sewer line.                    See Hood,
    
    760 F. Supp. 2d at 601-02
    .              There, the plaintiff alleged “a
    constitutional right to be free from unreasonable risks of harm
    to his body . . . and a constitutional right to be protected
    from the [city’s] custom and policy of deliberate indifference
    toward the safety of its employees.”              Collins, 
    503 U.S. at 117
    .
    The complaint in Collins also alleged that the City violated
    those constitutional rights “by following a custom and policy of
    not training its employees about the dangers” of that workplace,
    namely, the dangers posed by sewer lines and manholes.                
    Id.
    The Supreme Court concluded that “[n]either the text nor
    the history of the Due Process Clause supports [the] claim that
    the governmental employer’s duty to provide its employees with a
    safe working environment is a substantive component of the Due
    Process Clause.”      
    Id. at 126
    .            Therefore, the Court held that
    the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause “does not impose an
    independent     federal    obligation    upon    municipalities      to   provide
    10
    certain minimal levels of safety and security in the workplace.”
    
    Id. at 130
    .
    Considering     the   facts    alleged      in   Hood’s    complaint,       the
    district    court    concluded       that    her   claim     “falls      within    the
    Collins precedent.”          Hood, 
    760 F. Supp. 2d at 602
    .                 Although
    Hood attempted to distinguish the holding in Collins by claiming
    that her liberty interest in bodily integrity had been violated,
    rather than a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
    risk of bodily harm, see Collins, 
    503 U.S. at 117
    , the district
    court did not consider this distinction to be persuasive.                          See
    Hood, 
    760 F. Supp. 2d at 601-02
    .              The district court noted that
    courts have recognized a liberty interest in bodily integrity
    only   in   very   limited    circumstances,       such    as    when    minors    are
    molested by government employees.              
    Id.
     (citing Wragg v. Vill. of
    Thornton, 
    604 F.3d 464
    , 466-68 (7th Cir. 2010) (minor’s claim of
    molestation against government official); Jones v. Wellham, 
    104 F.3d 620
    , 628 (4th Cir. 1997) (woman’s claim of rape against
    police officer); Doe v. Taylor Ind. Sch. Dist., 
    15 F.3d 443
    ,
    450-52   (5th   Cir.    1994)   (en    banc)    (student’s       claim    of   sexual
    abuse against teacher); Hall v. Tawney, 
    621 F.2d 607
    , 609 (4th
    Cir.   1980)    (child’s     claim    against      teacher      that    paddling   in
    school violated the child’s substantive due process rights under
    the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause)).                         The district
    court concluded that Hood had provided neither factual nor legal
    11
    support   for      the     extension      of    substantive          due       process     to    the
    circumstances of her case, in which the harmful conditions of
    Hood’s workplace allegedly caused her injury.                             Id. at 602.
    The district court held that Hood’s substantive due process
    claim    that      the    defendants       violated           her   liberty          interest    in
    bodily    integrity          was     not       a    cognizable             violation        of    a
    constitutional           right.     Id.         Accordingly,             the    district    court
    concluded that Hood had failed to state a claim for which relief
    could    be    granted      under    §     1983,        and    granted         the   defendants’
    motion to dismiss.           Id.    Hood appeals.
    III.
    We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to
    dismiss       an   action    under       Fed.      R.    Civ.       P.    12(b)(6).         Nemet
    Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 
    591 F.3d 250
    , 253
    (4th Cir. 2009).            To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
    must contain factual allegations that “raise a right to relief
    above the speculative level and . . . state a claim to relief
    that is plausible on its face.”                         Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor
    Co., Inc., 
    551 F.3d 218
    , 222 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
    marks omitted).            In conducting this review, we “take the facts
    in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” but we “need not
    accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts.”                                   Giarratano
    12
    v.   Johnson,      
    521 F.3d 298
    ,     302     (4th   Cir.    2008)      (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    We have reviewed the record, the briefs, and the arguments
    presented by the parties in this appeal.                    We conclude, like the
    district court, that Hood asserted a substantive due process
    claim asserting a right to be free from harm caused by the
    dangerous condition of her workplace.                      As the district court
    properly recognized, however, the Supreme Court’s decision in
    Collins has plainly stated that this type of claim does not
    allege a cognizable violation of a federal constitutional right.
    See 
    503 U.S. at 117, 126, 130
    .
    Hood attempts to distinguish the holding in Collins on the
    ground   that,     in    the   present      case,    the   defendants      engaged    in
    deliberate acts that violated her right to bodily integrity, or
    acted with deliberate indifference to that right.                          We find no
    merit in this distinction and agree with the district court that
    Collins is dispositive of Hood’s claim, because Hood’s injury,
    as   alleged,      was    caused    by    the      dangerous      condition    of    her
    workplace    due    to    mold     growth    and    excessive      humidity     in   her
    classroom.    See Hood, 
    760 F. Supp. 2d at 602
    .
    Our conclusion is unaffected by Hood’s characterization of
    her substantive due process claim as being based on a liberty
    interest in bodily integrity, rather than on a constitutional
    right to be free from unreasonable risk of harm to one’s body in
    13
    the workplace.      As we have stated, the Supreme Court’s decision
    in   Collins   is   dispositive     of    Hood’s   described   claim.      We
    therefore affirm the district court’s order dismissing Hood’s
    amended   complaint,   based   on    the   reasons   well   stated    by   the
    district court.
    AFFIRMED
    14