William Chhun v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. , 84 A.3d 419 ( 2014 )

Supreme Court
No. 2012-298-Appeal.
(PC 11-4547)
William Chhun et al. :
v. :
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, :
Inc., et al.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island,
250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone
222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2012-298-Appeal.
(PC 11-4547)
William Chhun et al. :
v. :
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, :
Inc., et al.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on
December 10, 2013, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the
issues raised in this appeal should not be decided summarily. The plaintiffs, William Chhun and
Joli Chhim (plaintiffs), appeal from a Superior Court judgment granting the motion to dismiss of
the defendants, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS),1 Domestic Bank
(Domestic), Aurora Loan Services, LLC (Aurora), and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
(Deutsche Bank) (collectively, defendants). After considering the written and oral arguments
advanced by counsel, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and that this appeal may be
decided at this time. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the judgment of the Superior
Court.
1
For more information on the role of MERS in the mortgage industry, see Bucci v. Lehman
Brothers Bank, FSB, 68 A.3d 1069, 1072-73 (R.I. 2013).
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Facts and Travel
On a motion to dismiss, the facts are gleaned from the complaint; we assume all of the
allegations in the complaint are true and resolve any doubts in favor of the plaintiff. See
Narragansett Electric Co. v. Minardi, 21 A.3d 274, 278 (R.I. 2011). On April 24, 2006, William
Chhun and Joli Chhim executed a mortgage (the mortgage) on 11 Wakefield Avenue in
Cranston. The mortgage identified plaintiffs as “Borrower,” Domestic as “Lender,” and MERS
as “a separate corporation that is acting solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors
and assigns.”2
On September 10, 2010, MERS purported to assign the mortgage to Aurora. The
Corporate Assignment of Mortgage (the assignment) is endorsed by MERS, “as nominee for
Domestic Bank [its] Successors or Assigns.” It is signed by “Theodore Schultz, Vice-President”
(Schultz). The complaint, however, alleges that Schultz “had no authority to assign” the
mortgage. More specifically, plaintiffs allege that Schultz was “an employee of Aurora, not a
Vice-President or Assistant Secretary of MERS.” Furthermore, plaintiffs allege that MERS did
not order the assignment to Aurora.3
On August 5, 2011, plaintiffs filed a three-count complaint, seeking a declaratory
judgment, quiet title, and punitive damages. The complaint alleges that both MERS and Aurora
attempted to invoke the power of sale. Although the complaint does not provide any details
about the foreclosure process, it does allege that “Aurora or the successful bidder at the
2
Although not attached to the complaint, a later filing includes a copy of an adjustable rate note
also signed by William Chhun on April 24, 2006, promising to pay $224,000 in principal plus
interest to Domestic.
3
The plaintiffs also allege that “[t]he assignment from MERS to Aurora is void due to failure of
consideration.”
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foreclosure sale took a foreclosure deed.”4 The plaintiffs requested, inter alia, that the court
declare that the assignment is void, that the foreclosure sale is void, and that plaintiffs own a fee
simple interest in the property.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
assignment of the mortgage and that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The plaintiffs responded with a lengthy pleading in opposition to defendants’ motion.
The Superior Court justice granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that plaintiffs did not have
standing to seek relief based on the assignment because they were neither an assignor nor an
assignee of the assignment. Alternatively, he also concluded that, even if plaintiffs did have
standing, they had “failed to allege facts in their Complaint which ‘raise a right to relief above
the speculative level,’” quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The
Superior Court justice further stated that Aurora properly was the mortgagee prior to the
commencement of foreclosure proceedings and that the identity of the note holder was irrelevant.
Standard of Review
The articulation of the standard of review on a motion to dismiss was raised as an issue in
this case. Under this Court’s traditional explication of the standard, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss should be granted only “when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff
would not be entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of facts that could be proven in
support of the plaintiff’s claim.” Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 149-50 (R.I. 2008) (quoting
Ellis v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 586 A.2d 1055, 1057 (R.I. 1991)); see also
McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217, 225 (R.I. 2005) (“[I]t is our function to examine the
4
In their Rule 12A counterstatement, defendants contend—without citation—that Aurora
conducted a foreclosure sale on August 3, 2011.
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complaint to determine if plaintiffs are entitled to relief under any conceivable set of facts.”). In
undertaking this review, we are “confined to the four corners of the complaint and must assume
all allegations are true, resolving any doubts in plaintiff’s favor.” Minardi, 21 A.3d at 278.
Generally, this Court looks to Federal jurisprudence for guidance or interpretation of
Rule 12(b). See Hall v. Kuzenka, 843 A.2d 474, 476 (R.I. 2004) (“[W]here the Federal rule and
our state rule are substantially similar, we will look to the Federal courts for guidance or
interpretation of our own rule.” Quoting Heal v. Heal, 762 A.2d 463, 466-67 (R.I. 2000)).
Additionally, we have noted that “Rhode Island Rule 12(b) is nearly identical to Rule 12(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Hall, 843 A.2d at 476-77. In recent years, however, the
Federal courts have significantly altered their interpretation of the standard of review applicable
to a motion to dismiss, and the Superior Court justice in this case relied on that interpretation.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Under this
standard, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level,” and a plaintiff must “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.5 “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Significantly, “the Federal Rules do not require courts to credit a
complaint’s conclusory statements without reference to its factual context.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
686. “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”
5
In Twombly, the Supreme Court stated that the “no set of facts” language originating in Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)—and on which this Court’s articulation of the traditional
Rhode Island standard is based—“has earned its retirement.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 562, 563 (2007). Thus, it is clear that the new Federal standard cannot be blended
with the traditional Rhode Island standard.
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Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief * * * [is] a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court has not yet addressed whether continued adherence to our traditional Rhode
Island standard is appropriate or whether the new Federal guide of plausibility should be
adopted. However, we are satisfied that this is not the case to answer such an important question
because our decision under either articulation of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard
would be the same. Accordingly, we leave the Twombly and Iqbal conundrum for another day.
Analysis
Standing
The Superior Court justice held that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
assignment of the mortgage on their home. Recently, this Court held that, in limited
circumstances, “homeowners in Rhode Island have standing to challenge the assignment of
mortgages on their homes to the extent necessary to contest the foreclosing entity’s authority to
foreclose.” Mruk v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., No. 2012-282-A., slip op.
at 13 (R.I., filed Dec. 19, 2013). The plaintiffs in this case contest Aurora’s authority to
foreclose, alleging that the mortgage was not validly assigned. In light of Mruk, we are satisfied
that plaintiffs have standing to prosecute this claim.
The Motion to Dismiss
The Superior Court justice concluded that, even if plaintiffs had standing, their
“allegations with respect to the invalidity of the assignment of the Mortgage interest are merely
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‘conclusory statements’ which are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” Before this
Court, defendants contend that “the Superior Court utilized the Rhode Island pleading standard.”
Although the Superior Court justice stated that “[p]laintiffs’ [c]omplaint cannot survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion even under the more forgiving pleading standard articulated in [Barrette v.
Yakavonis, 966 A.2d 1231 (R.I. 2009) and Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144 (R.I. 2008)],” at the
crucial points of the decision, the Superior Court justice employed Twombly and Iqbal.
Regardless of which standard the decision rests upon, we conclude that the allegations in the
complaint are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under both our traditional standard and
the newer Federal standard.
Paragraph 12 of the complaint alleges: “On or about September 10, 2010, MERS
attempted to assign this Mortgage to Aurora. * * * Theodore Schultz signed. Theodore Schultz
had no authority to assign.” Thus, the plaintiffs have alleged that the one person who signed the
mortgage assignment did not have the authority to do so. This allegation is buttressed by other
allegations in the complaint. Paragraph 13 states that “Theodore Schultz was an employee of
Aurora, not a Vice-President or Assistant Secretary of MERS.” Paragraph 17 alleges that
“MERS did not order the assignment to Aurora.” Finally, paragraph 19 contends that “[n]o
power of attorney from MERS to either Theodore Schultz or Aurora is recorded and referenced
in the subject assignment.” These allegations, if proven, could establish that the mortgage was
not validly assigned, and, therefore, Aurora did not have the authority to foreclose on the
property. Accordingly, the complaint states a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted,
and it is not “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief
from the defendant under any set of facts that could be proven in support of the plaintiff’s
claim.” Palazzo, 944 A.2d at 149-50 (quoting Ellis, 586 A.2d at 1057); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
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678-80 (articulating plausibility standard). Thus, the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion was
improperly granted.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court
and remand the case for further proceedings.
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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE: William Chhun et al. v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
Inc., et al.
CASE NO: No. 2012-298-Appeal.
(PC 11-4547)
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED: February 3, 2014
JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg
SOURCE OF APPEAL: Providence County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice Allen P. Rubine
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For Plaintiffs: George E. Babcock, Esq.
For Defendants: Charles A. Lovell, Esq.