Robert Chiellini v. State of Rhode Island , 95 A.3d 394 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                      Supreme Court
    No. 2012-216-Appeal.
    (PM 01-1761)
    Robert Chiellini                 :
    v.                        :
    State of Rhode Island.              :
    ORDER
    The applicant, Robert Chiellini, appeals from an October 10, 2003 judgment of the
    Superior Court denying his application for postconviction relief.         In 1997, applicant was
    convicted of first-degree murder, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-23-1. He was sentenced to a
    term of life imprisonment, with an additional ten years to serve pursuant to the habitual offender
    statute, G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21. This Court affirmed the judgment of conviction in 2000. State v.
    Chiellini, 
    762 A.2d 450
    (R.I. 2000).
    On April 5, 2001, following this Court’s affirmance of his conviction, applicant filed
    a pro se application for postconviction relief pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1.            In that
    application, he argued that, as a result of what he contended was the ineffective assistance of his
    trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct, his constitutional rights had been violated.
    On April 8, 2002, applicant’s court-appointed attorney moved to withdraw as attorney of
    record; in support of that motion, he filed a “no-merit” memorandum pursuant to Shatney v.
    State, 
    755 A.2d 130
    , 135 (R.I. 2000). According to the attorney’s Shatney memorandum,
    applicant’s claims for postconviction relief were based on the following: (1) that, according to
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    applicant, the justice who presided at applicant’s bail hearing found that “the case presented by
    the State constituted a second degree murder and should be resolved through a plea and [a]
    sentence of twenty-five years to serve;” and (2) that a witness statement (missing from the
    record) indicating that the victim “was breathing on her own” when she arrived at the hospital
    could have been used to show that applicant was not “legally responsible if the emergency room
    physician had caused [the victim’s] death * * * .” The attorney then set forth the reasons for his
    conclusion that, after meeting with applicant and after reviewing “the trial transcript and the
    appellate proceedings,” there was no merit to applicant’s claims. A hearing was held before a
    justice of the Superior Court on the attorney’s motion to withdraw, which hearing applicant
    attended. The attorney’s motion to withdraw was granted, and applicant proceeded pro se on his
    application for postconviction relief.
    The applicant was thereafter afforded two additional hearings (one on February 27 and
    the other on March 25, 2003) before a different justice of the Superior Court. 1 At the February
    27, 2003 hearing, the hearing justice provided applicant with the opportunity to augment the
    record, but applicant did not proffer any additional evidence in support of his claims. At the
    March 25, 2003 hearing, applicant contended for the first time that he had been deprived of the
    effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to inform him of a plea bargain
    (viz., forty-five years to serve in exchange for a guilty plea) offered by the state prior to trial; in
    support of that contention, applicant submitted, among other things, a transcript of a pretrial
    evidentiary hearing held on November 12, 1997. The hearing justice then proceeded to read the
    transcript line-by-line with applicant, focusing particularly on the portions referred to by
    1
    Due to the death of the justice who was initially assigned to applicant’s case, the case was
    assigned to another justice of the Superior Court, who presided at both of the subsequent
    hearings.
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    applicant. However, the hearing justice found that there was nothing in that transcript to support
    applicant’s contention relative to a proposed plea bargain. At the conclusion of the March 25,
    2003 hearing, applicant stated that he did not have any additional evidence to submit in support
    of his claims for postconviction relief. Subsequently, on June 16, 2003, with the permission of
    the court, applicant filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his application.
    On October 10, 2003, the hearing justice issued an order denying applicant’s application
    for postconviction relief. In rendering his decision, the hearing justice concluded as follows:
    “[The applicant] has offered no new relevant evidence. Nor has he
    offered any significant new legal arguments not previously
    considered and rejected as meritless by his post conviction [sic]
    attorney. [The applicant] has utterly failed to show that errors of
    the lawyers who represented him during the underlying trial
    proceedings were so serious as to violate his constitutional right to
    counsel and that his lawyers’ performance[s] were so deficient as
    to prejudice his defense.” (Internal quotation marks and original
    brackets omitted.)
    The applicant filed a timely appeal to this Court.
    The statutory remedy of postconviction relief, as set forth in § 10-9.1-1, is “available to
    any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that the
    conviction violated the applicant’s constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered
    material facts requires vacation of the conviction in the interests of justice.” Lynch v. State, 
    86 A.3d 390
    , 391 (R.I. 2014) (mem.) (internal quotation marks omitted). An applicant seeking
    postconviction relief bears “[t]he burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
    such relief is warranted in his or her case.” Brown v. State, 
    32 A.3d 901
    , 907 (R.I. 2011)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).     In reviewing a denial of postconviction relief, we are
    deferential to the hearing justice’s findings of fact, and we “will not disturb his or her ruling
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    absent clear error or a showing that the [hearing] justice overlooked or misconceived material
    evidence.” Tassone v. State, 
    42 A.3d 1277
    , 1283 (R.I. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    In the applicant’s written submission to this Court, he has summarized the procedural
    posture of the case and his arguments before the Superior Court, but he has failed to indicate the
    precise issues that he is challenging on appeal. It is well-settled that a “mere passing reference to
    an argument * * * , without meaningful elaboration, will not suffice to merit appellate
    review.” State v. Day, 
    925 A.2d 962
    , 974 n. 19 (R.I. 2007); see DeAngelis v. DeAngelis, 
    923 A.2d 1274
    , 1282 n. 11 (R.I. 2007) (“Simply stating an issue for appellate review, without a
    meaningful discussion thereof or legal briefing of the issues, does not assist the Court in focusing
    on the legal questions raised, and therefore constitutes a waiver of that issue.”) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). It was contended at oral argument before this Court that the hearing
    justice, in denying the application for postconviction relief, adopted the conclusions set forth in
    the Shatney memorandum without reconsidering the applicant’s claims in light of the additional
    evidence that the applicant had presented after the applicant’s court-appointed attorney’s motion
    to withdraw was granted. However, as we have previously stated, “this Court will deem as
    waived issues that the appellant fails to brief, despite being addressed at oral argument;”
    accordingly, we hold that the applicant’s contentions in his written submission to this Court and
    at oral argument have been waived. Rice v. State, 
    38 A.3d 9
    , 16 n. 10 (R.I. 2012). And, in any
    event, the contention articulated at oral argument is clearly meritless in view of what transpired
    at the hearing on March 25, 2003.
    We perceive no basis in the record for concluding that the hearing justice clearly erred or
    overlooked or misconceived material evidence in denying the applicant’s postconviction relief
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    application. See 
    Tassone, 42 A.3d at 1283
    . Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
    Superior Court.
    Entered as an Order of this Court this 20th day of June, 2014.
    By Order,
    _____________/s/_______________
    Clerk
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    RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
    Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
    TITLE OF CASE:      Robert Chiellini v. State of Rhode Island.
    CASE NO:            No. 2012-216-Appeal.
    (PM 01-1761)
    COURT:              Supreme Court
    DATE ORDER FILED:   June 20, 2014
    JUSTICES:           Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
    WRITTEN BY:         N/A – Court Order
    JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
    Associate Justice Edwin J. Gale
    ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
    For Applicant: Susan B. Iannitelli, Esq.
    For State: Jeanine P. McConaghy
    Department of Attorney General