State v. Joseph Corcoran ( 2022 )

May 26, 2022
Supreme Court
No. 2020-121-C.A.
(W3/18-464A)
State :
v. :
Joseph Corcoran. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any
typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2020-121-C.A.
(W3/18-464A)
State :
v. :
Joseph Corcoran. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme
Court on April 5, 2022, on appeal by the State of Rhode Island, seeking review of a
Superior Court order granting a motion to suppress all statements made to police
by the defendant, Joseph Corcoran. The state argues that the trial justice erred in
finding that the defendant was in custody at the scene of an automobile collision
and, therefore, erroneously suppressed the statements that the defendant made to
the officers at the time. Additionally, the state avers that the rights the police
officer read to the defendant at the time of his arrest and at the police station were
sufficient to apprise the defendant of his constitutional rights—an issue the trial
justice did not reach. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the order
of the Superior Court.
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Facts and Travel
During the evening of October 23, 2018, Westerly police officer Travis
Nichols arrived at the scene of an accident on Route 78 eastbound in Westerly,
Rhode Island, where he learned from a witness that defendant’s vehicle had struck
a light pole on the side of the ramp approaching Route 78. According to the
witness, after observing the collision, he checked on defendant and noticed that he
smelled of alcohol; the witness shared this information with Officer Nichols and
also identified defendant, who was standing outside of the driver’s-side door of his
vehicle, as the driver of the vehicle that struck the light pole. After speaking with
the witness, Officer Nichols approached defendant and observed damage to the
passenger-side front bumper, hood, and roof of defendant’s vehicle, and that the
vehicle’s airbags had deployed. The light pole was on the ground. Although
defendant did not appear injured and told the officer that he was uninjured, the fact
that the airbags deployed prompted Officer Nichols to request an ambulance.1
While speaking with defendant, Officer Nichols noted the tell-tale signs of
intoxication. The defendant’s eyes were bloodshot and watery; his speech was
slurred; and his breath smelled of alcohol. At that point, Officer Nichols asked
defendant “if he had consumed any alcoholic beverages[,]” to which defendant
1
Officer Nichols testified that it is a typical—and, we suggest, rather prudent—
practice to have someone medically screened when airbags have deployed in a
collision, regardless of whether the person appears injured or not.
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replied, “[N]o.” Officer Nichols then requested that defendant move to the front of
his vehicle, away from the driver’s-side door. Before conducting three field
sobriety tests, Officer Nichols testified, he informed defendant that he had
“suspicions that [defendant] had been drinking, even though he first said that he
hadn’t,” and he proceeded to “ask[] [defendant] again if he had been drinking.”
The defendant then admitted that he had been drinking and that he had consumed
“two beers.” A “backup” police officer, Officer Toscano, arrived at the scene; and,
while Officer Nichols conducted field sobriety tests, which indicated that
defendant was impaired, an ambulance arrived and parked approximately ten feet
in front of defendant’s vehicle on Route 78.
The emergency medical technicians approached defendant, who remained
near Officer Nichols. At that point, Officer Toscano approached Officer Nichols
to report that, after the collision, the witness saw defendant toss something into the
woods bordering the side of the road. Officer Nichols then asked defendant if he
had thrown anything into the woods, to which defendant responded in the negative.
Officer Toscano inspected the area and retrieved a paper bag containing three
empty forty-two-ounce bottles of high-alcohol-content beer.2 When Officer
2
State’s Exhibit 2 presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress in the
Superior Court was a photograph of the empty beer bottles from the paper bag that
was thrown into the woods. Although state’s Exhibit 5, the Influence Report Form
from the date of the arrest, states that he consumed two “40 oz” beers, the
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Nichols again asked defendant if he had thrown the bag into the woods, defendant
responded, “[Y]es.” At that point, Officer Nichols testified, “while Patrolman
Toscano stood by with the suspect,” he retrieved a preliminary breath test from his
patrol vehicle and asked defendant to take the test. (Emphasis added.) The
defendant agreed to submit to the test, which registered at a level of 0.201. He was
placed under arrest “for suspicion of DUI.”
After he arrested defendant and placed him in the police cruiser, Officer
Nichols read defendant a “Rights For Use At Scene” card, which provided:
“You are suspected of driving while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor and/or drugs.
“You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to
answer any questions or give statements. If you do
answers questions or give statements, they can and will
be used in evidence against you in court. You have the
right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one
will be provided for you.
“You have the right to be examined at your own expense
immediately by a physician selected by you. You will be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to exercise this right.”3
photograph displays three bottles of “Steel Reserve,” each indicating “42 ounce”
on the label.
3
Officer Nichols did not read the reverse side of the “Rights For Use At Scene”
card to defendant, which is titled “Constitutional Rights” and provides, in full, that:
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Upon arriving at the Westerly police station, Officer Nichols read defendant the
“Rights For Use At Station/Hospital” form, which provided, in pertinent part, that:
“You are under arrest for operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor * * *.
“You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to
answer any questions or give statements. If you do
answer questions or give statements, they can and will be
used in evidence against you in court. You have the right
to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will
be provided for you.”
After defendant was allowed a confidential phone call, Officer Nichols filled
out an “Influence Report Form” while asking defendant a series of questions and
recording his answers. The defendant admitted that he had been operating a
“1) You have the right to remain silent. You do not have
to give a statement or answer any questions.
“2) If you give up your right to remain silent, anything
you say can and will be used against you in a Court of
Law.
“3) You have the right to the presence of a lawyer and to
talk with a lawyer before and during any questioning.
“4) If you cannot afford a lawyer and you want one, a
lawyer will be appointed for you at no cost to you before
any questioning.
“5) If you do talk to the police, you can stop at any time.
“6) These are your Constitutional Rights, do you
understand them?”
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vehicle, that he had drunk two forty-ounce bottles of beer, and that he was under
the influence of alcohol. The defendant also agreed to take additional chemical
tests. The foregoing events led to defendant being charged with driving under the
influence of alcohol, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.
The defendant filed a motion to suppress his roadside admissions that he had
been drinking, as to the amount of alcohol he had consumed, and that he tossed the
empty beer bottles into the woods (the on-the-scene statements), on the basis that
those statements were the product of a custodial interrogation without being
advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The
defendant also sought to suppress the statements that were made and recorded in
the Influence Report Form at the police station (the recorded statements), on the
basis that the rights cards that Officer Nichols read to him did not fully and
adequately inform him of his right to have an attorney present during questioning
or of his right to exercise this or other Miranda rights at any point during the
interrogation.
Following an evidentiary hearing, at which Officer Nichols testified and
documents were admitted, the trial justice found that defendant was in custody at
the time he made the challenged admissions because “no reasonable person would
feel as though he was free to leave the scene” after defendant was relocated to the
roadside for further investigation and the officer expressed his disbelief about
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defendant’s statement that he had not been drinking. As a result, the trial justice
suppressed the on-the-scene statements as products of a custodial interrogation in
the absence of the requisite Miranda warnings. The trial justice also found that
“any further statements uttered, or written, by [defendant] during this continued
custodial interrogation, [were] inadmissible as fruits of the poisoned tree.”
Consequently, the trial justice granted defendant’s motion to suppress all
statements made to the police on the night of his arrest. An order entered, and the
state filed a timely appeal.
Standard of Review
“It is well settled that this Court ‘will reverse a trial justice’s findings on a
motion to suppress only if (1) his or her findings concerning the challenged
statements reveal clear error, and (2) our independent review of the conclusions
drawn from the historical facts establishes that the defendant’s federal
constitutional rights were denied.’” State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 513 (R.I.
2004) (quoting State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1044 (R.I. 2000)). “With respect
to questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact involving constitutional
issues, however, this Court engages in a de novo review[.]” State v. Jimenez, 33
A.3d 724, 732 (R.I. 2011) (quoting State v. Linde, 876 A.2d 1115, 1124 (R.I.
2005)); see State v. Parra, 941 A.2d 799, 803 (R.I. 2007) (“We * * * conduct a de
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novo review of the record and independently consider whether a defendant’s rights
have been violated.”).
Analysis
The state contends that the trial justice clearly erred in finding that
“defendant’s freedom of movement was * * * curtailed in such a way prior to his
actual arrest so as to constitute custody” and erred in considering the officer’s
suspicion of defendant’s intoxication as a factor in determining whether defendant
was in custody.
“Both the United States and the Rhode Island Constitutions forbid the use of
a defendant’s involuntary confession.” State v. Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 790 (R.I.
2007). “The Fifth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] provides: ‘No
person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself[.]’” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 428 (1984) (quoting U.S. Const.,
Amend. V). “In accordance with the crucially important holding in Miranda[,]
* * * before a confession can be used at trial, the state must establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his or
her right against self-incrimination[.]” Monteiro, 924 A.2d at 790.
To safeguard this right, “prior to custodial interrogation a suspect must
receive explicit warnings concerning his constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to counsel.” Grayhurst, 852 A.2d at 513 (quoting State
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v. Amado, 424 A.2d 1057, 1061 (R.I. 1981)); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 478-
79. However, the warnings under Miranda, and exclusion of statements in
violation thereof, are only required when a person is in custody and is undergoing
interrogation by the police. E.g., State v. Edwards, 810 A.2d 226, 239 (R.I. 2002).
“Absent a formal arrest[,]” Edwards, 810 A.2d at 240, a person is in custody
“if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that he or
she was not free to leave.” Jimenez, 33 A.3d at 732 (quoting State v. Vieira, 913
A.2d 1015, 1020 (R.I. 2007)). “In making this determination, a court may consider
the following factors: (1) the extent to which the person’s freedom is curtailed; (2)
the degree of force employed by the police; (3) the belief of a reasonable, innocent
person in identical circumstances; and (4) whether the person had the option of not
accompanying the police.” State v. Briggs, 756 A.2d 731, 737 (R.I. 2000) (quoting
State v. Diaz, 654 A.2d 1195, 1204 (R.I. 1995)); see Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 428(recognizing that a person is in custody when “deprived of his [or her] freedom of
action in any significant way”) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
Applying these factors to the present case, we are satisfied that the trial
justice correctly determined that defendant was in custody when he made the
incriminating statements to Officer Nichols at the scene of the accident. We are
unmoved by the state’s averment, citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439, and Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), that this case should be compared to an ordinary traffic
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stop for suspicion of driving under the influence, or to a case where there was a
jurisdictional issue underlying the defendant’s arrest, citing State ex rel. Town of
Little Compton v. Simmons, 87 A.3d 412 (R.I. 2014). See Simmons, 87 A.3d at 413
(considering whether Little Compton police officers arrested the defendant
illegally in the Town of Tiverton or lawfully in the Town of Little Compton).
In the case at bar, the officer was called to the scene of a single-vehicle
collision and was informed by the roadside witness that defendant crashed into the
light pole as he approached Route 78 from the on-ramp and, in the witness’s
opinion, smelled of alcohol. Officer Nichols approached defendant, who was out
of his vehicle, and observed a light pole on the ground; damage to the body of
defendant’s vehicle; airbags that had deployed; and defendant’s bloodshot and
watery eyes, slurred speech, and alcohol-tainted breath. Beyond that point and
until defendant was informed of his arrest, a police officer at all times remained
with defendant. Although there was no force employed by the police, defendant’s
freedom of movement was curtailed by the watchful accompaniment of either
Officer Nichols or Officer Toscano throughout the investigation and interrogation,
whereby defendant admitted to consuming the ubiquitous “two beers.”
Furthermore, in the context of these events, no further restriction on defendant’s
freedom and no amount of force were necessary to satisfy a factfinder that
defendant was in custody. See United States v. Mittel-Carey, 493 F.3d 36, 40 (1st
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Cir. 2007) (considering, relevant to the custody calculus—namely, the physical
control agents exerted over the defendant—that the defendant was escorted by
agents on the three occasions he was permitted to move to different areas in his
home).
With respect to the trial justice’s finding that defendant was in custody once
he was relocated and then questioned a second time about alcohol consumption by
an officer who was armed with all the indicia of an individual who had been
driving under the influence, we are of the opinion that a factfinder could conclude
that no reasonable person would feel free to leave. Although the state contends
that Officer Nichols’s mere suspicion of defendant’s intoxication is not a factor to
the custody determination, we deem this argument unavailing. “[A]n investigating
officer’s unarticulated plan has no bearing on whether a person is in custody at a
particular time.” Briggs, 756 A.2d at 737 (quoting Diaz, 654 A.2d at 1204-05).
However, “[t]he lack of any communication concerning the * * * investigation is
crucial” and factors into how a reasonable, innocent person would assess the
situation and his or her freedom to leave. Diaz, 654 A.2d at 1205 (emphasis
added). This inquiry turns on whether the objective of the investigation is
disclosed to a suspect, as the United States Supreme Court has explained:
“It is well settled, then, that a police officer’s subjective
view that the individual under questioning is a suspect, if
undisclosed, does not bear upon the question whether the
individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda. * * *
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Save as they are communicated or otherwise manifested
to the person being questioned, an officer’s evolving but
unarticulated suspicions do not affect the objective
circumstances of an interrogation or interview, and thus
cannot affect the Miranda custody inquiry.” Stansbury v.
California, 511 U.S. 318, 324 (1994) (emphasis added).
In fact, Officer Nichols’s suspicion that defendant had been drinking was
articulated to defendant and, thus, was not a mere subjective opinion without
consequence to the custody determination. After coming to a conclusion on
defendant’s physical state due to the initial circumstances—such as the light pole
on the ground; the witness’s statements; the deployed airbags and damaged
vehicle; and the appearance, speech, and odor of alcohol—Officer Nichols directed
defendant to move to a different location. He then informed defendant of the
officer’s belief that defendant had been untruthful about drinking and asked him
once again if he had been drinking, followed by failed field sobriety tests, further
questioning, and a preliminary breath test. Once Officer Nichols communicated
his suspicion to defendant, any reasonable person—innocent or not—would have
understood, based on the objective indicia, that he or she was being investigated
for the crime of driving under the influence and was not free to leave. See Diaz,
654 A.2d at 1205. In addition, Officer Nichols made it clear in his testimony that
he would not have “let [defendant] walk away” from the scene.
The state assigns error to the trial justice’s failure to articulate each of the
custodial factors in her determination that “no reasonable person would feel as
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though he was free to leave the scene.” However, these factors, discussed supra,
are designed to direct the trial justice’s attention to the factual circumstances in a
given case, which can include myriad situations. Briggs, 756 A.2d at 737 (listing
four factors a court may consider in determining whether “[a] person is seized or
under arrest”); see Diaz, 654 A.2d at 1204. The analysis, which the trial justice
appropriately undertook, is whether, in the totality of the circumstances, “a
reasonable person would believe that he or she was not free to leave.” Jimenez, 33
A.3d at 732 (quoting Vieira, 913 A.2d at 1020). Accordingly, the trial justice
correctly granted defendant’s motion to suppress his on-the-scene statements.
Lastly, the state argues that the recorded statements made by defendant at
the police station after his arrest and recorded in the Influence Report Form should
not have been suppressed because the Miranda warnings given to defendant upon
his arrest and again at the police station were sufficient to apprise defendant of his
constitutional rights. However, the trial justice did not reach the issue of the
sufficiency of the warnings in the context of the questioning at the police station.
As discussed supra, the trial justice suppressed the recorded statements made by
defendant at the police station as “fruits of the poisoned tree.” The state’s
contention on appeal that the post-arrest Miranda warnings given to defendant by
police officers were constitutionally sufficient neither addresses nor assigns error
to the trial justice’s reasons for suppressing those post-arrest recorded statements.
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Therefore, because the trial justice did not address the issue of the
sufficiency of the Miranda warnings in the trial court in the first instance, and
because the state failed to address the trial justice’s decision to suppress the
statements as fruit of the poisonous tree, the issue of the sufficiency of the later-
given Miranda warnings is not properly before this Court. See Barnes v. Rhode
Island Public Transit Authority, 242 A.3d 32, 36-37 (R.I. 2020) (“[S]imply stating
an issue for appellate review, without a meaningful discussion thereof or legal
briefing of the issues, does not assist the Court in focusing on the legal questions
raised, and therefore constitutes a waiver of that issue.”) (emphasis added)
(quoting Fisher v. Applebaum, 947 A.2d 248, 252 (R.I. 2008)); see also Girard v.
Sorel, 85 R.I. 43, 44, 125 A.2d 212, 212 (1956) (“It is well settled that to bring up
for review an alleged error in any * * * ruling made during trial, separate reasons
of appeal specifying each alleged erroneous action must appear in the reasons of
appeal.”). Accordingly, we decline to reach this issue and take no position on its
correctness.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the order of the Superior Court. The
papers in this case may be returned to the Superior Court.
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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case State v. Joseph Corcoran.
No. 2020-121-C.A.
Case Number
(W3/18-464A)
Date Opinion Filed May 26, 2022
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg
Source of Appeal Washington County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Melanie Wilk Thunberg
For State:
Mariana E. Ormonde
Attorney(s) on Appeal Department of Attorney General
For Defendant:
Nicholas J. Parrillo, Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)