In re Joseph C. , 178 A.3d 288 ( 2018 )

February 20, 2018
Supreme Court
No. 2015-324-Appeal.
(04-2556-4)
In re Joseph C. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250
Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-
3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2015-324-Appeal.
(04-2556-4)
In re Joseph C. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Robinson, for the Court. The juvenile respondent, Joseph C., appeals from a
May 22, 2015 judgment of the Family Court finding him delinquent for committing first-degree
robbery as well as conspiracy to commit robbery. This case came before the Supreme Court
pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this
appeal should not be summarily decided. After a close review of the record and careful
consideration of the parties’ arguments (both written and oral), we are satisfied that cause has not
been shown and that this appeal may be decided at this time. For the reasons set forth in this
opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Family Court.
I
Facts and Travel
On March 2, 2015, the Providence Police Department filed two delinquency petitions in
the Family Court against respondent, alleging that he had committed two offenses that, if
committed by an adult, would constitute the felony offenses of first-degree robbery, in violation
of G.L. 1956 § 11-39-1, and conspiracy to commit robbery, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-1-6. A
trial was held before a justice of the Family Court on May 21 and 22, 2015. We summarize
below the salient aspects of what transpired at that trial.
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A
The Testimony of Officer Juan Rodrigues
Officer Juan Rodrigues was the first witness to testify. He stated that, on March 1, 2015,
he was working as a patrol officer in Providence and that, at approximately 7:00 p.m. on that
date, he was dispatched to a reported armed robbery at a business that was both a gas station and
a convenience store located at the corner of Manton Avenue and Sheridan Street in Providence
(the Manton Avenue store). Officer Rodrigues testified that he and his partner responded first to
the Manton Avenue store and then left to search for suspects along the bicycle path at the end of
Sheridan Street, which path he entered on foot. He further testified that, while walking on the
bicycle path, he was approached by a male, who was detained and searched. Officer Rodrigues
further stated that he did not find any weapons on the suspect’s person, but he said that he
followed the tracks of the suspect’s footprints in the snow (a blizzard then being in progress) to a
point off the path, where the officer located a BB gun, gloves, and a ski mask approximately
twenty feet from where the suspect was apprehended.
B
The Testimony of Officer Miguel Mena-Torres
Officer Miguel Mena-Torres testified next. He stated that, at approximately 7:00 p.m. on
March 1, 2015, he was on duty as a patrol officer in Providence when he received a call about a
robbery “at gun point;” he said that he responded to the scene of the reported robbery by driving
to Glenbridge Avenue in Providence, near a bicycle path. He testified that, as he approached the
bicycle path on foot, he saw two people running up a hill, one of whom would later identify
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himself as D.M.1 Officer Mena-Torres stated that, after briefly giving chase, he ordered D.M. to
“get down on the ground” and that D.M. complied. The officer testified that he then searched
D.M. and found in his possession a BB gun and $36.00 in one dollar bills.
C
The Testimony of Detective Robert Melaragno
Detective Robert Melaragno testified that, at around 7:15 p.m. on March 1, 2015, he
“monitored a call” about a robbery at the Manton Avenue store. He stated that he responded to
the store and spoke with Mamuad Bekra2—the store clerk on duty at the time of the reported
robbery; the detective added that, while at the store, he watched a portion of the store’s video
surveillance footage.3
Detective Melaragno further testified that he returned to the police station from the
Manton Avenue store and interviewed4 respondent who, in the presence of his mother, confessed
to committing two acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offenses of first-
degree robbery and conspiracy. The detective added that respondent admitted that he had called a
friend, one K.J., between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. on the evening in question and that, in the
detective’s words, respondent and K.J. “discussed committing the robbery.” It was Det.
Melaragno’s further testimony that respondent said that he had gone to K.J.’s house and that,
“when he arrived there[,] [D.M.] was also at [K.J.]’s house” and the three individuals “discussed
1
Recognizing their possible status as minors, we will refer to the individuals allegedly
involved in the robbery at the Manton Avenue store by their initials only.
2
The record on appeal refers to the clerk on duty at the Manton Avenue store as both
“Mohned Bekra” and “Mamuad Bekra;” we shall hereinafter refer to that person simply as Mr.
Bekra.
3
The trial justice did not admit the surveillance video as a full exhibit, sustaining
respondent’s objection on chain-of-custody grounds.
4
The detective testified that he informed respondent of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and that respondent signed a form waiving those rights.
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committing the robbery.” Detective Melaragno testified that respondent explained that the two
BB guns used during the robbery “came from” two different neighbors and that the three
individuals who had met at K.J.’s house went by cab to the Manton Avenue store. He testified
that respondent stated that, when the cab arrived at the store, D.M. and K.J. “entered the store
before [respondent]” carrying the BB guns and that D.M. and K.J. “told the [store] clerk to get
on the floor and open the register.” Detective Melaragno added that respondent explained that he
then “went around the counter” and “emptied the cash out of the register” and that the three
individuals “fled from the store” and headed towards Merino Park, near the bicycle path. The
detective stated that respondent admitted to dropping the BB gun, a pair of gloves, and a ski
mask in the snow as the police approached. At trial, Det. Melaragno identified the BB gun, ski
mask, and gloves which were recovered by Officer Rodrigues on the night of the robbery.
Detective Melaragno further stated that, during his interview of respondent, he showed
him two photographs and that respondent identified the individuals depicted in those
photographs as K.J. and D.M. and acknowledged that both of them had “accompanied him in the
robbery.” The recording of Det. Melaragno’s interview with respondent was admitted into
evidence as a full exhibit at trial.
D
The Testimony of Nameer Jajou
The next witness was Nameer Jajou, who stated that he was part-owner of the Manton
Avenue store and that he had been working with Mr. Bekra on March 1, 2015 before leaving at
approximately 7:20 or 7:30 p.m. Mr. Jajou testified that, shortly before he left the store, he
observed that the cash register had between $400.00 and $500.00 in it. Mr. Jajou further testified
that, approximately ten or fifteen minutes after leaving the store, he received a telephone call
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from Mr. Bekra that caused him to return to the store; Mr. Jajou added that, when he arrived
back at the store, the police were on the scene and that “the cash register [was] broken” and
“[e]mpty.” It was Mr. Jajou’s testimony that the store had surveillance cameras, which recorded
what occurred on March 1, 2015, and that a disk of the video surveillance footage was given to
the police.
E
The Parties’ Arguments
During her closing argument, counsel for respondent contended that the trial justice was
confronted with “a corpus delecti [sic] problem” which required dismissal of the charges because
“[t]here [wa]s not enough evidence to be submitted as to a robbery taking place or a conspiracy
taking place.”5 Counsel argued that there was not sufficient evidence for the court to find beyond
a reasonable doubt that the Manton Avenue store had been robbed, contending that the state had
shown neither that Mr. Bekra had been “put in fear” nor that he had had “anything * * * taken
away from him.” Based on the purportedly insufficient evidence, counsel claimed that “[t]here
[wa]s a serious corpus delecti [sic] issue,” which required the trial justice to exclude
respondent’s confession from evidence. In response, the state argued that there was evidence
establishing that a robbery had been committed, contending as follows:
“[T]his robbery is fully [corroborated] both by the evidence on
scene with both the two particular suspects, this Respondent as
well as [D.M.], who were apprehended with evidence of the crime,
as well as the evidence that a crime was committed at the gas
5
On appeal, the state suggests that respondent has waived the corpus delicti argument
because he raised said argument for the first time during his closing argument. In our view, the
better practice would have been to raise the corpus delicti argument at the time the confession
was offered into evidence. However, we note that this Court has never indicated just when a
corpus delicti objection must be made; accordingly, we shall not, in the context of this case,
address the argument as to possible waiver.
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station as told by the store owner who said between four hundred
and five hundred dollars was taken.”
The state further argued that the corpus delicti relative to the conspiracy charge had been
established on the basis of an inference “from both the conduct and the actions of three
individuals robbing a gas station” and also on the basis of respondent’s confession at the police
station.
F
The Trial Justice’s Decision
After the closing arguments were concluded, the trial justice ruled from the bench,
finding that the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent had “commit[ed] a
robbery” and had “conspired * * * to commit this crime of robbery.” The trial justice reviewed
the testimony of each of the state’s witnesses, accepting their testimonies as true. She gave great
weight to Det. Melaragno’s testimony and said that his testimony had “tied all the pieces
together.” The trial justice further stated that she “couldn’t disagree more” with respondent’s
argument that the corpus delicti as to the crimes charged had not been established. She cited
respondent’s “own admission[s]” as well as other circumstantial evidence as support for her
conclusion that the crimes of first-degree robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery of the
Manton Avenue store had been committed.6 Accordingly, the trial justice found respondent
delinquent on both charges. The respondent filed a timely notice of appeal.
6
In the course of her decision, the trial justice stated that Mr. Bekra had “positively
identified” D.M. and respondent as two of the individuals who robbed the Manton Avenue store.
We note that the record does not reflect that Mr. Bekra positively identified anyone;
consequently, the trial justice erred in so stating. However, we conclude that this error was
harmless; there is more than enough additional evidence in the record to sustain the trial justice’s
finding as to respondent’s guilt.
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II
Standard of Review
It is well established that, “[i]n reviewing findings of fact by a trial justice in a
delinquency adjudication, we apply a deferential standard of review.” In re J.S., 91 A.3d 845,
850 (R.I. 2014); see also In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204, 209 (R.I. 2008) (stating that, in view of
our “substantial deference to the findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury, * * * [we] will
not disturb those findings unless the trial justice has overlooked or misconceived material
evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong.”). On appeal, we review the record “to determine
therefrom whether legally competent evidence exists therein to support the findings made by the
Family Court trial justice.” In re Malik D., 730 A.2d 1070, 1072 (R.I. 1999).
III
Analysis
A
Issues Raised on Appeal
The only pertinent issue raised on appeal is whether the state has met its burden of
establishing the corpus delicti of the crimes of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery such
that respondent’s confession was properly admitted into evidence. If the state met its burden in
that regard, then respondent’s appeal is without merit and the trial justice’s adjudication of
delinquency, which was based in large part on respondent’s confession, must be upheld.
The respondent contends that there was insufficient independent evidence that the
charged crimes had actually occurred and that, therefore, the trial justice erred when she
considered his confession in her decision. With respect to the robbery charge, respondent argues
that the state failed to produce sufficient independent evidence to establish that “the ‘gist’ of the
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robbery * * * had occurred.” He bases his argument on the fact that Mr. Bekra did not testify at
trial and on the fact that the video surveillance footage was excluded from evidence; he further
argues that, while reasonable inferences are allowed in a corpus delicti analysis, the “discovery
of an empty, broken cash register cannot, on its own, lead one to infer a robbery * * *.” With
respect to the conspiracy charge, respondent contends that, apart from his own confession, “there
was no evidence that indicated that anyone knowingly engage[d] in a mutual plan to do a
forbidden act.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) He argues that, other than his own
confession, the record was completely devoid of “any independent evidence of an agreement,
coordination, or planning by anyone on March first.” (Emphasis in original.) Additionally,
respondent challenges the trial justice’s finding that Mr. Bekra “positively identified” respondent
as one of the men who robbed him, arguing that there was no legally competent evidence in the
record to support this finding and that, therefore, the trial justice misconceived material evidence.
B
Corpus Delicti7
The operative principles relative to the corpus delicti rule are summarized with admirable
clarity and cogency in our opinion in the case of State v. Angell, 122 R.I. 160, 405 A.2d 10(1979). We explicitly expressed therein our agreement with “the principle that the corpus delicti
of a crime must be established before extrajudicial confessions or admissions connecting the
accused with the crime are admissible into evidence.” Id. at 165, 405 A.2d at 13. We then
7
A valuable historical perspective on the corpus delicti rule can be found in the following
comprehensive article: Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde the Defendant’s Confession,
103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 638 (1955). See also Thomas A. Mullen, Rule Without Reason: Requiring
Independent Proof of the Corpus Delicti as a Condition of Admitting an Extrajudicial
Confession, 27 U.S.F. L. Rev. 385 (1993). The corpus delicti rule is also thoroughly discussed in
Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.4(b) (3d ed. 2018).
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proceeded to elaborate as follows on just what the prosecution is required to establish for the
confession of the accused to be admitted:
“The prosecution is thus required to establish the corpus delicti
through the production of sufficient direct or circumstantial
evidence to establish that the crime charged was committed,
regardless of who may have committed it. * * * We are of the
opinion that only prima facie proof of corpus delicti must be
established prior to the introduction of defendant’s admissions [or]
confessions.” Id. (emphasis added).
And we have specifically “emphasized that the so-called corpus delicti need not be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt before the admission can be admitted into evidence.” State v. Wilbur,
115 R.I. 7, 14, 339 A.2d 730, 734 (1975). In Wilbur, we stated that there need only be “some
corroborative evidence tending to prove the corpus delicti * * *.” Id. at 13, 339 A.2d at 734.
Once a defendant’s confession has been admitted into evidence, it “may be used to prove
both the fact that the crime was committed and the defendant’s agency therein.” State v. Boswell,
73 R.I. 358, 363, 56 A.2d 196, 198 (1947); see also State v. Jacobs, 21 R.I. 259, 261, 43 A. 31,
32 (1899) (“The confession is evidence tending to prove both the fact that the crime was
committed and the defendant’s agency therein.”).
1. Robbery
It is our view that there was sufficient legally competent evidence to support the trial
justice’s finding that there was a robbery of the Manton Avenue store. See In re Richard A., 946
A.2d at 209. Accordingly, respondent’s corpus delicti contention is unavailing.
As defined by our case law, robbery is “the felonious and forcible taking from the person
of another of goods or money [of] any value by violence or [by] putting [the victim] in fear.”
State v. Tully, 110 A.3d 1181, 1193 (R.I. 2015) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The trial justice found that the state met its obligation relative to establishing that a
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robbery had occurred; she noted that the state’s witnesses provided ample evidence, independent
of respondent’s confession, that money was forcibly taken from the Manton Avenue store on
March 1, 2015. She specifically highlighted the following evidence in her decision:
(1) statements from Det. Melaragno, Officer Rodrigues, and Officer Mena-Torres that they each
received a report of a robbery at the Manton Avenue store around 7:00 p.m. on that date;
(2) statements from Officers Rodrigues and Mena-Torres that they apprehended two young men
on the bicycle path near the Manton Avenue store and that they located firearms, a ski mask, and
a pair of gloves on or near the young men at the time of their apprehensions; and (3) Mr. Jajou’s
testimony that, when he returned to the store in response to Mr. Bekra’s phone call, the police
were already on the scene, the cash register was “broken,” and $400.00 to $500.00 was missing.
We conclude that the trial justice’s factual findings constitute legally competent evidence
upon which the trial justice could base her decision that the state established the corpus delicti of
robbery. Angell, 122 R.I. at 165, 405 A.2d at 13. The record also reflects that several different
officers in the Providence Police Department received reports of an “armed robbery” or a
robbery “at gun point” at the Manton Avenue store on the evening of March 1, 2015.
Accordingly, the trial justice did not err when she admitted respondent’s confession into
evidence and then relied on the confession in her decision adjudicating him delinquent for having
committed first-degree robbery. See Boswell, 73 R.I. at 363, 56 A.2d at 198.
2. Conspiracy
It is further our view that the trial justice did not err in finding that there existed a
conspiracy to commit a robbery of the Manton Avenue store and that respondent participated in
that conspiracy. See In re Richard A., 946 A.2d at 209. It is well settled that “the gist of a
conspiracy is the unlawful combination of two or more persons to do an unlawful act or a lawful
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act for an unlawful purpose with the offense being complete once the agreement is made.” State
v. Berroa, 6 A.3d 1095, 1103 (R.I. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover,
“[b]ecause conspiracy rarely can be proven by direct evidence, illegal confederacy may be
inferentially established by proof of the relation, conduct, circumstances and acts of the parties.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The trial justice made the following findings of fact in this regard: (1) that the above-
referenced police officers received reports of a robbery at the Manton Avenue store; (2) that both
respondent and D.M. were apprehended on or near the bicycle path close to the Manton Avenue
store within thirty minutes of the call reporting a robbery at that store; (3) that D.M. was carrying
a BB gun and approximately $36.00 on his person at the time of his arrest; and (4) that
respondent’s footprints in the snow led to another BB gun, a pair of black gloves, and a black ski
mask, all located approximately twenty feet from where respondent was arrested. These facts
constitute circumstantial evidence of the “conduct, circumstances and acts” of respondent and
D.M. on the night of the robbery and provide a basis for an inference of the existence of a
conspiracy to commit a robbery of the Manton Avenue store. Berroa, 6 A.3d at 1103 (internal
quotation marks omitted). As a result, we conclude that the state produced sufficient independent
evidence of the corpus delicti of the crime of conspiracy to commit robbery. Angell, 122 R.I. at
165, 405 A.2d at 13. Accordingly, the trial justice did not err in admitting respondent’s
confession into evidence and, once admitted, the state was free to use the confession as evidence
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent “knowingly engage[d] in a mutual plan” to
commit robbery. State v. Gilman, 110 R.I. 207, 218, 291 A.2d 425, 432 (1972).
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C
Confession
We conclude that the state established the corpus delicti of both first-degree robbery and
conspiracy to commit robbery and, as a result, the trial justice did not err in admitting
respondent’s confession. Once the confession was admitted, the trial justice was free to rely on
that confession in her determination that respondent was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Boswell, 73 R.I. at 363, 56 A.2d at 198; see also Jacobs, 21 R.I. at 261, 43 A. at 32. Because the
contents of respondent’s confession, coupled with the other circumstantial evidence admitted at
trial, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent conspired to, and did in fact, perpetrate a
robbery of the Manton Avenue store on March 1, 2015, it is our view that the trial justice did not
err when she adjudicated respondent delinquent.
Accordingly, having closely scrutinized the record and bearing in mind the well-settled
principles that govern our review in this context, we perceive no reason to disturb the ruling of
the Family Court.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Family Court. The
record in this case may be remanded to that tribunal.
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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case In re Joseph C.
No. 2015-324-Appeal.
Case Number (04-2556-4)
Date Opinion Filed February 20, 2018
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and
Justices
Indeglia, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice William P. Robinson III
Source of Appeal Providence County Family Court
Judicial Officer From Lower Court Associate Justice Kathleen A.Voccola
For Petitioner:
Jane M. McSoley
Department of Attorney General
For Respondent:
Attorney(s) on Appeal
Angela M. Yingling
Office of the Public Defender
Mark Hirschboeck
Rule 9 Student Attorney
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2016)