Rhode Island American Federation of Teachers/Retired Local 8037 v. Johnston School Committee , 212 A.3d 156 ( 2019 )

June 19, 2019
Supreme Court
No. 2018-51-Appeal.
(PC 15-3044)
Rhode Island American Federation of :
Teachers/Retired Local 8037 et al.
v. :
Johnston School Committee et al. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island,
250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at (401) 222-
3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2018-51-Appeal.
(PC 15-3044)
Rhode Island American Federation of :
Teachers/Retired Local 8037 et al.
v. :
Johnston School Committee et al. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on
March 28, 2019, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the
issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. The defendants, the Town of
Johnston, the Johnston School Department, the Johnston School Committee, and various
municipal officials (collectively the town), appeal from the entry of summary judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs, the Rhode Island American Federation of Teachers/Retired Local 8307 and
several retirees of the Johnston School Department (collectively the association),1 in this dispute
about the cost of annual premiums for post-retirement life insurance benefits. After hearing the
arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda submitted by the parties, we are satisfied
that cause has not been shown, and proceed to decide this appeal. For the reasons set forth
herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
1
The Rhode Island American Federation of Teachers/Retired Local 8037 is an association of
retired Rhode Island public school teachers representing the interests of retired teachers, which in
this case includes retired teachers from the Johnston School Department. The individual
plaintiffs in this case are former teachers who retired from the Johnston School Department on or
after January 1, 2011, and are members of the association.
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Facts and Travel
The material facts in this case are not in dispute. This appeal concerns the annual cost of
a life insurance policy made available to retired teachers in Johnston, Rhode Island, pursuant to
G.L. 1956 § 16-16-42. According to a collective-bargaining agreement governing Johnston’s
active schoolteachers’ terms of employment, the town provided life insurance in the amount of
$45,000. The town paid the insurance premium for actively employed teachers; however, when
a teacher retired, the insurance policy would remain in effect on the condition that the retired
teacher assumed responsibility for paying the premium.
For many years, the annual cost of life insurance for a retired teacher was the annual cost
in effect at the time of the teacher’s retirement.2 In late 2010, the town changed its insurance
carrier to Minnesota Life Insurance Company (Minnesota Life) and selected a policy that
reduced the premium rate for active teachers and increased the rate for retired teachers.3 As a
result, teachers who retired on or after January 1, 2011, were required to pay a higher premium.
In August 2013, the town entered into a subsequent policy agreement with Minnesota Life that
significantly increased the annual rate for retired teachers.4
In response, the association filed this action in Superior Court, seeking a declaratory
judgment that, in accordance with § 16-16-42, the town is statutorily “required to provide the life
insurance policy at an annual cost that was in effect on the last day of [a teacher’s]
2
Until July 2010, the cost of the life insurance policy for both active and retired teachers was
45 cents per $1,000.
3
Under the new policy, for the period of January 1, 2011, through June 30, 2013, the active
teachers’ rate was reduced to 10.4 cents per $1,000, and the retired teachers’ rate was increased
to $1.05 per $1,000.
4
Effective September 1, 2013, through August 31, 2016, the active teachers’ rate was 13 cents
per $1,000, and the retired teachers’ rate was increased to $1.90 per $1,000.
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employment[.]”5 The association subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that § 16-
16-42 prohibits the town from assessing increased life insurance rates for teachers upon
retirement because the plain language of the statute requires the town to provide life insurance to
retired teachers at the same annual cost it paid before the teacher retired. The town filed an
objection, along with a cross-motion for summary judgment, countering that § 16-16-42 is clear
and unambiguous; and, pursuant to the statute’s plain and ordinary meaning, the town argued, it
is required to furnish the retiree with “the option of retaining the life insurance policy at ‘an
amount equal to the annual cost of the policy for the individual at the time of the individual’s
retirement.’” The town further asserted that, by “provid[ing] the retirees with the option of
continuing the insurance coverage at the rate in effect at the retirees’ retirements,” it has
complied with the requirements set forth in § 16-16-42.
The Superior Court justice heard arguments on both motions and issued a written
decision in which she determined that § 16-16-42 is clear and unambiguous; she held that,
“pursuant to the clear statutory mandates, the [t]own is required to provide retirees the option of
maintaining the life insurance policy that was in effect at the time of their retirement at the same
annual cost each retiree paid before his or her retirement.” The trial justice explicated that “[a]s
there is no other annual cost, the only plausible meaning is that the Legislature intended the
retiree to be substituted as the payor on the already established plan at the rate paid by the
[t]own.” Accordingly, the hearing justice granted the association’s motion for summary
5
In its first amended complaint, the association asked for a declaratory judgment (count I) that,
pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 16-16-42, the town is required to provide the life insurance policy at an
annual cost that was in effect on the last day of a teacher’s employment. The association also
asserted a breach-of-contract claim against the town (count II), requesting damages for the
difference between the cost of the insurance at the time of retirement and the increased cost of
the insurance under the Minnesota Life agreement. The parties subsequently agreed to limit the
scope of their motions for summary judgment to count I.
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judgment and declared that the town was “required to provide life insurance to each retiree at the
same annual cost that was in effect on the last day of his or her employment.” The town timely
appealed.
Standard of Review
This Court “reviews a ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo.” Epic
Enterprises LLC v. Bard Group, LLC, 186 A.3d 587, 589 (R.I. 2018) (brackets omitted) (quoting
Pimentel v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, 174 A.3d 740, 743 (R.I. 2017)). “We will
affirm a trial court’s summary judgment decision only if, after reviewing the admissible evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material
fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (brackets
omitted) (quoting Newstone Development, LLC v. East Pacific, LLC, 140 A.3d 100, 103 (R.I.
2016)). Moreover, “[a] matter that hinges on statutory interpretation is ripe for summary
judgment.” Id. “[W]hen reviewing the applicability of a statute, this Court interprets the statute
de novo.” Id.Analysis
On appeal, the town contends that the Superior Court erred in granting the association’s
motion for summary judgment and denying its cross-motion for summary judgment because,
according to the town, the trial justice incorrectly interpreted § 16-16-42. We are thereby
confronted with a question of pure statutory interpretation—that being § 16-16-42.
The disputed statute on appeal, § 16-16-42, entitled “Life insurance benefits,” provides:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, any
member who, at the time of retirement from service, has in effect
life insurance provided for as a benefit of his or her employment
shall, after retirement, be entitled to keep the policy of life
insurance in effect by paying to the city or town an amount equal
to the annual cost of the policy for the individual at the time of the
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individual’s retirement. The policy of insurance shall remain in
effect for so long as the member continues to make annual
payments.”
Before this Court, both parties assert that § 16-16-42 is clear and unambiguous; however,
each party posits a different interpretation. The town asserts that a plain and ordinary reading of
the phrases “at the time of retirement from service” and “at the time of the individual’s
retirement” makes clear that the Legislature intended to provide retirees “with the opportunity to
continue their life insurance policy at the time period after they have permanently” separated
from service. The town also points out that the statute does not read “on their last day of active
employment” and, therefore, according to its plain meaning, the cost of life insurance for retired
teachers must be that which is “in effect at the beginning of the retiree’s retirement[,]” i.e., the
rate set for retirees, not the premium before the teacher retires.
Alternatively, the association asserts that § 16-16-42 unambiguously requires the town to
provide retirees with the option of maintaining the insurance policy that was in effect at their
retirement at the same annual cost that each retiree paid before retirement. According to the
association, the phrase “at the time of retirement” refers to the day the teacher separates from
employment; whereas the phrase “after retirement” refers to when the teacher has retired. The
association contends that a teacher is entitled to the same policy at the same annual cost as when
he or she was employed, and not a different retirement rate.
“It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court
must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary
meanings.” Alessi v. Bowen Court Condominium, 44 A.3d 736, 740 (R.I. 2012) (quoting
Waterman v. Caprio, 983 A.2d 841, 844 (R.I. 2009)). Moreover, “[i]n matters of statutory
interpretation our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the
Legislature.” Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I. 2001). “The Legislature is presumed to
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have intended each word or provision of a statute to express a significant meaning, and the Court
will give effect to every word, clause, or sentence, whenever possible.” State v. Clark, 974 A.2d
558, 571 (R.I. 2009) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 779 (R.I. 1996)).
After employing this well-established statutory analysis, we are satisfied that the statute
carries no ambiguity, and therefore we construe the language of this statute in accordance with
its plain and ordinary meaning. We remain mindful that this Court presumes that every word of
a statute has significance; and, thus, whenever possible, we will give effect to each word and
phrase contained therein. After a review of the language of § 16-16-42, we are satisfied that
Johnston’s teachers are entitled to retain the insurance coverage in effect at the time of retirement
by paying the same annual cost that the retiree paid before retirement, as an active employee.
There is no separate retiree rate anticipated by this enactment.
By incorporating the phrases “at the time of retirement” and “after retirement,” the
Legislature clearly assigned independent significance to each phrase. We are of the opinion that
“at the time of retirement” signifies the day of or the day before a teacher retires from active
employment. Accordingly, we are satisfied that a proper interpretation of the statute provides
that, any teacher “who, at the time of retirement from service [or last day of active employment],
has in effect life insurance provided for as a benefit of his or her employment shall, after
retirement, be entitled to keep the policy of life insurance in effect by paying to the city or town
an amount equal to the annual cost of the policy for the individual at the time of the individual’s
retirement [or last day of active employment].” Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the
Superior Court justice.
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Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court
granting the association’s motion for summary judgment. The record shall be remanded to the
Superior Court.
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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
OPINION COVER SHEET
Rhode Island American Federation of
Title of Case Teachers/Retired Local 8037 et al. v. Johnston School
Committee et al.
No. 2018-51-Appeal.
Case Number
(PC 15-3044)
Date Opinion Filed June 19, 2019
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and
Justices
Indeglia, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer From Lower Court Associate Justice Maureen B. Keough
For Plaintiffs:
Carly Beauvais Iafrate, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal For Defendants:
William J. Conley, Jr., Esq.
Deidre E. Carreno, Esq.
SU‐CMS‐02A (revised June 2016)