State v. Joseph Segrain ( 2021 )


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  • January 27, 2021
    Supreme Court
    No. 2019-13-C.A.
    (P2/12-140A)
    State                 :
    v.                   :
    Joseph Segrain.               :
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
    before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
    are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
    Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
    Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
    Email      opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov,      of     any
    typographical or other formal errors in order that
    corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
    Supreme Court
    No. 2019-13-C.A.
    (P2/12-140A)
    State                   :
    v.                    :
    Joseph Segrain.              :
    Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
    OPINION
    Justice Robinson, for the Court. The defendant, Joseph Segrain, seeks
    review of an adjudication of a probation violation after a hearing that took place in
    October of 2017 in light of new charges having been filed against him as the result
    of a drive-by shooting. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing justice found
    that the defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, and she
    proceeded to order him to serve the nine years remaining on a suspended sentence
    which he had received as a result of an earlier conviction. The defendant contends
    on appeal that his being ordered to serve the nine years remaining on his suspended
    sentence was improperly based solely on the new charges, without due attention
    being given to the original conviction for which he was on probation. This case
    came before the Supreme Court for oral argument pursuant to an order directing
    -1-
    the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be
    summarily decided. After examining the written and oral submissions of the
    parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the appeal
    may be resolved without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in
    this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
    I
    Facts and Travel
    On January 10, 2012, defendant pled nolo contendere to one count of
    possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.1 Following defendant’s plea, the
    trial justice sentenced defendant to ten years of incarceration, with one year to
    serve and nine years suspended, with probation.       The defendant remained on
    probation on January 9, 2017, when the events at issue in this case transpired;
    following a shooting incident on that date (described below), defendant was
    arrested and charged with various crimes. Subsequently, the state filed a notice of
    1
    The defendant also pled nolo contendere to one count of maintaining a
    common nuisance for the sale of controlled substances and received a three-year
    suspended sentence on that count. However, the plea as to that count has no
    relevance to the instant appeal.
    -2-
    probation violation pursuant to Rule 32(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
    Procedure, which gave rise to the instant case.2
    On various dates between October 12 and October 25, 2017, a probation
    violation hearing was held in the Superior Court. We recount below the salient
    aspects of the hearing.
    A
    The Testimony of Dana Smith
    The first witness to testify was Dana Smith, the official in charge of security
    operations for the Superior Court. Mr. Smith testified that, on January 9, 2017, he
    was working at the Licht Judicial Complex when he saw two men exit Courtroom
    10, followed by Attorney Lauren Balkcom. It is clear from the record that those
    two men were defendant and one John Laboy.3 Mr. Smith testified that, after
    defendant was asked what business the two men had in the courthouse, defendant
    2
    The instant case deals only with defendant’s appeal from his probation
    violation sentence. The Court at this time is not addressing the charges stemming
    from the January 9, 2017 events.
    3
    According to the uncontradicted testimony adduced at the hearing, there are
    two gangs that are relevant to the instant case: Bucket East and Bucket West. The
    defendant and Mr. Laboy are members of the Bucket East gang. Certain of the
    other witnesses who testified in this matter are also members of the Bucket East
    gang. On the other hand, Carlos DePina and Nelson Barbosa, who are also
    referenced in this opinion, are members of the Bucket West gang. The two gangs
    are rivals.
    -3-
    responded either “‘I’m here for my boy’” or “‘I’m here for * * * my brother,’” but
    he provided no further information.
    Mr. Smith, who was standing outside the door to Courtroom 10, testified
    that during this conversation he noticed “four [other] gentlemen sitting in the back
    of the courtroom” who “were kind of almost ducking * * *.” Mr. Smith testified
    that Mr. Laboy, who had already left the courtroom, “turned toward the guys
    sitting in the courtroom and made a hand gesture toward his throat.” Mr. Smith
    stated that, at that point, he asked Mr. Laboy to leave the courthouse and that
    defendant left shortly thereafter. Mr. Smith stated that, upon exiting onto Benefit
    Street, defendant joined a group of approximately fifteen individuals, including
    Mr. Laboy, who “went to the left, right to College Hill * * * [and] started walking
    up the hill.”4 Mr. Smith further stated that the group proceeded to get into two cars
    parked on College Street; he added that defendant sat in the driver’s seat of a blue
    SUV-style BMW.
    Mr. Smith further testified that, after defendant and his companions had left
    the courthouse, the four men who had been seated in the back row of Courtroom
    10 also left the courthouse. Mr. Smith stated that, between three and five minutes
    4
    The record reflects that Mr. Smith and other witnesses referred to the street
    on which defendant had parked his vehicle as “College Hill.” However, it is clear
    from Mr. Smith’s testimony and the record as a whole that all references to
    “College Hill” were intended to mean “College Street,” which street is located
    adjacent to the Providence County Superior Court. We shall hereinafter use the
    term “College Street.”
    -4-
    after those four individuals had left, he heard gunshots and immediately proceeded
    to the area from whence the shots had emanated. He stated that, upon arriving
    there, he discovered that shots had been fired at a white vehicle; he added that an
    ambulance had arrived and emergency personnel had already removed the victim
    from the vehicle.
    B
    The Testimony of Attorney Lauren Balkcom
    The next witness to testify was Attorney Lauren Balkcom.            Attorney
    Balkcom testified that, on January 9, 2017, she was at the Providence County
    Superior Court representing Carlos DePina5 on charges unrelated to the present
    case. She stated that Carlos was seated next to several companions6 in the back of
    Courtroom 10. Those companions included Carlos’s cousin, Mathew DePina, and
    Mathew’s brother, Jovan, and his cousin, Nelson Barbosa.7
    5
    We note at the outset that the surname of three individuals to whom we
    make reference in this opinion is DePina—those individuals are Carlos, Mathew,
    and Jovan. Mathew and Jovan are brothers; Carlos is their cousin. To avoid
    confusion, we will refer to each by his first name. In doing so, we intend no
    disrespect.
    6
    It is clear from the record that Carlos’s companions were at the courthouse
    to support him. None of them had a scheduled court date on January 9, 2017.
    7
    For purposes of consistency, we will also refer to Nelson by his first name.
    In doing so, we intend no disrespect.
    -5-
    Attorney Balkcom testified that, after participating in a conference with a
    trial justice relative to Carlos’s case, she spoke with Carlos in the back of the
    courtroom. She testified that, while she was discussing Carlos’s case with him,
    defendant entered the courtroom and sat in the space between Carlos and his
    companions.    Attorney Balkcom further testified that, after exchanging brief
    remarks with defendant, she told him: “I can’t ask you to leave the courtroom, but I
    will ask you to please leave my conversation * * *.” She noted that, before exiting
    the courtroom, defendant looked in her and Carlos’s general direction and
    “wav[ed] his hand back and forth across where his neck was.” Attorney Balkcom
    also testified that another individual—who she later learned was Mr. Laboy—made
    similar hand gestures from outside the courtroom door.
    Attorney Balkcom testified that, inside the courtroom, one of Carlos’s
    companions showed her a Facebook Live8 video on his cellular phone, which
    depicted a group of people—one of whom she recognized as Mr. Laboy—standing
    outside the Benefit Street entrance of the courthouse. She noted that, in the video,
    Mr. Laboy made hand gestures similar to those she had observed him making
    8
    Facebook Live is a feature of Facebook, an online social networking
    platform, that allows users to “[g]o live on Facebook to broadcast a conversation,
    performance, Q&A or virtual event.”             See https://facebook.com/formedia/
    solutions/facebook-live (last visited January 25, 2021).
    -6-
    earlier; she added that he also said: “F*** you. F*** your Public Defender lawyer.
    F*** the West. We’re going to get you, boy * * *.”
    Attorney Balkcom next testified that she went to the window of Courtroom
    10, from which she saw the same group of individuals getting into two vehicles—
    one of which was a blue SUV-style BMW. She further stated that she took
    photographs of both vehicles when they drove down College Street, and she
    identified defendant as the driver of the BMW.        She added that, as she was
    standing on the first floor preparing to leave the courthouse, she saw Mr. Smith
    running out of the courthouse onto South Main Street. She stated that she followed
    Mr. Smith across South Main Street toward the Crawford Street Bridge,9 where she
    observed an individual—who she later learned was Mathew—being placed onto a
    stretcher.
    C
    The Testimony of Mathew DePina
    Mathew, the victim of the shooting, also testified at the hearing. Mathew
    testified that, on January 9, 2017, he picked up Carlos, Jovan, and Nelson and
    9
    We note that Attorney Balkcom did not indicate the name of the bridge
    during her testimony, but only described its location. She stated as follows: “I ran
    across South Main Street and I ran over to where the bridge is. So if you go across
    South Main Street and there’s a big statute [sic] right outside, on the other side of
    the street I went to the left of that over towards that bridge.” Based on Attorney
    Balkcom’s detailed narrative, we infer that she was referring to the Crawford Street
    Bridge.
    -7-
    drove them to the courthouse. Mathew testified that, after he parked the car near
    the courthouse, the group proceeded to Courtroom 10 to be with Carlos. Mathew
    stated that they sat in the back row of the courtroom.
    Mathew testified that, while he and his companions were seated in the
    courtroom, defendant entered the courtroom, accompanied by a group of
    approximately ten individuals, and he sat directly between Nelson and Jovan.
    Mathew stated that, after Attorney Balkcom asked defendant to leave the area, “he
    did like a sniffle, a gesture, and after that called [Carlos’s] lawyer a public
    attorney” before exiting the courtroom with the individuals who had accompanied
    him.
    Mathew testified that, while still inside the courtroom, he watched a
    Facebook Live video on his cellular phone, which video showed “John Laboy and
    the group of people that [had been] inside the courtroom.” In further describing
    the video, Mathew said: “They was outside the courtroom doing gestures, hand
    gestures, saying * * * f*** both my cousins, Nelson and Carlos, and everybody
    from the West.”
    Mathew testified that, when he returned to his car, he noticed defendant
    driving a dark-colored SUV-style BMW nearby. Mathew stated that he left his
    parking spot to pick up his cousins and brother and that, while driving, he noticed
    that a vehicle was following him. He testified that, as he continued driving, he saw
    -8-
    the BMW pull up alongside his car. Mathew stated that shots were fired and that
    he was struck by bullets in the back, neck, and shoulder; he added that he
    continued driving until he crashed his car into a snow bank.
    D
    The Testimony of Brandon Bates
    Brandon Bates, a member of the Bucket East gang, also testified at the
    hearing. He stated that, on January 9, 2017, he drove Mr. Laboy to the courthouse
    because Mr. Laboy had a court date. He added that he parked his car on College
    Street, a few spaces behind defendant’s BMW. Mr. Bates testified that, when he
    arrived at the courthouse, he observed a number of individuals from the Bucket
    East gang, including defendant. He stated that, when those individuals later exited
    the courthouse, they remained on the steps in front of the Benefit Street entrance.
    He specifically noted that the group was waiting for Carlos to leave because if
    Carlos “tried something * * * we were going to have to beat him up.” Mr. Bates
    added that they stood outside for twenty to thirty minutes before heading back to
    their cars. Mr. Bates stated that he and Mr. Laboy got into Mr. Bates’s Nissan
    Altima and that he saw defendant get into the driver’s seat of the BMW.
    Mr. Bates testified that, while waiting for Carlos to leave the courthouse, he
    parked his car near Mathew’s car, which Mr. Bates called a “Chevy,” and drove
    around in another gang member’s car before returning to his own vehicle so as to
    -9-
    leave the area. He noted that, when he arrived back at his car, the Chevy started
    pulling out of its parking spot. Mr. Bates then stated that he followed the Chevy
    and, shortly thereafter, defendant pulled his BMW up alongside the Chevy and
    opened fire.
    E
    The Testimony of Samuel10
    Sixteen-year-old Samuel testified at the hearing that, on January 9, 2017, he
    was in Providence riding in a black BMW which was following a white Chevy.
    Samuel stated that he saw defendant shoot into the white Chevy. He testified that
    defendant then sped away from the scene.
    F
    The Hearing Justice’s Decision
    In her bench decision at the close of the hearing, the hearing justice set forth
    her factual findings. The hearing justice based her findings of fact on what she
    deemed to be the credible testimony of a number of witnesses,11 as well as several
    still photographs and videos that were entered into evidence as full exhibits.
    10
    We refer to the witness pseudonymously.
    11
    Although other witnesses also testified, the hearing justice specifically
    referred to the testimony of Dana Smith, Attorney Balkcom, Mathew DePina,
    Brandon Bates, and Samuel, as well as three additional witnesses—Geovanni
    Perez, Neil Clapperton, and Nathan Tek—whose testimonies we need not recount
    for the purposes of this appeal.
    - 10 -
    Taking into account her factual findings and the evidence she deemed credible, the
    hearing justice found that, on January 9, 2017, defendant acted in a “hostile and
    aggressive manner” in Courtroom 10 due to his hostility toward Carlos, a member
    of a rival gang. She found that, despite being asked to leave the area by security
    officers, defendant and his fellow gang members “remained in the area in an effort
    to have a violent confrontation with Carlos DePina when he left the
    courthouse * * *.” The hearing justice further found that neither Carlos nor his
    companions were interested in engaging in a confrontation with defendant or the
    members of his gang; she found that, in fact, they demonstrated a strong desire to
    avoid a confrontation. She found that defendant was the driver of the BMW and
    that he discharged a firearm at the Chevy, causing Mathew to suffer serious
    injuries.   In view of these findings, the hearing justice ultimately declared
    defendant a probation violator.
    After hearing brief argument from counsel with respect to sentencing, the
    hearing justice, in making her decision, focused on both the underlying 2012
    conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, as well as the more
    recent conduct that triggered the Rule 32(f) violation hearing. She further stated
    that, in reaching a sentencing decision, a hearing justice “must consider the
    possibilities for [d]efendant’s rehabilitation, deterrence to others[,] and
    appropriateness of the punishment for the crime committed.” The hearing justice
    - 11 -
    recognized the fact that defendant had not been convicted of any crimes since his
    2012 conviction and that he had children at home. She nonetheless stated that
    “[t]he severity of the new conduct is such that I feel the need to revoke his
    remaining probation * * *.” Consequently, after noting that the 2012 sentence was
    “a pretty generous one,” the hearing justice ordered defendant to serve the nine
    years remaining on his previously imposed suspended sentence.
    A judgment entered12 sentencing defendant to the nine years remaining on
    his suspended sentence. The defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
    II
    Standard of Review
    It is well established that it is the duty of the court at a probation violation
    hearing to determine “whether or not the defendant has breached a condition of his
    or her probation by failing to keep the peace or remain on good behavior.” State v.
    Ditren, 
    126 A.3d 414
    , 418 (R.I. 2015) (internal quotations marks omitted); see
    State v. Fairweather, 
    138 A.3d 822
    , 826 (R.I. 2016). Pursuant to Rule 32(f) of the
    Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended in 2016,13 the state must
    12
    No judgment is contained in the physical record transmitted to this Court,
    nor is one available in the electronic filing system. However, the docket reflects a
    judgment of conviction on October 25, 2017, and defendant has attached an
    undated and unsigned copy of the judgment to his Rule 12A statement.
    13
    We are cognizant of the fact that “a 2016 amendment to Rule 32(f) of the
    Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure increased the state’s burden of proof
    - 12 -
    establish “by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant breached a
    condition of the defendant’s probation or deferred sentence or failed to keep the
    peace or remain on good behavior.” State v. D’Amico, 
    200 A.3d 1068
    , 1071-72
    (R.I. 2019) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Super. R.
    Crim. P. 32(f).
    We have stated that, “[i]n making this determination, the hearing justice
    weighs the evidence and assesses the credibility of the witnesses.” State v. Prout,
    
    116 A.3d 196
    , 202 (R.I. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have further
    stated that deference should be accorded “to the assessment of the credibility of
    witnesses made by a judicial officer who has had the opportunity to listen to live
    testimony and to observe demeanor.” State v. Washington, 
    42 A.3d 1265
    , 1271
    (R.I. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court’s review is “limited to
    considering whether the hearing justice acted arbitrarily or capriciously in finding a
    violation.” State v. Beaudoin, 
    137 A.3d 726
    , 732 (R.I. 2016) (internal quotation
    marks omitted); see Prout, 116 A.3d at 202.
    such that it must now establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the
    defendant breached a condition of the defendant’s probation or deferred sentence
    or failed to keep the peace or remain on good behavior.” State v. D’Amico, 
    200 A.3d 1068
    , 1071-72 (R.I. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    - 13 -
    III
    Analysis
    The defendant contends that the hearing justice erred in sentencing him to
    serve the full nine years of a previously suspended sentence.          In particular,
    defendant points out that, in his view, after brief statements about defendant’s
    background and character, the hearing justice “strayed in her analysis of
    formulating an appropriate sentence by focusing solely on the charges that had
    been alleged as a basis for the violation of probation.” The defendant further
    contends that the hearing justice did not know the facts of the underlying case prior
    to sentencing.
    It is well established that “the unexecuted portion of a probationer’s
    suspended sentence hangs over his or her head by the single horsehair of good
    behavior, until such time as the term of probation expires.” State v. Parson, 
    844 A.2d 178
    , 180 (R.I. 2004); see State v. McKinnon-Conneally, 
    101 A.3d 875
    , 879
    (R.I. 2014). When a defendant severs that single horsehair by violating the terms
    and conditions of his or her probation, the hearing justice has “wide discretion to
    determine whether to execute any or all of a defendant’s previously suspended
    sentence.” McKinnon-Conneally, 101 A.3d at 879 (emphasis added); see Neufville
    v. State, 
    172 A.3d 161
    , 165 (R.I. 2017). It is also well established that although a
    hearing justice must focus primarily on the nature of the first offense, he or she
    - 14 -
    may also consider the circumstances of the second offense. McKinnon-Conneally,
    101 A.3d at 879; see Neufville, 172 A.3d at 166.
    In our view, the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion by taking into
    account the severity of defendant’s new conduct in sentencing defendant to the
    nine years remaining on his previously suspended sentence. See State v. Simpson,
    
    174 A.3d 1238
    , 1243-44 (R.I. 2018); Neufville, 172 A.3d at 165-66; State v.
    Shepard, 
    33 A.3d 158
    , 166 (R.I. 2011); State v. Wisehart, 
    569 A.2d 434
    , 437-38
    (R.I. 1990). We recognize that the hearing justice gave great weight to the gravity
    of the charges precipitating the probation violation hearing, stating that “this
    particular conduct while on probation would tend to suggest that [defendant] is not
    a good candidate for rehabilitation.” We have found that consideration of the
    severity of a defendant’s more recent wrongdoing as it relates to his or her ability
    to be rehabilitated is a factor that may be appropriately considered in making a
    sentencing determination. See Simpson, 174 A.3d at 1244; Shepard, 
    33 A.3d at 166
    ; Wisehart, 
    569 A.2d at 438
    .
    We also are not persuaded by defendant’s contention that the instant case is
    directly comparable to our decision in State v. Fortes, 
    114 R.I. 161
    , 
    330 A.2d 404
    (1975). In that case, the defendant had pled nolo contendere and received a
    deferred sentence for possession of marijuana. Fortes, 114 R.I. at 162, 
    330 A.2d at 406
    . After finding that defendant had violated the terms of his deferred sentence
    - 15 -
    by committing assault with intent to murder, the hearing justice entered judgment
    against the defendant, sentencing him to fifteen years at the Adult Correctional
    Institutions. Id. at 163, 
    330 A.2d at 406
    . After reviewing the record in that case,
    this Court concluded that the sentence was “excessive” and was “unduly
    influenced by the seriousness of the offense which precipitated the revocation
    hearing and the resulting grievous injuries to the victim of that offense.” Id. at
    173-74, 176, 
    330 A.2d at 411, 412
    .
    We do not believe that the instant case is genuinely comparable to Fortes.
    First, in the case now before this Court, the offense underlying defendant’s
    probationary sentence is possession of marijuana with intent to distribute—an
    offense for which a sentence of up to thirty years is available under the statute.14
    Second, and perhaps more importantly, the hearing justice clearly stated that she
    based her sentencing decision on several factors, namely: the seriousness of the
    2012 conviction; the gravity of the more recent conduct; the possibility of
    rehabilitation; and other traditional sentencing factors. We are persuaded that the
    hearing justice in the instant case considered several appropriate factors in making
    14
    The defendant was charged and pled nolo contendere to possession of
    marijuana with intent to distribute under G.L. 1956 § 21-28-4.01(a)(4)(i). That
    section reads as follows: “Any person, except as provided for in subdivision (2) of
    this subsection, who violates this subsection with respect to: (i) A controlled
    substance, classified in schedule I or II, is guilty of a crime and, upon conviction,
    may be imprisoned for not more than thirty (30) years, or fined not more than one
    hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) nor less than three thousand dollars ($3,000),
    or both * * *.” Section 21-28-4.01(a)(4)(i) (emphasis added).
    - 16 -
    her sentencing decision and that she did not rely solely on the new charges pending
    against defendant.
    Accordingly, we are of the opinion that, by executing the full nine years of
    the defendant’s original suspended sentence, the hearing justice acted well within
    her discretion.
    IV
    Conclusion
    For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the
    Superior Court. The record may be returned to that tribunal.
    Justice Lynch Prata and Justice Long did not participate.
    Justice Flaherty participated in the decision but retired prior to its publication.
    - 17 -
    STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
    SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
    Licht Judicial Complex
    250 Benefit Street
    Providence, RI 02903
    OPINION COVER SHEET
    Title of Case                        State v. Joseph Segrain.
    No. 2019-13-C.A.
    Case Number
    (P2/12-140A)
    Date Opinion Filed                   January 27, 2021
    Justices                             Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
    Written By                           Associate Justice William P. Robinson III
    Source of Appeal                     Providence County Superior Court
    Judicial Officer from Lower Court    Associate Justice Netti C. Vogel
    For State:
    Owen Murphy
    Attorney(s) on Appeal                Department of Attorney General
    For Defendant:
    Christopher S. Gontarz, Esq.
    SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)