Melissa E. Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC, alias John Doe Corporation , 134 A.3d 173 ( 2016 )

Supreme Court
No. 2014-239-Appeal.
(KC 14-316)
Melissa E. Goddard :
v. :
APG Security-RI, LLC, alias John Doe :
Corporation et al.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250
Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-
3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2014-239-Appeal.
(KC 14-316)
Melissa E. Goddard :
v. :
APG Security-RI, LLC, alias John Doe :
Corporation et al.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. Which period of limitation applies to a civil action
alleging a violation of the employer drug testing statute (EDTS) 1—ten years as provided in
G.L. 1956 § 9-1-13(a) 2 or three years as provided in § 9-1-14(b) 3—is the central question of this
appeal. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to
appear and show cause why the issue raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided.
After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, we
conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further
1
The statute governing drug testing by employers is set forth in G.L. 1956 § 28-6.5-1(a) and
provides, in pertinent part, that:
“(a) No employer or agent of any employer shall, either orally
or in writing, request, require, or subject any employee to submit a
sample of his or her urine, blood, or other bodily fluid or tissue for
testing as a condition of continued employment unless that test is
administered in accordance with the provisions of this section.”
2
General Laws 1956 § 9-1-13(a) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise specially provided, all civil
actions shall be commenced within ten (10) years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and
not after.”
3
Section 9-1-14(b) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ctions for injuries to the person shall be
commenced and sued within three (3) years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not
after * * *.”
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briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court.
I
Facts and Procedural History
On March 27, 2014, Melissa Goddard (plaintiff) filed a complaint against APG Security-
RI, LLC, as well as against Scott Hemingway and Anna Vidiri in their capacities as
employees/agents of APG Security-RI, LLC (collectively, defendants). The complaint alleged
that, in January 2010, when plaintiff was employed as a security guard by APG Security-RI,
LLC, defendants violated G.L. 1956 § 28-6.5-1 when they required her to submit to a drug test
without the reasonable grounds set forth by the statute and subsequently terminated her
employment based on the result of that test. The plaintiff sought damages pursuant to both the
EDTS and § 9-1-2. 4 The defendants responded to plaintiff’s complaint with a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, in which they asserted
that the complaint was not timely filed. A hearing justice of the Superior Court held a hearing on
June 9, 2014, at which defendants argued that the three-year statute of limitations in § 9-1-14(b)
applied to civil actions arising out of alleged violations of the EDTS, and plaintiff argued that the
ten-year statute of limitations in § 9-1-13(a) applied instead. The hearing justice agreed with
4
Section 9-1-2 provides that:
“Whenever any person shall suffer any injury to his or her
person, reputation, or estate by reason of the commission of any
crime or offense, he or she may recover his or her damages for the
injury in a civil action against the offender, and it shall not be any
defense to such action that no criminal complaint for the crime or
offense has been made; and whenever any person shall be guilty of
larceny, he or she shall be liable to the owner of the money or
articles taken for twice the value thereof, unless the money or
articles are restored, and for the value thereof in case of
restoration.”
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defendants and found that the three-year statute of limitations in § 9-1-14(b) governed plaintiff’s
cause of action. The hearing justice also found that the statute of limitations began to run from
the date that the drug test was administered, and that plaintiff’s complaint had been filed more
than three years after the administration of the drug test. Accordingly, the hearing justice
granted defendants’ motion and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff filed a premature
notice of appeal, which we nevertheless deem to be timely. See Miller v. Saunders, 80 A.3d 44,
47 n.8 (R.I. 2013). 5
II
Standard of Review
“In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this Court
applies the same standard as the hearing justice.” Ho-Rath v. Rhode Island Hospital, 115 A.3d
938, 942 (R.I. 2015) (quoting Woonsocket School Committee v. Chafee, 89 A.3d 778, 787 (R.I.
2014)). “Because the sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the
complaint, our review is confined to the four corners of that pleading.” Id. (quoting Chafee, 89
A.3d at 787). “We will ‘assume[] the allegations contained in the complaint to be true and view[]
the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.’” Id. (quoting Chafee, 89 A.3d at 787). “A
motion to dismiss is properly granted when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff
would not be entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of facts that could be proven in
support of the plaintiff’s claim.” Id. (quoting Chafee, 89 A.3d at 787).
This appeal also presents us with a question of law regarding which of two general civil
action statutes of limitations will apply to causes of action arising from alleged violations of the
EDTS. It is well settled that ‘“[t]he question of whether a statute of limitations has run against a
5
The order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss entered on June 12, 2014; the final judgment
entered “nunc pro tunc” on October 20, 2014.
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plaintiff[’]s claim is * * * a question of law,’ which this Court reviews de novo.” Ho-Rath, 115
A.3d at 942-43 (quoting Balletta v. McHale, 823 A.2d 292, 294 (R.I. 2003)). “[T]his Court
[also] reviews questions of statutory construction and interpretation de novo.” Id. at 943 (quoting
National Refrigeration, Inc. v. Capital Properties, Inc., 88 A.3d 1150, 1156 (R.I. 2014)).
III
Discussion
The plaintiff argues that the ten-year statute of limitations in § 9-1-13(a) should apply to
alleged violations of the EDTS because § 9-1-13(a) specifically states that the ten-year statute of
limitations applies “[e]xcept as otherwise specially provided,” the EDTS does not indicate the
applicable statute of limitations, and none of the other established statutes of limitations apply.
The plaintiff also argues that actions brought pursuant to the EDTS do not meet this Court’s
common law definition of § 9-1-14(b)’s “injuries to the person” because “the legislature intended
the rights created in the [EDTS] to accrue to an individual by reason of a peculiar status and not
as rights to which one is entitled by reason of being a person in the eyes of the law.” The
plaintiff asserts that § 9-1-14(b) does not apply, therefore, because “the right to be free from
unreasonable drug testing is a right that accrues to an individual by reason of a peculiar status
* * *.” The plaintiff contends that the “peculiar statuses” in question are created by the separate
sections within the EDTS that delineate different drug testing rules for employees as opposed to
job applicants.
The defendants counterargue that the three-year statute of limitations in § 9-1-14(b)
applies because a violation of the rights protected by the EDTS results in an injury to the person
as defined by this Court and because plaintiff’s rights do not arise from any peculiar status. The
defendants assert that “the rights conferred and protected by the [EDTS] are * * * analogous” to
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civil rights even though the EDTS rights are not ‘“civil right[s]’ in the classical sense of th[e]
term.” The defendants also argue that the application of the three-year limit on causes of action
arising out of alleged violations of the EDTS is “consistent with the General Assembly’s use of
short limitations periods in other employment-related statutes” and supports the policy
considerations in favor of short statutes of limitations in the employment context.
The EDTS provides employees with a right to be free from drug tests that are not
administered in accordance with the process set forth within the statute. See § 28-6.5-1(a). The
EDTS sets out several conditions under which an employer may request, require, or subject an
employee to a drug test using a sample of the employee’s blood, urine, or other bodily fluids. Id.
A violation of the EDTS can lead to a misdemeanor conviction of the employer as well as to an
award of punitive damages, attorney’s fees, costs, and injunctive relief in favor of an employee-
plaintiff in a civil action against the employer. Section 28-6.5-1(b), (c). The EDTS does not,
however, provide a limitation on the time in which an employee has to bring a civil action. See
§ 28-6.5-1.
When a statute creates a civil remedy for its violation but is silent regarding the
applicable limitations period, we have often decided between one of two residual statutes of
limitations provided in chapter 1 of title 9: either the three years provided in § 9-1-14(b) or the
ten years provided in § 9-1-13(a). See Paul v. City of Woonsocket, 745 A.2d 169, 169, 172 (R.I.
2000) (holding that § 9-1-14(b) applied to a cause of action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
recover payment of an allegedly improper water tapping fee); Lyons v. Town of Scituate, 554
A.2d 1034, 1035, 1036 (R.I. 1989) (holding that the statute of limitations in § 9-1-14(b) applied
to recovery sought pursuant to § 9-1-2). Section 9-1-14(b) provides, in relevant part, that
“[a]ctions for injuries to the person” must be initiated within three years from the date that the
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cause of action accrued. We have previously held that the phrase ‘“injuries to the person’ * * *
is to be construed comprehensively and as contemplating its application to actions involving
injuries that are other than physical.” Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 98 R.I. 14, 20, 22,
199 A.2d 606, 610 (1964) (Commerce Oil) (determining that an action for malicious prosecution
was to be considered an injury to the person and therefore subject to the statute of limitations in
§ 9-1-14). In Commerce Oil, we commented that the purpose of the phrase “injuries to the
person” is:
“to include within that period of limitation actions brought for
injuries resulting from invasions of rights that inhere in man as a
rational being, that is, rights to which one is entitled by reason of
being a person in the eyes of the law. Such rights, of course, are to
be distinguished from those which accrue to an individual by
reason of some peculiar status or by virtue of an interest created by
contract or property.” Id. at 20-21, 199 A.2d at 610.
We have repeatedly applied the framework established in Commerce Oil to determine which
statute of limitations applies to various causes of action. See, e.g., Paul, 745 A.2d at 172;
McBurney v. Roszkowski, 687 A.2d 447, 448-49 (R.I. 1997) (holding that an action for
intentional interference with a contract was subject to the ten-year statute of limitations); Church
v. McBurney, 513 A.2d 22, 23, 24, 26 (R.I. 1986) (holding that actions for legal malpractice
were essentially claims for negligent breach of contract and were therefore subject to the statute
of limitations in § 9-1-13); Mikaelian v. Drug Abuse Unit, 501 A.2d 721, 724 (R.I. 1985)
(holding that the statute of limitations in § 9-1-14(b) applied to actions for libel because “the
right * * * to be free from defamatory statements [was] among those rights to which one is
entitled by reason of being a person, as opposed to a right arising out of contract or property”).
Clearly plaintiff has not alleged the invasion of a right or an interest created by contract or
property. Her ability to avail herself of the ten-year statute of limitations, therefore, turns on her
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claim that her right to recovery for a violation of the EDTS accrues to her “by reason of some
peculiar status”—the peculiar status being that of an employee. Thus, she contends that
violations of the EDTS are an exception to the definition of “injuries to the person” that this
Court has applied since Commerce Oil.
Since our pronouncement in Commerce Oil, we have not had an occasion to either define
or apply the “peculiar status” exception to the comprehensive construction that we have afforded
the language “injuries to the person” under § 9-1-14(b). We have, however, consistently
emphasized that “it is the nature of the right invaded and not the elements of damage resulting
therefrom that determines its character as an injury to the person.” Nappi v. John Deere & Co.,
717 A.2d 650, 651 (R.I. 1998) (mem.) (quoting Pirri v. Toledo Scale Corp., 619 A.2d 429, 431
(R.I. 1993)); Lyons, 554 A.2d at 1036 (quoting Commerce Oil, 98 R.I. at 21, 199 A.2d at 610);
Church, 513 A.2d at 24 (quoting Commerce Oil, 98 R.I. at 21, 199 A.2d at 610).
The plaintiff has essentially alleged a violation of her right to be free from drug testing
that is not conducted in accordance with the mandates set forth in the EDTS. See § 28-6.5-1. We
agree with plaintiff that the EDTS creates a right for employees to be free from drug testing
policies and procedures that do not comply with the statute. When we consider our previous
applications of § 9-1-14(b)’s “injuries to the person” pursuant to the definition expounded in
Commerce Oil, however, we conclude that the nature of the right created by the EDTS is
analogous to an invasion of privacy and thus one to which plaintiff was “entitled by reason of
being a person in the eyes of the law” and not by virtue of any “peculiar status” or by reason of
“an interest created by contract or property.” Commerce Oil, 98 R.I. at 20-21, 199 A.2d at 610;
see also Mikaelian, 501 A.2d at 724. As in our previous cases involving the Commerce Oil
framework, the injuries sustained from a violation of the EDTS are not necessarily physical and
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indeed need not be physical in order for § 9-1-14(b) to apply. See, e.g., Mikaelian, 501 A.2d at
724. We hold, therefore, that violations of the EDTS result in “injuries to the person” as
contemplated by § 9-1-14(b) and, accordingly, are subject to this three-year statute of limitations
and not to the ten-year period provided in § 9-1-13(a).
We note that our conclusion is consistent with statutes of limitations that the General
Assembly has promulgated for other employment-related claims. For example, the Fair
Employment Practices Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 5 of title 28, provides only one year to file a
charge with the commission for human rights, and thereafter the commission has two years to
issue a complaint. Section 28-5-17(a); § 28-5-18(b). The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act,
G.L. 1956 chapter 50 of title 28, provides an explicit three-year statute of limitations, § 28-50-
4(a), and the Civil Rights Act of 1990, G.L. 1956 chapter 112 of title 42, also limits civil
litigation to three years after the alleged violation of the statute. Section 42-112-2. As a matter
of public policy, these statutes demonstrate the General Assembly’s preference for applying
relatively short statutes of limitations to employment-related claims. 6
The plaintiff also sought damages pursuant to § 9-1-2. While the EDTS is silent with
respect to the applicable statute of limitations, we have previously held that § 9-1-2—the statute
providing civil liability for the victims of criminal offenses—was subject to the limitations
period set forth in § 9-1-14(b) because “[t]here is no peculiar status or contractual relationship
between the parties creating an alternative right upon which plaintiff might sue.” Lyons, 554
A.3d at 1036. Since we have previously held that actions for civil liability enabled by § 9-1-2 for
the victims of criminal offenses—which would include the misdemeanor offense created by the
6
We also note that the statute of limitations for the misdemeanor offense created by § 28-6.5-
1(b) is three years. See G.L. 1956 § 12-12-17(c) (providing that the statute of limitations for any
criminal offense not enumerated in paragraphs (a) or (b) is three years “unless a longer statute of
limitations is otherwise provided for in the general laws”).
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EDTS—are subject to the three-year statute of limitations, we also hold that actions brought
pursuant to § 9-1-2 for an alleged violation of § 28-6.5-1 are subject to the three-year statute of
limitations provided in § 9-1-14(b). See Lyons, 554 A.2d at 1036.
IV
Conclusion
Because the plaintiff filed her complaint more than three years after the alleged violation
of the EDTS, her claims pursuant to both the EDTS and § 9-1-2 are time-barred. Accordingly,
we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment, and we remand the record of this case to the Superior
Court.
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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S
OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE: Melissa E. Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC, alias John Doe
Corporation et al.
CASE NO: No. 2014-239-Appeal.
(KC 14-316)
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED: March 7, 2016
JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell
SOURCE OF APPEAL: Kent County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice Sarah Taft-Carter
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For Plaintiff: David R. Comerford, Esq.
Frank R. Saccoccio, Esq.
For Defendants: Mark A. Pogue, Esq.