State v. Mitchell Savard ( 2023 )

Supreme Court
No. 2020-229-C.A.
(P2/17-3050A)
State :
v. :
Mitchell Savard. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
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Supreme Court
No. 2020-229-C.A.
(P2/17-3050A)
State :
v. :
Mitchell Savard. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Long, for the Court. The defendant, Mitchell Savard (defendant or
Mr. Savard), appeals from a judgment of conviction following a jury trial at which
he was found guilty of operating a vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of
others, death resulting; and operating a vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of
others, personal injury resulting. On appeal, Mr. Savard argues that the trial justice
erred (1) in denying his motion for a new trial on the basis that the weight of the
evidence did not support his conviction and (2) by admitting evidence from an
electronic data recovery system obtained from one of the vehicles involved in the
automobile collision. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court.
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Facts and Procedural History
We recite the following summary of relevant facts, which appear in the record
of the proceedings in Superior Court. This matter arises out of a motor vehicle
collision that occurred on Interstate Route 295 northbound in Johnston on the
morning of Thursday, March 30, 2017. The vehicles involved included a sedan
driven by Mr. Savard; a flatbed tow truck driven by Mr. Trevor Armstrong (Mr.
Armstrong); and a box truck driven by Mr. Erik Salazar (Mr. Salazar) and in which
Mr. Andy Salgado (Mr. Salgado) was a passenger.
The initial state police investigation revealed that the collision occurred
through a chain reaction. Specifically, officers learned that Mr. Savard appeared to
have slowed his vehicle in the center lane of travel, causing the tow truck
immediately behind him and the box truck behind it to do the same. However,
neither the tow truck nor the box truck was able to slow down before the box truck
hit the tow truck and the tow truck hit Mr. Savard’s vehicle. As a result of the injuries
that Mr. Salgado and Mr. Salazar sustained during the collision, first responders
transported them to the Rhode Island Hospital, where Mr. Salazar later died.
On October 30, 2017, the state filed a three-count information charging Mr.
Savard with operating a vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, resulting
in the death of Mr. Salazar in violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-1; operating a vehicle
in reckless disregard of the safety of others, resulting in the serious bodily injury of
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Mr. Salgado in violation of § 31-27-1.1; and operating a vehicle in reckless disregard
of the safety of others resulting in the physical injury of Mr. Armstrong pursuant to
§ 31-27-1.2. 1 At Mr. Savard’s trial, the state offered evidence from multiple drivers
in the vicinity of the collision; Mr. Richard Till (Mr. Till), a coworker of Mr.
Armstrong who was speaking with him on the phone during the collision; Mr. Bruce
McNally (Mr. McNally), an accident reconstruction expert; and two state police
officers who investigated the collision, including the officer in charge of the
Collision Reconstruction Unit of the Rhode Island State Police.
The drivers present in the vicinity of the collision testified largely in a
consistent fashion, with no single witness having observed the entire sequence of
events leading to the collision. Notably, Ms. Heather Constantine (Ms. Constantine)
testified that, from her vehicle, she observed Mr. Savard’s vehicle at a complete stop
in the center lane of the highway and the tow truck slowing down and eventually
coming to a complete stop. Shortly after Mr. Savard stopped his vehicle, she
observed an explosion of debris in her rear-view mirror. Ms. Constantine further
testified that she did not observe any objects on the highway or adverse weather
conditions that would have prompted any vehicles on the highway to slow down or
to stop.
1
Prior to Mr. Savard’s trial, Mr. Armstrong passed away in a manner unrelated to
this case. Thereafter, the state dismissed count three of the information pursuant to
Rule 48(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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With respect to the events that took place immediately after the collision, Ms.
Heather Meunier testified that she exited her vehicle after the collision and
approached Mr. Savard in an effort to provide assistance. She explained that, after
she approached Mr. Savard’s vehicle, he stated that the tow truck had cut him off.
She further testified that she then attempted to assist Mr. Armstrong in his tow truck.
She also said that she did not observe any signs that Mr. Armstrong was intoxicated.
Mr. Till testified about his phone conversation with Mr. Armstrong during the
relevant period. He stated that Mr. Armstrong complained to him twice about an
individual slamming on the brakes in front of him, potentially in an effort to
antagonize him. After the collision, Mr. Till, Mr. Armstrong, and their employer
traveled to the state police barracks together so that Mr. Till could provide a witness
statement. However, despite the fact that these three individuals traveled to the state
police barracks together, one of the investigating officers testified that Mr. Till
denied that he had communicated with Mr. Armstrong after the collision and before
this interview.
The state also called Mr. McNally as an expert to provide testimony
concerning the electronic data recovery system in Mr. Armstrong’s tow truck. Mr.
McNally testified that after reviewing the hard brake events collected by the system,
he determined that the tow truck reduced its speed from 46 to 0 miles per hour in a
four-second span. Ultimately, the data collected by the recovery device led Mr.
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McNally to conclude that Mr. Armstrong applied the tow truck’s brakes multiple
times in quick succession before coming to a complete stop. The data also supported
Mr. McNally’s conclusion that, after the tow truck came to a stop, the box truck
struck the tow truck from behind.
Finally, the state called two officers who investigated the collision. Trooper
David Wilson testified that when he arrived at the scene, he spoke with Mr. Savard,
who recounted the following: He passed the tow truck on the highway and, through
his rear-view mirror, observed Mr. Armstrong swerving and lying down as if he was
falling asleep due to intoxication. Mr. Savard further explained that, after coming
to this realization, he decided to move in front of Mr. Armstrong’s vehicle and to
slow down in front of him. Trooper Wilson testified that when he asked Mr. Savard
to elaborate on his reasoning for this decision, Mr. Savard became flustered and was
ultimately unable to so. He also testified that Mr. Armstrong did not appear
intoxicated.
Sergeant Jeffrey L’Heureux, the officer in charge of the Collision
Reconstruction Unit at the Rhode Island State Police, also responded to the scene,
where he observed the aftermath of the collision and considered Mr. Savard’s
explanation, as relayed by Trooper Wilson. Based on his observations of the scene
and Mr. Savard’s explanation, Sgt. L’Heureux began to suspect that the events
leading to this collision indicated that it was not a typical car accident. Sergeant
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L’Heureux conducted an investigation, performed an accident reconstruction, and
determined that both Mr. Savard’s vehicle and the tow truck were stopped or nearly
stopped when the box truck hit the tow truck.
Similar to the other witnesses, Sgt. L’Heureux did not find evidence to suggest
that Mr. Savard had stopped his vehicle due to obstacles in the road or adverse
weather. Sergeant L’Heureux testified that his investigation ultimately led him to
conclude that Mr. Savard’s decision to stop his vehicle in close proximity to the tow
truck was the only way this collision could have occurred. He further concluded that
Mr. Savard’s statement to Trooper Wilson was inconsistent with his own findings.
Unrelated to his expert testimony, Sgt. L’Heureux also testified on
cross-examination that he interviewed Mr. Till at the state police barracks. He stated
that Mr. Till denied that he had communicated with Mr. Armstrong during the period
after the collision and before he provided his witness statement to the police.
At the close of the state’s case, Mr. Savard rested without presenting evidence.
The jury thereafter returned a guilty verdict on both counts, and Mr. Savard filed a
motion for a new trial on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. On January 3, 2020, the Superior Court heard Mr. Savard’s motion for a
new trial, along with an unrelated bail violation. The trial justice issued a bench
decision denying Mr. Savard’s motion for a new trial and addressed a separate,
handwritten document that he had presented to the trial justice at an earlier hearing.
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The trial justice subsequently sentenced Mr. Savard to ten years on count one,
five years to serve, five years suspended, with probation, in addition to suspending
his driver’s license for three years upon his release. Additionally, the trial justice
sentenced Mr. Savard to a concurrent term of five years suspended, with probation,
on count two and ordered that he attend anger-management classes at the ACI. Mr.
Savard filed a premature but timely notice of appeal on February 24, 2020, and the
Superior Court entered a judgment of conviction on June 1, 2021. 2
We consider whether the trial justice (1) erred in denying Mr. Savard’s motion
for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence and (2) erroneously admitted
evidence from the electronic data recovery system found in the tow truck as evidence
of Mr. Savard’s guilt.
Motion for a New Trial
When a trial justice analyzes a motion for a new trial, she or he must “evaluate
the evidence with reference to the jury instructions; independently assess both
witness credibility and the weight of the evidence; and resolve whether she or he
would have come to the same conclusion as the jury.” State v. Valdez, 267 A.3d 638,
644 (R.I. 2022). “After conducting this independent analysis, the trial justice should
deny the motion for a new trial if she or he ‘agrees with the jury’s verdict or if the
2
Pursuant to Article I, Rule 4(b) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure,
this Court treats a defendant’s premature notice of appeal as if it were timely filed.
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evidence is such that reasonable minds could differ as to the outcome[.]’” Id.(quoting State v. Otero, 788 A.2d 469, 472 (R.I. 2002)). “However, where the trial
justice disagrees with the jury’s verdict, she or he must conduct further analysis ‘to
determine whether the verdict is against the fair preponderance of the evidence and
fails to do substantial justice.’” Id. (quoting State v. Tabora, 198 A.3d 516, 519 (R.I.
2019)). If the trial justice determines that the verdict meets this standard, she or he
may grant the defendant’s motion for a new trial. Id.This Court reviews a Superior Court justice’s denial of a motion for a new
trial with great deference. Valdez, 267 A.3d at 644. We do so because the trial justice
is in an ideal position to evaluate the facts and judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Id. “We consider whether the trial justice, acting as the thirteenth juror, exercised
independent judgment in analyzing the evidence presented.” Id. at 645. “If our
review reveals that ‘the trial justice has complied with this procedure and articulated
adequate reasons for denying the motion, [the] decision will be given great weight
and left undisturbed unless the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material
evidence or otherwise was clearly wrong.’” Id. (quoting State v. Gomez, 848 A.2d
221, 234 (R.I. 2004)).
This Court does not require the trial court to refer to all of the evidence in
support of its decision. Valdez, 267 A.3d at 645. Instead, the trial justice “need only
cite evidence sufficient to allow this [C]ourt to discern whether the justice has
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applied the appropriate standards.” Id. (quoting State v. Banach, 648 A.2d 1363,
1367 (R.I. 1994)). Additionally, the defendant must demonstrate that the trial justice
failed to apply these standards. 3 Id.Our review of the record in this case reveals that the trial justice conducted a
proper analysis of Mr. Savard’s motion. The trial justice found ample credible
evidence in support of the jury’s verdict and took no issue with its conclusion.
More specifically, the trial justice assessed the evidence in light of the jury
instructions regarding the charges against Mr. Savard and determined that the sole
issue was whether his conduct rose to the level of recklessness. The trial justice
noted that the state was required to demonstrate that Mr. Savard must have known,
or should have understood, that his driving created an unreasonable risk of harm. In
support of her finding that Mr. Savard engaged in reckless conduct, the trial justice
independently assessed the credibility and weight of the numerous witnesses’
testimony and their unanimity regarding the unremarkable driving conditions on the
day of the collision. She highlighted Ms. Constantine’s testimony regarding her
observations of Mr. Savard’s driving: He radically reduced the speed of his vehicle
in the middle of traffic on the highway. She also credited Mr. McNally’s expert
3
Before this Court, Mr. Savard argues that he is entitled to a judgment remanding
this matter for a new trial. However, we wish to clarify that the appropriate remedy
in this context would be to remand this proceeding to the Superior Court for
reconsideration of the motion for a new trial, as opposed to a new trial itself. See
State v. Luanglath, 749 A.2d 1, 6 (R.I. 2000).
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testimony explaining that the tow truck engaged in a series of rapid stops just prior
to the collision; she noted his thorough and painstaking analysis of the data from the
tow truck and acknowledged that his testimony served as a vital aspect of the state’s
argument.
Further, the trial justice discredited Mr. Till’s testimony, wherein he recounted
his telephone conversation with Mr. Armstrong leading up to and during the
collision, because she concluded that he lied to the investigating officers about not
speaking with Mr. Armstrong prior to providing a witness statement at the state
police barracks. However, the trial justice also found that Mr. Savard’s on-scene
explanation to Trooper Wilson about the circumstances of the collision was false,
inaccurate, and lacking in credibility. She noted the absence of any evidence
suggesting Mr. Armstrong’s impairment and further noted the complete absence of
evidence supporting Mr. Savard’s explanation that Mr. Armstrong operated his
vehicle in an unsafe manner. In light of this comprehensive analysis, we conclude
that the trial justice applied the appropriate standard and properly considered the
record evidence in determining that she agreed with the jury’s verdict.
Notwithstanding the trial justice’s proper application of the three-part test, Mr.
Savard asks this Court to reverse the trial justice’s ruling because, he argues, the trial
justice failed to adequately perform her role as the thirteenth juror and instead
developed and displayed significant disdain for him. He contends that the trial
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justice developed this disdain throughout the duration of the trial, and that it
compromised her ability to weigh the evidence regarding Mr. Savard’s credibility.
As support for this contention, Mr. Savard refers to comments by the trial justice,
made during the hearing on the motion for a new trial, that Mr. Savard had a habit
of thinking he was smarter than everyone else, and that this habit harmed his case.
Mr. Savard also directs this Court to comments the trial justice made when
addressing the handwritten document that he presented to her at an earlier hearing.
We find Mr. Savard’s arguments unpersuasive.
While the trial justice remarked that Mr. Savard thought that he was smarter
than everyone, our review of the transcript reveals that the remark did not signal a
deviation from her independent analysis of the evidence presented at trial. To the
contrary, when viewed in context, it is clear that the trial justice made the remark
when she was discussing the believability of Mr. Savard’s on-scene statement to
Trooper Wilson. Although she credited defendant with being flustered after the
collision, she concluded that his explanation for slowing down in front of Mr.
Armstrong was both illogical and inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial.
Similarly, our review of the transcript reveals that the trial justice’s comments
when addressing Mr. Savard’s handwritten document do not establish that the trial
justice failed to assess the evidence as an impartial factfinder. During the hearing
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on the motion for a new trial, the trial justice made the following comments
regarding Mr. Savard’s handwritten document:
“I want to put on the record as well, if you’ll bear with me
a second, I’ll find it -- when we were last here on Mr.
Savard’s violation of bail, he insisted that the Court look
at the document that he had given her. I have made it part
of the court file, copies were given to both State’s counsel
as well as your attorney, and it really goes more toward the
reasons why you think a new trial should be granted.
You’re represented by counsel so it’s not appropriate to
submit your own documents, but you did so nonetheless.
And I did look at them. If anything, I would suggest that
whatever arguments you may think you have, go more for
an application for post-conviction relief. But just so we
can shut that down as well, I want to address a couple of
them because I think they’re unfair and unwarranted and I
think they need to be addressed. You start out first by
indicating that one of the reasons you think you should be
granted a new trial is that you didn’t have competent
representation. I would argue that the Rhode Island
Public Defender’s office has thoroughly learned the word
‘vigorous.’ It is insulting. It is inappropriate. And in
some respects it is just untrue.”
When viewed in context, it is clear that the trial justice discussed the
circumstances surrounding Mr. Savard’s handwritten document after she finished
ruling on the motion for a new trial. Moreover, her comments, though stern and
disapproving of Mr. Savard’s criticism of the performance by his trial counsel, do
not reasonably evince prejudice against Mr. Savard or impartiality in how she
considered the evidence presented at trial. See Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 118 R.I. 608,
621-22, 375 A.2d 911, 917-18 (1977).
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This Court is satisfied from our review of the record that the trial justice
exercised her independent judgment, did not overlook or misconceive the testimony
before her, and provided adequate reasons supporting her denial of Mr. Savard’s
motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence. Therefore, we conclude
that the trial justice did not err in denying the motion for a new trial.
Admissibility of Evidence
Mr. Savard argues that this Court should vacate the trial justice’s decision
because she erroneously admitted testimony about, and data from, the tow truck’s
electronic data recovery system. Specifically, Mr. Savard takes issue with Mr.
McNally’s qualifications and ability to provide expert testimony regarding the
“novel” science of electronic data recovery systems in automobiles, as well as with
the fact that this Court has not previously analyzed the veracity of this technology.
However, Mr. Savard failed to raise this argument before the trial justice during his
motion for a new trial; it is therefore waived. See State v. Jimenez, 276 A.3d 1258,
1273 n.7 (R.I. 2022) (“It is well settled that a litigant cannot raise an objection or
advance a new theory on appeal if it was not raised before the trial court.”) (quoting
State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 828-29 (R.I. 2008)). Moreover, the fact that a litigant
has failed to challenge an issue in this jurisdiction does not create a novel issue for
the purposes of the raise-or-waive rule. See State v. Mohapatra, 880 A.2d 802, 810
(R.I. 2005).
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Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of conviction of the Superior
Court and remand the record in this case.
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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case State v. Mitchell Savard.
No. 2020-229-C.A.
Case Number
(P2/17-3050A)
Date Opinion Filed July 26, 2023
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Melissa A. Long
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Maureen B. Keough
For State:
Virginia M. McGinn
Attorney(s) on Appeal Department of Attorney General
For Defendant:
Carl J. Ricci, Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)