Kinard v. State , 418 S.C. 478 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                      THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Supreme Court
    Maurice C. Kinard, Petitioner,
    v.
    State of South Carolina, Respondent.
    Appellate Case No. 2015-001205
    Appeal From Richland County
    The Honorable Diane S. Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge
    The Honorable Brooks P. Goldsmith, Post-Conviction
    Judge
    Opinion No. 27687
    Submitted November 14, 2016 – Filed December 7, 2016
    AFFIRMED
    Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of the
    South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense,
    Division of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for
    Petitioner.
    Attorney General Alan M. Wilson and Assistant Attorney
    General Jessica Elizabeth Kinard, both of Columbia, for
    Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to review the denial of his
    application for post-conviction relief (PCR). We grant the petition for a writ of
    certiorari, dispense with further briefing, and proceed with a review of the direct
    appeal issue pursuant to Davis v. State, 
    288 S.C. 290
    , 
    342 S.E.2d 60
    (1986).
    Petitioner contends the PCR judge erred in finding plea counsel was not ineffective
    in failing to file a notice of appeal on petitioner's behalf. We agree.
    Petitioner testified at the PCR hearing that he asked plea counsel, promptly after
    sentencing, to file a notice of appeal. Plea counsel testified he could not recall if
    petitioner made such a request at the conclusion of the plea proceeding, but
    counsel acknowledged he received a letter from petitioner after the time to appeal
    had expired. Counsel testified he did not see a reason to appeal.
    The PCR judge found plea counsel believed an appeal would be frivolous and
    "credibly emphasized" that he and petitioner "worked hard for the plea deal and
    received what [c]ounsel testified [w]as a near best case scenario in being able to
    plead to voluntary manslaughter." The PCR judge found petitioner was advised by
    the plea judge that if he wished to appeal, he would have ten days to do so.
    Finally, the PCR judge found petitioner failed to present any evidence showing he
    may be prejudiced by the alleged deficiency, as there were no objections made at
    the guilty plea proceeding and plea counsel had no reason to file a notice of appeal.
    We find the PCR judge applied the wrong standard in evaluating petitioner's
    allegation that plea counsel was ineffective in failing to file a notice of appeal after
    petitioner requested he do so. The merits of any such appeal, while relevant to an
    allegation that counsel failed to advise a defendant of the right to appeal, are not
    relevant where a PCR applicant alleges counsel failed to file an appeal after being
    asked to do so. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 
    528 U.S. 470
    , 
    120 S. Ct. 1029
    , 
    145 L. Ed. 2d 985
    (2000). A lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the defendant to
    file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable
    regardless of whether the appeal would have had merit. 
    Id., at 477.
    "[W]hen
    counsel's constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal
    that he otherwise would have taken, the defendant has made out a successful
    ineffective assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal." 
    Id., at 484.
    The
    defendant need not show that his hypothetical appeal might have had merit, only
    that but for counsel's deficient conduct, the defendant would have appealed. 
    Id., at 486.
    Because the PCR judge failed to apply the proper standard in evaluating
    petitioner's claim, and instead evaluated the claim on the improper basis of whether
    the appeal would have been successful, we reverse the finding that plea counsel
    was not ineffective in failing to file a notice of appeal and proceed with a review of
    petitioner's direct appeal issue. See Hiott v. State, 
    381 S.C. 622
    , 
    674 S.E.2d 491
    (2009)(The decision of the PCR judge may be reversed when it is controlled by an
    error of law.).
    Petitioner's conviction and sentence are affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(B)(1),
    SCACR, and the following authorities: Rule 203(d)(1)(B)(iv), SCACR (If the
    appeal is from a guilty plea, the appellant must file a written explanation showing
    that there is an issue which can be reviewed on appeal. The explanation should
    identify the issue(s) to be raised on appeal and the factual basis for the issue(s)
    including how the issue(s) was raised below and the ruling of the lower court on
    that issue(s). If an issue was not raised to and ruled on by the lower court, the
    explanation must include argument and citation to legal authority showing how the
    issue can be reviewed on appeal. If the appellant fails to make a sufficient
    showing, the notice of appeal may be dismissed.); State v. Johnston, 
    333 S.C. 459
    ,
    462 
    510 S.E.2d 423
    , 425 (1999)("[T]his Court has consistently held that a
    challenge to sentencing must be raised at trial, or the issue will not be preserved for
    appellate review.").
    AFFIRMED.
    PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 27687

Citation Numbers: 418 S.C. 478, 795 S.E.2d 15

Filed Date: 12/7/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023