State v. Bell ( 2020 )


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  •                     THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    The State, Respondent,
    v.
    Jermaine Marquel Bell, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2017-001500
    Appeal From Chester County
    Paul M. Burch, Circuit Court Judge
    Opinion No. 5742
    Heard March 10, 2020 – Filed July 8, 2020
    REVERSED
    Appellate Defender David Alexander and Appellate
    Defender Sarah Elizabeth Shipe, both of Columbia, for
    Appellant.
    Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney
    General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy
    Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and Senior
    Assistant Attorney General W. Edgar Salter, III, all of
    Columbia; and Solicitor Randy E. Newman, Jr., of
    Lancaster, for Respondent.
    GEATHERS, J.: Jermaine Bell appeals his conviction of murder, for which he was
    sentenced to life imprisonment. Bell argues the circuit court erred in allowing the
    decedent's husband and daughter to testify regarding statements purportedly made
    by the decedent indicating that she believed Bell was stealing from her. We reverse.
    FACTS
    The decedent, Judy Lindsay, and her common law husband, Mitchell
    Mayfield, lived in Chester County. Judy and Mayfield had one son, two daughters,
    and several grandchildren. Their youngest daughter, Jessica, lived at home with
    Judy, Mayfield, and Jessica's children. The family was well known in their
    neighborhood, and people would often gather to socialize on the family's front porch.
    One such person was Jermaine Bell, who was friends with Jessica and her brother.
    The family had a unique relationship with Bell, as they often ran him off or told him
    not to come around, only to invite him over later or allow him back, oftentimes after
    he procured sodas or other drinks for the family.
    During the weekend of Judy's death, Bell, who was transient, spent the night
    of Friday, September 11, 2015, on the family's couch. On Saturday, September 12,
    2015, Bell was gone before anyone else woke up. That same day, Judy and Jessica
    attended a funeral before Judy went to church to sing with the choir. After returning
    from church, Judy changed into a pair of pants and a t-shirt. Judy joined Jessica,
    who had been drinking alcohol,1 on the porch to smoke a cigarette. Mayfield also
    joined them on the porch before going to bed around 11:00 or 11:30 p.m.2 At some
    point, Jessica telephoned Bell and invited him to join them on the porch. When Bell
    arrived, Jessica gave him a shot of liquor.
    After socializing on the porch for a while, Jessica called her cousin and asked
    him to take her to get something to eat. When she returned about fifteen to twenty
    minutes later, Judy and Bell were still on the porch, and Bell was still drinking. Upon
    finishing her food, Jessica smoked a cigarette and went to bed around 12:30 or 12:45
    a.m. As Jessica was heading to bed, Judy indicated that she was going to stay on the
    porch until she finished her cigarette. Bell was still on the porch with Judy when
    Jessica went to bed.
    On Sunday, September 13, 2015, Mayfield woke up around 5:00 or 6:00 a.m.
    As part of his usual morning routine, Mayfield made himself some coffee, emptied
    his trash, and burned his trash in a burn barrel. Mayfield did not see Judy that
    morning, but assumed she was sleeping in the room with Jessica. However, while
    he was burning his trash, Mayfield noticed Judy's socks, shoes, and scarf were strewn
    1
    Judy and Mayfield did not drink alcohol.
    2
    Prior to going to bed, Mayfield and Judy got into an argument over whether
    Mayfield would attend a church event with her on Sunday and what he would wear.
    When Mayfield did go to bed, one of the couple's grandchildren slept in the bed with
    him.
    around the yard. Believing that the grandkids had thrown Judy's clothes into the
    yard, Mayfield woke Jessica up and told her to get up and have the kids clean the
    yard.3 Jessica asked Mayfield if he knew where Judy was, and Mayfield responded
    that he did not but indicated that Jessica should get up and try to locate Judy.
    After waking up, Jessica went outside and began panicking when she could
    not find Judy. Jessica started calling family members to ask if they had seen Judy.
    Additionally, Jessica tried to call Bell because she knew he was the last person to
    see Judy. When that proved unsuccessful, Jessica and a family friend drove to
    Herman "Bo" Weldon's house, where Bell was supposedly staying, but no one
    answered the door. However, while on the porch, Jessica spotted the black shoes
    Bell had been wearing the night before and noticed that they were covered in mud.
    At some point, Jessica finally got a hold of Bell and asked if he knew what happened
    to Judy, to which Bell responded, "Ask Mango.[4]" Thereafter, Jessica returned home
    to continue looking.
    When Mayfield and Jessica went back into the yard, Mayfield noticed what
    appeared to be drag marks. He attempted to follow the drag marks but could not
    follow them once they led into the tall grass. Mayfield then looked around the
    neighbor's yard and found one of Judy's shirts and her keys. At that point, Mayfield
    informed Jessica that he was calling the police.
    Around 9:35 a.m., Officer John Kelly of the Chester County Sheriff's Office
    was dispatched to investigate a reported missing person. Officer Kelly arrived on
    the scene at 9:41 a.m. and was met by Mayfield and Jessica, who explained that Judy
    was last seen on the porch with Bell. Mayfield took Officer Kelly to the side of the
    house where he found Judy's clothes. Once in the yard, Officer Kelly noticed the
    drag marks, noting that they went through the dirt, around the back side of the house,
    and into the next-door neighbor's yard. Mayfield then offered to show Officer Kelly
    where he had found Judy's shirt and keys, but Officer Kelly decided to call for
    detectives and a dog. Officer Kelly taped off the crime scene and continued talking
    with Mayfield and Jessica.5 At some point, Mayfield pointed out that Bell was
    walking down the street towards the crime scene, and Officer Kelly made contact
    3
    On cross-examination, Jessica was presented with her earlier statement in which
    she indicated that she had woken herself up around 7:00 a.m. and subsequently
    roused Mayfield.
    4
    "Mango" is Mayfield's nickname.
    5
    The crime scene comprised Judy and Mayfield's house, their next-door neighbor's
    house, and an abandoned house on the other side of their neighbor.
    with him. Bell gave detectives his version of the night's events, indicating that he
    left the house after Judy went to bed around 12:30 or 1:00 a.m. Bell then agreed to
    be interviewed, and a detective placed him in a squad car and transported him to the
    Chester County Sheriff's Office.6 Prior to the interview, Bell consented to a buccal
    swab.
    Around 10:55 a.m., Officer Randy Clinton of the York County Sheriff's
    Office's K-9 Division received a call in reference to using a bloodhound to track a
    missing person. Officer Clinton arrived on scene and "scented" the dog off a pair of
    Judy's socks. The dog led Officer Clinton through Judy and Mayfield's yard, past
    their neighbor's house, around a fence and rosebush, past Judy's shirt and keys, and
    to the backyard of an abandoned house. The dog continued to lead Officer Clinton
    to the back side of a tin storage shed behind the abandoned house. Officer Clinton
    then found Judy's naked body lying face down behind the storage shed.
    Following the discovery of Judy's body, the South Carolina Law Enforcement
    Division (SLED) was contacted to assist on the case. Thereafter, three SLED agents
    arrived on scene at 1:31 p.m. While on the scene, the SLED agents collected or
    marked multiple pieces of evidence, including Judy's orange t-shirt and several
    footwear impressions. Additionally, the agents took a buccal swab from Mayfield.
    After spending most of the day on site, law enforcement cleared the scene and took
    down the crime scene tape around 7:20 p.m.
    After clearing the murder scene, law enforcement investigated several other
    locations, including Weldon's house. Once there, officers collected a pair of black
    Coogi shoes based on Jessica's tip that they were the same shoes Bell had worn the
    night before. However, by the time officers found the shoes, they were wet and
    appeared to have been washed. Meanwhile, at the crime scene, Mayfield and his
    sister7 were walking around the yard to see if they could find any more items.
    Mayfield testified that while walking near the location where Judy's body was found,
    the two found a plastic bag filled with Judy's underwear and a missing ashtray. Upon
    finding the bag, Mayfield contacted law enforcement, and SLED agents arrived back
    on scene around 8:27 p.m. The items were then turned over to law enforcement,
    who did not find any latent fingerprints on the plastic bag or its contents.
    6
    Law enforcement also had the grandchildren who were present at the house on the
    night of the murder sent to Safe Passage for a forensic interview. However, the
    grandchildren were not able to provide any information regarding Judy's death.
    7
    Mayfield testified that his sister used to work for a police department and he asked
    her if she thought it was ok to look around the scene after the tape was removed.
    During Bell's interview at the Chester County Sheriff's Office, SLED Agent
    Lee Boan used several interview tactics in an attempt to gain information, including
    telling Bell that Judy had died of a heart attack and claiming that officers had
    matched Bell's DNA to evidence on scene. Despite Agent Boan's tactics, Bell
    maintained his innocence throughout the interview. However, during this interview
    and a follow-up interview conducted on September 15, 2015, Bell offered several
    inconsistent statements.
    First, Bell claimed that he spent the night of Judy's death at two different
    houses before finally conceding that he spent the night on Weldon's porch. Second,
    Bell claimed that on the night of the murder, he stepped off the porch and walked
    directly down the road. Bell then indicated that he had gone into the side yard to
    urinate before leaving. Finally, officers asked Bell what he was wearing the night
    of the murder, and Bell indicated that he had worn a black shirt, jeans, and Coogi
    shoes. Bell further claimed that he had slept in his clothes and had not showered or
    changed before walking to the crime scene and agreeing to be interviewed. Despite
    these claims, Bell was not wearing the same clothes during the interview and
    ultimately claimed that he did change clothes and shower.
    On September 14, 2015, Dr. Kim Collins conducted Judy's autopsy. Dr.
    Collins noted that Judy had an abrasion on her forehead and the area from Judy's
    collarbone up had a reddish-purple discoloration resulting from bruising. Dr. Collins
    indicated that such discoloration was consistent with manual strangulation, and
    swabs of Judy's neck area were taken to test for touch DNA. As she continued, Dr.
    Collins discovered blood in Judy's mouth resulting from Judy biting into the deep
    muscle of her tongue, scratches on the inside of her lips resulting from the pressure
    placed onto her teeth from her lips, and pinpoint hemorrhages on her inner lips
    resulting from ruptured blood vessels in her mouth. Additionally, Dr. Collins found
    hemorrhages in Judy's eyes as a result of ruptured blood vessels. Turning to the neck
    area, Dr. Collins discovered more hemorrhages in Judy's strap muscles, further
    indicating that the hemorrhages extended down through several layers of muscle.8
    Dr. Collins also found a massive amount of hemorrhaging on the deep tissue in the
    back of Judy's neck. Dr. Collins explained, "that's a lot of squeezing through the
    skin[,] through the underlying fat, through all those strap muscles and then to cause
    hemorrhage in the back of all these structures around the esophagus, that's very deep
    in the back of the neck." Based on the bruising and hemorrhaging in Judy's neck,
    8
    Dr. Collins explained that such hemorrhages do not always appear when a victim
    has been strangled but their presence suggests a significant amount of pressure on
    the neck.
    Dr. Collins determined Judy's cause of death to be homicide by manual strangulation
    and opined that Judy was strangled with "a great deal of force."
    Dr. Collins further noted multiple areas of abrasion and bruises to different
    parts of the body. One such abrasion was a long, linear scratch from Judy's armpit
    area down to her thigh.9 Dr. Collins also found a large area of abrasion on the left
    knee and an area of abrasion on the left buttock. Additionally, Dr. Collins found a
    large area of bruising on the inner aspect of the left arm near the elbow and similar
    bruising on the right arm, further indicating that the bruises were noticeable despite
    Judy's darkly pigmented skin. Dr. Collins opined that the bruising around Judy's
    armpits was consistent with being dragged and, after considering the knee abrasions,
    law enforcement concluded that Judy's body was dragged face down.
    Dr. Collins also performed a sexual assault examination on Judy's body. Dr.
    Collins determined that Judy had an abrasion to her pubic area, a tear and scraping
    to the tissue on the outside of the vagina, and hemorrhaging in the tissue around the
    rectum. However, Dr. Collins did not find any injuries inside the vagina nor did she
    discover anything suggesting the presence of bodily fluids.
    Bell was arrested on October 2, 2015, and the Chester County Grand Jury
    indicted him for murder on February 16, 2016. Bell's trial was conducted on June
    26 through June 30, 2017. At trial, Bell twice objected to the admission of testimony
    at issue on appeal. First, Bell raised the following objection to Mayfield's testimony:
    State: "Now, getting closer to the time of September 2015,
    had any other problems arose regarding the defendant,
    Jermaine Bell, between you and your wife, Judy?"
    Mayfield: "No. Now, at a point in time they - - Judy had
    told me Jermaine was stealing."
    State: "Someone was stealing?"
    Defense: "Objection, Your Honor."
    State: "Goes to the state of mind, Your Honor."
    Defense: "404-B."
    9
    Officers theorized that this abrasion occurred as Judy was being dragged past the
    rose bush.
    Court: "I'm going to give her a little leeway on it, I will
    overrule the objection. Go ahead."
    Mayfield went on to testify that Judy believed Bell was stealing glasses, money,
    cigarettes, and clothes from her. However, Mayfield also testified that they had no
    proof that Bell was stealing and they never reported it to the police.
    Similarly, Bell raised the following objection to Jessica's testimony:
    State: "Had she ever explained to you about anything that
    he had done?"
    Jessica: "Yeah, stealing stuff from her."
    Defense: "Objection, Your Honor, same as before,
    403."[10]
    State: "Goes to the state of mind, Your Honor."
    Court: "Overruled."
    Jessica went on to testify that Judy believed Bell was stealing her glasses and
    underwear but indicated that no one had confronted Bell or called the police about
    the issue. Notably, the circuit court did not provide a rationale in overruling either
    objection.
    Following the testimony of Mayfield and Jessica, the State presented several
    witnesses who saw Bell on the night of the murder or the following morning. First,
    Detective Brian Sanders testified without objection regarding a statement given by
    one of Jessica's friends. According to the friend, she had driven over to the house
    around 12:30 a.m. on the night of the murder to pick Jessica up so they could go out.
    She claimed that she blew the horn, nobody came to the door, the lights were off,
    the TV was on, and the front door was open. She further claimed that Bell came
    walking from a house across the street and indicated he did not know the location of
    Jessica or Judy when asked.
    Second, Weldon testified that he woke up around 7:00 a.m. on September 13,
    2015, to find Bell sleeping on the couch on his porch. Weldon walked to the store
    10
    We note the circuit court likely interpreted "same as before" to mean that Bell was
    objecting under Rule 404(b), SCRE, which he invoked in objecting to Mayfield's
    testimony regarding Judy's statements.
    to buy cigarettes and shared one with Bell when he returned. Weldon claimed that
    he and Bell did not really talk but that Bell kept going back and forth to the road.
    Next, Mayfield's nephew, Darkarious Woods, testified that he was driving by
    Judy and Mayfield's house around 1:00 or 1:30 a.m. on the night of the murder.
    Woods claimed that he saw Bell coming from the side yard between the house
    neighboring Judy's and the abandoned house behind which Judy's body was found.
    According to Woods, Bell walked up to his car and asked if it was new. Woods
    explained that he found this question odd because Bell had previously washed his
    car multiple times. Woods further testified that Bell seemed "jittery" during their
    conversation.
    Finally, Ervin Chalk testified that he had known Bell for a year or two and
    that Bell lived in the abandoned house across the street from his. Chalk indicated
    that on the day of the murder, he and Bell had attended the same birthday party at
    Chalk's aunt's house. Chalk claimed that Bell was drinking at the party, was wearing
    a blue and white striped shirt, and had left around 10:00 or 11:00 p.m. Chalk testified
    that he went to a club after leaving the party but on his way home around 3:30 a.m.,
    he saw Bell walking in the direction of Weldon's house and wearing the same blue
    and white striped shirt he had worn to the party.
    The State then presented several experts.11 First, the State offered Jessica
    Stowe as an expert in forensic serology. Stowe explained that while looking at oral,
    vaginal, and rectal swabs from Judy's body, she detected the presence of P30, a
    protein found in high concentrations in male seminal fluid. However, Stowe testified
    that she could not identify any spermatozoa from the swabs. Stowe forwarded the
    swabs testing positive for P30 to SLED's DNA section but the record does not reveal
    whether the P30 samples underwent DNA analysis or what results, if any, were
    obtained. Additionally, Stowe explained that she scraped and swabbed the
    underarms of Judy's orange t-shirt for touch DNA. Stowe also forwarded these
    swabs to SLED's DNA section.
    Following Stowe, the State offered Lilly Gallman as an expert in DNA
    analysis. Gallman testified that the swabs taken from Judy's neck contained a
    mixture of DNA from two individuals and indicated that Judy and Bell could not be
    excluded as contributors to the mixture. Gallman explained that the probability of
    11
    These experts included SLED Agent Melinda Worley, an expert in shoe wear
    impression. However, Agent Worley testified that she was not able to conclude that
    Bell's black Coogi shoes made the prints on scene nor was she able to conclude that
    Bell's shoes did not make the prints on scene.
    selecting an unrelated individual who could have contributed to the mixture was one
    in ten.12 Gallman testified that she also conducted a YSTR-DNA test on the swabs,
    further explaining that a YSTR-DNA test focuses only on the Y-chromosome.
    Gallman indicated that the YSTR test from the swabs "matched" Bell's Y-DNA and
    the probability of randomly selecting an unrelated male individual having a
    matching DNA profile was one in 8,600.13 Furthermore, Gallman asserted that the
    Y-DNA "matched" Bell's DNA profile to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.
    After testing the swabs from Judy's neck, Gallman tested the swabs taken from
    the underarms of Judy's shirt. Gallman determined that these swabs contained a
    mixture of DNA and that Judy and Bell could not be excluded as contributors to the
    mixture. Gallman indicated that the probability of selecting an unrelated individual
    who could have contributed to the mixture was one in 960.14 Gallman then
    performed a YSTR test on the underarm swabs and determined the swabs "matched"
    Bell's Y-DNA and the probability of randomly selecting an unrelated male
    individual having a matching DNA profile was one in 8,600. Conversely, Gallman
    determined that, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, Mayfield could be
    excluded as a contributor to the neck and shirt swabs under both the standard DNA
    and Y-DNA tests. However, Gallman testified that she analyzed Judy's fingernail
    clippings and determined that Bell could be excluded as a minor DNA contributor
    but Mayfield could not.
    During its closing arguments, the State made the following references to the
    testimonies of Mayfield and Jessica:
    Now I'm going to talk about that bag and the ashtray that
    was found. Remember, they were saying that Mitchell
    Mayfield and Jessica, that some of their mother's items had
    been missing and she believed that [Bell] was stealing
    from them, Judy did, and so did Jessica.
    12
    Gallman explained that the statistical frequency of the DNA was high because she
    was only able to analyze two out of sixteen loci on the chromosome.
    13
    Gallman explained that all males sharing the same paternal lineage would share
    the same Y-DNA. Therefore, any such male would be a match under the YSTR-test.
    However, Bell stipulated that his brother was working on the night of the murder
    and was not present at the home of the victim.
    14
    Gallman testified that she was only able to analyze four out of sixteen loci on the
    chromosome.
    ...
    [Jessica] said Judy believed the defendant was stealing
    some of her personal items; glasses, underwear[,] ashtray.
    I'm going to tell you something, after I got this case it was
    already too late, but I even went back over here to see this
    area for myself. I wish someone had gone back and looked
    even a little harder, you might have found a pair of glasses
    in there. I submit to you this defendant had his own little
    spots to hang out[,] to put stuff, to hide stuff. Her clothing
    could be anywhere in this area. He knows the woods, he
    knows the back trail, he knows the abandoned houses, he
    knows every single corner of that.
    ...
    Whoever killed Judy knew where to hide her body.
    Abandoned home, overgrown. . . . This was his hiding
    place, that's where the underwear was, that's where the
    ashtray was.
    ...
    [Judy] probably confronted [Bell] about her stolen items,
    maybe she was just sick of it, unfortunately we will never
    know because he killed her. Maybe it was a sexual
    rejection . . . .
    Ultimately, the jury found Bell guilty of murder, and the circuit court
    sentenced Bell to life imprisonment. Bell then moved for a new trial, but the motion
    was denied. This appeal followed.
    ISSUE ON APPEAL
    Did the circuit court err in allowing Mayfield and Jessica to testify regarding
    Judy's statements indicating she believed Bell was stealing from her?
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    "In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only." State
    v. Wharton, 
    381 S.C. 209
    , 213, 
    672 S.E.2d 786
    , 788 (2009). As such, "[appellate
    courts are] bound by the [circuit] court's factual findings unless they are clearly
    erroneous." State v. Baccus, 
    367 S.C. 41
    , 48, 
    625 S.E.2d 216
    , 220 (2006).
    "A [circuit court] has considerable latitude in ruling on the admissibility of
    evidence . . . ." State v. Kelley, 
    319 S.C. 173
    , 177, 
    460 S.E.2d 368
    , 370 (1995).
    Accordingly, "[t]he admission of evidence is within the discretion of the [circuit]
    court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion
    occurs when the conclusions of the [circuit] court either lack evidentiary support or
    are controlled by an error of law." State v. Goodwin, 
    384 S.C. 588
    , 601, 
    683 S.E.2d 500
    , 507 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting State v. Pagan, 
    369 S.C. 201
    , 208, 
    631 S.E.2d 262
    , 265 (2006)).
    "The improper admission of hearsay is reversible error only when the
    admission causes prejudice." State v. Hughes, 
    419 S.C. 149
    , 155, 
    796 S.E.2d 174
    ,
    177 (Ct. App. 2017) (quoting State v. Weston, 
    367 S.C. 279
    , 288, 
    625 S.E.2d 641
    ,
    646 (2006)). Additionally, "[a circuit court]'s decision regarding the comparative
    probative value and prejudicial effect of relevant evidence should be reversed only
    in exceptional circumstances." State v. Sweat, 
    362 S.C. 117
    , 129, 
    606 S.E.2d 508
    ,
    514 (Ct. App. 2004). Finally, "[i]f there is any evidence to support the admission
    of[] bad act evidence, the [circuit court]'s ruling will not be disturbed on appeal."
    State v. Wilson, 
    345 S.C. 1
    , 6, 
    545 S.E.2d 827
    , 829 (2001).
    LAW/ANALYSIS
    Bell argues the circuit court erred in allowing Mayfield and Jessica to testify
    regarding Judy's statements indicating she believed Bell was stealing from her
    because 1) the statements constituted inadmissible hearsay and did not fall within
    the "Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition" exception to the rule
    against hearsay; 2) the risk of unfair prejudice stemming from the statements
    outweighed their probative value; and 3) the statements constituted evidence of prior
    bad acts precluded by Rule 404(b), SCRE.
    Prior bad acts and Rule 404(b)15
    15
    Bell's remaining arguments are unpreserved for appellate review because they
    were not raised to and ruled upon by the circuit court or were not raised with
    sufficient specificity. See Staubes v. City of Folly Beach, 
    339 S.C. 406
    , 412, 
    529 S.E.2d 543
    , 546 (2000) ("It is well-settled that an issue . . . must have been raised to
    and ruled upon by the [circuit] court to be preserved for appellate review."); State v.
    Patterson, 
    324 S.C. 5
    , 19, 
    482 S.E.2d 760
    , 767 (1997) (indicating an "[a]ppellant is
    Bell argues the circuit court erred in allowing Mayfield and Jessica to testify
    regarding Judy's statements because the statements constituted evidence of prior bad
    acts and were thus inadmissible under Rule 404(b). The State argues the statements
    did not constitute evidence of prior bad acts but, rather, constituted evidence of the
    suspicion of prior bad acts. We agree with Bell.
    Pursuant to Rule 404(b), SCRE,
    Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
    to prove the character of a person in order to show action
    in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
    to show motive, identity, the existence of a common
    scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or
    intent.
    In other words, "evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible to show criminal
    propensity or to demonstrate the accused is a bad person." State v. King, 
    334 S.C. 504
    , 512, 
    514 S.E.2d 578
    , 582 (1999). Our courts have explained that, "[p]roof that
    a defendant has been guilty of another crime equally heinous prompts to a ready
    acceptance of and belief in the prosecution's theory that he is guilty of the crime
    charged." State v. Lyle, 
    125 S.C. 406
    , 416, 
    118 S.E. 803
    , 807 (1923). Thus, the
    effect of such evidence "is to predispose the mind of the juror to believe the
    [defendant] guilty, and thus effectually to strip him of the presumption of
    innocence."
    Id. Consequently, "[t]o
    be admissible, the bad act must logically relate
    to the crime with which the defendant has been charged." State v. Fletcher, 
    379 S.C. 17
    , 23, 
    664 S.E.2d 480
    , 483 (2008). Moreover, "[i]f the defendant was not convicted
    of the prior crime, evidence of the prior bad act must be clear and convincing."
    Id. (emphasis added).
    At the outset, the State argues the statements did not constitute evidence of
    prior bad acts but, rather, constituted evidence of a belief or suspicion of prior bad
    acts. We disagree for the following reasons. First, Judy's belief that Bell was
    stealing was, at minimum, evidence of two things: 1) Judy believed her property was
    stolen or lost; and 2) something led Judy to believe Bell was responsible. Thus, we
    find the State elicited Judy's belief that Bell was stealing to demonstrate that Bell
    limited to the grounds raised at trial"); see also State v. Johnson, 
    363 S.C. 53
    , 58,
    
    609 S.E.2d 520
    , 523 (2005) ("The objection should be addressed to the [circuit] court
    in a sufficiently specific manner that brings attention to the exact error."); State v.
    Dunbar, 
    356 S.C. 138
    , 142, 
    587 S.E.2d 691
    , 694 (2003) ("[T]o preserve [a legal
    issue], []it must be clear that the argument has been presented on that ground.").
    had previously stolen from her. Cf. Smalls v. State, 
    422 S.C. 174
    , 185–86, 
    810 S.E.2d 836
    , 842 (2018) (finding that after the officer indicated on cross-examination
    that a prior burglary involving a stolen gun had not been solved, the State's question
    asking whether the defendant had burglarized the house "did not serve any legitimate
    purpose" but "was an improper effort to introduce evidence that Smalls committed
    another crime"). Second, in its closing argument, the State portrayed Judy's belief
    as conclusive evidence that Bell had been stealing from her and asserted that the
    prior thefts were evidence of Bell's possible motives. Notably, evidence of motive
    is one of the five exceptions to the rule precluding the admission of prior bad acts
    evidence. See Rule 404(b), SCRE ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
    acts . . . may[] be admissible to show motive . . . .").
    Finally, if this court were to accept the State's distinction between evidence of
    prior bad acts and evidence of the belief of prior bad acts, such a distinction would
    swallow Rule 404(b)'s preclusion of prior bad acts evidence. Pursuant to the State's
    position, Rule 404(b) would not preclude evidence of a belief of prior bad acts, thus,
    the State would not need to invoke an exception to the rule to have such evidence
    admitted. Moreover, under the State's position, evidence that a defendant committed
    an unconvicted prior bad act would require proof of the act by clear and convincing
    evidence, but evidence that someone believes a defendant committed an unconvicted
    prior bad act would not be subject to the same evidentiary burden. See 
    Fletcher, 379 S.C. at 23
    , 664 S.E.2d at 483 ("If the defendant was not convicted of the prior crime,
    evidence of the prior bad act must be clear and convincing." (emphasis added)). If
    this court were to sanction such a distinction, the State could bypass the rule, as well
    as 404(b) scrutiny when invoking an exception to the rule, by simply having
    witnesses testify that they believe a defendant committed a prior bad act rather than
    putting forth direct evidence of the prior bad act in question. Thus, we conclude that
    Mayfield's and Jessica's statements constitute evidence of prior bad acts, and we will
    scrutinize the circuit court's admission of the statements accordingly.
    In State v. Fletcher, our supreme court found that the circuit court erred in
    allowing the State to present evidence of prior bad acts in a homicide by child abuse
    
    case. 379 S.C. at 25
    , 664 S.E.2d at 483–84. At trial, the State called one of the
    defendant's friends and coworkers to testify regarding two events involving the child
    victim.
    Id. at 21,
    664 S.E.2d at 481. Both co-defendants objected to the testimony,
    arguing there was not clear and convincing evidence establishing who committed
    the acts in question.
    Id. at 21,
    664 S.E.2d at 481–82. The circuit court overruled the
    objection and allowed the witness to testify.
    Id. at 21,
    664 S.E.2d at 482. The
    witness testified that on one occasion, he had gone to the co-defendants' house and
    heard a baby crying.
    Id. After going
    upstairs, he found the child sitting in a walker
    in the attic and profusely sweating.
    Id. On another
    occasion, the witness indicated
    he had gone to the co-defendants' house and found the child handcuffed by his feet
    to the co-defendants' bed.
    Id. at 22,
    664 S.E.2d at 482.
    On appeal, our supreme court found that, "there is simply not clear and
    convincing evidence in the record that Fletcher committed the prior bad acts testified
    to by [the witness]."
    Id. at 24,
    664 S.E.2d at 483. The court explained that,
    "[a]lthough [the witness] testified he saw [the child] handcuffed to the bed and in
    the walker in the attic, there was no evidence whatsoever introduced at trial that
    Fletcher was either the person who placed [the child] in the attic[] or that he
    handcuffed him to the bed."
    Id. Ultimately, the
    court held that the circuit court erred
    in admitting the witness's testimony, concluding "there is simply no evidence, let
    alone clear and convincing evidence[,] that Fletcher was the perpetrator of the prior
    bad acts against [the child]."16 Id. at 
    25, 664 S.E.2d at 483
    –84.
    Here, we find the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing Mayfield and
    Jessica to testify regarding Judy's statements because there is no evidence, let alone
    clear and convincing evidence, demonstrating that Bell had previously stolen Judy's
    property. See 
    Goodwin, 384 S.C. at 601
    , 683 S.E.2d at 507 ("An abuse of discretion
    occurs when the conclusions of the [circuit] court either lack evidentiary support or
    are controlled by an error of law." (quoting 
    Pagan, 369 S.C. at 208
    , 631 S.E.2d at
    265)). Mayfield and Jessica both testified that Judy believed Bell was stealing from
    her but indicated that the family had no proof of this, had not called the police, and
    had not confronted Bell about the alleged thefts. Assuming some of Judy's property
    16
    Consistent with the holding in Fletcher, our courts have routinely held that a
    circuit court errs by admitting evidence of prior bad acts when the defendant cannot
    be established as the perpetrator of the bad acts by clear and convincing evidence.
    See State v. Cutro, 
    332 S.C. 100
    , 106, 
    504 S.E.2d 324
    , 327 (1998) ("[H]ere, the
    evidence is insufficient to establish that appellant was the actor in Parker's death or
    Asher's injuries[,] and we hold the trial judge erred in admitting this evidence.");
    State v. Pierce, 
    326 S.C. 176
    , 178, 
    485 S.E.2d 913
    , 914 (1997) ("The State failed to
    offer any proof that appellant inflicted these injuries. Thus, this testimony is
    inadmissible under Lyle[,] and the trial court erred in admitting it."); State v.
    Conyers, 
    268 S.C. 276
    , 281, 
    233 S.E.2d 95
    , 97 (1977) ("There was very little
    evidence, however, to establish that appellant poisoned her first husband other than
    the fact that she was his wife and he had some life insurance. This evidence alone
    was insufficient to establish the identity of appellant as the actor in poisoning her
    first husband. The admission of this testimony was clearly prejudicial and requires
    that a new trial be granted.").
    had been stolen, we find this case is similar to Fletcher because neither Mayfield's
    nor Jessica's testimony could definitively establish that Bell was the perpetrator of
    the thefts. See Fletcher, 379 S.C. at 
    25, 664 S.E.2d at 483
    –84 ("[T]here is simply
    no evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence[,] that Fletcher was the
    perpetrator of the prior bad acts . . . ."). Moreover, unlike the acts in Fletcher, there
    is no evidence, beyond her statements of belief, that Judy's property had in fact been
    stolen. There is no evidence in the record indicating that the clothes in the bag
    Mayfield testified he found are the same clothes Judy alleged were stolen.
    Additionally, neither Mayfield nor Jessica testified that Judy believed Bell had stolen
    the ashtray found in the bag. Accordingly, we do not find clear and convincing
    evidence demonstrating that Bell was the perpetrator of the alleged thefts. See id. at
    
    23, 664 S.E.2d at 483
    ("If the defendant was not convicted of the prior crime,
    evidence of the prior bad act must be clear and convincing." (emphasis added)).
    Thus, the circuit court erred in admitting the evidence of prior bad acts.
    Harmless error
    The State argues that any error in admitting Mayfield's and Jessica's
    testimonies was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
    An "[e]rror is harmless when it 'could not reasonably have affected the result
    of the trial.'" State v. Mitchell, 
    286 S.C. 572
    , 573, 
    336 S.E.2d 150
    , 151 (1985)
    (quoting State v. Key, 
    256 S.C. 90
    , 93, 
    180 S.E.2d 888
    , 890 (1971)). "No definite
    rule of law governs this finding; rather, the materiality and prejudicial character of
    the error must be determined from its relationship to the entire case." State v.
    Thompson, 
    352 S.C. 552
    , 562, 
    575 S.E.2d 77
    , 83 (Ct. App. 2003) (quoting 
    Mitchell, 286 S.C. at 573
    , 336 S.E.2d at 151). Accordingly, "our jurisprudence requires us
    not to question whether the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, but
    whether beyond a reasonable doubt the trial error did not contribute to the guilty
    verdict." State v. Tapp, 
    398 S.C. 376
    , 389–90, 
    728 S.E.2d 468
    , 475 (2012) (emphasis
    added). In other words, an error is harmless "when guilt has been conclusively
    proven by competent evidence such that no other rational conclusion can be
    reached." State v. Kirton, 
    381 S.C. 7
    , 37, 
    671 S.E.2d 107
    , 122 (Ct. App. 2008)
    (emphasis added).
    In State v. King, our supreme court found the erroneous admission of prior
    bad acts evidence constituted reversible 
    error. 334 S.C. at 514
    –15, 514 S.E.2d at
    583–84. King was accused of the murder of his father-in-law.
    Id. at 507–09,
    514
    S.E.2d at 579–81. At trial, King's ex-wife testified regarding prior incidents in which
    King had stolen items from her.
    Id. at 511,
    514 S.E.2d at 582. On appeal, the
    supreme court found the circuit court erred in admitting the prior bad acts evidence
    because the evidence was "not admissible under any theory."
    Id. at 513,
    514 S.E.2d
    at 583.
    In concluding that the error was not harmless, the supreme court determined
    that all of the evidence in the record was circumstantial.
    Id. at 514,
    514 S.E.2d at
    583. The court further found that, "[w]hile this circumstantial evidence pointed to
    appellant's guilt, especially the blood evidence, the evidence was not overwhelming."
    Id. (emphasis added).
    The court explained that "[t]he admission of this testimony
    allowed the State to insinuate to the jury that appellant had a drug problem[,]" and
    "[t]he [State]'s questions eliminated many legitimate reasons why appellant would
    need money."
    Id. "This improper
    evidence suggested to the jury that appellant was
    guilty of committing the charged crimes because of his criminal propensity to
    commit crimes and his bad character."
    Id. at 514,
    514 S.E.2d at 583–84.
    Additionally, the court noted that "[t]he State continuously stressed this improper
    testimony in its closing argument."
    Id. at 514–15,
    514 S.E.2d at 584 (emphasis
    added). "Therefore, it [wa]s impossible under these circumstances to conclude the
    improper evidence did not impact the jury's verdict."
    Id. at 515,
    514 S.E.2d at 584
    (emphases added). Finally, the court determined that the "improper testimony
    permeated the trial and the jury likely used this evidence to infer that since appellant
    had previously stolen from his ex-wife, he probably committed these crimes against
    his father-in-law also."
    Id. We find
    the case at bar is strikingly similar to King. Here, like in King, all of
    the evidence in the record was circumstantial. Additionally, while we are cognizant
    of the fact that this circumstantial evidence pointed to Bell's guilt, such evidence was
    not overwhelming.17 Given this evidentiary context, we find Mayfield's and Jessica's
    17
    In asserting that the error was harmless, the State relies heavily on Gallman's
    testimony indicating the touch DNA taken from Judy's neck and the underarms of
    her shirt "matched" Bell's Y-DNA. However, we note that a "match" is only part of
    the equation in DNA analysis. "After determining that two DNA samples match,
    forensic analysts estimate the statistical frequency of such matches in a reference
    population. The purpose of the statistical estimates is to provide meaning to the
    match by showing the likelihood that an unrelated person in the reference population
    would match by chance." William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of
    New Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons from the "DNA War", 84 J. Crim. L. &
    Criminology 22, 61 (1993); see also State v. Phillips, Op. No. 27978 (S.C. Sup. Ct.
    filed June 3, 2020) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 22 at 29–30) ("Random match
    probability is the likelihood that another randomly chosen person—unrelated to the
    suspect—will have a DNA fragment identical to the fragment the analyst found in
    statements regarding Judy's belief were highly prejudicial. First, like the testimony
    in King, the statements tended to establish Bell's criminal propensity by painting him
    as a thief. See id. at 
    514, 514 S.E.2d at 583
    –84 ("This improper evidence suggested
    to the jury that appellant was guilty of committing the charged crimes because of his
    criminal propensity to commit crimes and his bad character."); 
    Lyle, 125 S.C. at 416
    ,
    118 S.E. at 807 ("[The] effect [of bad acts evidence] is to predispose the mind of the
    juror to believe the [defendant] guilty, and thus effectually to strip him of the
    presumption of innocence."). Second, the statements allowed the State to insinuate
    to the jury that Bell was a pervert. See King, 334 S.C. at 
    514, 514 S.E.2d at 583
    ("The admission of this testimony allowed the State to insinuate to the jury that
    appellant had a drug problem."). Because Judy's body was found unclothed and with
    injuries to the vaginal and rectal areas of her body, the insinuation that Bell was a
    the touch sample."). Crucially, "[o]ne very important thing to understand about
    touch DNA is that in many cases . . . the DNA analyst is not able to obtain a full
    DNA profile from the 'touch' sample." Phillips, (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 22 at 28).
    Therefore, "[t]he probability of a random match in any given case depends on the
    size of the fragment the analyst can obtain from the touch sample."
    Id. at 30.
    "Thus,
    the more complete the fragment, the less likely another person could randomly
    match it. The smaller the fragment, on the other hand, the more likely some other
    person will also have the identical fragment, and would then be a 'random match.'"
    Id. (emphases added).
    Here, the State's DNA expert testified that when examining
    the DNA sample from Judy's neck, the expert was only able to analyze two out of
    the chromosome's sixteen loci. Similarly, when analyzing the DNA sample from
    Judy's underarms, the State's expert was only able to analyze four of the
    chromosome's sixteen loci. The expert further testified that the probability of
    selecting an unrelated individual with a matching DNA profile ranged from one in
    ten to one in 960. Additionally, the expert testified that the probability of randomly
    selecting an unrelated male individual with a matching Y-DNA profile was one in
    8,600. We do not find that the statistical frequencies associated with Bell's DNA
    and Y-DNA tests were so low as to suggest that Bell's guilt was the only rational
    conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. See, e.g., 
    Thompson, 352 S.C. at 556
    57, 575 S.E.2d at 80
    ("The expert further opined that only one in thirty-two
    quadrillion persons have the same genetic marker as Thompson." (emphasis
    added)). Rather, a jury could have reasonably determined that the statistical
    frequencies did not reliably identify Bell as the source of the DNA or Y-DNA on
    Judy's neck and shirt. See State v. Dinkins, 
    319 S.C. 415
    , 418, 
    462 S.E.2d 59
    , 60
    (1995) ("The jury should be allowed to make its own determination as to whether it
    believes the [DNA] statistics are reliable. The jury is free to believe or disbelieve
    the experts and the statistics.").
    pervert tended to suggest that Bell was capable of and likely engaged in a sexually
    charged attack. In turn, this allowed the State to compensate for the absence of any
    evidence connecting Bell to the sexual injuries. Third, the statements allowed the
    State to establish potential motives for the killing despite Bell's friendly relationship
    with Judy and her family. In fact, in its closing argument, the State relied on Judy's
    belief as evidence of Bell's potential motive, asserting that Bell may have killed Judy
    after she confronted him about the alleged stolen items or after rejecting Bell's sexual
    advances.
    But perhaps the most prejudicial effect was the establishment of a connection
    between Bell and the bag of Judy's underwear Mayfield testified he found on the
    scene. During the trial, law enforcement testified that they did not find any latent
    fingerprints on the bag or its contents, nor did they find anything that would directly
    tie Bell to the bag. However, despite the lack of proof that Bell was stealing,
    Mayfield's and Jessica's testimonies tied Bell directly to the bag of underwear.
    Because the bag was purportedly found near the location of Judy's body, this
    connection tended to place Bell at the scene and suggested that he was familiar with
    the area in which the body was found. Moreover, in its closing argument, the State
    again used the statements against Bell, consistently asserting that the items in the
    bag were the ones Judy believed Bell had stolen, that Bell in fact stole these items,
    and that Bell had "hiding spots" behind the abandoned house.
    Ultimately, we find the statements that Judy believed Bell was stealing from
    her, which could not be proven or disproven, had the same prejudicial effect as
    evidence that would have conclusively established that Bell was stealing. In other
    words, even if Judy was mistaken in her belief that Bell was stealing, her statements
    would have still prejudiced him as if he had been. Furthermore, these statements
    were extremely prejudicial because they provided possible motives for the murder,
    connected Bell to the bag of underwear and Judy's injuries, and demonstrated Bell's
    criminal propensity. Moreover, because the State continuously stressed the
    improper statements in its closing argument, "it is impossible under these
    circumstances to conclude the improper evidence did not impact the jury's verdict."
    King, 334 S.C. at 
    515, 514 S.E.2d at 584
    ; see also Phillips, (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No.
    22 at 39) ("If there were any possibility we might find the error of admitting the
    [testimonies] harmless, the assistant solicitor extinguished that possibility with her
    incorrect statements in her closing argument."). Therefore, we find the error in
    admitting Mayfield's and Jessica's testimonies concerning the alleged prior bad acts
    was highly prejudicial and requires that Bell's conviction be reversed.
    CONCLUSION
    Based on the foregoing, Bell's conviction is
    REVERSED.
    LOCKEMY, CJ., and HEWITT, J., concur.